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PREFACE 
Following the establishment of the European Economic Community, a Committee 
of Experts was set up under the Chairmanship of Pierre Uri to prepare studies 
of the economic conditions of the member countries. The 'Report on the econ-
omic situation in the countries of the Community' was published in 1958. 
Following the accession in 1973 of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, 
the Commission of the European Communities considered that it would be valu-
able to supplement the Uri Report with a study on each of the new Member Sta-
tes. On this occasion, however, the Commission followed a somewhat different 
procedure and commissioned separate studies from independent experts in each 
of the three countries. The studies 'The United Kingdom Economy' and 'The 
Irish Economy' appeared in 1975, as numbers 9 and 10 of 'Economic and Finan-
cial Series', published by the Commission of the European Communities. 
The present study of the Danish economy was prepared by Professor Anders 
Ølgaard of the Institute of Economics at the University of Copenhagen. Unfor-
tunately, the preparation of this study has taken more time than originally 
envisaged because of interruptions for personal and professional reasons, in-
cluding advisory work for the Danish Government. 
The author would like to record his gratitude to his colleagues with whom he 
is teaching the subjects dealt with in the present study, to other colleagues 
at the Institute and to the staff of the Danish Economic Council - especially 
Mr. Arne Mikkelsen - for valuable comments and criticisms of draft chapters. 
He is indebted to Mrs. Else Haugebo for careful typing of drafts. Thanks are 
also due to Mr. K.I. Roberts, Principal Administrator at the Commission of 
the European Communities, for advice on editorial matters. The responsibility 
for the final version remains, however, with the author. Contents 
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STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS OF THE DANISH ECONOMY 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Rather frequently, the Danish economy is referred to as one based mainly 
on agriculture. It is, indeed, true that agricultural produce dominated export 
earnings until a few decades ago. During the last quarter of the 19th century, 
the Danish economy - like the Dutch - adjusted to the international decline 
in prices of grain, etc. by rapidly increasing the production of animal prod-
ucts such as bacon, beef, and butter. This structural change was greatly 
helped by the new cooperative movement. While output of grain continued to 
increase, it was now mainly used as input for animal products, providing the 
base for increasing exports of these products to the more industrialized 
economies of the UK, Germany, and others. From 1890 onwards, the terms of 
trade of agriculture improved, and just before 1930 agricultural exports ac-
counted for 75 per cent of total exports, while well over 20 per cent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) was attributable to agriculture. 
Before the First World War, Danish manufacturing industry started to develop 
slowly, mainly in the field of small-scale import substitution, following the 
pattern typical of the first phases of industrialization. However, a few ex-
port industries did emerge, one of which was ship-building. 
2. During the 1930s, declining export possibilities mainly hit agriculture, 
the largest exporting sector, and from the early 1930s onwards, the share of 
agriculture in exports - and employment - started to decline, the latter even 
in absolute terms. 
As in other European countries, quantitative import restrictions were intro-
duced in order to stimulate employment in manufacturing, the unemployment 
rate being substantial - reaching a peak of 32 per cent (average) in 1932. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is doubtful whether this policy formed part 
of an industrial strategy designed to shift the basis of the economy from 
primary to secondary industries. Be this as it may, the outcome was very much 
along these lines. At the beginning of the 1950s, manufacturing industry was 
ready for, and able to accomplish, a major expansion of industrial exports, 
covering a wide range of products. 10 -
It has been argued that the development of manufacturing industry from the 
early 1930s onwards represents an example of a successful 'infant industry' 
policy. The fact that the reconstruction problems after the German occupation 
during the Second World War were rather small, at least compared with those 
of most of our neighbouring countries, probably contributed to this success. 
Thus, Danish exporters of manufactured goods had an earlier start than their 
foreign competitors. Furthermore, non-agricultural money wages were compara-
tively low after the Second World War, as the distribution of income changed 
rather drastically during the war in favour of agriculture and to the disad-
vantage of urban workers. Finally, the Danish Krone was devaluated in line 
with Sterling in 1949. 
3. One of the arguments against the infant industry strategy is that once 
introduced, protection is very difficult to eliminate. In the case of Denmark, 
this problem was solved from abroad. Like other Western European countries, 
Denmark received Marshall aid from the US - totalling 1.7 billion kroner cor-
responding to one third of one year's export earnings. But the aid was given 
on the usual condition that imports of manufactures etc. should be liberalized 
within the OEEC framework. Whereas - contrary to developments in most other 
Western European countries - liberalist thinking during the early 1950s was 
mainly expressed by the spokesmen for Danish agriculture, representatives of 
manufacturing industry still argued along protectionist lines. But with en-
forced liberalization of Danish imports in these fields, the protectionists 
in manufacturing industry had to give in. 
Hence the 1950s are often referred to as the period of the second industrial 
revolution, with manufacturing exports increasing sharply - mainly light 
industries covering a large number of products in very different fields. In 
1960, exports of manufactured goods exceeded those of agricultural products. 
During the first half of the 1950s, the major problem of economic policy was 
considered to be that of the balance of payments. During the late 1940s, this 
problem was expected to be solved by increased agricultural exports. With 
minimum international liquidity - and an almost total shortage of dollars -
Denmark could not afford a balance of payments deficit, hence total domestic 
demand had to be reduced in order to keep imports down. 
However, from 1957 onwards the new majority government took a more active 
hand in promoting foreign borrowing. At the same time, the terms of trade 
were improving, and more generous rules on depreciation allowances (based on 
net depreciated value) were introduced. 
These factors all contributed to an unprecedented boom, and in the early 
1960s, urban unemployment vanished for the first time. 
4. From this period onwards, economic development became more like that in 
neighbouring countries. While still contributing substantially - although 
with a declining share - to total exports, agriculture was increasingly sub-
sidized with respect to domestic sales. The system according to which domes-
tic prices of agricultural produce were fixed was changed from the British 
system (prices corresponding to world market prices) to the Continental sys-
tem (prices reflecting the cost of domestic production). At the same time, 
the labour force engaged in agriculture declined substantially, by far the 
major part of the non-owners moving to urban industries. 11 
If the 1950s could properly be labelled the second industrial revolution, the 
1960s might be called the years of (uncontrolled) revolution in the size of 
the government sector. From 1960 to 1973, total taxes as a percentage of GDP 
increased from 28 per cent to well over 50 per cent. The increase in public 
expenditure (government and municipal) was equally strong both for purchases 
of goods and services and for transfers. While the public share of GDP around 
1960 was not extremely high by Western European standards (low post-war re-
construction costs and modest defence expenditure), by the 1970s it was among 
the highest in Europe. The fact that, from the late 1960s onwards, the in-
crease was mainly financed by higher income taxes, added substantially to po-
litical tensions, caused perhaps not so much by the high level of overall 
taxation as by the composition of taxes and their rapid rate of increase. 
The increase in public purchases of goods and services during the 1960s took 
place at a time of rapidly increasing activity in the field of building and 
construction. The number of new dwelling units per year was doubled, leading 
to a very high average standard of housing as compared to that in other coun-
tries. The building boom reflected both a rapid increase of private income, 
and the substantial direct and indirect subsidies available in the field of 
housing. 
The 1960s were expected to be the decade of a rapidly increasing urban labour 
force, partly reflecting the large number of children born during the 1940s, 
and partly because of the decline in rural employment, and this caused great 
concern about the expected rate of unemployment. Experience proved these wor-
ries to be unfounded. The rapid increase of the building and construction 
sector, and the even faster increase of employment in the public sector, led 
to labour shortages, although these sectors were able to compete successfully 
for the available labour resources. But the exporting industries and those 
competing with imports found it difficult to offer equally high increases in 
pay, and wages as well as profits in the balance of payments industries were 
squeezed. 
Against this background, it was hardly surprising that the balance of payments 
became the predominant problem of economic policy and the question of unem-
ployment became insignificant during most of the period 1960-73. In 1960, 
Denmark's foreign debts were approximately equal to its foreign assets. By 
1973, net outstanding foreign debt had increased to nearly 20 billion kroner. 
During the early 1960s, the balance of payments problem was mainly considered 
to result from domestic savings being insufficient to finance private invest-
ment. A high level of private sector investment was required in order both to 
increase output in manufacturing industry and to introduce more capital in-
tensive means of production in agriculture, so as to maintain output in spite 
of a declining labour force. 
However, it gradually became evident that the balance of payments deficit had 
become a more permanent aspect of the functioning of the Danish economy, and 
that the share of total resources employed in the balance of payments indus-
tries had become too small to provide the output necessary for any improve-
ment. The low share of resources in these industries in turn reflected the 
booming demand from 'domestic industries', in particular from the public sec-
tor, and the housing industry. Hence in order to improve the balance of pay-
ments, a reallocation of resources was required. - 12 -
It was hoped that the entry of Denmark into the EEC would contribute substan-
tially to solving the balance of payments problem by improving the terms of 
trade, mainly because of higher agricultural export prices. The terms of trade 
did improve, but economic policy immediately after the EEC entry was not kept 
sufficiently tight to counter the effects of the increase in real income 
caused by the improvement of the terms of trade. Furthermore, the reallocation 
process started too late to take advantage of the 1972-73 boom in world trade. 
Hence the economy was very badly prepared to meet the serious consequences of 
the rapid increase in oil prices as well as the general weakening of world 
demand which occurred from late 1973 onwards. 
5. To summarize, developments in the Danish economy from the end of the 
post-war reconstruction period may be divided into four sub-periods: 
a) 1950-58: Substantial unemployment, low growth rates of output, low rates 
of inflation, balance of payments equilibrium. 
b) 1958-66: Sharply declining unemployment, high growth rates of output, in-
creasing - but still rather modest - rates of inflation, but balance of 
payments deficits. 
c) 1966-73: Full employment, slightly lower rates of growth than in the pre-
ceding period, accelerating rates of inflation, persistent balance of pay-
ments deficits. 
d) 1973-77!; Increasing unemployment, low rates of growth, high - although 
declining - rates of inflation and substantial balance of payments deficits. 
However, before these sub-periods are studied in more detail using national 
accounts statistics, the growth and composition of the population and labour 
force will be analysed. 
POPULATION 
6. Following the First World War, a referendum was held in the southern part 
of Jutland (Slesvig). In accordance with its outcome, the northern part of 
Slesvig returned to Denmark in 1920, adding 160 000 persons to the population, 
which in 1921 amounted to 3 270 000 inhabitants. The 4 million mark was passed 
in 1945, and in 1973 the population for the first time exceeded 5 million 
persons. 
7. Changes in the age distribution of the population are shown in table 1.1. 
The pattern is rather similar to that of many other Western European coun-
tries. On the whole, the share of children (aged below 18) has declined, ex-
cept for the effect of a substantial temporary increase in the number of 
births during the late 1940s. With a time lag, this temporary increase also 
affected the proportion of young people (aged 18-24), producing a temporary 
increase around 1970. 
1 
Developments since 1973 are summarized in chapter XI, - 13 -
Table I.l 
Age distribution of the population of Denmark 
Age (both sexes): 0-17 
18-24 
25-59 
60-69 
70-
TOTAL, f 
Total population, 1 000 
>er cent 
persons 
1921 
37.0 
12.5 
40.2 
6.1 
4.2 
100.0 
3 268 
1930 
33.0 
12.7 
43.5 
6.2 
4.6 
100.0 
3 551 
1940 
29.1 
11.8 
47.2 
7.2 
4.7 
100.0 
3 844 
1950 
30.5 
9.6 
46.5 
7.8 
5.6 
100.0 
4 281 
1960 
30.5 
9.6 
44.3 
8.9 
6.7 
100.0 
4 585 
1970 
27.8 
11.3 
43.2 
9.8 
7.9 
100.0 
4 938 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Befolkningsudvikling og sundhedsforhold 1901-60, 
S.U. No 19 and supplementary information. 
At the other end of the age-scale, the proportion of people aged 60 or over 
has increased substantially, from 10 per cent in 1921 to no less than 18 per 
cent in 1970. Before the Second World War, the tendency for the proportion of 
children to decline exceeded that of the old to increase, hence the proportion 
of those contributing most to the labour force (people aged 25-59 years) was 
increasing. However, over the last decades, this trend has been reversed. 
8. Additional 
appropriate 'f1 
the population 
resenting a dec 
ulation increas 
the population 
has been steadi 
reflecting the 
key figures which help to 
ows' are shown in table I. 
of Denmark has on the whol 
lining percentage rate of 
es. By far the major part 
is explained by the birth 
ly increasing, the acceler 
change in the age composit 
explain changes in the population by 
2. The average annual increase of 
e been about 30-40 000 persons, rep-
growth as the total size of the pop-
of the changes in the growth rate of 
rate. The absolute number of deaths 
ating rate during the 1960s mainly 
ion of the population. 
The net reproduction rate has shown marked fluctuations. It exceeded that 
corresponding to a stationary population during most of the 1920s, but de-
clined during the next decade. It increased subsequently and reached a peak 
of 1 370 during the mid 1940s. During the 1950s and 1960s it remained above 
1 000, but since 1969 its level has suggested a tendency for the population 
of Denmark to decline in the long term. 
The lack of stability of the net reproduction rate suggests that alternative 
models might preferably be used for purposes of forecasting, e.g. the cohort 
method. Here the basic variable is the number of children born during the 
fertile period of a certain woman. This figure has been declining over time, 
but apparently according to a more predictable pattern. However, the profile 
of 'spacing' varies; it may, for instance, be postponed by economic reces-
sions, improved methods of contraception, etc. 14 
Table 1.2 
Births, deaths, immigration: annual averages by decades 
1921/30 
1931/40 
1941/50 
1951/60 
1961/70 
Increase of tot. pop. 
pyr cent 
0.89 
0.79 
1.12 
0.70 
0.75 
1 000 
31.3 
28.8 
44.2 
31.6 
34.9 
Births  Deaths  Net immigration 
1 000 persons 
71.2 
66.2 
85.3 
76.2 
79.2 
38.3 -1.6 
39.6 2.2 
39.4 -1.7 
40.4 -4.2 
47.0 2.7 
Met repro-
duction rate 
1 104 
941 
1 217 
1 191 
1 135 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk Årborg 1976 and supplementary informa-
tion. 
9. Perhaps the most interesting figures of table 1.2 are those of net immi-
gration. Compared with other countries, the net figures are surprisingly 
small, only a few thousand persons per year. This order of magnitude was 
maintained even during most of the 1960s in spite of the high rate of growth 
of the economy and labour shortages. It was only from 1969 onwards that net 
immigration became sizeable, reaching a peak of 12 000 in 1973. 
The explanation of this delayed response can probably be found partly in the 
attitude of the trade unions. During the 1930s, unemployment in manufacturing 
industry was substantial, and the situation was similar, although to a lesser 
extent, in the 1950s. Hence the trade unions were reluctant to let foreigners 
compete with domestic workers for the limited number of jobs. It was only 
after a period of several years of full-employment that this attitude became 
more relaxed. 
THE LABOUR FORCE AND PARTICIPATION RATES 
10. Labour force statistics prior to the 1970s are mainly based on figures 
from population censuses held every five years. However, employment surveys 
were introduced in 1967 and have been made frequently since 1969. In table 
1.3, 1970 figures from both sources are shown, but it should be pointed out 
that the definitions used differ slightly between the two sources. 
11. The total labour force has increased roughly at the same rate as that of 
the population aged 15-74 years. Hence total participation rates have remained 
stable, and the changes in the published figures mainly reflect definitional 
changes. 
However, from 1958 onwards, free labour mobility existed in the Nordic 
countries (Scandinavia and Finland). - 15 -
Table 1.3 
Danish labour force by occupation 
Census figures 
1950  1960  1970 
Employment surveys
3 
1970  1973 
Agriculture etc. 
Trade and industry 
Build, and construe. 
Distribution, banking, etc. 
Transport 
Private services 
Government services 
Others 
TOTAL LABOUR FORCE 
1 000 persons 
518 367 244 267 233 
551 613 660 687 652 
134 150 211 200 202 
263 294 356 381 384 
132 145 153 157 167 
209 197 203 216 204 
169 236 416 441 564 
48 62 67 31 40 
2 024  2 064  2 310 
per cent 
2 380  2 446 
Agriculture etc. 
Trade and industry 
Build, and construe. 
Distribution, banking, etc. 
Transport 
Private services 
Government services 
Others 
TOTAL 
Population age 15-74, 
1 000 persons 
Participation rate 
25.6 
27.2 
6.6 
13.0 
6.5 
10.3 
8.3 
2.5 
100.0 
3 029 
(66.8)
b 
17.8 
29.7 
7.3 
14.3 
7.0 
9.5 
11.4 
3.0 
100.0 
3 266 
63.2 
10.6 
28.6 
9.1 
15.4 
6.6 
8.8 
18.0 
2.9 
100.0 
3 572 
64.7 
11.2 
28.9 
8.4 
16.0 
6.6 
9.1 
18.5 
1.3 
100.0 
3 559 
66.9 
9.5 
26.7 
8.3 
15.7 
6.8 
8.3 
23.1 
1.6 
100.0 
3 628 
67.4 
a Spring survey in 1970, autumn survey in 1973. In 1970, no autumn survey was 
made. However, seasonal fluctuations are not very pronounced. 
h Due to changes of definitions, this figure should be reduced before being 
comparable with corresponding figures for later years. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1973 and 1974. 16 
Table 1.3 shows a break-down of the labour force by industries. The number of 
employed in agriculture has been reduced by more than half between 1950 and 
1973, leaving less then ten per cent of the labour force in the agricultural 
sector at the end of the period. The share of employment in trade and indus-
try has remained roughly stable at 26-29 per cent, while the substantial in-
crease in the activities of the building and construction sector during the 
1960s is reflected in an increasing share of the labour force being employed 
in this industry. 
The most interesting part of the table, however, is that showing persons em-
ployed by the government sector. The absolute number increased from 170 000 
persons in 1950 to no less than 565 000 persons in 1973. While agriculture 
employed a quarter of the labour force in 1950 and slightly below ten per 
cent in 1973, the figures for the share of government employees show almost 
exactly the opposite development. This dramatic expansion of the proportion 
of the total labour force engaged in government activities will be discussed 
further in chapter VI. 
12. The composition of the total labour force with respect to occupational 
status has changed considerably since 1950. Admittedly, the proportion of 
skilled workers has remained at 12-14 per cent and that of unskilled workers 
has only declined moderately, from about 33 per cent to 29 per cent. But the 
proportion of self-employed (including employers) has shown a marked decline 
from around 22 per cent to about 13 per cent, which is more than made up for 
by the change in the proportion of salaried employees, which increased from 
21 per cent in 1950 to 40 per cent in 1973. 
13. As pointed out above, the total participation rate of the population 
aged 15-74 years has remained roughly constant. But behind this apparent sta-
bility are some substantial changes within groups according to age, sex etc. 
Table 1.4 shows that the participation rate of men has declined, while that 
of women has increased. The increase of 7.4 percentage points for women ex-
ceeds the corresponding decline for men, but since the larger part of the la-
bour force consists of men, the two changes result in a roughly unchanged to-
tal participation rate. 
14. The decline in the participation rate of young men was not unexpected 
due to generalized and extended education. However, the decline for males 
aged 25-59 years - representing roughly two thirds of the total male labour 
force - has taken most experts by surprise. A partial explanation can proba-
bly be found in increased early retirement. The same may partly explain the 
reduced participation rate for those over 60 years old. For this group, in 
particular, an additional factor may be important. The process of overall 
growth implies structural shifts, leaving people unemployed at least tempo-
rarily. It is obviously more difficult for older people to find alternative 
jobs, hence early retirement is often forced upon them. 
15. The increased participation rate of women as a whole is exclusively due 
to the trend among married women. The rate for unmarried women remained un-
changed. For those aged 15-24, the participation rate declined, corresponding 
to the trend for men, but this was offset by an increase for the large group 
aged 25-59. 
The participation rate for married women increased substantially between 1967 
and 1973 for all groups below the age of 60 years. Any detailed analysis of - 17 -
Table 1.4 
Participation rates, 1967 and 1973 
Labour force:
1 
15 - 19 
20 - 24 
25 - 59 
60 - 74 
Participation 
rates: 
15 - 19 
20 - 24 
25 - 59 
60 - 74 
Men 
1967 
123.2 
163.5 
998.9 
170.4 
1456.0 
65.2 
77.5 
96.5 
60.0 
84.7 
1973 
96.9 
135.7 
1038.5 
159.3 
1430.4 
50.4 
70.4 
93.8 
50.7 
79.2 
Women 
1967 
81.9 
123.9 
453.0 
39.3 
698.1 
44.8 
61.5 
43.4 
12.0 
39.8 
1973 
72.3 
128.7 
614.1 
48.4 
863.5 
40.1 
69.6 
56.0 
13.2 
47.2 
Unmarri 
1967 
78.8 
77.4 
141.2 
22.7 
320.1 
45.4 
79.3 
71.0 
12.7 
49.3 
=d women 
1973 
70.3 
79.6 
149.8 
25.3 
325.0 
39.8 
73.0 
73.3 
15.2 
49.5 
Marrie 
1967 
3.1 
46.5 
311.8 
16.6 
378.0 
34.1 
44.7 
36.9 
11.2 
34.2 
i women 
1973 
2.0 
49.1 
464.3 
23.1 
538.5 
55.0 
64.6 
52.1 
11.5 
45.9 
^ 1 000 persons. Military conscripts, domestic servants and 'assisting house-
wives' are excluded. Part-time employees are included in the figures with-
out reducing their weight. 
Source: Employment surveys, autumns. For some of the figures, see William 
Scharling, Tendenser for udbudet af arbejdskraft 1973-1988, Copen-
hagen 1973 (unpublished). 
this change would have to take into account a number of aspects, such as the 
distinction between married and unmarried women which is changing due to 
changes in family patterns. But in the present context attention will only be 
given to one particular aspect. As will be further discussed in chapter VI, 
for government employees the rate of increase has been much faster for mar-
ried women than for men and unmarried women. What has probably happened is a 
process corresponding to that in the food processing industry. An increasing 
proportion of activities in both fields has moved from the home to an outside 
'work place'. This in turn has permitted women to work outside their homes 
(something most men would do anyway), but at the same time increased partici-
pation rates presuppose facilities for taking care of children, just as they 
presuppose industries for producing canned food and refrigerators. 
The implicit consequences for using the size of GNP as an expression of the 
standard of living of a given population, if this hypothesis holds, should 
be kept in mind, but will not be elaborated here. 18 
GROWTH RATES AND INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, 1950-73 
16. In the final part of the introduction above, three sub-periods with dif-
ferent patterns of growth were distinguished: 1950-58, 1958-66 and 1966-73. 
In the following, differences between these sub-periods will be analysed on 
the basis of national accounts data for 1950, 1958, 1966 and 1973. In all 
these years, economic activity was high compared with neighbouring years. 
Supplementary year-by-year figures are shown in appendix tables 1.1 and 1.2. 
To some extent, the techniques applied in handling the national accounts data 
will differ from usual procedures, and some concepts will be introduced which 
differ from those used in traditional analysis. This is partly due to the 
fact that Danish national accounts data for 1950-73 at constant prices are 
calculated and presented on the basis of 1955-prices. Hence for the early 
1970s, the weights applied in the constant-price figures are more than 15 
years old. The implied index-number problems are therefore quite substantial. 
A detailed treatment of these problems can be found in the appendix (see pp. 
35-44). 
Table 1.5 
Gross domestic product at factor cost, current prices 
DKR 1 000 million 
Agriculture etc. 
Manuf., handicraft etc. 
of which: manufacturing 
handicraft 
electr., gas, etc. 
Building and construction 
Distribution, banking, hotels etc. 
Transport 
Private services, incl. use dwelli 
Government services 
Total GDP at factor co 
- net interest payments, etc. 
Total GNI at factor co 
- repair, maintenance, dépréciât. 
TOTAL NNI AT FACTOR CO 
ngs 
St 
st 
ST 
1950 
4.6 
6.3 
4.1 
1.9 
0.3 
1.4 
4.3 
1.8 
1.6 
1.6 
21.6 
0.1 
21.5 
2.7 
18.8 
1958 
5.5 
10.1 
6.4 
3.0 
0.7 
2.4 
6.4 
3.4 
2.9 
3.3 
34.0 
0.0 
34.0 
5.5 
28.5 
1966 
7.7 
22.8 
14.4 
7.0 
1.4 
6.8 
14.0 
7.3 
6.2 
9.9 
74.7 
0.1 
74.6 
12.8 
61.8 
1973 
12.5 
46.2 
30.9 
13.1 
2.2 
15.1 
28.3 
14.9 
11.8 
30.3 
159.1 
1.0 
158.1 
27.5 
130.6 
Sources: See sources to appendix table 1.1. - 19 -
Table 1.6 
Gross domestic product at factor cost, at constant 
1955-prices (= real product) 
Agricult. etc. 
Trade and 
Industry 
of which: 
manufact. 
handicraft 
el, gas, etc. 
Building and 
construction 
Commerce, 
banking, 
hotel etc. 
Transport 
Priv. serv-
ices, incl. 
use of 
dwellings 
Government 
services 
Total real 
GDP 
= real prod. 
1950 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
per 
cent 
5.2 20.1 
7.5 29.1 
4.8 18.5 
2.4 9.4 
0.3 1.2 
1.8 7.1 
4.9 18.9 
2.2 8.7 
2.1 8.0 
2.1 8.1 
25.8 100.0 
1958 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
5.9 
9.0 
5.9 
2.6 
0.5 
2.2 
6.9 
3.1 
2.5 
2.8 
31.5 
per 
cent 
18.7 
28.4 
18.6 
8.3 
1.5 
6.9 
19.1 
10.1 
7.9 
8.9 
100.0 
1966 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
6.3 
15.1 
10.2 
3.8 
1.1 
3.8 
9.3 
4.6 
3.0 
4.4 
46.5 
per 
cent 
13.5 
32.4 
22.0 
8.1 
2.3 
8.3 
19.9 
9.9 
6.6 
9.4 
100.0 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
6.2 
22.1 
15.8 
4.2 
2.1 
5.0 
12.7 
6.4 
3.5 
6.8 
62.7 
per 
cent 
9.9 
35.3 
25.3 
6.7 
3.3 
7.9 
20.2 
10.3 
5.6 
10.8 
100.0 
Note: Percentages are calculated before rounding of the basic data. 
Sources: See sources to appendix table 1.1. 
17. Table 1.5 shows usual figures for gross domestic product at factor cost 
by industry at current prices. However, the figures are of course affected by 
inflation. In order to remedy this distortion, similar figures are shown in 
table 1.6, calculated at 1955-prices according to the technique used by the 
1 Repair and maintenance are included in the gross figures. This inflates the 
'level' of the Danish figures somewhat, as compared with the similar fig-
ures for other EEC countries. - 20 -
Table 1.7 
Real income by industries, 1955-prices 
1950  1958  1966  1973 
DKR DKR DKR DKR 
i ooo
 pe^ i ooo
 pel i ooo
 pel 1 000
 pet\ 
.,, . cent .,., . cent .,, . cent .,, . cent  million million million million 
Agricult. ect. 
Trade and 
industry 
of which: 
manufact. 
handicraft 
el, gas, etc. 
Building and 
construction 
Distribution, 
banking, 
hotels etc. 
Transport 
Priv. serv-
ices, incl. 
use of 
dwellings 
Government 
services 
Total real 
income 
5.4 
7.5 
4.9 
2.2 
0.4 
1.7 
5.1 
2.1 
2.0 
1.9 
25.7 
Sources: See sources 
21.2 
29.2 
19.0 
8.7 
1.5 
6.6 
19.8 
8.3 
7.6 
7.3 
100.0 
to appendix 
5.1 
9.4 
6.0 
2.8 
0.6 
2.2 
5.9 
3.2 
2.7 
3.1 
31.6 
table 
16.2 
29.7 
19.0 
8.8 
1.9 
7.0 
18.7 
10.1 
8.5 
9.8 
100.0 
1.1. 
5.0 
14.8 
9.3 
4.6 
0.9 
4.4 
9.0 
4.7 
4.0 
6.4 
48.3 
10.3 
30.6 
19.3 
9.5 
1.8 
9.1 
18.7 
9.7 
8.3 
13.3 
100.0 
5.1 
19.2 
12.8 
5.5 
0.9 
6.3 
11.8 
6.2 
4.9 
12.6 
66.1 
7.8 
29.1 
19.4 
8.3 
1.4 
9.5 
17.8 
9.4 
7.4 
19.0 
100.0 
Danmarks Statistik (The Danish Statistical Office). These figures will, in 
future, be referred to as real product figures. They are estimated on the as-
sumption that all inputs and outputs in each year during the whole period are 
valued at 1955-prices, and hence relative prices are implicitly assumed to 
have remained constant over the whole period. 
According to table 1.6, the share of agriculture in total real product de-
clined from 20 per cent in 1950 to 10 per cent in 1973, the main adjustment 
taking place during the period of urban expansion from 1958 onwards. The 
share of trade and industry remained slightly below 30 per cent during the 
1950s, but subsequently increased to 35 per cent, whilst that of building and 
construction increased substantially from 1958 to 1966. Finally, the share of 
government services in total real product showed a steady, although apparent-
ly not very substantial, increase from 8.1 per cent in 1950 to 10.8 per cent 
in 1973. - 21 -
18. Some of these findings, based on traditional procedures of deflation, 
are somewhat surprising. Furthermore, they are to some extent misleading be-
cause of the implied assumption of constant relative prices over the period 
shown. 
An obvious alternative would be to retain the figures for total real GDP of 
the various years and subsequently use the implied deflator for total GDP to 
deflate figures for individual industries in a particular year. According to 
this procedure, the percentage distribution of real GDP by industry will of 
course correspond exactly to the distribution at current prices (cf. table 
1.5), because the same deflator is used for all industries in a given year. 
In table 1.7, such estimates have been made, and are labelled figures of real 
income of the various industries. In brief, these figures could be described 
as illustrating actual trends, but on the assumption that no general price 
increase had taken place. On the other hand, the real income figures do re-
flect the changes in relative prices between the various industries which 
have actually occurred. 
One immediate conclusion from the above calculations could be that while fig-
ures of real product and real income for a certain industry in a certain year 
could differ a great deal because of the different methods of price defla-
tion, the time series of total real product and total real income would be 
identical. When figures in the bottom rows to tables 1.6 and 1.7 are compared, 
it will be seen that this is not exactly the case. The explanation of this 
discrepancy is related to changes of the terms of foreign trade. Obviously, 
when traditional procedures of deflation are applied (cf. table 1.6), such 
terms of trade changes cannot possibly be reflected in the figures, because 
relative prices are implicitly assumed to have remained constant. This issue 
is elaborated in the appendix. 
19. Although the percentage distribution of real income by industries (cf. 
table 1.7) is identical to that of GDP at current prices (cf. table 1.5), 
the growth pattern of real income by industry differs substantially from that 
of real product (cf. table 1.6). From 1950 to 1973, the share of agriculture 
in total real income declined at a faster rate than that of real product, 
whilst the share of trade and industry in total real income remained roughly 
constant. However, the most significant change occurs with respect to govern-
ment services. From 1950 to 1973, their share of real product, only increased 
moderately. However, their share in total real income increased from 7.3 per 
cent in 1950 to 19.0 per cent in 1973 (reflecting a similar increase based on 
figures at current prices). According to an opportunity-cost interpretation, 
the figures imply that while the economy in 1950 sacrificed 7.3 per cent of 
alternative total output in order to obtain government services, the corre-
sponding figure in 1973 was 19 per cent.l 
As in other countries, Danish figures on contribution to GDP by government 
services are estimated from the input side, because no market price is ob-
tained for such services. In this connection, no productivity increases 
have been assumed to take place. Many of the problems relating to GDP fig-
ures for government services are particularly difficult to solve in rela-
tion to real product estimates. In this connection it should be recalled 
that the figures of shares of GDP can also be obtained from national ac-
counts at current prices. - 22 -
Table 1.8 
Annual growth rates of real product and real income 
Agriculture, etc. 
Trade and industry 
of which: manufacturing 
trade 
el, gas, ect. 
Building and construction 
Distribution, banking, hotels etc. 
Transport 
Private services, inc. use of 
dwellings 
Government services 
TOTAL 
Implicit price deflator of total 
1950-58 
Real 
prod. 
1.6 
2.3 
2.6 
1.0 
6.1 
2.2 
2.6 
4.4 
2.3 
3.6 
2.5 
3.2 
Real 
inc. 
-0.8 
2.8 
2.6 
2.7 
5.4 
3.5 
1.9 
5.1 
4.1 
6.5 
2.6 
3.1 
1958 
Real 
prod. 
0.8 
6.7 
7.2 
4.6 
10.6 
7.3 
5.6 
4.8 
2.6 
5.7 
5.0 
5.1 
-66 
Real 
inc. 
-0.3 
5.8 
5.6 
6.5 
4.8 
8.9 
5.4 
5.0 
5.1 
9.5 
5.4 
4.7 
1966 
Real 
prod. 
-0.2 
5.8 
6.5 
1.5 
10.0 
4.2 
4.5 
4.8 
2.0 
6.8 
4.4 
6.8 
-73 
Real 
inc." 
0.3 
3.7 
4.5 
2.5 
0.5 
5.5 
4.0 
4.3 
3.0 
10.0 
4.6 
6.6 
Sources: See sources to appendix table 1.1. 
20. In table 1.8, findings according to tables 1.5 - 1.7 are summarized, ex-
pressed in terms of percentage rates of growth per year. In terms of overall 
growth rates, the bottom part of the table confirms the suggestions made in 
the final part of the introduction above. In the period 1950-58, the average 
overall growth rate only amounted to roughly 2.5 per cent, in 1958-66 - with 
declining rates of unemployment - it reached 5-5 1/2 per cent, and in the 
third sub-period, viz. from 1966 to 1973, the overall growth rate declined to 
4 1/2 per cent, partly because as full employment had been reached in the mid-
1960s, the possibilities of increasing total employment became more limited. 
The bottom row of the table shows that the rate of inflation as expressed by 
the implicit GDP deflator was only slightly above 3 per cent per year during 
the period 1950-58. In the second sub-period, it increased to roughly 5 per 
cent and from 1966 to 1973, averaged nearly 7 per cent, maintaining an accel-
erating trend, (cf. the year-by-year figures of growth rates and price in-
creases in appendix table 1.1). 
21. The growth rates of individual industries will be dealt with in later 
chapters. - 23 -
Table 1.9 
Shares of GDP by main groups of industries 
Sources: Tables 1.6 and 1.7. 
(per cent) 
Shares of real product 
Balance of payements industries 
(agrie, manuf. ect.) 
Domestic industries (building 
and constr., gov.t services) 
Other industries 
Shares of GDP at current prices 
= shares of real income 
Balance of payements industries 
(agrie, manuf. etc.) 
Domestic industries (building 
and constr., gov.t services) 
Other industries 
TOTAL 
1950 
49.2 
15.2 
35.6 
50.4 
13.9 
35.7 
100.0 
1958 
47.1 
15.8 
37.1 
45.9 
16.8 
37.3 
100.0 
1966 
45.9 
17.7 
36.4 
40.9 
22.4 
36.7 
100.0 
1973 
45.2 
18.7 
36.1 
36.9 
28.5 
34.6 
100.0 
22. Before concluding this section on the structure of industry, an impor-
tant distinction should be mentioned, i.e. that between 'balance of payments 
industries', 'domestic industries' and 'other industries'. The persistent 
balance of payments deficit since 1960 suggests that the industrial pattern 
has not been consistent with external equilibrium. Resources employed in in-
dustries which compete with foreign firms either abroad (exports) or on the 
home market (mainly agriculture and manufacturing industries), have been too 
limited. On the other hand, domestic industries (building and construction, 
government services) have been able to expand too fast from the viewpoint of 
external equilibrium. This problem has been particularly urgent in periods 
of full employment. With total resources fully utilized, a dampening of the 
growth of domestic industries is obviously a necessary condition for the ex-
pansion of the balance of payments industries. 
Table 1.9 includes the additional group of 'Other industries', covering dis-
tribution, transport and private services, etc. In a more detailed analysis, 
some of these industries ought to be placed in the two other groups of the 
table.
1 However, the pattern according to table 1.9 would largely remain 
1 E.g., foreign shipping, tourist industries etc. should be considered bal-
ance of payments industries whereas banking should be grouped with domestic 
industries. - 24 -
Table 1.10 
GDP and domestic demand, current prices 
(DKR 1 000 million) 
GDP, factor cost 
+ indir, taxes, net 
GDP, market prices 
+ imp. goods and services 
Total 
- exp. goods and services 
Domestic demand 
of which: consumption 
fixed investm. 
stockbuilding 
repair and maint. 
1950 
21.6 
1.5 
23.1 
6.8 
29.9 
6.0 
23.9 
18.0 
3.4 
0.9 
1.6 
1958 
34.0 
3.2 
37.2 
10.9 
48.1 
11.9 
36.2 
27.7 
5.9 
-0.2 
2.8 
1966 
74.7 
9.0 
83.7 
23.9 
107.6 
22.9 
84.7 
61.1 
16.6 
0.5 
6.5 
1973 
159.1 
21.9 
181.0 
55.9 
236.9 
52.9 
184.0 
130.9 
38.1 
1.4 
13.6 
Sources: See sources to appendix table 1.1. 
unaffected by such adjustments, and the share of 
main stable anyway. 
'Other industries' would re-
The upper part of the table shows that,the share of the balance of payments 
industries, measured on a real-product basis, declined slightly from 1950 to 
1973, while that of domestic industries increased correspondingly. However, 
in order to illustrate the problem of resource allocation, shares of real in-
come (equal to shares of GDP at current prices) provide the proper background, 
and such figures are shown in the lower part of the table. According to these 
figures, resource allocation has changed substantially from 1950 to 1973, the 
share of balance of payments industries having declined from 50 to 37 per 
cent and that of domestic industries having increased from 14 per cent to no 
less than 28 per cent. Against this background, it is hardly surprising that 
there have been persistent balance of payments deficits. 
THE STRUCTURE OF DOMESTIC DEMAND, 1950-73 
23. In this section, patterns of growth and structural changes of domestic 
demand will be analysed on the basis of national accounts data, applying 
techniques similar to those which were used in the preceding section in con-
nection with the supply side. 25 
Table I.11 
Domestic demand, 1955-prices (constant relative prices over time) 
Consumption 
private 
public 
TOTAL 
Fixed invest. 
housing 
other priv. 
public 
TOTAL 
Stockbuilding 
' TOTAL DOMES-
TIC DEMAND 
of which: 
public 
housing inv. 
public + 
housing 
1950 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
16.3 
2.9 
19.2 
0.8 
2.3 
1.0 
4.1 
1.2 
24.5 
3.8 
0.8 
4.6 
per 
cent 
66.7 
11.7 
78.4 
3.1 
9.5 
4.0 
16.6 
5.0 
100.0 
15.7 
3.1 
18.8 
1958 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
18.9 
3.9 
22.8 
0.8 
3.4 
1.3 
5.5 
-0.2 
28.1 
5.2 
0.8 
6.0 
per 
cent 
67.3 
13.8 
81.1 
2.9 
11.9 
4.8 
19.6 
-0.7 
100.0 
18.6 
2.9 
21.5 
1966 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
27.9 
6.0 
33.9 
1.9 
7.0 
2.7 
11.6 
0.4 
45.9 
8.7 
1.9 
10.6 
per 
cent 
60.6 
13.2 
73.8 
4.1 
15.2 
6.0 
25.3 
0.9 
100.0 
19.2 
4.1 
23.3 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
36.3 
9.6 
45.9 
3.5 
10.9 
3.4 
17.8 
0.9 
64.6 
13.0 
3.5 
16.5 
per 
cent 
56.3 
14.8 
71.1 
5.4 
16.8 
5.3 
27.5 
1.4 
100.0 
20.1 
5.4 
25.5 
Note: Techniques of deflation correspond to those applied in table 1.6. 
Sources: See sources to appendix table 1.1. 
24. Standard national accounts data at current prices are shown in table 
I.10, but the figures are to a large extent affected by accelerating rates of 
inflation. 
1 Contrary to what could be done when figures for GDP by industries were shown 
above, it is possible to separate figures on repair and maintenance when de-
mand components are illustrated. In the following, this has been done, and 
in tables I.11 and 1.12 this item is completely disregarded. The purpose has 
been to provide for better comparability with similar figures for other EEC 
countries. 
(cont'd on page 26) 26 
Table 1.12 
Domestic demand, 1955-prices 
(same deflator of all components in a given year) 
Consumption 
private 
public 
TOTAL 
Fixed inv. 
housing 
other priv. 
public 
TOTAL 
Stockbuild-
ing 
TOTAL DOMES-
TIC DEMAND 
of which: 
public 
housing inv. 
public +■ 
housing 
1950 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
16.8 
2.6 
19.4 
0.7 
2.3 
1.0 
4.0 
1.1 
24.5 
3.6 
0.7 
4.3 
per 
cent 
68.6 
10.6 
79.2 
2.9 
9.6 
3.6 
16.3 
4.5 
100.0 
14.4 
2.9 
17.3 
1958 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
18.6 
4.2 
22.8 
0.8 
3.4 
1.3 
5.5 
-0.2 
28.1 
5.5 
0.8 
6.3 
per 
cent 
66.1 
14.8 
80.9 
2.9 
11.9 
4.8 
19.6 
-0.5 
100.0 
19.6 
2.9 
22.5 
1966 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
26.3 
8.3 
34.6 
2.1 
6.0 
2.9 
11.0 
0.3 
45.9 
11.2 
2.1 
13.3 
per 
cent 
57.3 
18.0 
75.3 
4.5 
13.1 
6.4 
24.0 
0.7 
100.0 
24.4 
4.5 
28.9 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
31.6 
15.8 
47.4 
4.5 
8.1 
4.0 
16.6 
0.6 
64.6 
19.8 
4.5 
24.3 
per 
cent 
49.6 
24.4 
73.4 
7.0 
12.6 
6.1 
25.7 
0.9 
100.0 
30.5 
7.0 
37.5 
Note: Techniques of deflation are similar to 
Sources: See sources to appendix table 1.1. 
those applied in table 1.7. 
In table I.11, demand components at constant prices are presented, assuming 
that relative prices have remained constant over the period 1950 to 1973. 
(cont'd of note 1 on page 25) 
Furthermore, all figures at 1955-prices are indicated at factor cost. In 
this way, the effects of indirect taxation are excluded. The adjustment has 
been made on the assumption that net indirect taxes affect prices of private 
consumption only. While this is not completely true, the discrepancies are 
insignificant and do not affect the main pattern according to the figures. 27 
According to the table, the share of total consumption (at factor cost) in 
total domestic demand has declined from roughly 80 per cent during the 1950s 
to slightly above 70 per cent during the last part of the period, while the 
share of total fixed investment has increased correspondingly. Furthermore, 
the composition of total consumption has changed. While the share of private 
consumption has shown a substantial decline, that of public consumption has 
increased, although only moderately - from 11.7 per cent in 1950 to 14.8 per 
cent in 1973. 
25. In table 1.12, a different method of deflation is used, applying the 
same deflator for all demand components in a given year. Hence the percentage 
distribution according to table 1.12 is identical to a percentage distribu-r 
tion based on corresponding figures at current prices. 
26. The shares of total consumption and total investment in total domestic 
demand are very similar according to the two tables, but this is not true for 
the components of each of these totals. The share of private consumption in 
total domestic demand according to table 1.12 declines even more than that in 
table I.11. At the same time, the share of public consumption in table 1.12 
shows a more dramatic increase, from 10.6 per cent in 1950 to 24.4 per cent 
in 1973. The discrepancy between the two tables with respect to the share of 
public consumption mainly reflects the fact that public consumption is very 
labour intensive and, furthermore, not subject to significant increases in 
labour productivity. Hence costs in this field, largely reflecting wage rates 
for government employees, have tended to show a faster rate of increase than 
most other costs and prices. For private consumption, the implication is that 
prices have shown a comparative decline, probably partly due to increases in 
productivity. 
27. Turning to the components of total investment, the share of 'other pri-
vate investment' (excluding residential investment) in total domestic demand 
shows a smaller increase in table 1.12 than in table I.11. As with private 
consumption, goods incorporated in 'other private investment' have become 
comparatively less expensive over time, probably due also to substantial in-
creases in productivity. 
Apparently, the opposite has been true for residential investment and public 
investment. On the whole, the shares of both show a significant increase, 
measured at constant relative prices (cf. table I.11), but the increase is 
even larger according to table 1.12. 
28. The share of total public demand for goods and services including total 
investment in housing is shown separately in the bottom part of tables I.11 
and 1.12. The reason for including residential investment at this point is 
partly that this demand is primarily directed towards 'domestic industries', 
and partly that private residential investment has been subject to direct 
government regulations, restrictions, and subsidies to such an extent as may 
In order not to complicate the presentation too much, the deflator applied 
in table 1.12 is simply the deflator of total domestic demand. Therefore, 
the figures of total domestic demand in DKR 1 000 million are identical in 
table I.11 and 1.12. Thus, the technique in the present context is simpler 
than the corresponding one applied in table 1.7. 28 -
justify it being treated in the same way as direct public purchases of goods 
and services. 
According to the bottom row of table I.11, the share of public demand includ-
ing residential investment increased from below 20 per cent in 1950 to 
slightly above 25 per cent in 1973. However, including the effect of changes 
in relative prices, the increase becomes much more pronounced: from 17.3 per 
cent to no less than 37.5 per cent (cf. the bottom row of table 1.12). These 
figures imply that the total share of private consumption and business in-
vestment in total domestic demand has fallen from well over 75 per cent in 
1950 to 60 per cent in 1973. 
29. In brief, one of the main results of the above analysis is that the 
share of total demand which is under (direct) government control has increas-
ed substantially, partly because of increased levels of activity, and partly 
because of increases in relative prices, especially in the field of public 
consumption. 
In this connection, an additional comment should be made on the demand man-
agement by government with respect to public expenditures and residential in-
vestment. As has been pointed out, overall real growth rates declined from 
the second to the third sub-period, viz. from 1958-66 to 1966-73, the main 
reason being that full employment was reached in the mid 1960s. However, in 
spite of scarcities of resources and lower overall growth rates during the 
third sub-period, the growth of public demand in real terms continued at 
about 10 per cent per year. The consequences of this policy for the balance 
of payments hardly need elaboration. 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
30. As stated previously, unemployment was substantial during most of the 
1950s. From the late 1950s to the mid 1960s, it declined and, subsequently, 
almost disappeared. During most of the period from 1966 to 1973, full employ-
ment prevailed. 
In the following section, this summary will be elaborated, based on figures 
for 1950, 1958, 1966 and 1973 (cf. table 1.13). Supplementary year-by-year 
figures for the overall rate of unemployment are given in appendix table 1.2. 
31. From 1950 to 1973, the number of employees covered by the unemployment-
insurance scheme, under which the major part of unemployment-relief payments 
is financed by government transfers and only a minor part by contributions 
from members, increased from 630 000 to 830 000. Thus only one third of the 
labour force was covered by the scheme. Even when the self-employed (includ-
ing owners) are deducted from the labour force, only half of the total number 
of employees were insured, and percentages of unemployment according to table 
1.13 only refer to this group. As unemployment among the non-insured employ-
ees has, at least until recently, been insignificant, the percentages shown 
in the table should be reduced substantially to make them comparable with 
corresponding figures for most other countries. 
32. During most of the 1950s, the overall rate of unemployment among insured 
employees remained at a level of roughly ten per cent (cf. also appendix ta-- 29 
ble 1.2). Although unemployment rates had been even higher during the 1930s, 
such a level was clearly not acceptable. However, during most of the 1950s a 
shortage of foreign exchange was an important problem, and expansionist poli-
cies in order to reduce unemployment would necessarily have aggravated the 
balance of payments problem, the more so because quantitative import restric-
tions were being dismantled within the OEEC framework. 
Table 1.13 
Unemployment 
Total labour force (cf. table 1.3) 
Number of persons with unemployment 
insurance 
of which: men 
women 
Unemployment as % of insured employees 
Men 
Women 
TOTAL 
February *\ 
June V Not seasonally adjusted 
November J 
Trade and industry 
Building and construction 
Unskilled workers 
Northern Jutland, all industries 
1950 
2 024 
633 
504 
129 
9.7 
4.6 
8.7 
14.7 
3.9 
7.6 
5.7 
15.2 
14.4 
16.6 
1958 
1 000 
-
709 
555 
154 
per 
10.9 
5.5 
9.6 
17.8 
4.1 
6.7 
6.8 
19.8 
16.9 
16.9 
1966 
aersons 
-
797 
595 
202 
lent 
2.7 
1.0 
2.3 
6.3 
0.5 
1.7 
1.8 
6.0 
4.8 
6.5 
1973 
2 446 
833 
652 
181 
2.4 
2.4 
2.4 
3.6 
1.2 
2.2 
1.9 
5.0 
3.4 
5.8 
Note: For coverage, see text. 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1950-60, 1970 and 1975. 
However, these high average annual rates of unemployment conceal substantial 
seasonal variations (cf. the figures for February, June and November in ta-
ble 1.13). During the 1960s and the first part of the 1970s, seasonal unem-
ployment was reduced substantially, partly because of the declining impor-
tance of some industries with large seasonal variations (e.g. agriculture), 
and partly because of new techniques allowing activities to continue through-
out the winter months (e.g. in building and construction). From the mid 30 -
1960s onwards, overall unemployment became insignificant, at least when short 
term unemployment, e.g. in connection with change of job, is disregarded. 
33. In addition, regional unemployment problems were reduced. Being a small 
country with reasonably good means of transportation, regional problems are 
small compared with those of most other countries. But of course regional 
differences do exist. Thus a high share of the population - roughly 25 per 
cent - lives in the area around Copenhagen, on the eastern outskirts of 
Denmark. In Jutland most activities take place along the east coast, but 
western Jutland is less densely populated. Finally, unemployment rates are 
usually highest in northern Jutland, although, as is shown in table 1.13, 
progress was made in the 1960s in this area. 
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
34. As shown in the previous section, economic growth during the main part 
of the 1960s contributed substantially to solving the unemployment problem 
of the 1950s. A price for this achievement was, however, paid in the form of 
a persistent and increasing balance of payments deficit. This issue will be 
more fully discussed in chapter X, and the main figures are presented in ta-
ble X.l. However, a chapter on the structural problems of the economy cannot 
avoid at least mentioning this subject. 
Whereas the external goods and services account showed surpluses during most 
of the 1950s, a series of increasing deficits has been recorded since 1960 
(cf. appendix table 1.2). Consequently, foreign debt has been increasing, and 
so have foreign interest payments. Hence the deficits on the current account 
as a whole have increasingly exceeded those for goods and services. 
SUMMARY 
35. In brief, Danish basic economic problems from 1950 to 1973 may be summar-
ized as follows: 
a) During the main part of the 1950s the important constraint for economic 
policy was related to shortages of foreign exchange. Balance of payments 
deficits had to be avoided - and so they were. Manufacturing industries 
expanded in spite of increasing foreign competition. In particular, ex-
ports of manufactured goods increased rapidly. But unemployment remained 
substantial. 
b) From the late 1950s to the mid 1960s, unemployment was declining and full 
employment was subsequently achieved. However, rates of inflation increas-
ed, and became higher than in many neighbouring countries. Balance of pay-
ments deficits became a persistent feature of the Danish economy. 
1 However, it has become increasingly difficult for the smaller Danish islands 
to retain their inhabitants. This problem is partly industrial, but is also 
related to difficulties with respect to social facilities, e.g. schools. - 31 
c) From the mid 1960s to 1973, full employment was largely maintained, but 
problems with respect to inflation and the balance of payments were aggra-
vated. As shown in the analysis above, one of the most important factors 
behind this development is to be found in changes in the structure of to-
tal demand, with domestic industries being allowed to expand too fast. 
This policy in the field of public expenditure etc. gave rise to serious 
problems for the balance of payments industries. 
36. Against this general background, the most important Danish industries 
will be examined in the following chapters. 32 -
Appendix table 1.1 
Total GDP, real product, real income etc., 1949-1973 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
GDP, 
current 
prices, 
DKR 1000 
million 
18.9 
21.6 
23.4 
25.0 
26.5 
27.6 
28.7 
30.6 
32.7 
34.0 
37.4 
40.5 
45.4 
50.8 
53.5 
61.1 
68.3 
74.7 
81.9 
89.3 
101.1 
112.6 
123.5 
138.9 
159.1 
GDP de-
flator 
1955 = 
100 
78.6 
83.6 
90.2 
95.1 
95.3 
96.8 
100.0 
104.7 
106.0 
107.8 
111.9 
113.8 
120.7 
127.9 
134.2 
140.9 
150.0 
160.7 
169.1 
176.4 
184.5 
200.2 
211.9 
227.7 
253.7 
Terms of 
trade, 
1955 = 
100 
107 
98 
89 
94 
97 
99 
100 
101 
98 
100 
106 
103 
102 
104 
105 
107 
107 
109 
107 
104 
106 
106 
106 
109 
110 
Real product, 
1955-prices 
DKR 1000 
million 
24.0 
25.8 
25.9 
26.3 
27.8 
28.5 
28.7 
29.3 
30.8 
31.5 
33.4 
35.6 
37.6 
39.7 
39.9 
43.4 
45.5 
46.5 
48.4 
50.6 
54.8 
56.3 
58.3 
61.0 
62.7 
per cent 
i ncrease 
7.6 
0.4 
1.2 
5.9 
2.5 
0.1 
1.9 
5.4 
2.3 
6.1 
6.5 
5.6 
5.6 
0.4 
8.8 
5.0 
2.2 
4.1 
4.5 
8.2 
2.6 
3.6 
4.6 
2.8 
Real income, 
1955-prices 
DKR 1000 
million 
24.4 
25.7 
25.1 
25.8 
27.6 
28.5 
28.7 
29.4 
30.6 
31.6 
34.2 
36.1 
37.8 
40.3 
40.6 
44.6 
47.0 
48.3 
49.8 
51.6 
56.3 
57.9 
60.0 
63.9 
66.1 
per cent 
increase 
5.3 
- 2.3 
2.9 
6.8 
3.3 
0.8 
2.4 
4.2 
3.1 
8.4 
5.4 
4.8 
6.6 
0.9 
9.7 
5.3 
2.8 
3.2 
3.6 
9.1 
2.8 
3.6 
6.4 
3.5 
Note: The terms of trade figures in the third column are calculated from the 
implicit deflators of exports and imports of goods and services accord-
ing to the national accounting data. On the whole, they are very simi-
lar to the unit-value indices, published by Danmarks Statistik, the 
latter covering trade of goods only. The main exception is that the 
figures above show a smaller deterioration from 1949 to 1951 (from 107 
to 89) than figures derived from the unit-value data (from 112 to 86). 
It should be added that real-income figures are calculated before 
rounding of the terms of trade figures above. In fact the terms of 
trade improved slightly in 1965 and in 1970. 
Sources : Danmarks Statistik: Nationalregnskabsstatistik 1947-1960, S.U. No 7 
and Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1970 and 1975. 33 
Appendix table 1.2 
External balance, GDP, unemployment, 1949-1973 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
Exports 
Good 
DKR 1 
Imports  Export 
surplus 
s and services 
000 mill  ion, 
current prices 
4.7 
6.0 
7.8 
8.0 
8.2 
8.8 
9.8 
10.5 
11.4 
11.9 
12.9 
13.8 
14.3 
15.3 
17.3 
19.4 
21.4 
22.9 
24.2 
27.2 
30.7 
34.6 
39.2 
44.1 
52.9 
4.9 
6.8 
8.0 
7.8 
8.0 
9.2 
9.5 
10.5 
11.1 
10.9 
12.7 
14.2 
14.9 
16.8 
17.0 
20.5 
22.3 
23.9 
25.7 
28.3 
32.9 
37.8 
41.0 
42.7 
55.9 
-0.2 
-0.8 
-0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
-0.4 
0.3 
0.0 
0.3 
1.0 
0.2 
-0.4 
-0.6 
-1.5 
0.3 
-1.1 
-0.9 
-1.0 
-1.5 
-1.1 
-2.2 
-3.2 
-1.8 
1.4 
-3.0 
Domes-
tic 
demand 
20.4 
23.9 
25.3 
26.5 
28.4 
30.3 
31.0 
33.4 
35.2 
36.2 
40.9 
44.8 
50.0 
57.2 
58.9 
68.8 
77.0 
84.7 
93.3 
102.3 
117.4 
131.1 
142.4 
157.3 
184.0 
GDP 
market 
prices 
Indi-
rect 
taxes 
net 
DKR 1 000 million 
current prices 
20.2 
23.1 
25.1 
26.7 
28.6 
29.9 
31.3 
33.4 
35.5 
37.2 
41.1 
44.4 
49.4 
55.7 
59.2 
67.7 
76.1 
83.7 
91.8 
101.2 
115.2 
127.9 
140.5 
158.7 
181.0 
1.3 
1.5 
1.7 
1.7 
2.1 
2.3 
2.6 
2.8 
2.8 
3.2 
3.7 
3.9 
4.0 
4.9 
5.7 
6.6 
7.8 
9.0 
9.9 
11.9 
14.1 
15.3 
17.0 
19.8 
21.9 
GDP 
factor 
cost 
18.9 
21.6 
23.4 
25.0 
26.5 
27.6 
28.7 
30.6 
32.7 
34.0 
37.4 
40.5 
45.4 
50.8 
53.5 
61.1 
68.3 
74.7 
81.9 
89.3 
101.1 
112.6 
123.5 
138.9 
159.1 
Percent-
age rate 
of unem-
ploy-
ment! 
9.6 
8.7 
9.7 
12.5 
9.2 
8.0 
9.7 
11.1 
10.2 
9.6 
5.9 
4.2 
3.3 
3.0 
4.2 
2.4 
2.0 
2.3 
2.7 
5.0 
3.9 
2.9 
3.7 
3.6 
2.4 
Calculation techniques were slightly changed in 1959. The effect on the 
figures is, however, not substantial. 
Sources: See sources to appendix table 1.1 supplemented by additional infor-
mation (cf. sources to table 1.13). - 34 -
Appendix table 1.3 
Indice of real income, real product etc. by industry; 
1958, 1966 and 1973 (1950 = 100) 
Agriculture, etc. 
real income 
real product 
real inc./real product 
Manufacturing 
real income 
real product 
real inc./real product 
Handicraft 
real income 
real product 
real inc./real product 
Electricity, gas, ect. 
real income 
real product 
real inc./real product 
Building and construction 
real income 
real product 
real inc./real product 
Distribution, banking, etc. 
real income 
real product 
real inc./real product 
Transport 
real income 
real product 
real inc./real product 
Private services 
real income 
real product 
real inc./real product 
Government services 
real income 
real product 
real inc./real product 
Total value added 
real income 
real product 
real inc./real product 
1950 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
1958 
94 
114 
83 
123 
123 
100 
124 ' 
108 
115 
152 
160 
95 
131 
119 
110 
116 
123 
95 
148 
141 
106 
137 
120 
115 
166 
133 
125 
123 
122 
101 
1966 
92 
121 
76 
191 
215 
89 
205 
155 
132 
221 
360 
62 
259 
209 
124 
178 
190 
94 
220 
204 
108 
205 
147 
140 
343 
208 
165 
188 
180 
104 
1973 
95 
120 
79 
263 
332 
79 
245 
174 
140 
228 
680 
34 
369 
272 
136 
231 
259 
89 
289 
285 
101 
252 
168 
149 
670 
322 
208 
257 
243 
106 
Note: All figures are calculated before rounding of the basic data. 
ments, see final part of appendix to chapter I. 
Sources: See sources to appendix table 1.1. 
For com-35 
Appendix to chapter I 
REAL PRODUCT, REAL INCOME AND TERMS OF TRADE 
A note on concepts, methodology and techniques in deflating national-accounts 
data 
Introduction 
1. In the section above on 'Growth rates and industrial structure', the con-
cepts of real product and real income were introduced. Both concepts reflect 
possible ways of deflating national-accounts data in order to obtain figures 
'in real terms'. Basically, the two concepts should not be discussed from the 
viewpoint of trying to decide whether one of them is always superior to the 
other. Instead, the choice between 'real product' and 'real income' should 
depend on the purpose of the analysis. Furthermore - but this point was not 
brought up in chapter I -, if the concepts are properly defined, there will 
be a simple relationship between the real product and the real income of a 
certain industry. This relationship depends on the terms of trade of the sec-
tor concerned. 
2. In the following, formal proofs will be avoided. Instead, the exposition 
will start out by defining the concepts of real-product, real-income and 
terms-of-trade. Subsequently, relationships between these concepts will be 
established, and will be illustrated by way of a numerical example, which at 
the same time indicates the lines along which formal proofs would proceed. 
Finally, attention will focus on the data presented in chapter I, and on the 
figures in appendix table 1.3 in particular. 
1 Thus, real-product figures will usually provide the proper starting point 
for traditional analysis in the field of productivity, while real-income 
figures will provide the starting point for analysis of income by indus-
tries, factor remuneration, etc. 
2 The content of this appendix is based on chapters 13-15 in Anders Ølgaard, 
Growth, Productivity and Relative Prices, North-Holland Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam 1966. The present exposition is, however, simplified considerably. 
Proofs of the various relationships may be obtained from the author. 36 -
Concepts 
3. Figures of real product in chapter I (cf. table 1.6), correspond exactly 
to value-added figures at constant prices according to traditional national 
accounts procedures. The basic idea is that prices of all individual inputs 
and outputs are assumed to have remained constant over the whole period under 
study. On this assumption, figures of value-added at constant prices can be 
calculated for each industry. Obviously, since all prices are assumed to have 
remained constant, relative prices are implicitly assumed to have remained 
constant as well. However, for many purposes such an assumption is not very 
relevant. Therefore, the additional concept of real income is introduced. 
4. Real income figures for individual industries are based on the idea that 
actual behaviour of relative prices should be reflected in the figures. In 
addition, the 'general price level' according to the figures should remain 
constant. Therefore, the value-added figures for all industries in a given 
year should be deflated by means of the same deflator. For this purpose, the 
common deflator actually used in table 1.7 was the implicit deflator, obtain-
ed from actual figures of total real product (at current and at 1955-prices), 
the latter being adjusted for the effect of changes of the terms of foreign 
trade. 
5. In a closed economy, total real product and total real income will be 
identical. This, however, does not generally hold for real product and real 
income of a certain industry in a given year. If real income exceeds real 
product, relative prices will have changed in favour of the industry con-
cerned - and vice versa. However, this statement only becomes meaningful when 
the term 'relative prices of the sector concerned' is defined. 
6. In order for the following analysis to be correct, a necessary additional 
assumption-'· is that, in the base year, total sales equal total purchases for 
each individual industry and hence for the total economy. (This in turn im-
plies balance of payments equilibrium.) 
Within a traditional input-output framework, total sales by a given industry 
are used, either as input in other industries, as final goods in order to 
meet domestic final demand, or as exports. In accordance with traditional as-
sumptions of input-output analysis, the sales prices of a given industry in a 
given year are assumed to be independent of who is actually purchasing the 
output. Furthermore, in order to simplify the exposition, the public sector 
is assumed not to exist (or to behave like a private sector). In this way, 
the distinction between figures at factor cost and at market prices is avoid-
ed. 
7. Total purchases by a given industry consist partly of inputs bought from 
other industries, and required in order to produce output. Obviously, such 
inputs will usually add up to a figure, smaller than total output, the dif-
This additional assumption is required only in order to make the formal 
analysis consistent. Minor differences for a certain industry in the base 
year (implying that the industry obtains a net financial asset or liability 
against the rest of the world) do not invalidate the application for prac-
tical purposes. 37 
ference representing the value-added by the industry concerned. Hence if, 
with respect to purchases by the industry, the analysis only includes inputs 
from other industries, the basic assumption of total sales equalling total 
purchases would give rise to considerable difficulties. 
However, each industry also buys final goods - consumption as well as in­
vestment goods -, and prices of these goods do of course also affect the real 
income of the industry concerned. In the following, it is assumed that the 
total sales of each industry in the base year are exactly equal to total pur­
chases of inputs from other industries as well as of final - consumption and 
investment - goods. Furthermore, in order to simplify the exposition it is 
assumed that all industries of the economy buy final goods in the same pro­
portion as that of total consumption as compared with total investment for 
the total economy. In brief, while the composition of inputs purchased by the 
individual industries differs, all industries buy final goods in the same 
proportions. Hence we may assume that only one type of final demand exists, 
including consumption as well as investment. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
no financial savings are made by any industry in the base year. 
Within this framework, the terms of trade of an industry (reflecting changes 
of relative prices affecting the industry) is defined as an index of prices 
of output divided by a price index of total purchases by the industry con­
cerned, the latter covering inputs as well as final goods. 
Relationships between concepts 
8. Now the stage has been set, allowing the following conclusions to be 
drawn: 
A. For a -given industry in a given year, real income minus real product is 
exactly equal to the total output of the industry, multiplied by the per­
centage change of the terms of trade of the industry concerned. 
Furthermore, the difference between the real income and the real product 
of a given industry will be defined as its gain from the changes in rela­
tive prices (or from changes in its terms of trade). 
An alternative way of stating this relationship is the following: 
B. The real income divided by the real product of a given industry in a given 
year is proportionate to the percentage change in the terms of trade of 
the industry concerned, the proportion being equal to the ratio of its 
output divided by its value-added. 
9. In an open economy, total real income will only equal total real product, 
provided that the terms of foreign trade remain unchanged. In fact, corre­
sponding to conclusions A and Β we may arrive at the following conclusions 
for the relationship between total real income and total real product in an 
open economy: 
C. In an open economy, the difference between total real income and total 
real product is equal to total exports, multiplied by the percentage 
change in the terms of foreign trade. Hence this difference expresses the 
gain (or loss) from changes in the terms of foreign trade. - 38 -
Table 1 
Input-output table of year 1, all prices = 1 
From industry A 
industry Β 
industry C 
Imports 
Value-added 
TOTAL 
To 
A 
-
10 
40 
70 
50 
170 
industry 
Β 
-
-
10 
20 
50 
80 
C 
20 
-
-
30 
70 
120 
Final 
domestic 
demand 
100 
60 
60 
-
-
220 
Exports 
50 
10 
10 
-
-
70 
Total 
170 
80 
120 
120 
170 
-
An alternative way of stating this relationship is the following: 
D. Total real income divided by total real product is proportionate to the 
percentage change in the terms of foreign trade, the factor of proportion­
ality being equal to the ratio of total exports divided by total value-
added. 
10. Finally, it may be shown that the terms of trade of the individual in­
dustries and terms of foreign trade fit neatly into an overall pattern: 
E. The gain from the terms of foreign trade - as seen from the viewpoint of 
the total economy - can be distributed among the individual industries, at 
the same time taking into account domestic changes in relative prices. In 
this way, the gains of the individual industries are obtained, these gains 
adding up exactly to the gain of the total economy from the terms of for­
eign trade. 
A numerical example 
11. In order to illustrate these relationships, a numerical example might be 
appropriate. General index-number problems will not be discussed. Instead, it 
is assumed that quantities remain unchanged from year 1 to year 2,
1 the two 
years to be compared. 
In year 1 (cf. the input-output table shown in table 1), all prices are as­
sumed to be equal to unity. Total value-added is equal to 170, and total im-
1 This, however, does not hold for the implicit distribution of final domes­
tic demand by industries. 
2 Of course, this assumption is not crucial. It can always be fulfilled by 
using appropriate units of measurement. - 39 -
Table 2 
Input-output table of year 2, current prices 
From industry A 
industry Β 
industry C 
Imports 
Value-added 
TOTAL 
To industry 
A 
-
10(2) 
40(1) 
70(l
1/2) 
345 
510 
Β 
-
-
10(1) 
20(l
1/2) 
120 
160 
C 
20(3) 
-
-
30(l
1/2) 
15 
120 
Final 
domestic 
demand 
100(3) 
60(2) 
60(1) 
-
-
480 
Exports 
50(3) 
10(2) 
10(1) 
-
-
180 
Total 
170(3) 
80(2) 
120(1) 
120(l
1/2) 
480 
-
Note: Figures in parentheses are the price multipliers. 
ports equal 120. On the demand side, total domestic final demand equals 220 
and total exports 70. 
12. From year 1 to year 2, output prices of industry A increase from unity 
to 3, those of industry Β increase to 2 while those of industry C remain un­
changed. Import prices increase by fifty per cent. Note that, by these as­
sumptions, export prices have been fully described. 
In table 2, the input-output table of year 2 is shown at current prices, all 
flows (except those of value-radded) being indicated as quantities multiplied 
by prices. Year 2 is the base year for the various price indices, which con-
Table 3 
Real income, and real product in year 2 
Industry A 
Industry Β 
Industry C 
TOTAL 
Real income 
(1) 
158.1 
55.0 
6.9 
220.0 
Real product 
(2) 
50.0 
50.0 
70.0 
170.0 
Difference 
= (D-(2) 
108.1 
5.0 
-63.1 
50.0 - 40 
sequently are of the Paasche type. Note that, in year 2, total exports at 
current prices equal total imports at current prices (=180). Hence total fi-
nal domestic demand equals total value-added (=480). 
13. Real income and real product figures for year 2 are indicated in table 3. 
Real product figures follow immediately from table 1, because quantities of 
output and input are assumed to have remained constant. The indices are of 
the Laspeyres type. 
Real income figures for year 2 by industries are found by deflating value-
added figures at current prices (cf. table 2). The common deflator, used for 
all industries, is that of total final domestic demand, equal to 480 divided 
by 220 = 24/11.
2 
As appears from table 3, industry figures of real income and real product in 
year 2 may differ substantially. Output prices of industry A show the largest 
increase from year 1 to year 2, namely from 1 to 3. Hence the substantial 
gain from changes of relative prices, obtained by industry A, is not surpris-
ing. 
At the other extreme, output prices of industry C remained constant from year 
1 to year 2, while all other prices increased. In accordance with this pat-
tern, industry C suffered a substantial loss due to a deterioration of its 
terms of trade. 
14. Terms of trade figures for individual industries as well as for the to-
tal economy are shown in table 4. According to the bottom row, export prices 
have increased by 157.1 per cent, while import prices only increased by 50 
This is not accidental. Value-added figures at constant prices are usually 
calculated as quantity indices of the Laspeyres type, so in order for the 
analysis to be consistent the corresponding price indices must be of the 
Paasche type. In the above example, quantities remain unchanged from year 1 
to year 2. Hence Laspeyres and Paasche indices will usually lead to the 
same result. Note, however, that this is not true with respect to the im-
plicit distribution of final domestic demand by industries. Thus, even in 
this example, price indices may differ according to type, and the proper 
price-index to use is the Paasche type. 
An alternative way of determining the common deflator, leading to the same 
result, but being more in line with the analysis above, is the following: 
In year 2, total real product equals 170. In order to arrive at total real 
income, an additional term must be added (cf. conclusion C above). This 
term is exports (in year 2 at prices of year 1, i.e. 70) multiplied by the 
percentage change of the terms of trade in foreign trade, the latter being 
equal to 71.4 per cent (cf. table 4 below). Hence the gain from changes in 
the terms of foreign trade is equal to 50 and total real income in year 2 
equals 170+50=220. Thus the real income deflator is equal to total value-
added of year 2 at current prices (480) divided by 220 = 24/11. 
Note, finally, that the ratio of total value-added in year 2 divided by to-
tal value-added in year 1 (480/170) represents the deflator of total real 
product - but not that of its components in terms of value-added by indus-
tries. - 41 -
Table 4 
Terms of trade in year 2 
Industry A 
Industry Β 
Industry C 
Total economy 
= foreign trade 
Price index 
sales 
(1) 
300.0 
200.0 
100.0 
257.1 
pur­
chases 
(2) 
183.4 
188.2 
211.0 
150.0 
of 
t.o.t. 
=(i;xioo 
(2) 
(3) 
163.6 
106.3 
47.4 
171.4 
t.o.t. 
100 
(4) 
0.6360 
0.0625 
-0.5260 
0.7143 
Total 
sales 
(5) 
170 
80 
120 
70 
Gain 
=(4).(5) 
(6) 
108.1 
5.0 
-63.1 
50.0 
1 in year 2 at price of year 1. 
Note: All figures are calculated before rounding of the basic data. Apart 
from the price indices of purchases, the figures should be self-explan­
atory, e.g. sales prices of the total economy (i.e. the index of ex­
port prices), equals 180/70 = 257.1; correspondingly, the index of im­
port prices is of course equal το 150. 
The price index of purchases by industry Β is determined as follows 
(those of industries A and C are found in a similar way): in year 2 at 
current prices, the value-added of B equals one fourth (120/480) of to­
tal value-added. Hence final domestic demand of B equals 25 units of 
the output of A, 15 units of output of B and 15 units of output of C. 
Furthermore, B buys inputs equal to 10 units of output of C and 20 
units of imports. On the basis of all these quantities, the (Paasche) 
price index of total purchases by B is determined. 
per cent. Hence the terms of trade improved by 71.4 per cent. Multiplying 
this figure by total exports (in year 2 at prices of year 1) provides the 
gain to the economy from changes in the terms of foreign trade. This gain is 
equal to 50 units. This figure, in turn, equals the difference between total 
real income and total real product according to table 3. 
Corresponding terms of trade figures by industries are shown in table 4. In­
dices of sales prices by industries follow immediately; indices of prices of 
purchases are calculated according to the procedure, described in the note 
to table 4. From these indices, the terms of trade indices of the industries 
are easily found. When the percentage changes of these indices are multiplied 
by total sales (= total output of year 2 at prices of year 1) of the industry 
concerned, figures of gains (or losses) by industries due to changes of rela­
tive prices are finally obtained. In accordance with conclusion A above, the 
gains according to table 4 equal differences between real income and real 
product according to table 3. 42 -
15. As appears from table 4, the terms of trade in foreign trade improved by 
well over 70 per cent from year 1 to year 2. This result is not surprising, 
recalling that import prices only increased by 50 per cent, while prices of 
the main part of exports either trebled in industry (A) or doubled in indus­
try (B). However, the gain from changes in the terms of foreign trade was 
certainly not distributed evenly among industries. Industry A had a substan­
tial gain, while C suffered a loss. 
At first sight, the result obtained by industry Β - a very minor gain of only 
5 units - may be surprising. After all, the total gain of the economy from 
the improvement in the terms of foreign trade, to be distributed among the 
industries, was substantial (equal to 50 units). Furthermore, output prices 
of industry Β doubled, increasing more than import prices. In addition, apart 
from imports, Β only uses input from industry C, and the price of the latter 
remained unchanged. 
However, the share of input in total output of industry Β is rather modest, 
implying that the share of value-added (and hence of final demand) in total 
output is comparatively high. Furthermore, average prices of final demand 
have increased more than the prices of industry B's output, the price index 
of final demand being equal to 218. Hence the modest gain by sector Β in 
spite of low prices of its inputs in year 2 is explained by a substantial in­
crease in the average price of final demand, the latter exceeding the price 
increase of industry B's own output. 
16. The above type of analysis provides many interesting results, but only 
one of them will be briefly commented upon from a more general viewpoint. 
Suppose that export prices of a country increase, leading to an improvement 
in its terms of trade. Such a development will benefit the economy, taken as 
a whole, and exporting industries in particular. But from the viewpoint of 
the remaining industries, the price effect may be negative. This negative ef­
fect may be caused by the fact that these industries use output from export 
industries as input (e.g. fuel), but the explanation may also be related to 
their final demand. In an economy exporting agricultural products, higher 
prices of these products will of course give rise to improved terms of for­
eign trade, but may at the same time be to the disadvantage of the remaining 
industries, because the prices of other components of final demand (including 
consumers' goods) have increased. 
Some additional comments on the Danish figures 
17. The purpose of the technical and conceptual exercise above has been to 
justify the use of real-product as well as real-income figures in chapter I. 
The quantitative importance of this distinction from a short run viewpoint 
with regard to the total Danish economy appears from the year-by-year figures 
in appendix table 1.1. In accordance with the techniques outlined above, the 
percentage increase of real income always exceeds that of real product, if 
the terms of foreign trade have improved - and vice versa. During the years 
of the Korean war, around 1950, the difference between percentage increases 
of real income and real product were in fact substantial. But such differ­
ences also occur during the last part of the period covered by the table. 
Thus from 1971 to 1972, total real product increased by 4.6 per cent. At the 43 
same time, the terms of foreign trade improved by 3 per cent, and total real 
income increased by no less than 6.4 per cent.
1 
18. From a long-term viewpoint, the difference between growth rates of total 
real product and real income is only modest (cf. the bottom rows of appendix 
table 1.3). In fact, from 1950 to 1973, the ratio of total real income divid-
ed by total real product only increased by 6 per cent for the period taken as 
a whole, reflecting an increase in the index of the terms of foreign trade 
from 98 in 1950 to 110 in 1973 (cf. appendix table 1.1). 
However, when real income and real product figures by individual industries 
are compared, the differences become substantial (cf. appendix table 1.3). 
In this table, indices of time series of real income, real product and the 
ratio of these two concepts are indicated for 1958, 1966 and 1973 (1950=100). 
Thus the table may be considered as providing a summary of tables 1.6 - 1.8. 
However, the following comments will be limited to the third row for each in-
dustry, i.e. the real income/real product ratio, reflecting changes of the 
terms of trade of the industry concerned (cf. paragraph 8 above, especially 
conclusion B). 
19. One of the results according to the table is that, on the whole, the 
terms of trade of a certain industry tend to show the same direction and rate 
of change during all the three sub-periods, indicated in appendix table 1.3. 
The sector showing the largest improvement in its terms of trade (more than a 
doubling from 1950 to 1973) is 'government services', whilst 'private serv-
ices' have had an overall gain of nearly fifty per cent. 'Handicraft' has had 
a gain of forty per cent. 
At the other extreme, the industry of 'electricity, gas etc.' has seen a sub-
stantial deterioration of its terms of trade, and the same is true for 'manu-
facturing industries', although to a much smaller extent, i.e. an overall de-
terioration of roughly 20 per cent. 
20. Immediately, these findings suggest that the explanation of the differ-
ent patterns of sector terms of trade should, at least partly, be found in an 
analysis of productivity by industries, a reasonable hypothesis being that 
deteriorating terms of trade of an industry partly reflect substantial pro-
ductivity gains - and vice versa. However, such an analysis would obviously 
require additional data and would, furthermore, carry us too far. 
While productivity differences may explain part of the findings on industry 
terms of trade, other factors are of importance as well. The deterioration 
of the terms of trade of agriculture, of about 25 per cent from 1950 to 1966, 
undoubtedly should be explained not only by improved productivity, but also 
by difficulties with respect to extending output at profitable prices during 
However, the difference between these rates of growth undoubtedly exagger-
ates the gain from the improved terms of foreign trade from 1971 to 1972. 
This is partly due to the fact that the implicit weights had become obso-
lete. Another reason is related to the fact that the assumptions, indicated 
above, were not fulfilled to the same extent in both years. Thus in 1971, 
there was a balance of payments deficit of DKR 1 800 million, while in 1972 
there was a surplus of DKR 1 400 million (cf. appendix table 1.2). - 44 
this period. The subsequent improvement from 1966 to 1973 of the terms of 
trade of agriculture is probably mainly due to higher prices of agricultural 
output, following the accession of Denmark to the EEC.
1 
These problems are discussed in chapter II. Note that-the bottom rows of 
tables II.1 and II.4 contain figures on the real income/real product ratio 
of agriculture similar to those indicated in appendix table 1.3. 45 -
Chapter II 
AGRICULTURE 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND PRIOR TO THE 1930s 
1. In order to understand the structure and the problems of Danish agricul-
ture during recent decades, the unavoidable starting point is the Western Eu-
ropean agricultural crisis of the 1870s, caused by a sharp decline in prices 
of grain due to increased supplies from abroad. The reaction of most European 
countries was to introduce protectionist policies, trying to maintain domes-
tic grain prices at a level above that at which grain could be imported. This 
strategy was, however, not feasible from a Danish viewpoint, because nearly 
all Danish exports at that time consisted of agricultural produce, and par-
ticularly of grain. 
Necessity is said to be the mother of invention, and invention certainly was 
required. The process of industrialization had only just reached the take-off 
point, hence the necessary structural changes had to be made inside agricul-
ture. The resulting pattern was one of a continued increase in the output of 
vegetable products - grain, and later beet, - not to meet final demand, but 
mainly to be used as input for sharply increasing output of livestock prod-
ucts, mainly butter, bacon, and beef. From the 1880s onwards, Denmark became 
a net importer of grain. 
2. An important aspect of these changes was the role of the Danish cooperat-
ive movement, and, in particular, the introduction of the 'folk high school' 
and the centrifugal separator. The former developed during the second half of 
the nineteenth century and provided the educational background for the coop-
erative movement to become operational; the latter - which was not invented 
until 1880 - was used in no less than 500 cooperative Danish dairies ten 
years later, and enabled even comparatively small dairy units to produce high 
quality butter. 
3. From the 1890s onwards, conditions for Danish agriculture improved sub-
stantially. High growth rates of international trade, based on the increased 
output of manufacturing industries, created a substantial increase in demand, 
particularly for livestock products. This was especially true of the U.K. 
which - with a small domestic agricultural sector - became the main customer 
for Danish livestock products, especially butter and bacon. - 46 
Table II.1 
Agriculture, share of labour force and of GDP 1875-1929 
Agriculture labour force ( 1 000) 
Agriculture labour force, share of 
total labour force, per cent 
Agriculture, share of GDP, per cent: 
(a) current prices 
(b) 1929 prices 
(c) : (a)/(b) = 
Real inc./real prod. 
1875 
499 
51 
42 
37 
116 
1890 
503 
47 
35 
31 
115 
1900 
511 
43 
28 
25 
112 
1913 
531 
39 
28 
23 
124 
1929 
613 
34 
21 
21 
100 
Source: Figures are calculated on the basis of appendix tables in Svend Aage 
Hansen, Økonomisk vaekst i Danmark, vol. II: 1914-1970, Copenhagen 
1974. 
Thus, the structure of Danish agriculture changed towards the provision of 
more labour intensive outputs, which were competitive abroad on markets where 
demand was increasing and where there were no serious trade barriers against 
livestock products.
1 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, relative prices as seen from the 
viewpoint of agriculture began to improve. From 1900 to 1913 the improvement 
was substantial (cf. the bottom row of table II.1), hence Danish agricul-
ture reaped the fruits of the structural change which had taken place from 
the 1880s onwards. 
This favourable pattern could not prevent the share of agriculture in total 
GDP and in the total labour force from declining, but the decline took place 
at a comparatively slow rate. Whereas 50 per cent of the labour force was em-
ployed in agriculture in 1875, the share had only dropped to roughly 40 per 
1 It is, however, interesting to note that Danish exports to the U.K. of beef 
have remained insignificant ever since the 1880s, Germany being the main 
customer for Danish beef. The main explanation of this market pattern is 
probably that the U.K. has been particularly interested in high-quality 
livestock products, e.g. bacon from the 'pig sector'. With the main empha-
sis until recently on butter, and therefore on dairy cattle the quality of 
Danish beef could not match that of our overseas competitors. 
2 The bottom row of the table indicates the ratio of agricultural real income 
over agricultural real product, which in turn is proportionate to the terms 
of trade of agriculture (cf. appendix to chapter I). - 47 -
Table II.2 
Exports, 1875-1929 
Percentage distribution 
Beef and cattle 
Butter 
Bacon and pigs 
Eggs 
Grain, flour etc. 
Other agrie.
1 
Total agrie, prod. 
Other products 
Percentage distribut 
Great Britain 
Germany 
Norway and Sweden 
Other countries 
Total exports, mill. 
by 
TOTAL 
ion by 
TOTAL 
DKR 
product 
EXPORTS 
country
 2 
EXPORTS 
1875 
15 
21 
13 
1 
28 
8 
86 
14 
100 
42 
29 
24 
5 
100 
152 
1890 
13 
38 
16 
3 
7 
11 
88 
12 
100 
55 
25 
13 
7 
100 
195 
1900 
7 
43 
21 
6 
3 
9 
89 
11 
100 
59 
17 
13 
11 
100 
282 
1913 
10 
31 
25 
5 
2 
14 
87 
12 
100 
62 
25 
4 
9 
100 
637 
1929 
5 
31 
31 
5 
1 
5 
78 
22 
100 
60 
21 
7 
12 
100 
1 616 
1 Including sugar, but excluding canned food. 
2 The figures for 1875, 1890 and 1900 are based on data for general trade, 
i.e. including re-exports. For these years, the shares of Norway and Sweden 
are probably too high when compared with figures for the following years. 
The opposite is true for Great Britain. 
Source: Ole Bus Henriksen and Anders Ølgaard, Danmarks Udenrigshandel 1874-
1958, Copenhagen 1960. 
cent prior to the First World War (cf. table II.1). Measured in absolute 
terms, it continued to increase until 1929, when it reached an all-time peak 
of 613 000 persons. Another way of stating this relationship would be to say 
that due to improved efficiency as compared with that of agricultural sectors 
of other countries, Danish agriculture was able to compete for the available 
resources with domestic manufacturing industries relatively more successfully, 
and therefore the process of industrialization in Denmark was delayed. 48 
4. This pattern is confirmed by the development of exports (cf. table II.3). 
From 1875 to 1913, the share of agricultural exports remained at 85-90 per 
cent of the total leaving only 10-15 per cent for exports of manufactured 
goods. But the composition of agricultural exports changed. The share of 
grain declined during the early part of the period, and subsequently butter 
and bacon became the dominating products. In fact, in 1929 butter and bacon 
comprised more than 60 per cent of total exports. 
Great Britain and Germany were by far the largest markets for these products, 
hence Danish exports were heavily concentrated during the late 1920s, not 
only in terms of products, but also in terms of geographical markets. 
5. The rapidly increasing output of livestock products in turn required in-
creased imports of grain, foodstuffs, fertilizers etc. In the late 1920s, im-
ports of raw materials for agriculture amounted to roughly 25 per cent of to-
tal imports. 
DECADES OF CRISIS, WAR AND POST-WAR PROTECTIONISM 
6. The barriers to international trade erected in the wake of the interna-
tional crisis of the early 1930s, also hit agricultural products and thus 
Danish agriculture. The rapid increase of output stopped due to dwindling 
markets, and consequently, the agricultural labour force started to decline, 
Table II.3 
Agriculture, share of labour force and of GDP, 1929-1958 
Agriculture labour 
Agriculture labour 
total labour force 
Agriculture, share 
(a) current prices 
(b) 1929-prices 
(c):(a)/(b) = Real 
force (1 000) 
force, share of 
por cent 
of GDP, per cent: 
inc./real prod. 
1929 
613 
34 
21 
21 
100 
1939 
568 
28 
17 
20 
86 
1950 
470 
23 
19 
17 
113 
1958 
396 
19 
14 
15 
90 
Source: See source to table II.1. 49 
even in absolute terms. Those leaving agriculture were mainly young assist-
ants - the number of farms remaining constant - and probably most of them 
found employment in urban industries, thus aggravating the unemployment prob-
lem for those already belonging to the urban labour force. 
For some agricultural exports, e.g. butter, the pattern of the 1930s was one 
mainly of declining prices. However, in 1932 Denmark was guaranteed a quota 
for exports of bacon to the U.K. corresponding to 62 per cent of British ba-
con imports. With limited bacon supplies to the British market and rather low 
price elasticities, this arrangement led to increased export prices for Dan-
ish bacon. 
7. During the German occupation of Denmark (1940-45), the obvious German in-
terest was to encourage agriculture to maintain the highest possible output 
in order to maximise Danish food exports to Germany. At the same time, a gen-
eral feature of Danish economic policy was to try to keep money wages down in 
an attempt to dampen inflation. The combined effect of these policies was a 
substantial change of income distribution in favour of agriculture and to the 
disadvantage of urban workers. 
8. During the late 1940s, economic planning for the 1950s was still based on 
the assumption that agricultural exports would regain their earlier promi-
nence or at least maintain their share of total exports, which had declined 
from 78 per cent in 1929 to 63 per cent in 1950 (cf. table II.5). It was 
even imagined that exports of butter to the U.S. would contribute substan-
tially to solving the dollar-shortage problem. 
Admittedly, the share of agriculture in the total labour force had dropped 
from 34 per cent in 1929 to 23 per cent in 1950 (cf. table II.3). But rela-
tive prices of agriculture had improved substantially from 1939 to 1950 (cf. 
the bottom row of table II.3), and it could be expected that the share of ex-
ports would again reach about two-thirds of total agricultural final output, 
the proportion reached prior to the crisis of the 1930s and the shortages of 
the 1940s. In fact, this latter expectation turned out to be the only one to 
come true (cf. table II.4). 
Furthermore, the development of agricultural exports was one characterized by 
continued diversification. The share of butter and bacon in total agricultur-
al exports declined from 78 to 57 per cent between 1929 and 1950, and there 
were high hopes of increasing exports of canned food, cheese, etc. 
9. Against this background, it was decided to stick to the traditional Dan-
ish principle of letting home market prices reflect average export prices; 
this principle was maintained for roughly another decade. But it soon became 
clear that the liberalization of manufactures according to the 0EEC scheme 
was not at all reflected in similar tendencies for agricultural products. The 
During the autumn of 1949, 0EEC prepared a report on economic conditions in 
the European countries, providing part of the basis for distributing the 
Marshall Aid. This report was based on 'country reports', the Danish one 
being prepared in the autumn of 1948: Danmarks Langtidsprogram 1948/49-
1952/53. The question of Danish exports of butter to the Western Hemisphere 
is discussed on pp. 17-19 and 28-30 in this report. - 50 -
Table II.4 
Agricultural exports, 1929-1958 
Agrie, exports, mlll.DKR
1 
Total exports, mill.DKR 
Agrie, shares of· total 
exports 
Agrie, total final output, 
mill.DKR 
Share of exp. in total fi-
nal agrie, output 
Export, butter: 
quantity, 1 000 t 
price (DKR/kg) 
value, mill. DKR 
Export, bacon etc.: 
quantity, 1 000 t 
price (DKR/kg) 
value, mill. DKR 
Total share of butter and ba-
con in agricultural exp. by 
value 
1929 
1 
1 
1 
262 
616 
78 
803 
70 
159 
3,16 
502 
249 
1,96 
488 
78 
1939 
1 
1 
1 
156 
578 
73 
824 
63 
150 
2, 
372 
190 
2, 
394 
66 
48 
08 
1950 
2 
4 
5 
899 
592 
63 
289 
55 
156 
5,80 
906 
181 
4,14 
747 
57 
1958 
4 291 
8 608 
50 
6 593 
65 
115 
4,59 
526 
247 
4,76 
1 173 
40 
1 Excluding sugar and canned food. 
Source: See source to table II.2, supplemented by additional information. 
only market which was not heavily protected was the British, and here Danish 
exports had to compete with subsidized surplus output from other countries, 
many of them traditional net importers of livestock products. Thus, the alle-
gation that Danish agriculture had to compete mainly with the Treasuries of 
other countries (including that of Great Britain, where the deficiency-pay-
ments system was maintained) was not without foundation. 
The tendency for the economic conditions affecting agriculture to deteriorate, 
which had been reversed during the 1940s, once more became obvious. Relative 
prices deteriorated (cf. table II.3); and this deterioration continued 
throughout the 1960s. Furthermore, the share of total exports originating 
from agriculture continued to decline (cf. table II.4). 51 -
Table II.5 
Number of 'whole-year workers' in agriculture, 1949/50-1972/73 
Owner and spouse 
Children at 14 and above, other 
relatives 
Permanently hired employees: 
without own household 
with own household 
Day labourers etc. 
TOTAL NUMBER OF MAN YEARS 
1949/50 
188.5 
63.1 
98.4 
23.4 
23.6 
397.0 
1957/58 
166.4 
43.1 
72.3 
19.6 
16.8 
318.2 
(1 000 
1965/66 
140.0 
17.4 
23.6 Ì 
12.2 J 
4.5 
197.7 
nan years) 
1972/73 
135.0 
7.1 
16.4 
2.8 
161.3 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk Årborg, various years. 
Table II.6 
Number of farms, 1919-1973 
(1 000's) 
Acre 
0, 
5 
10 
15 
30 
60 
120 
age: 
5  5 
- 10 
- 15 
- 30 
- 60 
- 120 
hectares 
hectare?; 
hectares 
hectares 
hectares 
- hectares 
TOTAL NUMBER 
1919 
Ì ,no  j 109 
25 
43 
23 
4 
1 
205 
1933 
56 
50 
27 
45 
21 
4 
1 
204 
1949 
46 
56 
31 
50 
20 
3 
1 
207 
1959 
38 
54 
33 
48 
20 
3 
1 
197 
1973 
15 
26 
22 
41 
23 
5 
1 
133 
Notes: (a) 1 hectare equals 2.471 acres. 
(b) Danish agriculture has always been dominated by 
small-holders owning their own farms. Tenants have 
not been of major importance, and most of thorn 
have had the government as their landlord accord-
ing to various laws aimed at strengthening the 
small-holder pattern. 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk Arborg and Landbrugs-
statistik, various years. - 52 
FROM THE BRITISH TO THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM OF AGRICULTURAL PRICING 
10. Gradually it became clear that the basic structural problems of Western 
European agriculture were of a more general nature. In contrast to the situ-
ation prevailing in the last part of the nineteenth century, these economies 
were at a stage where income elasticities for livestock products were rather 
low, and at the same time improvements in agricultural productivity had be-
come imperative in most countries, because the low level of income of farmers 
created serious social problems. Hence, there was no longer the possibility 
of solving the problems of Danish agriculture by continued high rates of 
growth of output. 
11. Consequently, part of the solution had to be found in a further reduc-
tion of the agricultural labour force, accompanied by increased labour pro-
ductivity. The latter was partly brought about by a rapid introduction of 
mechanization in agricultural production. Thus labour input was reduced by 
one half between 1949/50 and 1965/66 (cf. table II.5). Subsequently the num-
ber of farms - and of farmers - had to be reduced also (cf. table II.6), and 
it has become increasingly widespread for small-holders to have a (part-time) 
job in manufacturing or in other industries. 
Another aspect of this change was a decline in net imports of grain. As was 
mentioned above, imports of raw materials for agriculture amounted to roughly 
25 per cent of total imports during the late 1920s, but with increased domes-
tic crops and low growth rates for output of livestock products, this share 
declined to about 5 per cent, the main part consisting of oil cakes, etc. 
During the last decade, net imports of grain have become insignificant. 
12. When the European Communities were established in 1957, Danish agricul-
ture was placed in a difficult position. As Denmark was not a member of the 
EEC, its role as supplier of agricultural produce to the Communities dimin-
ished as there were substantial trade barriers. The basic problem was that 
the main markets for Danish agriculture - EEC countries and the UK - belonged 
to two different trade blocks. Even the development of the European Free 
Trade Area did little to alleviate the situation because EFTA did not include 
arrangements to liberalize trade in agricultural products between member 
countries. 
13. In these circumstances, the principle of letting agricultural domestic 
prices be determined by export prices had to be sacrificed. This process 
started in the late 1950s and accelerated during the 1960s. The main idea was 
to let domestic prices of livestock products increase to reflect actual in-
creases in costs. But since two-thirds of total livestock products were ex-
ported, this policy only solved one-third of the problem. Although the policy 
of subsidizing agriculture during the 1960s served to reduce the difficulties 
somewhat, it certainly did not eliminate them. Relative prices continued to 
deteriorate, and the labour force continued to decline. 
Many economists became worried about the effects of this policy. They main-
tained that subsidizing agriculture, partly by higher output prices of live-
stock products, might unduly slow down the adjustment process with respect to 
the size of the agricultural labour force. As shown in table II.5, this worry 
turned out to be unfounded. 53 
Table II.7 
Danish livestock products, 1962/63 and 1972/73 
(1 000 t) 
Butter 
Cheese 
Beef, veal, etc. 
Bacon, pork,etc. 
1962/63 
Output 
156 
116 
294 
682 
of which 
export 
112 
81 
199 
519 
dom. 
consumpt. 
48 
41 
93 
166 
1972/73 
Output 
144 
129 
195 
826 
of which 
export 
96 
76 
110 
620 
dom. 
consumpt. 
40 
52 
84 
195 
Note: Minor components on the supply and demand side, e.g. stock changes and 
imports, are disregarded. Hence the figures do not tally. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Landbrugsstatistik 1963 and 1973 and supplemen-
tary information. 
14. Another aspect of the adjustment process during the 1960s was a change 
in the composition of the output of livestock products. Output of the less 
labour intensive products (the so-called 'grain products': bacon, poultry, 
etc.) increased (cf. table II.7) the increase being reflected in the growing 
use of grain for feeding. At the same time, output in the more labour inten-
sive sector of dairy products stagnated or even declined. 
15. The entry of the UK and Denmark into the EEC solved the basic dilemma, 
mentioned above, from 1973 onwards. The two main groups of customers of Dan-
ish agriculture, the UK and other EEC countries, became subject to the same 
common agricultural policy, as did Denmark. 
During the 1960s and the first part of the 1970s Danish domestic agricultural 
prices had roughly reached the level of the domestic prices in the EEC. Hence 
the main immediate current gain to Danish agriculture from entering the EEC 
was one of improved terms of trade, caused by higher export prices. Other ef-
fects were capital gains in the form of higher prices of farm land, partly 
reflecting substantial increases in grain prices. These short term gains from 
joining the EEC have been substantial, although partly of a once-for-all na-
ture. But the main advantage from entering the EEC has been the establishment 
of free access to all the traditional European markets of Danish agriculture -
for the first time since 1930. 55 
Chapter III 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Unlike the agricultural sector, the structure of Danish manufacturing in-
dustries is characterized by vast complexity. Whereas agricultural production 
can still, although with much less justification than a few decades ago, be 
considered fairly homogeneous, the composition of output in manufacturing in-
dustries is very heterogeneous. Thus, any analysis either has to go deeply 
into details, or be restricted to a general description with the associated 
risk of omissions and over-simplification. The latter method has been used 
here. 
2. Possession of energy and raw materials is often considered to be a neces-
sary part of a country's industrial base. If that were so, industrial produc-
tion in Denmark would have been very narrow indeed. As for energy, Denmark 
has so far been almost 100 per cent dependent on imported fuel. As far as 
raw materials are concerned, resources are limited to lime, chalk and clay. 
These raw materials have been utilized for industrial purposes. Thus, cement 
manufacturing is among the important Danish industries, with the advantage 
obtained from the momentum of an early start. Furthermore, Denmark's compara-
tive advantage in this field has formed the basis for a major 'downstream-in-
dustry', i.e. the manufacturing of cement-making machinery. In both fields, 
Danish firms, being closely interrelated, have developed into a multinational 
concern, apparently with strong international market positions. 
The easy access to sea-transport routes has served as a substitute for domes-
tic possession of industrial raw materials. Hence, generally speaking, the 
lack of such materials inside the Danish borders has not been a serious com-
petitive disadvantage. On the contrary, the lack of raw materials may have 
In this respect Denmark is similar to Japan. However, in contrast to Japan, 
only a minor part of fuel imports is used in industry, the main part being 
used for heating. 
In addition, gravel from the beaches could be mentioned. This has been an 
export article of some importance. However, for environmental reasons this 
export is probably coming to an end. 56 -
brought certain advantages to manufacturing industry, because there wt?re no 
(or virtually no) domestic producers of raw materials to protect. Consequent-
ly, raw materials could be imported duty-free by Danish manufacturers, where-
as the prices paid by their foreign competitors were very often higher due to 
the existence of duties. 
The importance of sea transport from the viewpoint of the Danish economy has 
been reflected in the fact that international shipping is a major Danish in-
dustry. This in turn has been of great importance for the development of a 
shipyard industry. This industry again has provided the demand for substan-
tial production of steel plates etc., based to a large extent on scrap iron. 
3. The close interrelationship between agricultural and industrial produc-
tion has been an important factor in the development of the industrial sector 
in Denmark. To mention only a few examples, the structural changes in agri-
culture a hundred years ago, described in chapter II, implied among other 
things an increased demand for dairy machinery which thus stimulated the manu-
facture of such machinery. Demand from agriculture has also been of decisive 
importance for the development of certain chemical products viz. fertilizers. 
On the supply side, the same holds true for the development of an important 
line of pharmaceutical output, i.e. insuline for which the raw materials come 
from pig production. Still more obvious examples are to be found in canning 
and in beverage industries. 
4. However, the factors mentioned can only explain part of the industrial 
development in Denmark. Schumpeterian entrepreneurship may remain the main 
explanatory factor. Apparently, Denmark has had a fair share of this very im-
portant resource. Only a few examples from recent decades will be mentioned. 
Some rapidly expanding firms, which might be labelled multinational firms of 
Danish origin, 'Danfoss' being one of them, owe their existence to the fact 
that the personal capacities of their founders have been of a truly 
Schumpeterian type. 'Danfoss' produces compressors, heating-valves and hy-
draulics. 'Lego' toys is a similar example in quite a different field. 
5. Danish trade policies have already been mentioned in passing. Taking a 
secular view, the tradition has decidedly been one of free trade, but with a 
substantial departure during the 30 years from the early 1930s to around 1960. 
This was the period of import restrictions, being more prolonged in Denmark 
than in most other countries. During the post-war years, Denmark exclusively 
stuck to import restrictions
1 while in most other countries the instruments 
of protectionist policies were changed from quantitative restrictions to cus-
tom barriers. 
This raises the question as to how it was possible for Denmark to stick to 
quantitative restrictions on foreign trade in spite of the obligations to 
liberalize according to the rules laid down in the then OEEC. The answer, 
in short, was that it was a matter of Danish officials 'knowing their lib-
eralization arithmetic', i.e. their ability to find mixtures of liberaliza-
tion, which gave the appearence of being impressive but in fact kept alive 
the hard core of protectionist regulations until total abolishment when 
EFTA was founded. The 'trick' consisted of mainly liberalizing those goods 
which formed a relatively big proportion of imports, but only a small share 
of domestic production. 57 
The massive use of import restrictions for a period of 30 years should be 
seen in the perspective of general international protectionism, especially at 
the beginning of the period. Also, experience with import restrictions in 
Denmark during the 1930s provides evidence of the usefulness of an 'infant 
industry' policy. The immediate purpose of introducing import restrictions 
was to create maximum employment opportunities with minimum balance of pay-
ments costs. The effects of this policy may be seen from the fact that, dur-
ing the 1930s, the composition of imports changed, with the share of manufac-
tured goods (excl. capital goods) being reduced from 29 per cent of total im-
ports in 1930 to 23 per cent in 1938. At the same time, the share of deliv-
eries if home-manufactured goods in total domestic final demand increased at 
the expense of producers abroad. 
6. After the Second World War, there was widespread uncertainty as to which 
industries would be the main exporting industries of the coming decades. As 
was described in chapter II, high hopes with respect to agriculture turned 
out to be far too optimistic. On the other hand, exports of manufactured 
goods showed substantial increases over a wide range of products during the 
1950s. But the question still remained as to whether manufacturing industry 
would be able to compete on the home market if the hard core of import re-
strictions were removed. With respect to this problem, the prospects were 
generally considered to be rather grim.
1
 
7. Fortunately it turned out that much of this fear was unfounded. One rea-
son was that import restrictions had to a certain extent been used to promote 
exports, the issuing of import licenses being used as a weapon against other 
countries to persuade them to open up their home markets for Danish exports. 
Another - and more important - reason may be related to the low overall 
growth rate of the Danish economy - and hence of domestic demand - during 
most of the 1950s as compared with that of most other Western European coun-
tries. Due to balance of payments problems, domestic demand was kept rather 
tight during the main part of the 1950s. Markets abroad generally expanded at 
a faster rate, which may have made them more attractive for Danish manufac-
turers. 
ρ  Furthermore, research by The Danish Economic Council suggests that industry 
started its postwar expansion in a comfortable situation regarding the mar-
kets for its industrial exports as well as their composition by main groups 
of articles. In both respects, the foreign markets of manufacturing indus-
tries seem to have grown faster during the 1950s and the main part of the 
1960s than was the case for the markets of most other OECD countries. In other 
words, the goods produced by manufacturing industries happened to be asso-
ciated with the fastest expanding markets - perhaps because most export in-
dustries were comparatively 'new' and thus able to choose the right products 
2 
Cf. Danmark og de europaeiske markedsplaner. Nr. 1, Industrivareomrâdet, 
Copenhagen 1958. This report on the future prospects for Danish manufactur-
ing industries carefully discusses the effects of removing import restric-
tions. The tone of the analysis gave the report the nickname 'The shock re-
port' . 
Det økonomiske Råd, Udviklingen i Danmarks internationale konkurrence-evne. 
Copenhagen 1969. 58 -
without having to adjust an outmoded pattern of output. Actually, during the 
1950s and the main part of the 1960s, industrial exports grew in volume terms, 
at an exceptionally high rate of around 13 per cent per year. 
8. The factors which enabled manufacturing industries to expand in domestic 
markets as well are as follows. Firstly, as discussed in chapter I, overall 
economic growth suddenly started to accelerate, and of course it is always 
easier to survive in an expanding market. Secondly, the 'shock report' may 
have underestimated the importance of the fact that large parts of Danish 
manufacturing industries had already got accustomed to competing with foreign 
producers - the competition having taken place abroad. Thirdly, during the 
late part of the 1950s, economic policies on industrial expansion started to 
concentrate on manufacturing, introducing more favourable depreciation allow-
ances, etc. 
This is not to imply that no home-market industries were affected by the fi-
nal abolishment of import restrictions during the late 1950s and the follow-
ing years. Major examples of industries having a rough time when protection 
was removed are textile and clothing industries as well as the manufacture of 
shoes. However, some of them managed to adapt themselves exceedingly well to 
the changed climate of competition. This was particularly true for producers 
relying mainly on a comparative advantage with respect to design and quality, 
an aspect which was also relevant for other industries, for instance furni-
ture. 
At the same time, producers of more standardized products in the fields of 
textiles found it increasingly difficult to compete with foreign products, 
not least those originating from some less developed countries, a problem not 
unknown in other countries. 
THE SIZE STRUCTURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL ENTERPRISE 
9. The pattern of Danish manufacturing industries is characterized by small 
firms, a diversified - although mainly rather labour-intensive - pattern of 
production, and the fact that, compared with most other manufacturing indus-
tries in Western Europe, Danish manufacturing industries are 'young'. 
Tables III.l and III.2 illustrate the pattern with respect to size in 1973. 
In both tables, percentage distributions are indicated by type of industry 
and by number of employees in each enterprise. In table III.l, the relative 
distribution refers to the number of firms, referring to the legal unit. (A 
firm may in turn consist of several establishments with different geographi-
cal location.)
1 In table III.2, the distribution refers to the total number of 
persons employed, including workers as well as salary-earners and owners. The 
figures only cover firms of which the main activity is manufacturing and with 
a staff of at least 6 persons: hence the coverage is somewhat more limited 
than the labour force surveys discussed in chapter I (see e.g. table 1.3). 
Prior to 1973, similar Danish statistics always referred to establishments, 
not enterprises. Hence the 1973 figures, based on enterprises, will usually 
not be comparable with similar figures for earlier years. 59 
Table III.l 
Number of firms in manufacturing industries 
Relative distribution by type of industry and number of employees 
(Per cent.) 
Mining and 
quarrying 
Food, 
beverages, 
tobaccos-
Textiles, 
clothing, 
shoes 
Wood and 
wood prod. 
(incl. 
furniture) 
Paper, 
printings 
Chemical 
prod. (incl. 
Petrol .prod.) 
Non-metall. 
mineral 
products 
Basic metal 
industr. 
Processed 
metal prod., 
machinery 
etc. 
Other manuf. 
ind. 
TOTAL, 
PER CENT 
TOTAL NUMBER 
OF FIRMS 
6-9 
0.4 
1.4 
1.8 
1.8 
2.5 
0.9 
1.3 
0.1 
3.3 
0.4 
13.9 
794 
Number o 
10-19 
0.4 
2.4 
4.2 
4.1 
4.1 
1.9 
2.3 
0.3 
8.0 
0.9 
28.6 
] 526 
20-49 
0.1 
3.1 
5.7 
4.4 
2.7 
2.3 
1.9 
0.4 
9.7 
0.8 
31.1 
1 768 
f employees per firm 
50-99 
0.0 
1,6 
2.3 
1.3 
1.2 
0.8 
0.7 
0.2 
4.1 
0.4 
12.6 
717 
100 
199 
0.0 
1.1 
1.4 
0.4 
0.5 
0.9 
0.4 
0.1 
2.5 
0.1 
7.4 
421 
200 
499 
— 
0.8 
0.5 
0.3 
0.5 
0.5 
0.2 
0.2 
1.4 
0.0 
4.4 
251 
500 
and 
above 
0.0 
0.5 
0.1 
0.0 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
0.8 
0.0 
2.0 
114 
Total 
0.9 
10.9 
16.0 
12.3 
11.7 
7.5 
6.9 
1.4 
29.8 
2.6 
100.0 
-
Total 
number 
of 
firms 
58 
617 
908 
698 
660 
433 
396 
70 
1 696 
155 
-
5 691 
Excluding dairies. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Industristatistik 1973. 60 -
Table III.2 
Number of employees in manufacturing industries 
Relative distribution by type of industry and number of employees per firms 
Mining and 
quarring 
Food, 
beverages, 
tobacco 
Textiles, 
clothing, 
shoes 
Wood and 
wood prod, 
(incl. 
furniture) 
Paper, 
printings 
Chemical 
prod.(incl. 
petrol .prod.) 
Non-metall. 
mineral 
products 
Basic metal 
industr. 
Processed 
metal prod., 
machinery 
etc. 
Other manuf. 
ind. 
TOTAL, 
PER CENT 
TOTAL 
NUMBER OF 
EMPLOYEES 
(Per 
Number of employees per firm 
6T9 
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
0.0 
0.3 
0.1 
1.4 
5989 
10-19 
0.1 
0.4 
0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.4 
0.4 
0.1 
1.5 
0.2 
5.4 
22841 
20-49 
0.1 
1.3 
2.4 
1.8 
1.1 
1.0 
0.7 
0.1 
4.0 
0.3 
12.8 
54165 
50-99 
0.0 
1.6 
2.0 
1.1 
1.2 
0.8 
0.6 
0.2 
3.8 
0.4 
11.7 
49433 
100 
199 
0.1 
2.0 
2.5 
0.8 
0.9 
1.6 
0.7 
0.1 
4.7 
0.3 
13.7 
58116 
200 
499 
_ 
3.2 
1.8 
1.1 
1.9 
2.2 
1.0 
0.8 
5.8 
0.2 
18.0 
76145 
500 
and 
above 
0.2 
8.2 
0.6 
0.3 
3.3 
2.8 
2.5 
0.6 
18.2 
0.3 
37.0 
156882 
Total 
0.5 
16.8 
10.3 
6.1 
9.4 
8.9 
6.0 
1.9 
38.3 
1.8 
100.0 
. 
cent) 
Total 
number 
of 
employ-
ees 
2 035 
71 501 
44 102 
25 306 
40 125 
37 220 
26 066 
7 927 
162 231 
7 058 
-
423 571 
Source: See source to table III.l. 61 
10. By international standards, most Danish firms in manufacturing indus-
tries are small. 40-45 per cent of the firms have less than 20 employees, and 
an additional 30 per cent have between 20 and 50 employees. At the other end 
of the scale, only just over 100 firms (= 2 per cent) have 500 employees and 
above and hence belong to the group of really large firms by Danish standards. 
The distribution of the 425 000 employees is illustrated in table III.2. 
Firms with less than 20 employees, representing more than 40 per cent of the 
total number of firms, account for less than 7 per cent of total employment, 
while the largest firms, only 2 per cent of the total, employ 37 per cent of 
the labour force in manufacturing industry. Roughly 75 per cent of the em-
ployees are wage-earners, less than 1 per cent are owners and the remaining 
25 per cent are salaried employees. 
According to both tables, metal processing is the dominant manufacturing in-
dustry. But again, the picture becomes blurred as soon as a closer look is 
taken. This industry includes ship yards, but also electric components etc., 
hence the structure of the industry is very heterogeneous, with some of the 
firms working as sub-contractors. The absence of production of 'large durable 
consumer goods' (cars etc.) is an important aspect of the picture. 
11. Over the last decades, several attempts have been made in order to sum-
marize the characteristics of the structure of Danish manufacturing indus-
tries. One was made in the reports published by the Danish government prior 
to the decision to enter the EEC. It was pointed out
1 that if the labour 
force had been distributed according to the pattern with respect to size ex-
isting in the Federal Republic of Germany, the total number of firms would be 
reduced by almost 50 per cent. In particular, the number of small firms would 
be reduced substantially. 
This analysis was elaborated in a series of publications , in which it was 
shown that the relative distribution of firms with respect to size, and of 
the labour force between big and small firms, had remained rather stable dur-
ing the 1960s. But again, according to the study, closer analysis reveals a 
more· complicated pattern. Admittedly, the structure appears to have remained 
stable, when 'stock figures' of the structure from the early 1960s are com-
pared with similar figures for 1970. But - applying techniques similar to 
those used in modern demography - more careful analysis requires that each 
individual unit (firm) is followed throughout the period. Such investigations 
seem to indicate that a substantial amount of change has taken place, new 
firms entering the scene and old dropping out, small firms becoming big and 
Danmark og de Europaeiske Faellesskaber, volume I, 1968, p. 75 pp, in par-
ticular p.79. 
2 Perspektivplan-redeggSrelse 1972-1987 (PP II), Copenhagen 1973, pp. 227-243 
and pp. 236-38 in particular. The analysis is elaborated in appendix volume 
III to this report, published in February 1974. 62 -
vice versa. Furthermore, the firms dominating in manufacturing exports - and 
the types of products exported - change rather rapidly.
1 
Thus the conclusion may be that the basic strength of Danish manufacturing is 
its adaptability and flexibility. New products and new firms develop very 
quickly at the expense of existing ones. This pattern provides a basis for 
substantial increases in productivity. 
The pattern may be explained by the level of education and skills of workers 
as well as of management, and it may further be explained by the fact that 
Danish manufacturing industries are rather young. The ease of adjustment may 
be facilitated by the fact that 'components' in the broadest sense of the 
word play a dominating role. Hence the difficult problems of industries sell-
ing final goods on a large scale, with each unit being quite expensive (e.g. 
durable consumer goods) in markets where preferences change, are avoided to a 
larger extent than in manufacturing industries in many other countries. How-
ever, exceptions can of course be found, Danish shipyards being one of them. 
MARKETS 
12. The share of exports in total output (incl. sales of intermediary goods) 
has shown an increasing trend, and was between 25-30 per cent during the ear-
ly 1970s. Around 1960, the corresponding share was only slightly above 20 per 
cent. In 1950, the share of exports in output of final goods was only around 
19 per cent,
2 corresponding to an export share out of total output of roughly 
15 per cent. Some of the factors explaining this development have been dis-
cussed above in connection with comments on the rapidly increasing exports by 
manufacturing industries during this period. Over the last decade, increasing 
international specialization in the field of manufacturing has probably been 
the most important factor. 
13. Roughly 75 per cent of total exports of manufactures have been sold in 
Western Europe, the most important market being Sweden (18-20 per cent of to-
tal manufacturing exports) followed by the Federal Republic of Germany, Nor-
way and the UK (10-13 per cent each). During the years of Danish membership 
of EFTA, the share sold to the EFTA countries increased at the expense of ex-
ports to the six members of the EEC. However, the accession of Denmark to the 
EEC reversed this trend. 
This issue was also discussed in the 'EEC-report', published in 1968. Al-
though the figures are by now somewhat out of date, it may be worth noting 
some of the findings: a special investigation, covering 100 firms, showed 
that out of the total increase in exports of these firms from 1960 to 1965, 
fifty per cent came from firms having no, or virtually no, exports in 1960. 
An additional investigation, confined to exports of machinery etc., showed 
that the relative increase of exports had been greatest among smaller firms. 
Op.cit. pp. 83 ff. 
See Danmark og de Europaeiske Faellesskaber, vol. I, 1968, p. 81. - 63 -
Table III.3 
Employment and output in manufacturing industries 
Number of 
workers 
Number of 
salary-earners 
Number of 
working hours 
Output in 
manufacturing
0) 
1965 
100 
100 
100 
100 
1967 
93 
101 
90 
107 
1969 
96 
105 
90 
129 
1971 
94 
107 
85 
136 
1973 
99 
110 
83 
153 
1973, 
absolute 
numbers 
32ia) 
106a) 
540
b) 
-
a) 
b) 
c) 
1 000 persons, 
millions of hours. 
This index it not too reliable. It is illustrating output at constant 
prices, but the index has been revised during the period. It may be an 
open question whether it actually illustrates growht of outpout or growth 
of value-added, but it aims at illustrating the former. 
Source : Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1975. 
EMPLOYMENT 
14. Table III.3 illustrates main trends in employment in manufacturing in-
dustries, taken as a whole, during the period 1965-1973. The number of workers 
employed - 321 000 in 1973 - has remained roughly constant. However, due to 
shorter working hours, longer vacations etc., the total number of hours worked 
has nevertheless shown a significant decline - well over 15 per cent from 
1965 to 1973. 
During this eight-year period, output in manufacturing industries increased 
by well over 50 per cent. Roughly speaking, this should imply an increase in 
labour productivity per hour of 8 per cent per year in manufacturing indus-
tries. However, such a figure is obviously subject to many shortcomings for a 
variety of reasons, one of them being whether the output index properly re-
flects the trend in value-added. - 64 -
Table III.4 
Wages and profits in manufacturing industry 
(Per cent) 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
Share in gross 
value-added of 
wages 
55.0 
56.4 
58.7 
58.0 
57.1 
56.7 
58.4 
60.2 
58.6 
57.8 
profits 
45.0 
43.6 
41.3 
42.0 
42.9 
43.3 
41.6 
39.8 
41.4 
42.2 
Average profit margins 
Gross profits a a per 
cent of total assets 
before de-
preciation 
after de-
preciation 
13.3 7.6 
12.7 7.0 
10.6 5.6 
11.6 6.8 
11.9 7.1 
12.5 7.8 
11.6 6.9 
11.1 6.2 
12.8 9.0 
13.7 9.1 
according to sample
1 
Rate of 
return on 
net 
assets
2 
12.5 
10.4 
7.0 
10.5 
11.4 
13.9 
10.8 
7.5 
14.5 
18.3 
Capacity 
to expand 
through 
earnings·^ 
4.3 
3.5 
2.2 
3.3 
3.5 
4.3 
3.0 
2.1 
4.2 
5.4 
See text for further explanation. 
2 Profits after depreciation, interest payments and taxes, expressed as a 
percentage of net assets. 
3 
Same definition of profits as in the preceding note, but here related to 
total assets. 
Sources: See text. 
WAGES AND PROFITS 
15. Another interesting, but complicated, issue is related to wages and 
profits in manufacturing industries. Some key figures are shown in table 
III.4. In the first column, the share of wages in value-added is indicated 
for the years 1964-1973. During this period, definitions have been changed, 
and although attempts have been made to adjust the figures, they should be 
interpreted with caution. Furthermore, attention should be drawn to the fact 
that wages are expressed as the share of gross domestic product. Hence the 
level of the share of wages according to the table does not provide an appro-
priate expression of the share of wages out of the total net income earned by 
labour and capital in manufacturing industry. The latter figure would be a 65 
good deal higher than shown in the table - and the corresponding profit share 
correspondingly lower. 
According to the table, the share of wages has shown an increasing trend from 
1964 to 1973, or at least to 1971. This result corresponds to findings in a 
number of other countries. However, figures illustrating the shares of wages 
and profits in manufacturing industries taken as a whole are subject to many 
shortcomings, some of them being related to index-number problems due to in-
ter-industry shifts of the composition of total value-added. 
Still, the figures in the first two columns of table III.4 may give a rough 
idea of the order of magnitude of changes in the shares of wages and profits. 
As far as the share of profits is concerned, it is interesting to note that, 
according to the table, the share of profits has invariably changed in the 
same direction as that of the average profit margins according to the last 
four columns of the table. This is so in spite of the fact that the profit 
margin figures have been estimated on the basis of quite different data. 
16. Available national accounts data hardly provide a sufficient basis for 
the purpose of illustrating the development of the average rate of profit in 
manufacturing industry. Instead, the figures in the remaining part of table 
III.4 have been arrived at on the basis of profit statistics, published each 
year by the Danish Institute for Industrial Credits. The figures are based on 
accounts by firms having obtained loans from the Institute. The presentation 
is partly due to estimates by the Danish Economic Council. The last column 
shows at which rate the firms covered by the statistics - generally consid-
ered to be rather efficient ones - would be able to expand on the basis of 
self financing, assuming that no dividends were paid out. 
Generally speaking, all the profit rate concepts indicated in table III.4 
show a declining trend until the boom years of 1972 and 1973. Furthermore, 
the short-term fluctuation from year to year of the four different concepts 
invariably move in the same direction (they all increase or decline at the 
same time). It should, however, be kept in mind that all four profit concepts 
are -based on calculations using historical costs for depreciation, and the 
value of assets. Existing information does not allow for 'inflation-account-
When attempts are made in order to determine the functional income distri-
bution, it should be maintained that wages represent net income of labour. 
In order to treat profits correspondingly, deductions of repair, mainte-
nance and depreciation from gross profits should be made. Obviously, this 
adjustment would reduce .the share of profits and hence increase the share 
of wages. 
An additional adjustment, generally made before the functional income dis-
tribution is calculated, is to take into account the imputed wages of own-
ers. However, in manufacturing industries this adjustment is only of minor 
importance due to the comparatively small number of owners. 
See Det økonomiske Råd, Dansk gSkonomi foråret 1972, pp. 38-45, in particu-
lar table 5 p. 44. In this publication, conceptual problems related to the 
table are discussed. The sample on which table III.4 is based, however, 
differs from the sample which provided the basis for table 5 in the 1972 
report. Consequently, the level of the profit rates differs, but the short 
term fluctuations are very similar. - 66 -
Table III.5 
Gross value-added of manufacturing 
industries by type of industry, 1965 and 1973 
Mining and quarring 
Food, beverages, tobacco 
Textiles, clothing, shoes 
Wood and wood prod. 
(incl. furniture) 
Paper, printings 
Chemical prod. 
(incl. petrol, prod.) 
Non-metallic mineral prod. 
Basic metal industr. 
Processed metal prod., 
machinery etc. 
Other manufact. industr. 
TOTAL 
1965 
DKR 1 000 
million 
0.08 
3.08 
1.49 
0.78 
1.54 
1.41 
1.03 
0.33 
5.01 
0.65 
15.40 
per cent 
0.5 
20.0 
9.7 
5.1 
10.0 
9.1 
6.7 
2.2 
32.5 
4.2 
100.0 
1973 
DKR 1 000 
million 
0.15 
6.60 
2.33 
1.53 
2.99 
3.78 
2.42 
0.67 
10.32 
0.42 
31.21 
per cent 
0.5 
21.1 
7.5 
4.9 
9.6 
12.1 
7.8 
2.1 
33.1 
1.3 
100.0 
Sources: Changes of definitions have taken place between 1965 and 1972, hence 
the figures are not entirely comparable. 1965 figures are taken 
from Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsorversigt 1975, 1973 fig-
ures from Danmarks Statistik, Industristatistik 1973. The figures 
are slightly higher than according to national accounts defini-
tions, because some 'overheads' advertising, insurance etc. have 
not been deducted from output in order to arrive at value-added. 
ing', i.e. calculations on the basis of current costs of assets. But probably 
such 'current-cost based' figures of profit rates would reveal a pattern simi-
lar to that found by the British Sandilands Committee with respect to manu-
facturing firms, namely that in periods of inflation, historical-cost ac-
counting tends to overrate grossly the level and the rate of increase of real 
profits. 
OUTPUT, VALUE-ADDED AND WAGES BY TYPE OF INDUSTRY 
17. It was stated earlier that the distribution of Danish manufacturing 
firms according to size had not changed, on average, very much over the last 67 
Table III.6 
Indice of output and gross value-added, by industry,1973 
Mining and 
quarrying 
Food, beverages, 
tobacco 
Textiles, cloth-
ing, shoes 
Wood and wood 
prod. (incl. 
furniture) 
Paper, printings 
Chemical prod. 
(incl. petrol 
prod.) 
Non-metallic 
mineral prod. 
Basic metal 
industries 
Processed metal 
prod., machinery 
etc. 
Other manufact. 
industries 
TOTAL 
Output 
119 
353 
210 
199 
161 
226 
150 
227 
189 
159 
225 
Raw materi-
als, etc. 
19 
253 
110 
99 
61 
126 
50 
127 
89 
59 
125 
Gross val-
ue-added 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Wages 
36 
49 
61 
55 
63 
45 
50 
56 
65 
56 
57 
Residual
1 
64 
51 
39 
45 
37 
55 
50 
44 
35 
44 
43 
Includes profits, repairs and maintenance and depreciation. 
Source: Danmarks Statistiks, Industristat!stik 1973. 
decade, although this did not take into account the position of the individ-
ual firms. This conclusion also holds with respect to the composition of the 
GDP of manufacturing industry analysed by individual industries, cf. table 
III.5. 
As appears from the table, the industrial pattern, measured at this level of 
aggregation, has remained largely unchanged from 1965 to 1973, the major ex-
ceptions being a relative decline of the textile and clothing industry and a 
relative growth of the chemical industry. The dominating manufacturing indus-
trial activities are in the field of machinery, metal processing etc., i.e. 
the same result as that shown in tables III.l and III.2. This industry ac-
counts for one-third of the total value-added of Danish manufacturing indus-
tries. Next comes the food-processing industry, accounting for 20 per cent. - 68 
18. As may be seen from table III.6, the structure of the individual indus-
tries varies a great deal. The industry receiving the largest share of output 
in the form of input of raw materials etc. is food processing, taking advan-
tage of the produce of Danish agriculture. Next comes 'Basic metal industries' 
(iron and steel works) and 'Chemical industries' (including petroleum refin-
eries) . 
More interesting, perhaps, is the size of the share of gross value-added be-
ing paid as wages to the employees of the industry concerned. According to 
table III.6, the share varies from 36 per cent (in 'Mining and quarrying') to 
65 per cent in metal processing etc., but of course the figures would vary 
much more if measured at the level of the individual firm. 
For manufacturing industries, taken as a whole, wages account for 57 per cent 
of total gross value-added (cf. table III.4). It must be emphasized that the 
share of 'residual income' cannot be considered to truly reflect the share of 
profits in manufacturing industries, as the 'residual' (in 1973 equal to 43 
per cent of gross value-added) includes repair, maintenance and depreciation. 
Hence the share of wages would be a good deal higher (and the share of prof-
its correspondingly lower), if the figures had taken 'net value-added' as 
their starting point. 
Nevertheless, table III.6 may be interpreted as providing confirmation of the 
suggestion, made above, that Danish manufacturing industries are, on the 
whole, rather labour intensive, although this varies from industry to indus-
try (and also between enterprises inside each industry). Therefore, the abil-
ity of Danish manufacturing industries to compete with foreign firms depends 
not only on the prospects for increased productivity (including design, inno-
vations, quality etc.), but also to a large extent on the comparative rate of 
growth of money wages (assuming exchange rates to be fixed). 
DANISH PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO 'WORKERS' PARTICIPATION' 
19. Around 1970, a number of proposals were presented, mainly by Danish 
trade unions, on 'Workers' Participation', i.e. compulsory schemes according 
to which the workers would gradually own an increasing share of joint stock 
companies, - and possibly of other enterprises as well. It is outside the 
scope of the present volume to discuss these proposals in detail, but a few 
aspects of the proposal made by the Association of Danish Trade Unions should 
be mentioned because they are related to the differences with respect to the 
share of wages shown in table III.6. 
The proposal put forward in 1971
1 by the Association of Danish Trade Unions
2 
provided for compulsory contributions to be paid in the form of a certain 
An earlier proposal, see Viggo Kampmann, Økonomisk Demokrati, et forslag, 
published by the trade union of the workers in the metal processing indus-
try, Copenhagen 1969, was based on the idea that the total profits of each 
enterprise should be shared between the owners and the workers. The (com-
pulsory) share being allotted to the labour force would be used to buy 
shares in the enterprise concerned; these shares would be jointly owned by 
(cont'd on page 69) 69 
percentage of the total wage bill of each enterprise. These revenues would be 
used in order to buy shares in Danish companies. On the additional assumption 
that the board of the fund receiving the revenues would be dominated by rep-
resentatives of workers' associations - trade unions and others - the obvious 
objection to the proposal would be that it really implied that Danish enter-
prises would soon become socialized. 
In order to meet this objection to some extent, two additional suggestions 
were included in the proposal. Firstly, although the shares would formally be 
owned by the central fund, the right to vote on the basis of the shares in a 
certain enterprise would not belong to the fund, but to the workers of the 
enterprise concerned. Secondly, in order to limit the power of the board of 
the fund to decide where to invest the revenues, it was suggested that each 
enterprise would be entitled to require that the contribution by the enter-
prise concerned (or at least part of it) be invested in that particular enter-
prise. But this proposal obviously implies a very fundamental dilemma: if the 
funds were recycled back to the enterprise making the contributions, problems 
would arise because enterprises making comparatively large contributions -
i.e. with high shares of wages in value-added - would be the labour intensive 
ones and, therefore, would not need as much finance as the capital intensive 
enterprises. However, the latter would only contribute very modestly to the 
fund because of their relatively small wage bill. 
For reasons of resource allocation, therefore, 'compulsory recycling' should 
be avoided. But the implication of this conclusion is that the powers of the 
board of the fund with respect to investment might have to be increased, and 
this in turn reinforces the argument that the whole scheme really represented 
a kind of 'disguised socialization'. 
No solution has yet been found with respect to these problems. However, the 
debate on these issues is still going on, and Parliament has not yet passed 
any legislation in this field. This debate may also be of importance with re-
spect to the possibilities of changing the structure of the revenues of the 
Danish government sector, a question which will be reconsidered in chapter VI. 
(cont'd of note 1 on page 68) 
the workers of the enterprise or perhaps by a board representing the inter-
ests of larger groups of workers. 
2 
Økonomisk Demokrati, report to the congress of the Association of Danish 
Trade Unions 1971. 71 
Chapter IV 
BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION 
VALUE-ADDED, OF THE BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
1. As was pointed out in chapter I (see tables 1.6 - 1.8), the share of 
building and construction in total added-value (GDP) remained roughly stable 
at about 7 per cent during most of the 1950s. At the same time, unemployment 
in this sector was substantial (cf. table 1.13), although the figures partly 
reflect seasonal unemployment. In this period, the building and construction 
sector could not be accused of making it difficult for the balance of pay-
ments industries to expand. 
However, from the late 1950s onwards the picture changed completely. Overall 
growth rates increased substantially and unemployment almost disappeared. One 
of the main factors in this upswing was the increased activity of the build-
ing and construction sector. In the period 1958-66, the real growth rate of 
this sector far exceeded that of the economy as a whole (cf. table 1.8). 
Furthermore, the proportion of the total labour force engaged in building and 
construction increased (cf. table 1.3). 
From 1966 to 1973, the share of building and construction in total value add-
ed and in the total labour force remained roughly constant. However, the 
economy operated at full capacity, and the problems of resource allocation by 
industries remained. 
2. Supplementary year-by-year figures are shown in the first two columns of 
table IV.1. The figures indicate very clearly that short-term fluctuations of 
growth rates have been much larger in the building and construction sector 
than for the total economy, but that the fluctuations of the two series gen-
erally move in the same direction. Hence it can hardly be claimed that stabi-
lization policies - in particular counter-cyclical policies - have been very 
successful with respect to the building and construction sector. 
3. Further analysis of the output of the building and construction industry 
is not possible as the required data is practically non-existent. A more de-
tailed description must therefore be based on the demand side of the national 
accounts, i.e. on figures for fixed investment in buildings. The principal 
components are shown in the last three columns of table IV.1 for the period 
1960-73. - 72 -
Table IV.1 
Building and construction, main indicators 
1960 (mill. DKR, 
1955-prices) 
Percentage vol-
ume growth rates 
as compared with 
preceding year: 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1973 (mill. DKR, 
1955-prices) 
1973, when 
1960 = 100: 
GDP
1 
Total 
35 614 
5.6 
5.6 
0.4 
8.8 
5.0 
2.2 
4.1 
4.5 
8.2 
2.6 
3.6 
4.6 
2.8 
62 709 
176 
of which 
build, and 
constr. 
2 
4 
605 
10.6 
5.2 
- 1.0 
17.7 
6.5 
2.0 
9.4 
- 3.5 
8.6 
3.5 
2.6 
5.3 
1.1 
980 
191 
Investm 
gov. t 
etc. 
400 
15.0 
17.4 
- 8.3 
12.1 
18.9 
12.9 
18.1 
14.2 
19.9 
17.4 
10.2 
- 4.5 
17.4 
1 230 
308 
. in  buildings, etc. 
industrial 
and agri-
cultural 
1 
900 
5.6 
3.7 
- 0.5 
19.4 
10.3 
- 7.4 
- 1.7 
-14.0 
11.9 
7.1 
2.9 
- 1.2 
26.8 
560 
173 
residen-
tial 
1 095 
18.3 
8.5 
- 4.3 
28.6 
7.5 
2.2 
19.5 
- 9.5 
26.0 
0.0 
- 1.4 
27.8 
6.4 
3 475 
317 
Real product, cf. table 1.6. 
2 Excluding residential buildings in agriculture. 
Sources: See sources to appendix table 1.1. 
Investment by government (including local authorities) in construction has -
with the exception of 1963 - shown a remarkably high and stable rate of 
growth until 1972. Hence it has not been used as a counter-cyclical instru-
ment. - 73 -
Table IV.2 
Starts of new buildings by floorage 
1960 ( 
Index, 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1000 m
2) 
1960 = 100: 
1973 
total 
5 399 
116 
126 
114 
164 
151 
172 
172 
159 
193 
180 
189 
249 
243 
12 972 
Floor area st 
gov. t 
etc. 
454 
193 
147 
102 
152 
150 
235 
270 
279 
243 
332 
279 
260 
263 
1 191 
arted 
industri-
al 
agr 
and 
LCUl-
turai 
2 
3 
209 
93 
114 
105 
152 
138 
127 
127 
99 
114 
111 
112 
121 
172 
790 
resi 
ti 
2 
7 
den-
al 
676 
123 
133 
124 
176 
163 
198 
192 
188 
250 
212 
237 
353 
299 
991 
Number 
of 
residen-
tial 
units 
started 
29 956 
116 
122 
114 
153 
139 
167 
152 
148 
180 
148 
157 
213 
168 
50 399 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1970 and 1975. 
Building investment by private sector firms has fluctuated, mainly reflecting 
expectations with respect to future sales possibilities. The very substantial 
increase - more than 25 per cent - between 1972 and 1973 is probably due to 
the effect on confidence of the result of the referendum on Danish EEC-mem-
bership in October 1972. 
Investment in residential buildings has shown an increase for the period as a 
whole of the same order of magnitude as that of government investment, but 
fluctuations have been much more pronounced. 
4. While the figures in table IV.1 use national accounts data, table IV.2 
(and the following tables) use non-monetary quantitative terms. The table 
shows the total floor area of new buildings started in the years from 1960 to 74 
1973. In principle, the figures of table IV.2 - mainly presented in terms of 
index numbers rather than growth rates - illustrate the same development as 
that shown in the last three columns of table IV.1. However, there are sever-
al differences with respect to definitions. Furthermore, the figures in table 
IV.2 fluctuate even more that those shown in table IV.1. 
Perhaps the most interesting finding from table IV.2 is related to industrial 
and agricultural investment in buildings. Such investment has only shown a 
moderate increase, if any, during most of the period, especially if certain 
boom-years - in particular 1973 - are disregarded. From the mid 1960s onwards, 
the proportion of total building investment destined for industrial purposes 
(factories, office buildings,etc.) has shown a clear downward trend. 
RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION, 1960-73 
5. The last two columns of table IV.2 illustrate developments in residential 
construction. In 1960, roughly 30 000 new residential units were started; in 
1973 the corresponding figure was 50 000, i.e. an increase by roughly 70 per 
cent. In terms of floor area, the increase was much larger, roughly a trebling. 
Hence new residential units have become larger, mainly because an increasing 
share of the new housing units are one-family houses rather than apartments. 
6. Table IV.3 shows the number of residential units completed. Apart from 
some problems with respect to definitions (see note to table IV.3), the first 
column of table IV.3 is based on the same basic statistics as the last column 
of table IV.2. Not surprisingly, the figures on residential units completed 
show a much smoother development than the corresponding figures for residen-
tial units started, the period used in order to build a unit being flexible 
and partly depending on capacity utilization in the building industry. 
The first column of table IV.3 confirms the main conclusion mentioned earlier: 
a rap-id increase of investment in residential buildings until 1967-68 and 
subsequently a rather stable level. In 1973, the number of new residential 
units reached an all-time peak of 55 000. 
In addition, table IV.3 provides two different analyses: by physical type of 
unit and by ownership. As far as the first analysis is concerned, the number 
of one-family houses completed in 1973 was roughly 38 000, while the corre-
sponding number in the form of apartments only amounted to 17 000. From 1960 
to 1969, roughly half of all new residential units were apartments and the 
other half one-family houses,
1 both categories increasing at roughly the same 
rate. But in 1972 and 1973, one-family houses increasingly predominated. 
To a certain extent, this pattern is reflected in the break-down by type of 
ownership in the last column of table IV.3. Of the 55 000 new residential 
units in 1973, 42 000 were owned by private persons and 13 000 by housing so-
cieties. The activities of the latter have almost exclusively been in the 
1 Prior to 1969, some rural areas dominated by one-family houses were not 
covered by the figures, cf. note to table IV.3. - 75 -
Table IV.3 
Residential units completed 
(Indices, 1960 = 100) 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1973, 
number 
of 
units 
Total 
100 
108 
116 
114 
143 
144 
146 
163 
169 
182 
185 
184 
183 
204 
55 566 
of which 
one-
family 
houses 
100 
106 
114 
115 
152 
167 
156 
179 
154 
185 
189 
187 
214 
246 
37 935 
apart-
ment 
build-
ings 
100 
111 
118 
115 
136 
116 
134 
151 
195 
189 
190 
193 
154 
161 
16 848 
others 
100 
118 
117 
101 
118 
175 
148 
112 
83 
93 
104 
84 
62 
57 
783 
of wh 
private 
100 
118 
118 
107 
135 
149 
141 
166 
154 
177 
180 ' 
175 
186 
214 
42 304 
ich owned 
housing 
socie-
ties 
100 
93 
119 
144 
175 
142 
167 
175 
225 
215 
217 
220 
192 
203 
12 902 
by 
others 
100 
70 
66 
41 
68 
94 
85 
49 
64 
75 
78 
100 
74 
26 
360 
Note: Prior to 1969, certain rural areas were not included. For 1969, data 
are published according to both sets of definitions. Hence a procedure 
of 'chaining' is used in connecting figures prior to and after 1969. 
The extended coverage amounted to roughly 9 000 new residential units, 
mainly one-family houses owned by private persons. - The fact that the 
coverage was extended in 1969 explains why absolute 1960-figures are 
not given; they would not be comparable with the 1973-figures of the 
last row. 
Source: See sources to table IV.2. - 76 -
Table IV.4 
Starts of new residential units by numbers 
Geographical distribution 
(Per cent) 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
Metropol 
metro. 
27 
24 
22 
19 
21 
18 
17 
13 
area 
itan zone 
other 
15 
16 
11 
15 
21 
15 
16 
16 
Jutland 
43 
42 
49 
49 
42 
49 
48 
50 
Other parts 
15 
18 
18 
17 
16 
18 
19 
21 
Denmark 
total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Note: In Danish statistics, a distinction is made between the 'metropolitan 
area' (including Copenhagen and 19 adjacent municipalities) and the 
'metropolitan zone' (covering North Sealand, i.e. roughly the area 
north of a line from Copenhagen to Roskilde). The corresponding names 
in Danish are 'Hovedstadsområdet' and 'Hovedstadsregionen'. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1975. 
field of apartments, in fact they dominated the supply of new apartment 
buildings during most of the period 1960-73. The declining share of apart-
ments during the early 1970s reflects increasing difficulties for the housing 
societies. 
7. The geographical distribution of new residential units during the period 
1966 to 1973 is shown in table IV.4. The declining share of new residential 
units in the metropolitan area might partly be due to the fact that building 
land is becoming increasingly scarce. This could lead one to conclude that 
further expansion around Copenhagen would take place in the remaining parts 
of the metropolitan zone. (For definitions, see note to table IV.4). However, 
such an expansion has apparently not taken place, and the main conclusion to 
be drawn from table IV.4 is that an increasing share of new residential units 
have been built outside the metropolitan zone, defined in the broadest sense. 
THE STOCK OF RESIDENTIAL UNITS, 1970 
8. Compared with other Western European countries, Danish standards of hous-
ing are very high. This result is partly due to the accelerating activity in 77 
Table IV.5 
Number of residential units and inhabitants per unit, 1970 
1 room 
2 rooms 
3 rooms 
4 rooms 
5 rooms 
6 rooms 
and 
above
1 
TOTAL 
farms 
0.3 
8.3 
33.5 
41.7 
31.3 
60.1 
175.2 
Number 
one-
fami-
ly 
hous-
es 
1.3 
36.9 
163.6 
260.0 
133.6 
117.0 
712.4 
of units 
apart-
ment 
build. 
58.9 
281.1 
240.0 
107.0 
21.3 
10.4 
718.7 
, 1 000 
oth-
ers 
4.1 
38.6 
51.8 
22.5 
9.7 
9.8 
136.5 
total 
64.6 
36^.9 
488.9 
431.2 
195.9 
197.3 
1 742.8 
Inhabitants per unit 
farms 
1.68 
2.36 
2.73 
3.22 
3.59 
-
-
one-
fami-
ly 
hous-
es 
1.58 
2.14 
2.57 
3.17 
3.44 
-
-
apart-
ment 
build. 
oth-
ers 
1.11 1.20 
1.84 1.81 
2.64 2.30 
3.10 2.81 
3.09 3.11 
-
-
total 
1.13 
1.88 
2.59 
3.14 
3.41 
-
-
1 Including units with number of rooms unknow (13 600). 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Bolingen, Statistisk Tabelvaerk 1975, C 2. 
the field of residential construction during the 1960s. The increase from 
30 000 to 50 000 in the number of new residential units built per year from 
1960 to 1973 compares with an annual increase in population of by some 40 000 
persons over the same period. 
In 1970,. the total number of residential units amounted to 1 743 000, inhab-
ited by 4 776 000 persons. In table IV.5, the total number of residential 
units are shown by number of rooms and by type (one-family houses, apartments, 
etc.). Roughly 40 per cent of the total number of residential units were one-
family houses, a similar number were apartments, 10 per cent were farm houses, 
the remaining 10 per cent covering other types. Most of the one-family houses 
have 3-5 rooms, most apartments 2-3 rooms. 
Roughly speaking, the total number of residential rooms amounted to 6.2 mil-
lion or 1.25 rooms per head, a very high figure by international comparison. 
Of course, such a comparison ought to take into account the number of resi-
dential units dismantled. Reliable figures are rather scarce; most recent 
estimates imply that the figure has been increasing. During the 1960s and 
early 1970s, the number of residential units dismantled was probably about 
10 000 units per year. 78 
Table IV.6 
Geographical distribution of total residential 
units in 1970 by type of dwelling 
(1 000 units) 
Metropolitan area 
Other urban areas 
Rural areas 
TOTAL 
Owner 
occupied 
dwell-
ings 
116 
201 
529 
846 
of which 
farms 
1 
3 
157 
161 
one fam-
ily 
houses 
97 
161 
348 
606 
Rented 
uni ts 
406 
307 
104 
817 
Others 
20 
20 
40 
80 
Total 
542 
528 
673 
1 743 
Source: See appendix tables IV.2 - IV.4. 
Table IV.7 
Number of residential units by type and by year of construction, 1970 
(1 000 units) 
Year of con-
struction: 
Prior to 
1919 
1919-1940 
1941-1960 
1961-1965 
1966-1970 
TOTAL 
Occupied by 
total 
314 
164 
160 
100 
108 
846 
of 
farms 
117 
31 
9 
2 
2 
161 
owner 
which 
one-
family 
houses 
156 
105 
142 
97 
105 
605 
Uni 
total 
265 
202 
195 
72 
82 
816 
ts rented 
of which 
owned by 
priv. 
hous-
ing so-
cieties 
242 7 
158 28 
61 125 
29 42 
29 51 
519 253 
Others 
32 
16 
21 
6 
6 
81 
Total 
611 
382 
376 
178 
196 
1 743 
Source: See appendix table IV.1. 79 
Furthermore, Danish residential units are very well equipped: 83 per cent of 
all units had central heating, 99 per cent their own kitchen, 73 per cent 
bathing facilities and 90 per cent their own toilet. 
9. The comparatively even distribution of rooms by inhabitants according to 
the last column of table IV.5 should not conceal the fact that there are 
still substantial housing problems for part of the population, in particular 
in urban areas. It has been estimated that roughly 10 per cent of the urban 
population live in residential units with less than one room per person, and 
that roughly 18-19 per cent of the total number of rooms would need to be re-
distributed in order to obtain a completely even distribution of rooms by in-
habitants in urban areas. 
10. Roughly speaking, just below one-third of total residential units are 
located in the metropolitan area, a similar proportion in other urban areas 
and somewhat above one-third in rural areas.· Not surprisingly, owner-occupied 
dwellings predominate in rural areas, whereas rented units - mainly apart-
ments - have an equally dominating role in the metropolitan area. 
Table IV.6 summarizes the more detailed information given in appendix tables 
IV.2-IV.4. It is often tempting to discuss economic policies in a certain 
field from the viewpoint of the economy as a whole. However, such an approach 
is particularly dangerous in the field of housing problems. As appears from 
the appendix tables, the distribution of residential units by age and by type 
of ownership is very different in the three types of areas. Most of the prob-
lems are particularly difficult to solve in the larger cities, including the 
Copenhagen area. 
11. About half the 1.7 million residential units in 1970 were owned by their 
occupants, when farm houses are included in this category, cf. table IV.7. 
Roughly two-thirds of the apartments - mainly old ones - were owned by pri-
vate persons etc., while the remaining third (slightly more than 250 000 
apartments) was owned by housing societies. 
Roughly one-third of the total number of residential units were built prior 
to 1919, slightly more than 20 per cent originated in the twenty inter-war 
years 1919-40 and a similar share in the twenty (war and post-war) years 
1941-60, and finally, 21 per cent were built during the 1960s. Hence this 
last decade contributed as many new dwellings to the total stock of residen-
tial units as earlier periods of two decades. 
Estimates by Christen Sørensen. The latter figure results from a technique, 
familiar from illustrations of personal income distribution, which produces 
the so-called Lorenz-curves. 
2 In the first three columns of table IV.7, farms and one-family houses are 
only counted if they are actually occupied by their owner; houses not so 
occupied are included under 'units rented'. 80 
Table IV.8 
Main groups of residential units in 1970 by year of construction 
Year of construction 
Prior to 1919 
1919-1940 
1941-1960 
1961-1970 
Year of construction 
Prior to 1919 
1919-1940 
1941-1960 
1961-1970 
Owner-occupied 
Farm 
houses 
117 
31 
9 
4 
23 
10 
3 
1 
one-fami-
ly houses 
1 
156 
105 
142 
202 
30 
32 
42 
57 
Rented apartments 
owned by 
private  housing 
societies 
000 units 
242 7 
158 28 
61 125 
58 93 
Per cent 
46 1 
49 9 
18 37 
16 26 
Total 
of groups 
shown 
522 
322 
337 
357 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Source: See appendix table IV.1. 
HISTORICAL TRENDS IN THE STRUCTURE OF RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT 
12. Definitions are frequently changed in basic statistics on residential 
units (cf. e.g. note to table IV.3); hence comparable figures covering sev-
eral decades are difficult to obtain. However, the 1970 census of the stock 
of residential units by year of construction as well as by other criteria 
(cf. appendix tables IV.1-IV.4), provides an alternative basis for obtaining 
historical data, although the description is bound to be very broad. The 
bottom part of table IV.8 shows the pattern of residential units, origina-
ting from each period, with respect to type of unit and ownership, and pro-
vides a rough impression of the composition of residential construction dur-
ing the period concerned. 
One of the problems related to this interpretation is that demolition is im-
plicitly disregarded. Therefore, the figures for earlier periods are less 
reliable than those for 1961-70. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that most 
farm-houses were built in the period prior to 1919. Rural residential areas 
were dominated by owner-occupied houses (cf. appendix table IV.4), while 
urban residential units - and those of the metropolitan area in particular -- 81 -
Table IV.9 
Geographical distribution of total residential 
units in 1970 by year of construction 
(Per cent) 
Year of construction 
Prior lo 1919 
1919-1940 
1941-1960 
1961-1970 
Metropoli 
area 
27 
42 
35 
23 
tan  0th  er urban 
area 
21 
29 
38 
38 
Rural areas 
52 
29 
27 
39 
Total 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Source: See appendix tables IV.2 - IV.4. 
mainly consisted of apartments, owned by private landlords (cf. appendix ta-
bles IV.2 and IV.3). The role of housing societies was still insignificant. 
During the inter-war years 1919-1940, urbanization became more widespread. 
The share of apartments in the total of new residential units increased, and 
a growing proportion were built by housing societies, in the metropolitan 
area in particular. 
Since the Second World War, almost no new farm houses have been built. The 
share of total apartments built by private landlords has been declining. The 
1940s, and in particular the 1950s, were the decades of the housing societies, 
erecting over 33 per cent of all new residential units. 
However, during the 1960s the pattern changed, the most important feature be-
ing the increasing share of owner-occupied one-family houses, accounting for 
more than half of the total number of new residential units. The proportion 
of new apartments in total new dwellings continued to decline, with the hous-
ing societies following the trend established earlier by private landlords. 
13. The importance of agriculture prior to the First World War is reflected 
in the figures in the first row of table IV.9. During the inter-war years the 
growth of building activity in the metropolitan area was comparatively large, 
more than 40 per cent of all new residential units being erected in this area. 
After the Second World War, the metropolitan area declined in importance. 
HOUSING POLICIES 
14. One of the main features according to table IV.8 is the increasing im-
portance of housing societies in the construction of apartments, starting 82 
during the inter-war years and reaching a peak during the 1950s. From the 
1960s onwards, owner-occupied one-family houses started to predominate not 
only at the expense of apartments built by private landlords, but subsequent-
ly also at the expense of housing societies. To a large extent, this picture 
reflects the development of housing policies, including tax treatment of own-
ers of one-family houses. 
15. Housing societies are non-profit organizations. In principle, they have 
provided residential units - mainly apartments - for middle- and low-income 
groups. To a large extent their activities have been based on government sub-
sidies, mainly in the form of reduced interest rates paid on loans to finance 
residential construction. Occasionally, an additional purpose of subsidies in 
this field has been of importance, namely to prevent the level of activity in 
residential construction from declining too much. Hence the role of the hous-
ing societies has not been limited to that of providing residential facili-
ties from the existing stock of apartments; they have also played an impor-
tant role as contractors in the industry of building and construction. 
16. At the beginning of the Second World War, a system of rent control was 
introduced, which lasted until 1973, at least in the larger cities. The bas-
ic idea was that rents should be fixed according to historical costs of con-
struction and financing. Obviously, such a system gives rise to problems in 
periods of inflation, which was an important feature of the Danish economy, 
not only during the Second World War, but also later on - and increasingly so 
during the late 1960s and the early 1970s (cf. chapter I). Hence rents to be 
paid for old apartments have been much lower than those for new apartments of 
the same size and quality. 
Such policies, maintained over decades, had several effects, not all of them 
being advantageous. Old - and therefore cheap - apartments would always be 
occupied. But landlords would not be induced to maintain - or even improve -
the standard of the apartments. Furthermore, since rents could only be in-
creased to a limited extent and in an unpredictable way, depending on new 
legislation, new apartment buildings were not attractive objects for private 
inveátors. They would have to compete with housing societies, the latter hav-
ing access to cheaper financing because of subsidized interest rates. Fre-
quently, it was difficult to have new apartments, built by private investors, 
occupied immediately after their construction at rents covering costs, and 
the investor did not know when, nor by how much, rents would be allowed to 
increase. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that housing societies played 
an increasingly dominating role with respect to investment in new apartments 
and other residential units to be let. 
In 1966, political agreement was reached on long-term housing policies, 
covering eight years: 1966-74. Basically, the underlying assumption was 
that the general price level would not increase during this period. Conse-
quently, the long-term interest rate was expected to decline substantially. 
On these assumptions, rents,etc. were fixed for the entire eight years, 
with some increase over the period for residential units with comparatively 
low rents. Had the assumptions been fulfilled, many housing problems would 
have been solved in 1974. 
However, the general tendency was for inflation to accelerate rather than 
to disappear. Hence new problems had arisen, and new policies had to be de-
cided upon in 1974. 83 -
17. In Denmark, the finance for investment in residential units is obtained 
through a mortgage-bond system. Since about 1960, this system has been used 
by all types of owner. The effective interest rate has been above 10 per cent 
since 1969, and in 1973 it was roughly 13 per cent. 
18. Even new owner-occupied houses, which accounted for more than half the 
total of new residential units during the 1960s, have been financed at these 
apparently rather high interest rates. At first sight, this makes it somewhat 
surprising that new owner-occupied houses are taking an increasing share of 
the market. However, these interest payments lower the taxable income of the 
owner, and with high and increasing marginal tax rates, the after-tax inter-
est rate is considerably lower than indicated above. Furthermore, in periods 
of inflation, the real interest rate becomes even lower. In fact, during the 
latter part of the 1960s, the real after-tax interest rate was quite low, and 
occasionally even negative. 
As interest payments rank fully for tax relief, it might be expected that the 
corresponding benefits from occupying the house should be included at market 
value as part of taxable income. However, political attempts to achieve this 
aim have not been very popular among owner-occupiers. These owners represent 
an increasing share of the electorate (in 1973 probably at least half of it) 
and the possibility of treating them in a less generous way with respect to 
taxation has not been considered very promising. 
Further details of the bond-system - the use of which is not limited to 
house-purchase - are given in chapter VIII. Housing societies also finance 
residential investment through this mortgage system. From 1966 onwards, 
they have received a current government subsidy corresponding to the dif-
ference between the actual effective interest rate to be paid and an inter-
est rate of 6-7 per cent. The subsidy is, however, only paid for a limited 
period. Appendix table IV.1 
Number of residential units in 1970 by year of construction 
Year of construction 
Prior to 1919 
1919-1940 
1941-1960 
1961-1965 
1966-1970 
TOTAL 
Owner 
occu-
pied 
total 
313 982 
164 175 
159 693 
100 079 
108 230 
846 159 
of which 
farms 
116 
30 
9 
2 
1 
160 
one-
family 
houses 
625 156 294 
866 105 111 
204 142 334 
201 96 481 
907 105 037 
803 605 257 
others 
41 063 
28 198 
8 155 
1 397 
1 286 
80 099 
Rented 
apart-
ments 
total 
265 203 
201 635 
195 349 
71 921 
82 221 
816 329 
of which owned by 
priv. 
242 461 
158 352 
61 238 
28 727 
28 702 
519 480 
housing 
socie-
ties 
6 408 
28 126 
125 231 
42 065 
51 294 
253 124 
others 
16 334 
15 157 
8 880 
1 129 
2 225 
43 725 
(number of units) 
Other 
dwell-
ings 
32 213 
15 839 
20 681 
6 385 
5 168 
80 286 
Total 
611 398 
381 649 
375 723 
178 385 
195 619 
1742 774 
a) Including roughly 
Source:Danmarks Stati 
100 000 units with unknow year of construction, 
stik: Boligen, Statistisk Tabelvaerk 1975, C 2. 
œ Appendix table IV.2 
Number of residential units in metropolitan areal jn 1970 by year of construction 
(Number of units) 
Year of construction 
Prior to 1919 
1919-1940 
1941-1960 
1961-1965 
1966-1970 
TOTAL 
Owner 
occu-
pied 
total 
19 134 
33 317 
35 630 
13 744 
14 098 
115 923 
of which 
farms 
536 
123 
96 
45 
19 
819 
one-
family 
houses 
10 454 
26 544 
33 144 
13 171 
13 519 
96 832 
others 
8 144 
6 650 
2 390 
528 
560 
18 272 
Pented 
apart-
ments 
total 
137 602 
121 085 
90 144 
28 509 
28 171 
405 511 
of which owne 
priv. 
122 121 
85 611 
28 598 
11 071 
9 734 
257 135 
housing 
socie-
ties 
5 624 
23 055 
56 610 
16 585 
16 693 
118 567 
d by 
others 
9 857 
12 419 
4 936 
853 
1 744 
29 809 
Other 
dwell-
ings 
7 246 
4 666 
6 905 
635 
778 
20 230 
Total 
163 982 
159 068 
132 679 
42 888 
43 047 
541 664 
Copenhagen and 19 adjacent municipalities. 
Source : See source to appendix table IV.1. 
co 
Ul Appendix table IV.3 
Number of residential units in other urban areas 
(10 000 inhabitants and above) in 1970 by year of construction 
Year of construction 
Prior to 1919 
1919-1940 
1941-1960 
1961-1965 
1966-1970 
TOTAL 
Owner 
occu-
pied 
total 
46 537 
42 922 
48 439 
31 711 
31 323 
200 932 
of which 
farms 
1 863 
537 
235 
52 
51 
2 738 
one-
family 
houses 
26 384 
27 291 
44 667 
31 330 
31 016 
160 688 
others 
18 
15 
3 
37 
290 
094 
537 
329 
256 
506 
Rented 
apart-
ments 
total 
78 360 
64 560 
87 260 
34 392 
42 124 
306 696 
of which owne 
priv. 
73 358 
57 447 
23 394 
12 410 
13 024 
179 633 
housing 
socie-
ties 
615 
4 930 
60 455 
21 898 
28 844 
116 742 
d by 
others 
4 387 
2 183 
3 411 
84 
256 
10 321 
(Number o 
Other 
dwell-
ings 
5 249 
5 070 
6 931 
1 696 
1 595 
20 541 
f units) 
Total 
130 146 
112 552 
142 630 
67 799 
75 042 
528 169 
00 
O) 
Source: See source to appendix table IV.1. Appendix table IV.4 
Number of residential units in rural areas in 1970 by year of construction 
Year of construction 
Prior to 1919 
1919-1940 
1941-1960 
1961-1965 
1966-1970 
TOTAL 
Owner 
occu-
pied 
total 
248 311 
87 936 
75 624 
54 624 
62 809 
529 304 
farms 
114 
30 
8 
2 
1 
157 
226 
206 
873 
104 
837 
246 
of which 
one-
family 
houses 
119 456 
51 276 
64 523 
51 980 
60 502 
347 737 
others 
14 629 
6 454 
2 228 
540 
470 
24 321 
Rented 
apart-
ments 
total 
49 241 
15 990 
17 945 
9 020 
11 926 
104 122 
of 
priv. 
46 982 
15 294 
9 246 
5 246 
5 944 
82 712 
which owned by 
housing 
socie-
ties 
169 
141 
8 166 
3 582 
5 757 
17 815 
others 
2 090 
555 
533 
192 
225 
3 595 
(Number o 
Other 
dwell-
ings 
19 718 
6 103 
6 845 
4 054 
2 795 
39 515 
!" units) 
Total 
317 270 
110 029 
100 414 
67 698 
77 530 
672 941 
00 
v] 
Source: See source to appendix table IV.1. - 89 
Chapter V 
PRIVATE SERVICES 
1. In chapters II, III and IV, the most important Danish industries have 
been discussed at some detail. The increasing role of government services 
will be dealt with in the first part of chapter VI on 'Public finance'. The 
present chapter comments on the remaining industries, mainly private services. 
The chapter will be brief as the subject is rather heterogeneous, and there 
are rather few general observations to be made. 
2. The contribution to GDP of private services amounts to roughly 35 per 
cent of total GDP (cf. table V.l). In fact, the industries discussed in the 
present chapter almost exactly correspond to those labelled 'Other industries' 
in table 1.9. Thus they represent what is left when the mainly balance of 
payments industries (agriculture, manufacturing etc.) as well as the predomi-
nantly domestic industries (building and construction, government services 
etc.) have been excluded. 
3. Although the share of private services as a whole in total GDP has re-
mained roughly constant at the 35 per cent level, the various components show 
different trends. The share of the distributive trades has shown a continuous 
decline. This is due to increasingly large scale operations at the whole-sale 
as well as at the retail level. The declining share at the retail level re-
flects a number of factors: increased participation rates of certain types 
of customers, in particular married women, increased use of individual means 
of transportation (cars - not bicycles any more), etc. Of course, these fac-
tors are of importance in most Western European countries , but the very rap-
id overall growth in Denmark during the 1960s and the fact that distances 
are, on the whole, rather small, may have made it particularly difficult for 
the 'small retailer' to survive in competition with supermarkets, etc. 
4. While the share of the distributive trades in GDP has been declining, the 
opposite holds for the types of services characteristic of an industrialized 
and increasingly specialized economy. Thus, the share of banking and insur-
ance has increased from 2.2 per cent in 1950 to 3.6 per cent in 1973. A simi-
lar development is shown for the various professions (lawyers, accountants, 
architects, etc.). Unfortunately, this can only be illustrated for the period 
1950-1966, because definitions were changed in 1970 (see note to table V.l). 
It will carry us too far to comment on the importance of the other - mainly 
minor - service industries, but it should be noted that domestic servants - 90 -
Table V.l 
Contribution by private service industries to gross 
domestic product at factor prices, current prices 
Distribution trades 
Banking and 
insurance 
Professions
1 
Foreign shipping 
Other transport 
Communication 
Hotels, 
restaurants, etc. 
Cinemas, 
theatres, etc. 
Domestic servants 
Use of Dwellings 
Private services, 
total
1 
Government serivces
1 
Other industries 
GDP, TOTAL 
1950 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
3.4 
0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
1.1 
0.3 
0.3 
0.1 
0.3 
0.9 
7.7 
1.6 
12.3 
21.6 
per 
cent 
16.0 
2.2 
1.9 
2.0 
5.0 
1.4 
1.3 
0.2 
1.3 
4.4 
35.7 
7.3 
57.0 
100.0 
1958 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
5.0 
0.8 
0.8 
1.0 
1.9 
0.6 
0.4 
0.1 
0.3 
1.8 
12.7 
3.3 
18.0 
34.0 
per 
cent 
14.8 
2.5 
2.4 
2.9 
5.4 
1.8 
1.2 
0.3 
0.9 
5.1 
37.3 
9.8 
52.9 
100.0 
1966 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
10.7 
2.1 
2.0 
1.5 
4.1 
1.7 
1.0 
0.2 
0.4 
3.8 
27.5 
9.9 
37.3 
74.7 
per 
cent 
14.3 
2.9 
2.6 
2.0 
5.5 
2.2 
1.3 
0.2 
0.6 
5.1 
36.7 
13.3 
50.0 
100.0 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
20.5 
5.7 
2.6 
3.3 
8.4 
3.2 
1.9 
0.3 
0.3 
8.8 
55.0 
30.3 
73.8 
159.1 
per 
cent 
12.9 
3.6 
1.6 
2.1 
5.3 
2.0 
1.2 
0.2 
0.2 
5.5 
34.6 
19.0 
46.4 
100.0 
From 1969 to 1970, the distinction between 'Government services' and 'Pro-
fessions' (Lawyers, accountants, architects etc.) was changad. According to 
the new set of national accounts definitions, the coverage of 'Government 
services' was extended at the expense of 'Professions'. Hence these figures 
for 1966 are not fully comparable with the 1973 figures in the table. 
Sources: See sources to appendix table 1.1. 
have almost disappeared. Such labour intensive services with few possibili-
ties for the use of technological progress, are bound to become increasingly 
expensive as compared with other prices. On the supply side, the increasing 
interest shown by younger women to get jobs in industries - as illustrated by 
the increasing participation rates - makes the job of domestic servant less 
attractive from an educational viewpoint. - 91 -
Finally, the increasing share of GDP attributed to 'use of dwellings' is 
rather difficult to interpret, as the figures are bound to be very uncertain. 
This is so partly because of problems related to restrictions and regulations 
with respect to rents, and partly, because an increasing proportion of the 
contribution to GDP by this sector must be imputed, since the share of owner-
occupied dwellings has been increasing (cf. chapter IV). 
5. The trends revealed by table V.l are confirmed by labour force statistics 
on the basis of surveys undertaken since 1967 (cf. table V.2). Thus employ-
ment in the retail trades has been declining; as a share of total employment 
and also in absolute terms. One of the implications of this development is 
that some of the activities, earlier undertaken at the retail level, have now 
been moved to the wholesale level in connection with the creation of 'chains' 
etc. The share of wholesale trade in total employment has remained rather 
stable - showing, if anything, a slight increase. 
Employment in banking and insurance increased rapidly from 1967 to 1970, but 
subsequently stagnated as increasingly advanced technical devices were intro-
duced. 
The possibilities of introducing such devices may be less obvious in the 
field of professions; at least the share of total employment in these fields 
has been increasing steadily. The opposite has held for 'other services', 
including hotels, etc. 
Finally, according to table V.2 only 16 000 domestic servants remained in 
1973. 
6. The share of employment by the private service industries, taken as a 
whole, declined slightly from 1967 (32 per cent) to 1973 (31 per cent). This 
development is in sharp contrast to the share of employment in government 
services, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
7. Finally a few supplementary comments on the composition of the labour 
force in private services. Because of the heterogeneous structure of this 
sector, general trends are difficult to establish. But it should be noted 
that the number of 'owners' (including self-employed) in the distributive 
trades declined from slightly below 80 000 in 1967 to slightly below 60 000 
in 1973. This decline mainly reflects developments in retail trade. For obvi-
ous reasons, the mobility problem in connection with sectors of declining im-
portance will often be most serious for owners of small units with a fixed 
location. Hence the above figures confirm the similarity of the problem fac-
ing small-holders in agriculture and the owners of small retail shops. The 
latter may even be worse off than the former, partly because they are less 
well organized, partly because the real assets on which their activities have 
been based will usually be more difficult to sell in case of a discontinua-
tion of their traditional activities. 
8. Table V.3 shows the composition by sex and marital status of the main 
service industries in 1967 and 1973. The most general feature according to 
the table is the tendency for the share of married women in the labour force 
to increase at the expense of unmarried women. The increasing importance of 
married women in services from 1967 to 1973 fits well with the marked rise in 
the participation rates of this group from 1967 to 1973 (cf. table 1.4). 
Among the groups listed in table V.3, the tendency is especially strong for 
the professions. - 92 -
Table V.2 
Labour force in private services 
Retail distribution 
Wholesale distribution 
Banking and insurance 
Professions 
Transport, communication, 
etc. 
Other services, incl. 
hotels, theatres, etc. 
Domestic servants 
Private services, total 
Government services 
Other industries 
TOTAL LABOUR FORCE 
1967 ( 
1 000 
pers. 
201 
114 
59 
50 
161 
130 
41 
756 
368 
1 216 
2 340 
autumn) 
per 
cent 
8.6 
4.9 
2.5 
2.1 
6.9 
5.6 
1.7 
32.3 
15.7 
52.0 
100.0 
1970 ( 
1 000 
pers. 
193 
117 
71 
61 
156 
124 
32 
754 
441 
1 185 
2 380 
spring) 
per 
cent 
8.1 
4.9 
3.0 
2.6 
6.6 
5.2 
1.3 
31.7 
18.5 
49.8 
100.0 
1973 (autumn) 
1 000 
pers. 
186 
125 
72 
68 
167 
121 
16 
755 
564 
1 127 
2 446 
per 
cent 
7.6 
5.1 
3.0 
2.8 
6.8 
4.9 
0.7 
30.9 
23.1 
46.0 
100.0 
Note: The definitions correspond to those of table 1.3. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1974. 
Table V.3 
Analysis by sex and marital status of labour force in private services 
(Per cent) 
Distribution, banking, etc. 
Professions 
Transport, communication, etc. 
Other services 
Domestic servants 
TOTAL 
men 
1967 
55 
58 
79 
32 
-
53 
1973 
53 
56 
78 
35 
-
55 
unmarried 
women 
1967  1973 
20 16 
23 17 
9 8 
26 23 
89 90 
23 17 
married 
women 
1967  1973 
25 31 
19 27 
12 14 
42 42 
11 10 
24 28 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik: Statistiske Efterretninger 1968 No 15 and 1974 
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Chapter VI 
THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR AND FISCAL POLICY 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES, SHARE OF GDP 
1. The rapidly expanding role of the public sector (including central gov-
ernment, local government, social security systems etc.) will be a recurrent 
theme in this chapter. Although the supply side of the national accounts does 
not provide detailed break-downs, at least it provides an important starting 
point. The figures have already been shown in chapter I; they are summarized 
in table VI.1. Measured at constant (1955) prices as real product (cf. table 
1.6), the share of government services in total GDP has only increased moder-
ately, although the increase was accelerating somewhat over the last part of 
the period covered by table VI.1. 
Table VI.1 
Government services according to national accounts figures 
Real 
product 
Real income 
Current 
prices 
1950 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
2.1 
1.9 
1.6 
per 
cent 
of 
total 
GDP 
8.1 
7.3 
7.3 
1958 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
2.8 
3.1 
3.3 
per 
cent 
of 
total 
GDP 
8.9 
9.8 
9.8 
1966 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
4.4 
6.4 
9.9 
per 
cent 
of 
total 
GDP 
9.4 
13.3 
13.3 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
6.8 
12.6 
30.3 
per 
cent 
of 
total 
GDP 
10.8 
19.0 
19.0 
Note: As the coverage of 'Government services' was extended somewhat in 1970 
(see note to table VI.1), the increase from 1966 to 1973 shown in the 
above table is slightly exaggerated. 
Source : See appendix table 1.1. - 94 -
Table VI.2 
Labour force in government services etc. 
Admin., police, 
defence 
Education etc. 
Health and social 
services 
Government serv-
ices, total 
Professions
1 
Other occupations 
TOTAL LABOUR FORCE 
1967 (autumn) 
1 000 
pers. 
95 
115 
158 
368 
50 
1 922 
2 340 
per 
cent 
4.1 
4.9 
6.7 
15.7 
2.1 
82.2 
100.0 
1970 ( 
1 000 
pers. 
108 
133 
200 
441 
61 
1 878 
2 380 
spring) 
per 
cent 
4.5 
5.6 
8.4 
18.5 
2.6 
78.9 
100.0 
1973 (autumn) 
1 000 
pers. 
125 
167 
272 
564 
68 
1 814 
2 446 
per 
cent 
5.1 
6.9 
11.1 
23.1 
2.8 
74.1 
100.0 
1973 
(1967 
=100) 
131 
146 
172 
153 
135 
94 
105 
Lawyers, accountants, architects, etc. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1974. 
However, if the share of government services is measured as the share of real 
income or - what amounts to the same - on the basis of figures at current 
prices, the increase becomes dramatic: from 7.3 per cent in 1950 to 13.3 per 
cent in 1966 and to no less than 19.0 per cent in 1973. As discussed in chap-
ter I, the increasing share is to a large extent explained by the fact that 
government services, mainly consisting of labour services, have become rela-
tively more expensive as compared with the prices of other goods - and per-
haps also as compared with other wage rates. However, the number of govern-
ment employees has increased as well, in particular over the last decade, as 
shown by the employment surveys. 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES 
2. Table VI.2 provides an analysis of the labour force according to employ-
ment surveys. From 1967 to 1973, the number of government employees has in-
creased by more than 50 per cent. The only other group showing a somewhat 
similar increase is the professions, which over the same period increased by 
35 per cent. Most other industries have had a declining labour force over the 
period 1967 to 1973. - 95 -
Table VI.3 
Labour force in government services converted to full-time employees 
Admin., police, 
defence 
Education etc. 
Heath and social 
services 
Government services, 
total 
Professions 
Other occupations 
TOTAL LABOUR FORCE 
Total labour force, 
unadjusted 
1967 (autumn) 
1 000 
pers. 
91 
99 
137 
327 
47 
1 800 
2 174 
2 340 
per 
cent 
of uñ-
ad just. 
95 
86 
87 
89 
94 
94 
93 
100 
1970 ( 
1 000 
pers. 
102 
113 
169 
384 
57 
1 753 
2 194 
2 380 
spring) 
per 
cent 
of uñ-
ad just. 
95 
85 
84 
87 
93 
93 
92 
100 
1973 (autumn) 
1 000 
pers. 
118 
137 
220 
475 
61 
1 681 
2 217 
2 446 
per 
cent 
of uñ-
ad just. 
94 
82 
81 
84 
91 
93 
91 
100 
1973 
(1967 
=100) 
129 
138 
161 
145 
131 
93 
102 
105 
Sources : Employment surveys, see e.g. Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk tiårs-
oversigt 1974, supplemented by estimates in William Scharling, Ten-
denser for udbudet af arbejdskraft 1973-1988, Copenhagen 1973 (un-
published) and additional information received from William Schar-
ling-
The increase by type of government activity was, however, not evenly distrib-
uted. Employment in 'administration, police and defence' increased by 31 per 
cent, in 'education etc.' by 46 per cent and in the sector 'health and social 
services' by no less than 72 per cent. Hence in 1973, almost half of the la-
bour force in government services was employed in the 'health and social 
services' sector. 
3. The figures in table VI.2 give part-time employees the same weight as 
those working full-time. The information from respondents to the sample sur-
veys, on which the labour force estimates are based, does not provide a com-
plete basis for converting the figures to corresponding figures of full-time 
employees. Still, such figures, (cf. table VI.3), provide a useful supplemen-
tary information despite their lower degree of reliability. 
According the table VI.3, part-time working has increased in importance al-
though, for the total labour force, the extent is still limited. Conversion - 96 -
Table VI.4 
Composition by sex and marital status of labour 
force in government services (unadjusted data) 
Admim., 
police, 
defence 
Education 
etc. 
Health, soc. 
services 
Government 
services, 
total 
Professions 
Other occu­
pations 
TOTAL LABOUR 
FORCE 
Admin., 
police, 
defence 
Education 
etc. 
Health, soc. 
services 
Government 
services, 
total 
Professions 
Other occu­
pations 
TOTAL LABOUR 
FORCE 
Men 
1967 
65 
52 
24 
141 
29 
1 308 
1 478 
68 
45 
16 
38 
58 
68 
63 
1973 
77 
70 
37 
184 
38 
1 232 
1 454 
62 
42 
13 
33 
56 
68 
59 
Unmarried 
women 
1967 1973 
1 000 ρ 
15 19 
21 26 
69 94 
105 139 
11 12 
247 188 
363 339 
Per 
16 15 
18 16 
43 35 
29 25 
23 17 
13 10 
16 14 
Married 
women 
1967 
ersons 
15 
42 
65 
122 
10 
367 
499 
cent 
16 
37 
41 
33 
19 
19 
21 
1973 
29 
71 
141 
241 
18 
394 
653 
23 
42 
52 
42 
27 
22 
27 
Total 
1967 
95 
115 
158 
368 
50 
1 922 1 
2 340 2 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
1973 
125 
167 
272 
564 
68 
814 
446 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Sources: See sources to table IV.3. 97 
of part-time workers to equivalent full-time employees implies a reduction of 
the total labour force by 7 per cent in 1967 and by 9 per cent in 1973. 
However, in government services part-time work is of comparatively greater 
importance, in particular in the areas of education and social services etc. 
Here, conversion to full-time implies a reduction of 13-14 per cent in 1967 
and of nearly 20 per cent in 1973. Consequently, on a full-time equivalence 
basis the share of government services in the total labour force only in-
creased from 15 per cent in 1967 to 21 in 1973, as compared with an increase 
from 16 to 23 per cent according to the unadjusted figures in table VI.2. 
4. The differences with respect to part-time employment are related to the 
composition of the labour force by sex and marital status (cf. table VI.4), 
which is based on unadjusted labour force figures. The share of married women 
increased rapidly between 1967 and 1973. In government services, this pattern 
is very clearly reflected in 'administration, police, defence', where - for 
obvious reasons - men constitute the dominant part of the labour force. 
However, in the field of education - and even more so for social services etc. 
- the share of men was small in 1967 and has declined, while that of married 
women was high and has increased. Thus in 1973, the male labour force in the 
Table VI.5 
Index (1973 compared with 1967) of labour force in 
government services by sex and marital status, both un-
adjusted and when converted to equivalent full-time employment 
1967 = 100 
Admin., 
police, 
defence 
Education 
etc. 
Health, 
social 
services 
Government 
services 
TOTAL LABOUR 
FORCE 
Men 
unad-
justed 
ad-
justed 
119 121 
135 133 
152 152 
131 131 
98 99 
Unmarried 
women 
unad-
justed 
ad-
justed 
126 126 
124 118 
138 131 
133 128 
93 90 
Married women 
unad-
justed 
ad-
justed 
190 177 
169 159 
217 204 
197 185 
131 122 
Total 
unad-
justed 
ad-
justed 
131 129 
146 138 
172 161 
153 145 
105 102 
Sources: See sources to table VI.3. Table VI.6 
Central government expenditure, current and capital account. Fiscal years, current prices 
Current account 
Social expenditure: 
Pensions, etc. 
Health and social insur. 
Others (incl. unempl. 
benefits) 
Social expend., total 
Education 
Schools 
Further education 
Education, total 
Other curr. expend. 
Current expend., total 
Gov.t investiu, excl .defence 
Defence 
Public utilities 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
Total NNI at factor cost, 
DKR 1 000 million 
Gov.t expenditure, 
per cent of NNI 
1938/39 
mill. DKR  per cent 
93 14 
72 10 
87 12 
252 36 
67 9 
27 4 
94 13 
174 25 
520 74 
104 15 
63 9 
17 2 
704 100 
6.5 
10.8 
1950/51 
mill. DKR  per cent 
403 15 
248 10 
309 12 
960 37 
181 7 
98 4 
279 11 
690 26 
1 929 74 
294 11 
349 14 
27 1 
2 599 100 
18.8 
13.8 
1958/59 
mill. DKR  per cent 
1 082 19 
583 10 
542 10 
2 207 39 
449 8 
272 5 
721 13 
1 058 18 
3 986 70 
653 12 
965 17 
63 1 
5 667 100 
28.5 
19.9 
1966/67 
mill. DKR  per cent 
3 321 20 
2 102 12 
1 385 8 
6 808 40 
1 411 8 
1 449 9 
2 860 17 
3 334 19 
13 002 76 
1 935 11 
2 025 12 
178 1 
17 140 100 
61.8 
27.7 
1973/74 
mill.DKR  per cent 
12 505 27 
6 304 13 
5 461 12 
24 270 52 
2 602 6 
4 649 10 
7 251 16 
8 561 18 
40 082 86 
2 385 5 
3 544 8 
515 1 
46 526 100 
130.6 
35.6 
Note: The fiscal year is from April 1st to March 31s·.. NNI figures refer to calendar years, three quarters of which are covered 
by the corresponding fiscal year. 
Source: Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Statsfinanserne 1973-74, Copenhagen 1975, and earlier years. For reasons explained in the 
text, this yearly publication has not been published since 1974. 
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field of health and social services only represented 13 per cent, while the 
proportion of married women reached no less than 52 per cent. 
5. According to tables VI.2 and VI.3, viz. the growth rates of various sec-
tors of the labour force, differed when unadjusted and when converted to 
full-time employees. These differences are illustrated in table VI.5, indica-
ting growth rates from 1967 to 1973 for main types of employment in govern-
ment services by sex, etc. While growth rates for the male labour force are 
very similar whether adjusted or not, indices for non-married women mainly 
show lower growth rates, when they are based on adjusted figures, and the 
same trend is even clearer for married women. The latter not only constitute 
an increasing share of the total labour force in government services (cf. 
table VI.4), but at the same time they are employed on a part-time basis to a 
much larger extent than in the other groups. 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
6. The usual distinction between central government, local government, and 
the social security systems also holds for the public sector. However, direct 
contributions to social security schemes from employers and employees are in-
significant. Most public expenditure in the form of social transfers is fi-
nanced by the central government. This pattern has important consequences for 
the tax structure. 
7. In Denmark, there are two levels of local government, 'amter' (or 'amts-
kommuner') and 'kommuner' (or 'primaerkommuner'). Around 1960, there were 22 
'amtskommuner' and roughly 1 400 'primaerkommuner'. During the 1960s, the 
number of 'amtskommuner' was reduced to 14 and that of 'primaerkommuner' to 
277.
X 
The main purpose of this change of structure was to create local units large 
enough to take over certain responsibilities in a decentralized system. The 
reason for maintaining both types of 'kommuner' was mainly that some func-
tions (e.g. hospitals and larger roads) would require a rather large basis 
in terms of population, area etc., and there became the responsibility of the 
'amtskommuner', whereas other activities were well suited for smaller units, 
and were referred to the 'primaerkommuner'. Thus the distinction between 
'amtskommuner' and 'primaerkommuner' mainly refers to types of functions. In 
principle, the 'primaerkommuner' are not subordinated to the 'amtskommuner'. 
In the following, a distinction between the two types will not be made, and 
both will be covered by the label: local authorities. 
8. The original intention of the reorganization of local government was that 
it should be followed by a delegation of functions from the central govern-
ment. Substantial changes in this field were made during the early 1970s. 
Therefore, it is difficult to obtain a long series of comparable figures by 
type of expenditure for the total government sector. In some of the following 
tables, reasonably reliable time series in this field are presented from 1967 
onwards, based on information from the Economic Secretariat of the govern-
In the metropolitan area, some special arrangements were made. They are not 
covered by the above description. 100 
ment. In order to provide a somewhat longer perspective, these figures are 
supplemented by tables, showing expenditures and revenues of the central gov-
ernment only. However, the coverage of the latter figures may - in particular 
for the last decade - be affected by the changes in the institutional pattern. 
POST-WAR TRENDS IN EXPENDITURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
9. Before the development of public expenditure during the last decade are 
examined at some detail, it may be worth-while looking at long-term trends. 
For this purpose, figures are only available at current prices and only for 
the central government (cf. table VI.6). Because of the increasing activi-
ties of local authorities, the figures show somewhat lower levels and lower 
growth rates as compared with the corresponding figures for the total public 
sector. However, amounts spent by the central government in order to refund 
expenditure undertaken by local governments are included in the figures under 
the relevant category. It might be added that, during the period covered by 
the table, the fiscal year refers to the twelve months from April 1st to 
March 31st. 
The most striking figures are those indicating the total expenditure of the 
central government as a per cent of net national income (NNI).
1 In 1930/39, 
this share was slightly below 11 per cent, in 1973/74 well over 35 per cent. 
The increase mainly took place during the latter part of the period. 
An increasing share of total central government expenditure has been used for 
current expenditure. The share of civil investment declined during the early 
1970s. Defence expenditure increased sharply up to the late 1950s, following 
our entry into NATO, but subsequently its share in total government expendi-
ture -declined. 
10. The two most important categories of central government current expendi-
ture are the social services and education. The share of social services in-
creased from 36 per cent in 1938/39 to 40 per cent in 1966/67 and to no less 
than 52 per cent in 1973/74, a development which calls for some explanation. 
The Danish social security system differs from that of other EEC-countries to 
the extent that the greater part of expenditure - and pensions in particular 
- are paid by the central government. Private and semi-private insurance ar-
rangements are only of limited importance. Thus, most allowances, including 
pensions, are financed by the tax-payers, a system which was established dur-
ing the early 1930s. This basic pattern remained unchanged until recently. 
Thus, until the early 1970s most payments to doctors by their patients were 
Obviously, the choice of net national income (at factor cost) as 'numeraire' 
implies that the shares will appear large, because the numeraire is the 
smallest conceivable expression in the national accounts. Still, it is the 
author's view that net concepts are the relevant ones (cf. the section on 
wages and profits in chapter III), and, therefore, the most appropriate ex-
pression of national income (or product) is the one used in table VI.6 and 
in subsequent tables. - 101 -
Table VI.7 
Total public expenditure by broad category 
Fiscal years 1967/68 - 1973-74, current prices 
Transfer payments 
Purchases of goods 
and services: 
Current account
1 
Capital account 
TOTAL PUBLIC EXPEND. 
Net national income, 
corresponding cal-
endar year 
1967/68 
DKR 
1 000 
mill 
10.1 
14.6 
4.8 
29.5 
67.7 
per 
cent 
NNI 
15 
22 
7 
44 
100 
1969/70 
DKR 
1 000 
mill 
13.9 
19.0 
6.5 
39.4 
84.0 
per 
cent 
NNI 
16 
23 
8 
47 
100 
1971/72 
DKR 
1 000 
mill 
20.0 
27.0 
8.1 
55.1 
101.5 
per 
cent 
NNI 
20 
26 
8 
54 
100 
1973/74 
DKR 
1 000 
mill 
24.4 
35.2 
8.2 
67.8 
130.6 
per 
cent 
NNI 
19 
27 
6 
52 
100 
Including all defence expenditure. 
Source: Information received from the Economic Secretariat of the government 
(Det økonomiske Sekretariat). 
refunded according to an insurance system (sick-benefit association) mainly 
financed by contributions by the individual members. However, this arrange-
ment was taken over by the government, adding to the traditional tax burden. 
The problems arising from such a system have become obvious as social expen-
ditures have increased. Until the mid 1960s, old age pensions were mainly 
paid to low income groups, but since 1970 every citizen over the qualifying 
age became entitled to receive such pensions. In addition, most expenditure 
in connection with the health services are paid - directly or indirectly - by 
the central government, and the same holds for the major part of unemployment 
benefits. With increased levels of benefit and with an increasing number of 
persons entitled to these benefits (e.g. old age pension), expenditure on so-
cial services was bound to increase very rapidly. 
11. The other large item shown in table VI.6 is education, which accounted 
for 11 per cent of total government expenditure in 1950/51 and 16 per cent in 
1973/74. The share devoted to public schools has, however, generally been on 
a downward trend although it should be kept in mind that, in this field, the 
role of the local authorities (which are not covered by the table) is rather 
important - and has been increasing. 
Other expenditure on education mainly covers a variety of higher education, 
including universities. These activities are almost exclusively financed by 
the central government. During the 1960s, expenditure in this field increased - 102 -
Table VI.8 
Total public expenditure, current and capital account 
Fiscal years 1967/68 - 1973/74, current prices 
Current account 
Social expenditure: 
Pensions, etc. 
Health and social 
insurance 
Others (incl. un-
employment benefits) 
Social expend., 
total 
Education 
Various transfers 
Other current 
expend. 
Current expend., 
total 
Public investment, 
excl. defence 
Defence 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
Net national income, 
correspond, calendar 
year 
1967/68 
DKR 
1 000 
mill 
4.7 
4.5 
3.0 
12.2 
4.3 
2.4 
4.1 
23.0 
4.1 
2.4 
29.5 
67.7 
per 
cent 
NNI 
7 
7 
4 
18 
6 
4 
6 
34 
6 
4 
44 
100 
1969/70 
DKR 
1 000 
mill 
6.3 
6.1 
3.7 
16.1 
5.8 
4.0 
5.4 
31.3 
5.5 
2.6 
39.4 
84.0 
per 
cent 
NNI 
8 
7 
4 
19 
7 
5 
6 
37 
7 
3 
47 
100 
1971/72 
DKR 
1 000 
mill 
9.9 
8.4 
6.0 
24.3 
8.4 
4.9 
7.2 
44.8 
7.1 
3.2 
55.1 
101.5 
per 
cent 
NNI 
10 
8 
6 
24 
8 
5 
7 
44 
7 
3 
54 
100 
1973/74 
DKR 
1 000 
mill 
13.3 
11.4 
7.4 
32.1 
10.8 
5.1 
9.1 
57.1 
7.1 
3.6 
67.8 
130.6 
per 
cent 
NNI 
10 
9 
6 
25 
8 
4 
7 
44 
5 
3 
52 
100 
Source: See source to table VI.7. - 103 -
dramatically; in 1958/59 it amounted to 5 per cent of total expenditure by 
the central government, but had increased to 9 per cent by 1966/67. 
TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, INCLUDING LOCAL AUTHORITIES, 1967-1973 
12. For the period 1967-1973, an analysis of public expenditure is available 
on a more comprehensive basis, covering not only expenditure financed by the 
central government, but also that financed by local authorities as well as by 
contributions to semi-official insurance schemes. In table VI.7, total public 
expenditure is shown by broad category. In order to eliminate the effect of 
inflation, additional figures are shown (in brackets) indicating for each 
category its share of total net national income of the corresponding calendar 
year. 
According to table VI.7, the share of total public expenditure increased from 
44 per cent of national income in 1967/68 to 52 per cent in 1973/74. The very 
sharp increase in transfer payments around 1970 was due to the introduction 
of a general old-age pension scheme, mentioned earlier. 
Purchases of goods and services also increased as a share of - a rapidly in-
creasing - national income. Such expenditure on current account amounted to 
22 per cent of national income in 1967/68 and to 27 per cent in 1973/74. 
These figures are not inconsistent with the labour force figures in tables 
VI.2 and VI.3, as it must be borne in mind that prices of goods purchased by 
the public sector have increased more slowly than the prices of services 
(= salary rates to government employees). 
Finally, capital expenditure increased slightly faster than national income 
until· the early 1970s, when the importance of this expenditure started to de-
cline. Since 1970, a growing proportion of this expenditure has been under-
taken by the local authorities. However, 'ceilings' on such expenditure have 
been imposed by the central government, partly in order to dampen the general 
boom of the early 1970s. 
13. Table VI.8 provides a more detailed analysis of total public expenditure 
over the period 1967/68 - 1973/74 and corresponds to table VI.6 except that 
it covers all public expenditure and not only those financed by the central 
government. 
14. Current expenditure on social services is by far the biggest - and the 
fastest expanding - category of total public expenditure. In 1967/68, it 
amounted to 18 per cent of NNI; in 1973/74 this share had increased to 25 per 
cent of NNI or slightly below half of total public expenditure. 
1 If a number of transfers had been included, actually shown under 'Various 
transfers' in table VI.8, but paid for reasons similar to those used for 
certain social expenditure, the share of social expenditure in total public 
expenditure would easily exceed 50 per cent. - 104 -
This increase is reflected in all categories of expenditure. The share of 
pensions
1 increased from 7 per cent in 1967/68 to 10 per cent in 1973/74, 
mainly because of the introduction of the new scheme of old-age pensions in 
1970. The figures for pensions do not include pensions paid to government em-
ployees as part of their employment conditions;^ the latter amounted to 
roughly DKR 1 000 million in the early 1970s. 
One of the factors explaining the increased expenditure in the field of 
health, and social insurances, is the introduction, in 1972 and 1973, of a 
scheme according to which those who are unable to work due to illness receive 
compensation in the form of current payments, the rates being fixed by law. 
Again, the underlying principle is not one of insurance, but of government 
transfers. 
With respect to other social expenditure, it might be mentioned that the to-
tal amount paid by public sources in connection with unemployment did not ex-
ceed DKR 1 000 million in any of the years indicated in table VI.8. 
15. Current expenditure in the field of education has also increased at a 
rate faster than the rate of growth of national income. In 1967/68, this ex-
penditure corresponded to 6 per cent of NNI, and to 8 per cent in 1973/74. 
The increase partly reflects current transfers in the form of grants to stu-
dents, but the main part consists of salaries to teachers and other employees. 
As was mentioned above in relation to the figures of central government ex-
penditure on education, the figures in table VI.6 only provide an incomplete 
picture, because a substantial part of total current expenditure in this 
field is financed by local authorities. In particular, this is true for ex-
penditure related to schools etc. For the period 1967/68 - 1973/74, it is es-
timated that the share of total current public expenditure on education that 
is devoted to schools, was around 60 per cent with a slightly declining trend, 
leaving the remainder (about 40 per cent and increasing) attributable to fur-
ther education. 
16. As appears from the previous comments, the expenditure figures for so-
cial services and education according to table VI.8 include transfers in 
these areas. All other transfers are included under the heading of 'Various 
transfers'. These transfers include assistance to developing countries (DKR 
1 500 million in 1973/74), and subsidies in the field of housing (well over 
DKR 2 000 million in 1973/74)in order to keep down rents (cf. chapter IV). 
The reason why the relative importance of these transfers declined from 
1971/72 to 1973/74 is that Danish public tranfers to agriculture disappeared 
in 1973/74 due to entry into the EEC. According to the figures on which table 
VI.8 is based, expenditure in this field amounted to well over DKR 1 000 mil-
lion in 1971/72. 
Expenditure on pensions includes a minor, but rapidly increasing amount 
(DKR 2 600 million in 1973/74 out of a total of DKR 13 300 million, cf. ta-
ble VI.8), covering current expenditure relating to institutions with 
dwellings and facilities for the aged. 
However, to the extent that government employees have such special arrange-
ments with respect to pensions, their pensions under the general scheme may 
be reduced. - 105 
17. Turning from current civil expenditure to expenditure on capital account 
- including public loans for investment purposes - table VI.8 confirms earl-
ier findings, in particular that the share of public investment in total pub-
lic expenditure declined during the early 1970s. This may partly reflect a 
counter-cyclical policy, but there is also a more fundamental explanation. 
Even prior to 1973 it was realized that the rate of growth of total public 
expenditure had to be reduced for structural reasons. The decline of public 
investment during the early 1970s may be interpreted as reflecting this new 
political attitude. Actually, the share of total public expenditure in na-
tional income did decline from 1971/72 to 1973/74, viz. from 54 per cent to 
52 per cent (cf. tables VI.7 and VI.8), the first reduction for many years. 
NEW STRATEGIES IN BUDGET MANAGEMENT 
18. During the first part of the 1970s, new methods were gradually intro-
duced with respect to budget management. As was mentioned above, one of the 
purposes was to provide for the decentralization of decision making by in-
creasing the powers of the local authorities. Another was to try to create a 
system, which would allow the central government to control the level of to-
tal public expenditure. Obviously, these two purposes might easily conflict. 
Conceptually, the distribution of the various functions of the public sector 
was clarified, with local authorities assuming responsibility for many activ-
ities in the social sector. The system of refunding by the central government 
of certain types of expenditure incurred by local authorities was abolished. 
Instead, block grants from the central government to the local units were in-
troduced. 
A similar strategy was introduced with respect to a number of expenditure 
areas where responsibility remained with the central government. For each 
such area, total expenditure may be limited by 'budget ceilings', which may 
also be used as fiscal-policy instruments. 
However, in other fields, rates of expenditure per person are specified by 
law. This is true, for instance, with respect to pensions and many other so-
cial transfers. Here total public expenditure will depend, partly on the lev-
el of benefits and partly on the number of persons entitled to receive the 
transfer concerned. Usually, the number of recipients will not be under the 
direct control of the authorities, and so variations in the levels of benefit 
will become the fiscal-policy instrument. 
19. The effects of this new system cannot yet be fully evaluated. Neverthe-
less, certain effects are worth mentioning. One is the advantage related to 
abolition of the system of automatic refunding by the central government of 
expenditure incurred by local authorities. Although the old system only im-
plied refunding of a certain percentage of local expenditure, the effect was 
still damaging from the viewpoint of the allocation of resources. Local au-
thorities were tempted to allow expenditure to increase in areas where the 
percentage to be refunded was substantial. Hence the very fact that the sys-
tem has been abolished - at least in part - may have contributed to dampening 
the rate of increase of total public expenditure. Table VI.9 
Central government revenue. Fiscal years, current prices 
Specefic sales taxes 
Import duties 
General sales taxes, includ-
ing VAT 
Commodity taxes, total 
Income taxes 
Persons 
Companies 
Taxes, total 
Other revenues 
Central government revenue, 
total 
Total NNI, factor cost, 
DKR 1 000 million 
Government revenue, per 
cent of NNI 
1938/39 
mill. 
DKR 
per 
cent 
315 43 
99 14 
-
414 57 
219 30 
63 8 
696 95 
34 5 
730 100 
6.5 
11.2 
1950/51 
mill. 
DKR 
1 563 
116 
23 
1 702 
1 060 
207 
2 969 
47 
3 016 
18.8 
per 
cent 
51 
4 
1 
56 
35 
7 
98 
2 
100 
16.1 
1958/59 
mill. 
DKR 
2 798 
279 
289 
3 366 
2 441 
363 
6 170 
170 
6 340 
28.5 
per 
cent 
44 
4 
5 
53 
38 
6 
97 
3 
100 
22.3 
1966/67 
mill. 
DKR 
7 323 
594 
2 297 
10 214 
7 453 
729 
18 396 
509 
18 905 
61.8 
per 
cent 
39 
3 
12 
54 
39 
4 
97 
3 
100 
30.6 
1973/74 
mill. 
DKR 
12 808 
780 
12 832 
26 420 
24 656 
1 872 
52 948 
629 
53 577 
130.6 
per 
cent 
24 
1 
24 
49 
46 
4 
99 
1 
100 
41.0 
o 
Note: See note to table VI.6. 
Source: See source to table VI. 107 
20. Another aspect of the new system of budget management is more fundamen-
tal, related to the basic purpose of increasing the powers of the local au-
thorities. In order to achieve this aim, the system may imply a reversal of 
the traditional Danish method of handling individual cases of 'unforeseen so-
cial events'. Previously, help to the individual hit by such an event has to 
a large extent taken the form of a right to a particular benefit at the rate 
fixed by law. But according to the new system, a larger share of the expendi-
ture on social services will be left to the judgement of each local authority 
in each individual case. However, the size of the 'block grants' is fixed by 
the central government on the basis of negotiations with the local authori-
ties' organizations. Therefore, the role of these organizations will be in-
creasing, implying - among other things - much closer contact between indi-
vidual local authorities. Against this background it is still an open ques-
tion whether the new system, aiming - in principle - at decentralizing the 
powers of public authorities, will in fact lead to different decisions - and 
thus to differences with respect to standards and patterns of resource allo-
cation - among the various local authorities. 
An additional reason for doubts as to whether the new system of decentraliza-
tion will lead in practice to different decisions is the fact that the organ-
izations of government employees (teachers, librarians, etc.) are strongly 
opposed to-any variation in standards in different local authority areas, and 
the influence of these organizations should not be underestimated. 
POST-WAR TRENDS IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
21. Turning to the revenue side, long-term trends in central government rev-
enues are shown in table VI.9, for the same years as for the expenditure fig-
ures in table VI.6. 
As a percentage of NNI, total revenues have increased somewhat faster than 
total expenditure, (cf. the bottom rows of tables VI.6 and VI.9). However, 
central government has usually had an overall surplus (even after including 
expenditure on capital account among total expenditure). 
22. The share of commodity taxes - including import duties and value-added 
taxes, - in total central government revenue has, on the whole, shown a de-
clining trend. This development has taken place in spite of the fact that gen-
eral sales taxes, which were not in use in 1938/39 and hardly in 1950/51, ac-
counted for nearly one fourth of total revenue in 1973/74. However, the role 
of import duties has been declining and was almost insignificant in 1973/74 
(partly due to our entry into the EEC). Furthermore, specific sales taxes ac-
counted for half of total revenues in 1950/51, but in 1973/74 the share had 
dropped to one quarter. 
Income taxes are now almost exclusively paid by persons. The share paid by 
companies has declined, partly reflecting improved depreciation allowances. 
The share of total central government revenue originating from personal in-
come taxes has shown an opposite tendency, increasing from 30 per cent in 
1938/39 to 46 per cent in 1973/74. Table VI.10 
Total public revenue, Calendar years 1965-73, current prices 
Specific sales taxes, incl. import 
duties etc. 
General sales taxes, incl. VAT 
Indirect taxes, total 
Income taxes, persons 
Income taxes, companies 
Income taxes, total 
Property taxes, inheritance duties,etc. 
Contrib. to social insurance schemes 
Total revenues 
Net national income 
Revenues collected by: 
Centr. government 
Municipalities 
Social insurance schemes 
1965 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
6.5 
1.9 
8.4 
8.7 
1.0 
9.7 
2.0 
1.1 
21.2 
56.8 
15.9 
4.2 
1.1 
per 
cent 
NNI 
12 
3 
15 
15 
2 
17 
3 
2 
37 
100 
% of 
total 
revenue 
75 
20 
5 
1967 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
7.8 
3.5 
11.3 
12.0 
0.9 
12.9 
2.6 
1.4 
28.2 
67.7 
per 
cent 
NNI 
12 
5 
17 
18 
1 
19 
4 
2 
42 
100 
% of 
total 
revenue 
20.7 
6.1 
1.4 
74 
21 
5 
1969 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
9.0 
7.7 
16.7 
16.4 
1.1 
17.5 
2.8 
1.6 
38.6 
84.0 
per 
cent 
NNI 
11 
9 
20 
20 
1 
21 
3 
2 
46 
100 
% of 
total 
revenue 
28.4 
8.6 
1.6 
74 
22 
4 
1971 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
9.8 
10.4 
20.2 
30.0 
1.3 
31.3 
4.0 
2.1 
57.6 
101.5 
per 
cent 
NNI 
10 
10 
20 
30 
1 
31 
4 
2 
57 
100 
% of 
total 
revenue 
40.6 
15.0 
2.0 
71 
26 
3 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
12.9 
13.2 
26.1 
39.7 
2.3 
42.0 
4.5 
1.4 
74.0 
130.6 
per 
cent 
NNI 
10 
10 
20 
30 
2 
32 
4 
1 
57 
100 
% of 
total 
revenue 
51.4 
21.3 
1.3 
69 
29 
2 
o  œ 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1976. - 109 
TOTAL PUBLIC SECTOR REVENUE, INCLUDING LOCAL AUTHORITIES, 1965-1973 
23. Obviously, revenue figures covering the total public sector are more in-
teresting than those of the central government only. Furthermore, they are 
easier to estimate than the expenditure figures shown in table VI.8. For the 
period 1965-73, total revenue figures are shown in table VI.10 for selected 
calendar years. 
In recent years, specific sales taxes accounted for somewhat above 10 per 
cent of national income, but with a slightly declining trend. In 1973, total 
revenue in this field amounted to nearly DKR 13 000 million. Of this amount, 
more than DKR 4 000 million was collected in connection with sales of cars 
and petrol, DKR 2 500 million was paid by smokers (cigarettes, etc.) and 
well over DKR 2 000 million was collected from taxes on spirits, wine and 
beer. The remaining DKR 4 000 million originated from a variety of other 
sources, including import duties of nearly DKR 1 000 million. 
The increasing share of commodity taxes in national income is due to the sub-
stantial growth of general sales taxes. In the early 1960s, a general sales 
tax was introduced at the wholesale level. In 1967, it was replaced by a gen-
eral value-added tax (VAT), at a rate of 10 per cent; by 1973 it had reached 
15 per cent.2 At this rate, total revenue from VAT, etc. corresponded to 10 
per cent of NNI, roughly the same share as total specific sales taxes. It 
should, however, be noted that commodity taxes are almost exclusively paid to 
the central government and do not provide revenue for local authorities. 
24. During the period from 1965 to 1973, revenues from personal income taxes 
almost exploded and they became an increasingly important source of revenue 
for local authorities. In 1965, they were equivalent to 15 per cent of NNI, 
and by 1973 the share had increased to no less than 30 per cent. This doub-
ling apparently took everybody by surprise and could probably not have been 
realized if the tax system had remained unchanged. However, during the late 
1960s several structural changes took place. 
For decades, income tax actually paid in the preceding year was deductible 
from gross income of the current year.^ This system was abolished in 1967. 
Furthermore, until 1970 actual income tax in any particular year was based on 
the previous year's income. From 1970 onwards, a new income-tax system was 
introduced on a 'pay-as-you-go' basis. 
1 In addition, owners of cars paid taxes - depending on the size of the car -
amounting to about DKR 1 000 million in 1973. In table VI.10, this amount 
is included among 'property taxes, etc.'. 
In April 1968, the rate was increased to 12.5 per cent and in June 1970 an 
additional increase to 15 per cent took place. See Danmarks Statistik: 
Skatter og afgifter. Oversigt 1977. Statistisk tabelvaerk 1977. V. 
This peculiarity of the Danish tax system implied that, even at tax rates 
at 100 per cent, average taxes could not exceed 50 per cent of total income 
before taxes. - 110 
With these structural changes, it was rather difficult for taxpayers to cal-
culate in advance the effects of the new system with respect to the amount of 
tax they would have to pay. As it turned out, the imagination of most people 
did not suffice, and the question of reducing personal income tax rates be-
came a recurrent issue in the Danish debate on taxes. 
As compared with personal income taxes, revenue from income taxes paid by 
companies have been insignificant, the latter amounting only to roughly 5 per 
cent of the former during the early 1970s. The rate of taxation of company 
incomes, 36 per cent, was relatively low as compared with most other Western 
European countries, and the procedures followed (including depreciation al-
lowances) in order to determine taxable company income were rather favourable 
to companies. 
25. Total revenue from property taxes, etc. have only amounted to 3-4 per 
cent of national income. In 1973, out of total revenue for this category of 
DKR 4 500 million, roughly DKR 1 000 million were paid by car-owners. Inher-
itance duties only provided DKR 300 million, and revenue from taxes on net 
wealth (based on information supplied on income-tax returns) were of the same 
order of magnitude. These taxes are all collected by the central government. 
Taxes on land and real property are mainly paid to local authorities. The old 
'Georgeist' idea that land should be taxed in order to avoid increases in 
land prices, at least as compared with other prices, has a long tradition in 
Danish politics. In 1957, a majority government was formed by the labour par-
ty, assisted among others by the Georgeist party. The program of this govern-
ment included the introduction of taxes on real property, and the relevant 
legislation was actually enacted. But at the next election, the Georgeist 
party dropped out of parliament. With important groups of voters, viz. farm-
ers and owner-occupiers, not particularly enthusiastic about these taxes, 
their importance has gradually declined.
1 
26. One of the most interesting results according to table VI.10 is the very 
low level of government revenue arising from contributions to social insur-
ance schemes. They only corresponded to 1-2 per cent of national income. From 
1971 to 1973 the share even declined, because contributions by members to 
sick-benefit associations were abolished, the activities of these associa-
tions being taken over by central government and the local authorities. 
PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE REVENUE FROM TAXATION OF COMMODITIES AND INCOME 
27. It is a familiar experience that most statements with respect to the 
possible maximum share of total public revenue out of total national income 
have turned out to be wrong. The size of the public sector in many countries 
has often increased beyond any 'ceiling', suggested by economists, politi-
cians, etc. 
When Denmark joined the EEC, a land-tax system was re-introduced with the 
aim of enabling the country as a whole to obtain part of the capital gains 
related to increased prices of land due to higher grain prices in the EEC. Ill 
Table VI.11 
Public revenues as a per cent of gross national income 1966 and 1973 
International comparison 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
Fed. Republic 
of Germany 
UK 
France 
Netherlands 
1966 
1973 
1966 
1973 
1966 
1973 
1966 
1973 
1966 
1973 
1966 
1973 
1966 
1973 
Commod-
ity 
taxes 
13.2 
15.1 
13.9 
17.6 
12.3 
13.0 
10.3 
9.9 
9.9 
9.2 
13.1 
12.5 
10.0 
11.2 
Income 
taxes 
14.3 
24.0 
12.3 
13.4 
18.1 
19.4 
10.9 
12.8 
11.7 
13.3 
5.4 
6.3 
13.0 
15.1 
Property 
taxes 
etc. 
2.8 
2.7 
1.3 
1.4 
0.6 
2.4 
2.0 
1.7 
5.1 
4.8 
3.8 
2.9 
1.7 
1.5 
Contrib. 
soc. 
insur. 
schemes 
2.8 
2.3 
7.3 
13.5 
5.9 
8.7 
10.0 
12.9 
4.8 
5.5 
13.4 
15.2 
11.4 
16.0 
Total 
33.1 
44.1 
34.8 
45.9 
36.9 
43.5 
33.2 
37.3 
31.5 
32.8 
35.7 
36.9 
36.1 
43.8 
Note: Data relating to Denmark in table VI.11 differ somwhat from similar 
figures in table VI.10. Differences are partly due to problems related 
to definitions, but the main reason is that, in table VI.11, the nu-
meraire is gross national income at market prices. Hence figures in 
table VI.11 will be lower than corresponding figures in table VI.10. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk tiårsoverigt 1976 (based on OECD 
statistics). 
Still, it may be worthwhile reconsidering the issue, taking the starting 
point in the suggestion that there _is a ceiling of total revenue to be ob-
tained from any single type of taxation, the ceiling being defined as total 
revenues from a certain kind of taxation measured as their share of national 
income (cf. table VI.10). 
It might be asserted that this issue is not specific to Denmark, but such an 
assertion would only be part of the truth. In order to illustrate this, ta-
ble VI.11 provides an international comparison of levels of taxation. Admit-
tedly, the table is an exception to the general rule, adhered to in the 
present volume, that contents of tables are limited to Danish figures. How-
ever, it may be justified by the fact that the Danish tax pattern differs 
from that of most other countries and that the issue of levels of taxation 
is one of the most important in the Danish economic debate. 112 
28. Specific sales taxes have, since the mid-1960s, remained slightly above 
10 per cent of NNI (cf. table VI.10). In fact, even including import duties, 
they have never exceeded 13 per cent since records began and up to 1973. As 
was mentioned above, in Denmark, these taxes are concentrated on a few prod-
ucts related to car driving, smoking and drinking, and there may be an upper 
limit for the burden of taxation which these products are able to carry. This 
limit depends partly on elasticities of demand, partly on the possibility of 
buying the products in adjacent countries. The latter argument of course re-
fers to Danish tax rates as compared with those of e.g. the German Federal 
Republic. Although harmonization of specific tax rates has not taken place in 
the EEC, increasing liberalization of the German-Danish 'border traffic' will 
affect the possibilities of keeping Danish tax rates particularly on alcohol 
and tobacco goods substantially above German rates. Finally, the problem of 
evasion should be kept in mind. In the field of specific sales taxes, smug-
gling is a case in point. 
29. Bearing these factors in mind, it is tempting to conclude that it was no 
accident that general sales taxes were introduced during the early 1960s. On 
the contrary, at that time, Danish politicians might well have realized that 
revenues from specific sales taxes were close to their ceiling, and that new 
sources of revenues were required. 
However, there is probably also a ceiling on the amount of revenue obtainable 
from value-added taxes and other general sales taxes. With increased tax 
rates in this field, the evasion problem will be of major importance. In ad-
dition, increased rates may induce people to 'do things themselves'. This may 
be considered a positive factor from other viewpoints, but it certainly does 
not contribute to the amount of tax revenue. 
30. According to table VI.10, total revenue from commodity taxes in 1973 
amounted to 20 per cent of net national income. This was a high share by in-
ternational standards (cf. table VI.11), although revenue from commodity 
taxes took an even larger share of national income in Norway. 
In brief, the contention, implicit in the preceding argument, is that it will 
be extremely difficult to obtain revenue from commodity taxes exceeding, say, 
25 per cent of net national income. 
31. While revenue from commodity taxes in Denmark are high by international 
standards, the same is even more true for revenue from personal income 
taxes.
1 As was shown in table VI.10, the latter increased from 15 per cent of 
NNI in 1965 to 30 per cent in 1973. This increase is reflected in table 
VI.11, which at the same time suggests that revenue from income tax in Den-
mark is at a record level by international standards. 
At present levels of tax rates, the evasion problem is substantial for income 
taxes - far greater than for other taxes, at least in the short run. Further-
more, the effects of high marginal income-tax rates are bound to give rise to 
The following comments will refer to personal income tax only. For compa-
nies, special evasion problems, related to the possibility that they will 
move to other countries with lower company tax rates, are becoming increas-
ingly important. 113 -
dissatisfaction, in particular when a large part of the population is hit by 
these marginal tax rates. In 1973, the (gross) marginal tax rate for average 
income groups was 55 per cent or more. 
In this connection, the problem of 'net marginal tax rates' should be men-
tioned. Social transfer payments to low-income groups may depend on the in-
come of the individual person concerned. Two examples are subsidies to fami-
lies living in expensive apartments and additional transfer payments to old 
people with low incomes, receiving pensions. Where the amount transferred in-
creases, as the income of the recipient decreases, any increase in the income 
of the person concerned will not only give rise to higher income taxes, but 
also to a reduction in the subsidies received. Hence the sum of these two 
marginal rates, i.e. the 'net marginal tax rate', may become substantial, 
even for individuals with low or average incomes.
1 
Two conclusions emerge from these considerations. One is that, even if one 
has great sympathy for the idea of contributing to a more even distribution 
of personal income by fiscal-policy measures, in Denmark it is simply not 
feasible to take any further steps in this direction by traditional policies 
because the result will be to increase net marginal tax rates even further. 
The other conclusion is that revenue from personal income tax had effectively 
reached a ceiling in 1973, corresponding to roughly 30 per cent of net na-
tional income. 
32. Summarizing the arguments of the present section, the main conclusion is 
that, for a variety of reasons, it is difficult to envisage revenue from com-
modity taxes and income taxes exceeding, say, 55-60 per cent of net national 
income. In 1973, revenue from these sources was already close to this ceiling. 
A NEED FOR NEW SOURCES OF REVENUE? 
33. Whether this conclusion - or contention - implies that there is a need 
for new sources of revenue depends, of course, on prospects with respect to 
future government expenditure. This issue has been dealt with earlier in the 
present chapter as well as in chapter I. Still, a few summarizing comments on 
the subject may be appropriate. 
Of course, the same effect arises to the extent that payments for social 
and other services, provided by the public sector, depend on the income of 
the person receiving the services. Payments by parents with children in the 
kindergarten provide an example in this field. 
With marginal income tax rates, even for average income groups, of the or-
der of magnitude indicated above, the question arises as to whether the in-
come tax system can be claimed to reflect 'progressiveness'. The higher the 
revenue to be obtained from income tax, the more difficult it becomes to 
maintain the progressiveness except for low-income groups. Instead, the 
system tends to become one of proportionate taxation. - 114 -
There are several arguments in favour of the viewpoint that the structural 
tendency for total government expenditure to increase faster than national 
income (reflected in table VI.8), will continue in the future.
1 One impor-
tant factor is that activities in the fields of social services and education 
are not easily mechanized. Furthermore, the effect of each specific cut-in 
expenditure will only be very marginal (in terms of corresponding tax reduc-
tions) for those who do not receive the benefit involved - usually the major-
ity of the voters. But the effect will be substantial for those affected by 
the expenditure cut, hence the latter are more likely to react in the politi-
cal debate than the former. 
To these arguments should be added the fact (discussed in chapter I), that 
there is a tendency for the prices of services bought by the public sector -
i.e. wage rates to government employees - to increase faster than the general 
price level. The same tendency can be observed in the rates of transfer pay-
ments to some of the large groups in this area, pensions being one example. 
34. The conclusion seems to be, therefore, that there is> an obvious need 
for new sources of revenue. Of course, this need will be even more obvious to 
the extent that existing sources of revenue, e.g. income taxes, are collected 
at reduced rates. 
Three suggestions appear immediately: 
1) Abandonment - at least partly - of the principle that government services 
should be free of charge. 
2) Increased taxation of real property, capital gains, etc. 
3) Payroll taxes. 
35. The principle of government services being free of charge is deeply 
rooted in Danish political tradition. No direct fees are usually paid in con-
nection with the use of highways, libraries, education facilities, social in-
stitutions, etc., and their introduction is a hot political issue. So far, 
there has been no sign of a new strategy in this field, although the problem 
1 The following arguments do not take account of the additional factors aris-
ing in an economy with substantial unemployment. Here, social transfers 
will become of increasing importance. At the same time, the base of taxa-
tion will be lower (and increase at slower rates) than in a full-employ-
ment economy. 
2 In this connection it should not be forgotten that government employees in 
these sectors are very well organized and quite able to make their view-
points known through TV and the press. Also, these organizations are not 
likely to let the voters overlook that less labour-intensive ways of pro-
viding services by the public sector may imply lower levels of standards. 
3 Another aspect of this mechanism is that it is very difficult for the pub-
lic sector continuously to adjust its 'pattern of output' to new patterns 
in the economy. The reasons for introducing a certain type of expenditure 
many years ago may have disappeared in the meantime, but the public expend-
iture itself may still continue. 
4 On the contrary: suggestions have been made from time to time that TV and 
radio should, in the future, be financed from the government budget. 115 
has often been emphasized by economists in the debate on fiscal policy. As 
this issue is largely political, no further comments will be made in the 
present context, except that it might be worth-while once more mentioning 
that the possible solution of letting the beneficiary pay, but at rates de-
pending on his income, is not feasible because of the 'net marginal tax' 
problem. 
36. The question of taxing real property and capital gains, and increasing 
inheritance duties, etc. is no less controversial. The issue was discussed 
above in connection with property taxes, and some of the aspects were men-
tioned in chapter IV in connection with the increasing share of the popula-
tion owning their own homes. Again, the issue is mainly a political one, but 
those being in principle in favour of these kind of taxes - and the author 
is one of them - should not overlook the problems involved. These problems 
may be reflected in the fact that, according to table VI.11, revenue from 
these taxes does not exceed 3 per cent of gross national income in any of the 
countries, listed in the table, except in the UK. 
First of all, it should be kept in mind that revenues from these sources are 
mainly related to land and buildings, no matter how such taxes are specified. 
If owner-occupied houses and farm land are excluded, the revenues are bound to 
become very small. Furthermore, taxation of capital gains is bound to give 
rise to many technical problems, and evasion is very difficult to avoid. 
Still it can hardly be denied that much social tension is created by the fact 
that, whilst current income (including interest payments) is taxed at high 
marginal tax rates, other types of income, arising e.g. from capital gains, 
are not taxed at all. However, the fundamental problem in this field may be 
of a more general nature, namely to reduce the rate of inflation rather than 
to try to remedy some of the effects caused by inflation. 
37. These considerations seem to lead to the conclusion that the only re-
maining candidate as an additional source of revenue is some form of payroll 
tax. This conclusion is supported by the fact that such taxes are of much 
greater importance in most other EEC-countries, although they may be labelled 
'contributions to social funds, insurance schemes, pension funds', etc. This 
difference is brought out by table VI.11, which seems to suggest that the 
basic tax problem is not that total taxation is extremely high, but that pay-
roll taxes in the form of contributions by employers and employees are ex-
tremely low by international standards. 
It would, however, be premature to expect additional payroll taxes at sig-
nificant rates to be introduced in Denmark in the near future. There are sev-
eral arguments for this contention, but only one will be mentioned. As was 
pointed out in the last part of chapter III, the proposal of the Association 
of Danish Trade Unions with respect to the introduction of 'Workers' Partici-
pation' is based on the idea that the scheme should be financed by contribu-
tions which, for all practical purposes, equal payroll taxes. Hence it may 
not be an easy task to introduce further payroll taxes without introducing 
the rest of the scheme. So far, the majority in parliament has not been too 
enthusiastic about the scheme as a whole. 116 
Table VI.12 
Total accounts of central government: selected fiscal years, current prices 
(DKR 1 000 million) 
Current revenues 
Expenditure: current, ivestm. and 
defence 
Balance on current and invest, accounts 
Various receipts, captial account 
Lending and other expenditures, 
capital account 
Net lending (+) or borrowing (-) 
of which deposited in central bank 
1967/68 
21.0 
20.4 
0.6 
0.4 
1.3 
- 0.3 
- 0.2 
1969/70 
27.6 
26.6 
1.0 
0.2 
0.8 
0.4 
1.3 
1971/72 
39.5 
37.2 
2.3 
0.3 
2.9 
- 0.3 
1.5 
1973/74 
53.6 
46.5 
7.1 
0.4 
3.7 
3.8 
4.2 
Source: Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Statsfinanserne 1973-74. 
Table VI.13 
Net position of central government, loans and debt. 31 March 19Ö8-74 
(DKR 1 000 million) 
Loans 
Housing 
Others 
Debt 
Domestic: 
Bonds etc. 
Central bank etc. 
Total domestic debt 
Foreign debt 
LOANS 
DEBT 
TOTAL 
TOTAL 
31 March 
1968 
5.0 
3.9 
8.9 
3.9 
- 1.1 
2.8 
1.7 
4.5 
1970 
4.9 
5.1 
10.0 
3.3 
- 2.9 
0.4 
3.2 
3.6 
1972 
4.8 
6.3 
11.1 
2.9 
- 8.3 
- 5.4 
5.3 
- 0.1 
1974 
4.8 
7.6 
12.4 
2.7 
- 15.4 
- 12.7 
6.5 
- 6.2 
Source: Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Statsfinanserne 1973-74. - 117 -
OVERALL BUDGETARY POSITION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
38. Total accounts of the central government during the period 1967/68 -
1973/74 are shown in table VI.12. Concepts are the same as those in tables 
VI.6 and VI.9. 
As appears from the table, central government revenues have exceeded expendi-
ture, even when government investment is included on the expenditure side. In 
fact, this has been the case in every year from the Second World War to 1973. 
A certain amount of domestic government lending has taken place,1 but still 
the net result has typically been one of fiscal policy reducing the money 
supply, with net government deposits in the central bank showing a persist-
ent increase. 
39. Finally, the obvious point should be made that, with persisting sur-
pluses, the central government has to an increasing extent become a net cred-
itor. 
Domestic government loans were provided to finance residential investment 
during the 1950s. The system came to an end around 1960, but loans amounting 
to some DKR 5 000 million still remain outstanding. Over the last decade, 
government loans have been granted for a variety of purposes. In early 1974, 
total government domestic loans, mainly in the form of bonds, amounted to 
DKR 12 000 million. 
Furthermore, large government surpluses during the early 1970s changed the 
situation into one where the government became a net creditor instead of a 
net debtor. However, in order to finance the persistent balance of payments 
deficits, the government borrowed heavily abroad, hence the improved overall 
position mainly turned up as substantial increases of domestic short-term as-
sets, in particular in the form of deposits in the central bank. 
2 
Part of the lending has taken the form of government purchases of bonds. 
Furthermore, loans have been given to electric power stations, partly in 
the form of re-lending of amounts borrowed abroad by the central govern-
ment. Foreign borrowing provides part of the explanation of the difference 
between the figures of net lending (or borrowing) and those of net deposits 
in the central bank in table VI.12. 
Local authorities keep their accounts in private banks, hence their sur-
pluses or deficits do not affect money supply. 119 
Chapter VII 
ECONOMIC POLICY 1967-1973 
INTRODUCTION 
1. In chapter VI, fiscal policy was mainly described from a structural view-
point, by analysing components of government expenditure and revenues. How-
ever, in order to evaluate the effects of economic policy in general on the 
development of the Danish economy, a year-by-year analysis might be appropri-
ate. In the present chapter, such a description is given for the period 1967-
73. Contrary to earlier chapters, tables will include figures for all the 
years of the period covered. 
FLUCTUATIONS OF MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1967-1973 
2. In table VII.l, key figures are provided for growth rates of main compo-
nents according to national accounts. The figures are real product figures, 
hence they do not reflect changes in relative prices; for instance, changes 
in the terms of trade are not apparent. 
One of the purposes of economic policy is to contribute to stable rates of 
growth. In this field, Danish economic policy has not been successful with 
respect to rates of growth of domestic demand. These have fluctuated consid-
erably, from slightly above 1 per cent in 1971 to over ten per cent in 1969. 
It is frequently claimed that the openness of the Danish economy makes it 
particularly difficult to successfully pursue a stabilization policy. How-
ever, it is worth noting that growth rates of exports have been much more 
stable than those of domestic demand. Hence differences in growth rates of 
the latter also show up in growth rates of total demand. 
Actually, the terms of trade did not fluctuate much (cf. appendix table 
1.1). The deteriorated somewhat from 1966 to 1968, but remained stable in 
the following years. From 1971 to 1973 they improved. This is specially 
true when EAGGF payments are included (cf. chapter X). 120 
Table VILI 
Annual growth rates of main national-accounts components, 1967-73 
Real-product figures 
Domestic demand 
Exp., goods and 
Total demand 
Imp., goods and 
Gross nat. prod 
serv. 
serv. 
, market prices 
1967 
3.9 
6.4 
4.6 
6.1 
3.9 
1968 
2.5 
8.8 
4.3 
4.3 
4.3 
1969 
10.5 
9.4 
10.2 
14.5 
8.2 
1970 
3.9 
5.8 
4.4 
7.9 
2.2 
1971 
1.3 
7.0 
3.0 
2.0 
3.5 
(Per 
1972 
2.3 
8.3 
4.1 
3.3 
4.5 
cent) 
1973 
8.3 
8.0 
8.2 
19.0 
2.8 
Note: The growth rates refer to changes over the preceding year. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1975. 
Table VII.2 
Main yearly economic indicators, 1967-73 
Average rate of 
unemployment
1 
Average price in-
crease according to 
GDP deflator
2
 
Balance of payments, 
current accounts
3
 
equal to surplus of 
Government sector 
Private sector
4
 
1967 
2.7 
5.3 
- 2.0 
1.0 
- 3.0 
1968 
5.0 
4.3 
- 1.6 
1.6 
- 3.2 
1969 
3.9 
4.6 
- 3.1 
2.6 
- 5.7 
1970 
2.9 
8.5 
- 4.1 
2.9 
- 7.0 
1971 
3.7 
5.8 
- 3.2 
4.2 
- 7.4 
1972 
3.6 
7.5 
- 0.4 
5.7 
- 6.1 
1973 
2.4 
11.4 
- 2.9 
10.4 
-13.3 
The figures only cover insured persons (cf. chapter I). 
ρ 
Percentage price increase as compared with preceding year. 
3 DKR 1 000 million, current prices. 
Roughly corresponding to figures in table VII.4. 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik: Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1975 and Det økonomiske 
Sekretariat, Økonomisk Oversigt, March iS'73, November 1974 and March 
1976. 121 -
Growth rates of imports etc. have fluctuated even more sharply than those of 
domestic demand, with peaks in 1969 and in 1973. During the first period 
there was still unused domestic capacity, and national product increased by 
8 per cent. However, the starting point of the 1972-73 upswing was an economy 
already working at full capacity. Hence national product was only able to in-
crease by 3 per cent. Most of the increase of demand, including rebuilding of 
stocks, was diverted into imports. In 1973, imports of goods and services 
showed an increase of no less than 19 per cent. 
3. With the possible exception of 1968, the objective of maintaining full 
employment was achieved during the years 1967-73 (cf. table VII.2). The un-
employment rates only refer to insured persons and are higher than other un-
employment rates that refer to the total number of employees. In 1973 - and 
probably also in 1970 - full employment was accompanied by substantial la-
bour shortages. 
However, the aims of maintaining price stability and balance of payments 
equilibrium were sacrified, especially in 1970 and in 1973. In 1973, in spite 
of improved terms of trade and favourable export conditions, the balance of 
payments deficit was of the order of DKR 3 000 million. But probably the most 
disquieting feature of table VII.2 is that the balance of payments deficit 
was substantial and persistent for virtually the whole of the period from 
1967 to 1973.
1 
The balance of payments deficit was maintained in spite of the fact that the 
government sector had a substantial and increasing surplus during the period 
from 1967 to 1973, with public savings exceeding public investment. However, 
it should be kept in mind that the size of the government sector was increas-
ing rapidly. The expansionary effect of increased purchases of goods and 
services usually exceeds the contractionary effect of increased taxation of a 
similar amount. Hence the combined overall effect on domestic demand may be 
expansionary in spite of increased government surpluses. 
4. Danish national accounts figures are only published on an annual basis, 
hence the figures in tables VII.l and VII.2 refer to calendar years. However, 
turning points have mainly occurred in mid-years. In order to cover this as-
pect without going into too much detail, a brief summary of short-term fluc-
tuations will be given, based on reports by the main Danish institutions 
publishing analyses of the economy. Such a summary shows the following pat-
tern: 
(1) Mid 1967 - mid 1968: Some slack in total demand. 
1 
2 
The low deficit in 1972 is explained by the introduction, in the autumn of 
1971, of a temporary import duty (see chapter X). At the same time, stocks 
were reduced substantially in 1972. 
Main sources are Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk Oversigt (Economic 
Surveys by the Economic Secretariat of the government), published once or 
twice per year; Det økonomiske Råds formandskab, Dansk Økonomi (Economic 
Reports by the chairmanship of The Economic Council) usually published 
twice per year; and finally Danmarks Nationalbank, Beretning og Regnskab 
(Report and accounts of the Danish central bank) published annually. - 122 -
Table VII.3 
Half-yearly economic indicators, 1967-73 
Indices, 1968 = 100 
1967,1. 
1967,2. 
1968,1. 
1968,2. 
1969,1. 
1969,2. 
1970,1. 
1970,2. 
1971,1. 
1971,2. 
1972,1. 
1972,2. 
1973,1. 
1973,2. 
Home sales 
of new machines 
(constant prices)
a) 
102 
95 
94 
106 
109 
122 
128 
128 
126 
126 
126 
133 
143 
149 
Number of 
employees in 
urban industries
3) 
101 
99 
99 
101 
103 
105 
110 
110 
108 
106 
108 
110 
111 
113 
Total retail sales at 
constant prices
0) 
102 
93 
98 
101 
105 
110 
113 
114 
116 
119 
120 
123 
125 
127 
Sources:
 a) Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk Oversigt, Konjunkturindika-
torer. 
b) Danmarks Statistik: (published currently). 1967 figures are esti-
mated. The figures are seasonally adjusted. 
(2) Mid 1968 - mid 1970: A strong and persistent upswing, leading to very low 
unemployment figures and increased balance of payments deficits. 
(3) Mid 1970 - mid 1972: Another period of lower growth rates, but at a high 
- although declining - degree of capacity utilization. 
(4) Autumn 1972 - end of 1973: A significant boom, the demand pressure lead-
ing to shortage of domestic resources. 
It is not an easy task to find current economic indicators, published on a 
half-year basis, which reflect the pattern just described; however, three 
examples of such indicators are shown in table VII.3. None of them are af-
fected by price changes. The first two are selected from the current economic 
indicators, published by the Economic Secretariat of the government. - 123 
SECTOR SURPLUSES RECONSIDERED 
5. According to the above comments, the main failure of Danish economic pol-
icy during 1967-73 was the lack of success in eliminating the balance of pay-
ments deficit. By definition, a balance of payments deficit is equivalent to 
domestic investment exceeding domestic savings. With the balance of payments 
deficit during the late 1960s and the early 1970s being of the order of mag-
nitude of 1-4 per cent of NNI (cf. table VII.4), it might be argued that 
such a deficit could easily be eliminated, simply by providing for a corre-
sponding increase of domestic savings. This argument might have been of some 
relevance had the deficit been a temporary one. However, keeping the perma-
nent nature of the deficits in mind, it must be admitted that the problem is 
much more complex, even during the full-employment years up to 1973. Basical-
ly, an explanation must include reference to the allocation of resources in 
the Danish economy, this pattern having been incompatible with balance of 
payments equilibrium. That the structure of the economy was not adjusted dur-
ing this period - with the purpose of eliminating the balance of payments 
deficit in mind - may be illustrated in several ways, table VII.4 being one 
of them. The table indicates the balance of payments deficit in the bottom 
row, measured as a per cent of NNI (as is the case for all the figures of the 
table). This balance of payments deficit by definition equals the surplus of 
the government sector plus the (negative) surplus of the private sector (cf. 
the bottom part of table VII.2).
1 
6. During 1967-1972, total private investment amounted to roughly 20 per 
cent of NNI, increasing to 24 per cent in 1973. But while residential invest-
ment showed an increasing trend, almost booming during 1972 and 1973, busi-
ness fixed investment declined, slowly but steadily, from 15.6 per cent of 
NNI in 1967 to 14.3 per cent in 1972. Even the 1973-upswing did not bring 
this share back to its 1967 level. 
Savings by financial and semi-government institutions (shown as 'other insti-
tutions' in table VII.4) increased steadily, but company savings showed a de-
clining trend - again with the exception of the later part of the period cov-
ered by table VII.4. Perhaps the most interesting result according to the ta-
ble is that the share of personal savings - including savings of unincorpo-
rated businesses - declined sharply, from 10 per cent of NNI in 1967 to 5.5 
per cent in 1973. 
Total savings during 1967-73 showed a declining trend. The private sector not 
only recorded a financial deficit, but this deficit increased, from 5 per 
cent of NNI in 1967 to 10 per cent in 1973. Hence private investment had to 
be financed,to an increasing extent, by borrowing from other sectors. 
7. The increasing financial surplus of the government sector has already 
been mentioned in connection with table VII.2. Table VII.4 brings out the de-
clining share of public investment during 1972 and 1973. Still, government 
investment plus residential investment - roughly corresponding to investment 
Whereas the figures in table VII.2 were expressed in DKR 1 000 million, the 
figures in table VII.4 are expressed as shares of NNI. 124 
Table VII.4 
Investment, savings and financial balance: Private, public and foreign 
sectors. Gross figures indicated as percentages of net national income 
(Per cent of NNI) 
Private sector 
A. Investment 
Residential 
Business fixed 
Change in stocks 
Investment, total 
B. Savings 
Joint stock comp. 
Other institutions 
Personal 
Savings, total 
Financial balance 
Government sector 
Investment 
Savings 
Government surplus 
Balance of payments, 
current account 
NNI, DKR 1 000 mill. 
current prices 
1967 
5.9 
15.6 
- 0.6 
20.9 
4.0 
2.5 
10.0 
16.5 
- 4.4 
6.2 
7.7 
1.5 
- 2.9 
67.7 
1968 
5.3 
14.8 
-
20.1 
3.9 
2.7 
9.1 
15.7 
- 4.4 
6.6 
8.8 
2.2 
- 2.2 
73.6 
1969 
6.3 
14.8 
0.9 
22.0 
3.7 
3.1 
8.4 
15.2 
- 6.8 
6.6 
9.7 
3.1 
- 3.7 
84.0 
1970 
6.2 
14.8 
0.2 
21.2 
3.7 
3.0 
7.0 
13.7 
- 7.5 
7.2 
10.3 
3.1 
- 4.4 
93.0 
1971 
6.1 
14.4 
- 0.1 
19.5 
3.5 
3.1 
5.6 
12.2 
- 7.3 
7.2 
11.3 
4.1 
- 3.2 
101.5 
1972 
7.2 
14.3 
- 1.4 
20.1 
3.8 
3.6 
7.3 
14.7 
- 5.4 
6.8 
11.8 
5.0 
- 0.4 
113.9 
1973 
8.3 
15.1 
1.0 
24.4 
4.9 
3.9 
5.5 
14.3 
-10.1 
6.1 
14.1 
8.0 
- 2.1 
130.6 
Sources: See sources to table VII.2. 
by domestic industries - increased from 12 per cent of NNI in 1967 to 14.0 
and 14.4 per cent in 1972 and 1973, respectively. As compared with this im-
pressive development, business fixed investment - roughly corresponding to 
investment by balance of payments industries - showed a much more sluggish 
performance. - 125 
8. Since the private sector financial deficit persistently exceeded the gov-
ernment savings surplus, the balance of payments deficit became a permanent 
feature of the period under study. Although the balance of payments deficit 
showed substantial fluctuations, if it is adjusted for increases of stocks 
according to table VII.4, the resulting deficit becomes more stable, and even 
shows a tendency to decline during the full-employment years 1972 and 1973. 
However, the main point to be made in this connection is that, even in those 
years, the deficit was not eliminated. 
WAS ECONOMIC POLICY SUFFICIENTLY TIGHT? 
9. The above analysis gives support to the conclusion that the persistent 
balance of payments deficit during the late 1960s and early 1970s reflected 
the increasingly dominant role of domestic industries, investment in these 
industries increasing at the expense of the balance of payments industries. 
Furthermore, the latter had to finance their investment by borrowing to an 
increasing extent. 
The period being, on the whole, one of full employment, it ought to have been 
possible for economic policy to produce an adjustment to this pattern by re-
ducing growth rates of domestic demand towards domestic industries. With a 
tight labour market, such policies would probably not have given rise to ma-
jor unemployment problems. To the extent that they would have led to lower 
growth rates of government expenditure, tax rates could have been increased 
less than was actually the case, and the problems of these rates getting 
close to the ceilings mentioned in chapter VI, would have been easier to han-
dle. 
Finally, if employment in government services as well as in building and con-
struction industries had increased at rates lower than was actually the case, 
the increase of money wage rates in these sectors would probably also have 
been lower. Hence the rate of inflation could have been reduced, and more re-
sources would have been available for the balance of payments industries, 
providing for the reallocation so urgently needed. Furthermore, the latter 
industries would not have seen their income squeezed as compared with those 
of domestic industries, and they would probably have been more able and wil-
ling to expand investment and output. 
10. Finally, let us examine the role of fiscal policy, as a counter-cyclical 
instrument, during the substantial booms of domestic demand in 1969-70 and 
1972-73. On the expenditure side, rather little was done during 1969-70 in 
spite of the fact that, in early 1968, a liberal-conservative government had 
taken over, which was probably well aware of the structural problems des-
cribed above. However, action was not taken until 1971, the result being re-
flected in declining government investment in 1972. On the whole, the govern-
ment's current expenditure was not reduced. In 1972-73, when the labour gov-
ernment was back in power, the efforts on the investment side were continued. 
But again, no major attempts were made to dampen domestic demand by reducing 
the growth rates of current expenditure. 
11. This policy probably reflects a fundamental philosophy, according to 
which counter-cyclical fiscal policy should mainly be pursued by adjusting 126 
revenue. When assessing - with the benefit of hindsight - fiscal policies 
during 1969-70, it should be kept in mind that the 1969 upswing was much 
stronger than anticipated, as the expansionist effects of 1969 being a 'tax-
free' year were underestimated.
1 Furthermore, it was recognized that the in-
troduction of the new income-tax system on a 'pay-as-you-go' basis would im-
ply a substantial tightening of fiscal policy from early 1970 onwards. The 
increase of the rate of value-added tax from 12 1/2 to 15 per cent, in June 
1970, was therefore too late. 
During the 1972-73 upswing, tax rates were not increased. In 1972, this may 
be explained by uncertainty with respect to the outcome of the EEC-referendum 
in October 1972. When the latter had resulted in support for Danish member-
ship of the EEC, the political climate was not favourable to acceptance of 
increased tax rates, because this could be interpreted as attempts to deprive 
the population of the economic benefits to be obtained from joining the EEC. 
Instead, in 1973 specific measures were taken in order to dampen the boom in 
building and construction, and in residential investment in particular. 
12. Hence, while the ex-post verdict on the use of fiscal instruments as 
part of stabilization policy during the period 1967-1973 can hardly be very 
positive, it should be kept in mind that large structural changes with re-
spect to the institutional framework took place during these years. In the 
later part of the period, the main change was external (EEC-membership), but 
during the preceding years the income tax system had gradually undergone con-
siderable change, and so had the responsibilities attributed to - and the 
revenues to be collected by - the local authorities. With such major institu-
tional changes, the possibilities of using fiscal policy, in order to affect 
total demand were not as good as would otherwise have been the case. 
Until 1969, income tax had been based on last year's income. The system of 
income taxes being collected on a pay-as-you-go basis was introduced in 
1970. Hence 1969 became a 'tax-free' year in the sense that 1969 incomes 
never provided a direct basis for taxation. - 127 -
Chapter VIII 
MONETARY INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY 
LENDING INSTITUTIONS 
1. The first savings banks in Denmark were established early in the 19th 
century, mainly in order to cater for savers making small deposits. Around 
1850, the first commercial banks were founded, organized as joint stock com-
panies, the immediate purpose being to provide loans for industry and com-
merce at a time when manufacturing industries slowly began to develop. 
Although the historical background of the two types of banks are very differ-
ent, their roles as financial intermediaries have become increasingly similar 
over time. Traditionally, lending by savings banks has to a larger extent 
been in the form of long-term loans, partly in order to finance residential 
investment and partly as loans for agriculture, local authorities, etc. 
Loans by commercial banks have mainly been provided as short-term industrial 
loans (cf. table VIII.1), although they have also provided a special type of 
loan, a 'building loan', for financing investment in buildings (including 
residential investment) during the period of construction. The increasing 
share of such loans from 1967 to 1973 according to table VIII.1 reflects the 
building boom during the early 1970s (cf. the first part of chapter IV). 
During the late 1960s and the early 1970s, total lending by savings banks 
roughly amounted to half of commercial bank lending. As a consequence of the 
fact that their activities were becoming increasingly similar, the latest law 
in this field, passed in April 1974, covered, for the first time, commercial 
banks as well as savings banks. In most of the present chapter, and in the 
appendix tables in particular, no distinction will be made between the two 
types of banks. Both will be covered by the label 'private banks'. 
2. An additional lending facility for households and enterprises, is the 
bond market, more easily accessible than similar arrangements in most other 
countries. In principle, the borrower receives the equivalent of his loan in 
terms of long-term bonds, issued by one of several mortgage associations. 
On the long-term financing of such investment, see below the reference to 
bonds issued by mortgage associations. 128 -
Table VIII.l 
Percentage distribution by industries of commercial bank lending 
Manufacturing industries 
Trade, wholesale and retail 
Other industries 
Building loans 
Other loans
1 
Total, per cent 
Total, DKR 1 000 million 
April 30th 
1967 
20.6 
23.4 
24.8 
16.6 
14.6 
100.0 
22.0 
1973 
15.1 
17.3 
24.8 
21.4 
21.4 
100.0 
37.4 
Including personal loans. 
Source: Danmarks Nationalbank, Beretning of regnskab 1973, ap-
dix table 19. 
Table VIII.2 
Growth of net lending, by banks 
and in the form of mortgage bonds 
(DKP 
Commercial banks 
Savings banks 
Private banks 
Bond loans
1 
T0TAL 
1 000 mill 
1968 
and 1969 
6.4 
2.2 
8.6 
14.8 
23.4 
ion, current 
1970 
and 1971 
2.6 
2.3 
4.9 
16.7 
21.6 
prices) 
1972 
and 1973 
8.9 
5.5 
14.4 
29.5 
43.9 
1 Net supply of mortgage at market values. 
Source: Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review 
August 1976. - 129 -
If the loan is to finance residential investment, the repayment period may be 
30-40 years. However, the repayment conditions, including the nominal rate of 
interest, are fixed for the whole period at the time the bonds are issued. 
These conditions usually involve the borrower making annuity payments (part 
interest and part capital repayment) based on the nominal value of the bonds. 
Subsequently, the borrower sells the bonds on the market at rates which are 
quoted daily on the stock exchange, and which vary according to market condi-
tions. As the borrower sells at a discount, the effective interest rate is 
higher than the nominal rate. Because of the fluctuations of the market, the 
timing of the sale of the bonds is very important as it establishes the ef-
fective interest rate for the whole period of the loan, and therefore has a 
considerable effect on the total cost of the investment. 
No previous savings are required in order to obtain a bond loan. In principle, 
the only requirement is that the borrower owns fixed property. On the basis 
of such fixed property, a mortgage is issued by the borrower to the mortgage 
association, providing safeguard to the latter for the interest and capital 
repayments. 
3. Table VIII.2 shows the increase of net lending by banks, commercial as 
well as savings banks, and by mortgage associations in the form of bonds, in-
dicated for two-year periods. 
Figures for the latter item indicate the net supply at market rates of mort-
gage bonds. During the years 1968-73, the central government had overall 
surpluses, (cf. the last part of chapter VI), and no government bonds were 
issued. Hence the amounts of increased net lending in terms of bonds can be 
interpreted as loans obtained by debtors in the private sector. As appears 
from the table, increased lending in the form of bond loans amounted to 
roughly DKR 60 000 million during the six-year period 1968-73, corresponding 
to twice the increase of bank lending during the same period. 
4. Private mortgages have to be issued as a condition for obtaining bond 
loans, and they may be issued by debtors in order to obtain loans in private 
banks. However, private mortgages may also be issued as a direct basis for 
loans, not using private banks or mortgage-bond associations as financial in-
termediaries. For example, when existing real property is sold, the buyer may 
obtain a mortgage loan in terms of bonds, but in addition to such a loan he 
may, as part of his total payments, issue a transferable mortgage directly to 
the seller. Such direct mortgage loans outside traditional financial interme-
diaries (the latter consisting of private banks as well as mortgage-bond as-
sociations) have become of increasing importance. 
Unfortunately, statistical information relating to the amount of direct pri-
vate mortgage loans is rather scarce.
1 Figures indicated in table VIII.3 only 
Figures on the gross supply of private mortgages at nominal value are 
available, but the major part of these mortgages provide the basis for 
lending by traditional financial intermediaries. Furthermore, their market 
value will usually be substantially below par. It has been estimated that, 
around 1970, new direct mortgage loans amounted to roughly DKR 4 000 mil-
lion per year (nominal value), and that total remaining debt on such loans, 
end of 1970, was about DKR 20 000 - 25 000 million. See Betaenkning om en 
statistisk belysning af pantepantebrevsmarkedet, Betaenkning nr. 616, 
Copenhagen 1971, chapter II.2. - 130 -
Table VIII.3 
Increased holdings of mortgage bonds by type of institution 
Central bank 
Private banks 
Pension funds, etc.
1 
Insurance companies 
Others
2 
TOTAL INCREASE
3 
1968 and 1969 
3.8 
1.0 
1.3 
2.3 
6.4 
14.8 
(DKR 
1970 
1 000  mill 
and 1971 
1.5 
3.0 
2.2 
2.6 
7.4 
16.7 
ion, current prices) 
1972 and 1973 
0.9 
4.3 
4.1 
5.6 
14.6 
29.5 
1 Including the Post Giro, see appendix to the present chapter. 
2 Estimated as a residual. 
3 Net supply at market values, cf. corresponding figures in table VIII.2. 
Source: Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review August 1976, p. 32. 
cover loans where traditional financial intermediaries have been involved. 
The same was true for the figures in the bottom row of table VIII.2. Hence 
the latter cannot be claimed to express 'total domestic credit expansion', 
because additional credit facilities, for example, direct private mortgage 
loans are available. To the extent that total lending by traditional finan-
cial intermediaries is restricted as part of a tight monetary policy, such 
additional lending facilities will probably be used and institutionalized to 
an increasing extent in order to by-pass credit ceilings imposed on lending 
by traditional financial intermediaries. 
5. Table VIII.3 illustrates changes of the creditor pattern with respect to 
bond holdings, the figures in the bottom row being equal to corresponding 
figures in table VIII.2. Hence table VIII.3 shows how the net increase of 
bonds at market values during the years 1968-73 was met by increased holdings 
of creditors. 
The group 'Others', i.e. non-financial enterprises and households, have in-
creased their bond holdings during the period 1968-73 by an amount correspond-
ing roughly to half of the total increase, while insurance companies and pen-
sion funds have bought the larger part of the remaining half, presumably in 
order to keep these bonds as a long-term, financial investment. The remaining 
creditors are private banks and the central bank itself. However, private 
banks may consider their bond holdings as being assets which under certain 
circumstances could be sold; the same to some extent holds for 'Others'. 
Hence the problems related to open market operations in bonds by the central 
bank are quite complex. This is particularly true because by far the major 
part of the bonds are long-term bonds. Thus, if the central bank were to con-
sider it important to prevent long-term interest rates from increasing, per-
haps because of a given political target with respect to residential invest-
ment, the result might become a substantial increase of the monetary base. - 131 
Table VIII.4 
Balance sheet of the central bank, end of selected years 1967-73 
Assets 
Central Government 
Official foreign exchange reserves 
Bond holdings etc. t 
Lending, etc. 
Assets = liabilities 
Liabilities 
Notes and coin 
Deposits, mainly from banks 
Other amounts, net 
(DKR 
1967 
- 1.4 
3.8 
3.7 
1.4 
7.5 
5.1 
0.7 
1.7 
1 000 mi  11 
1969 
- 3.2 
3.2 
6.9 
1.8 
8.7 
5.8 
1.9 
1.0 
ion, curr  ent 
1971 
- 6.3 
4.8 
8.1 
2.1 
8.7 
5.4 
1.9 
1.4 
prices) 
1973 
-10.7 
8.0 
8.2 
4.3 
9.8 
6.5 
1.2 
2.1 
Net of certain short-term liabilities. 
Source: Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review August 1976, p.5. However .fig-
ures of official reserves are taken from a different table, see same 
source, p.6. 
THE CENTRAL BANK 
6. The central bank keeps the accounts of the central government. In table 
VIII.4, balance sheets of the central bank at the end of selected years be-
tween 1967 and 1973 are presented in a condensed form, liabilities mainly 
representing parts of the monetary base. Hence the accounts of the central 
government are shown on the asset side, expressing a steady increase of net 
deposits by the central government. This increase is due partly to overall 
surpluses on domestic accounts, partly to foreign borrowing by the central 
government (cf. the last part of chapter VI). 
7. In addition, the central bank holds the official reserves of gold and 
foreign exchange. During the period 1968-73, in spite of persistent balance 
of payments deficits, foreign exchange reserves held by the central bank in-
creased due to heavy foreign borrowing (cf. chapter X). It should be re-
called that foreign exchange holdings by private banks should be added to 
those of the central bank in order to arrive at total international reserves. 
8. Finally, the central bank acts as the 'banker of the private banks'. On 
the liabilities side in table VIII.4, this is reflected by the 'Deposit' 
item. On the asset side, the items of 'Bond holdings' and 'Lending, etc.' 
(mainly lending to private banks) reflect monetary-policy decisions by the 
central bank. - 132 -
INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY POLICY 
9. The aims of monetary policy during the period from the mid 1960s and up 
to 1973 may be summarized as follows: up to the spring of 1969, the aim of 
keeping long-term interest rates stable was given high priority. However, 
open market operations in the form of bond purchases, amounting to 6 thousand 
million DKR led to an increase of the monetary base, which gave rise to prob-
lems when the foreign-exchange crisis developed in April-May 1969. In May, 
substantial speculation took place, based on the possible devaluation of the 
Danish krone. However, the parity of the krone was successfully maintained, 
but the event led to new priorities in monetary policy. The aim of keeping 
the monetary base under control was given higher priority, even if this im-
plied higher and less stable interest rates - as was actually the case. 
As the balance of payments deficits continued, and even increased, the aim of 
keeping domestic interest rates high in order to induce the non-bank private 
sector to borrow abroad - and hence to contribute to the financing of the in-
creasing foreign debt - was given increasing priority. 
On the whole, the frequently expressed basic aim of the central bank at least 
from 1969 onwards was to keep monetary policy tight. 
10. The main instruments used by the central bank in order to achieve these 
aims were adjustments of the discount rate, open market operations, the impo-
sition of conditions limiting private banks borrowing from the central bank. 
But a characteristic feature of the conduct of monetary policy has been that 
the design of the various instruments has been changing, and additional in-
struments have been introduced. Hence the following comments only describe 
the main features - at the risk of some over-simplification. 
THE DISCOUNT RATE AND OTHER INTEREST RATES 
11. Adjustments of the official discount rate of the central bank have been 
used as signals, indicating changes to be implemented with respect to the 
'tightness' of monetary policy. Discount rates at the end of each half year 
from the beginning of 1968 to the end of 1973 are shown in the first column 
of table VIII.5. 
The discount rate remained stable at 6.5 per cent from June 1964 to December 
1967, when it was increased to 7.5 per cent. The background for this increase 
- quite dramatic at the time it occurred - was that parliament could not pro-
A more detailed description of monetary instruments (as well as an outline 
of the institutional set-up in the field of banking and financing) is given 
in Danmarks Nationalbank, De penge- og valutapolitiske instrumenter i 
Danmark. Report to the Monetary Committee of the EEC, Copenhagen, December 
1972. - 133 -
Table VIII.5 
Danish interest rates 1968-73 
End of half-year periods 
(Per cent) 
1967,2. 
1968,1. 
1968,2. 
1969,1. 
1969,2. 
1970,1. 
1970,2. 
1971,1. 
1971,2. 
1972,1. 
1972,2. 
1973,1. 
1973,2. 
Discount rate, 
central bank 
7.5 
6.5 
6.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
9.0 
7.5 
7.5 
8.0 
7.0 
7.0 
9.0 
Private banks 
Highest lending 
rate 
Time deposits, 
3 months 
9.5 6.25 
9.0 5.25 
8.5 4.75 
11.5 7.0 
11.5 7.0 
11.5 8.0 
11.5 8.0 
10.0 6.5 
10.0 6.5 
10.5 7.0 
9.5 6.0 
9.5 6.0 
11.5 8.0 
Yield of 5 
per cent gov.t 
bond (S 2007J
1 
9.7 
8.7 
8.8 
9.6 
10.7 
11.1 
10.7 
10.4 
10.7 
10.4 
10.7 
10.9 
12.7 
Issued during the 1950s. Same amount redeemed every year. Redemption will 
be completed by the year 2007. Figures indicate effective yield. 
Source: Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review August 1972 and February 1974. 
vide a majority in order to pass laws on incomes-policy measures in the wake 
of the devaluation of the Danish krone in November 1967. 
Subsequently, the discount rate was reduced three times during 1968 to 6 per 
cent. These reductions can be seen as part of a concerted action of tighten-
ing fiscal policy in order to dampen private consumption (the value added tax 
rate had been increased in April 1968), at the same time easing monetary pol-
icy in order to stimulate private investment, an increase of the latter being 
needed as a basis for increased domestic demand in order to reduce unemploy-
ment. 
These events are further discussed in the sections on incomes policy in 
chapter IX. 134 
12. During the first half of 1969, monetary policy was tightened once more, 
the discount rate being increased from 6 to no less than 9 per cent. The main 
part of this upward adjustment was attributable to speculation against the 
Danish krone in May 1969. However, the shift to a higher discount-rate level 
probably also reflected increasing rates of inflation as well as concern with 
respect to the balance of payments deficit. The discount rate was maintained 
at 9 per cent until early 1971. 
13. As noted in the first part of chapter VII, overall growth rates started 
to decline from mid-1970. In the circumstances, the discount rate was reduced 
three times during 1971 and early 1972, bringing it down to 7 per cent. This 
rate was maintained until the summer of 1973 in spite of booming demand and 
shortage of domestic resources. Finally, in July 1973 the discount rate was 
increased to 8 per cent. An additional increase, to 9 per cent, took place 
in December 1973, reflecting the international and domestic problems arising 
in the wake of the oil crisis. 
14. It is not co-incidental that, according to table VIII.5, lending and de-
posit rates by private banks show a pattern over time very similar to that of 
the discount rate.
2 For decades, the private banks had an agreement, accord-
ing to which the participants would hold the same interest rates for deposits. 
Changes of the discount rate by the central bank would normally be reflected 
immediately in the deposit rates of the private banks. This pattern is 
brought out by the three first columns of table VIII.5. 
The agreement between the private banks on interest rates on deposits was 
supported by the central bank; in fact it provided part of the basis of the 
framework for the conduct of monetary policy. The agreement was finally 
brought to an end in 1973. 
15. In table VIII.5, the trend in bond yields (effective interest rates) is 
illustrated by yields of a government bond with a nominal interest rate of 5 
per cent, the redemption to be completed in year 2007. Issuing of new bonds 
of this type took place during the 1950s and the series was 'closed' prior to 
1960. Hence the yields according to the table are not fully representative of 
the yields of newly-issued bonds. On the whole, yields of bonds in 'open' se-
ries will be somewhat higher and will tend to fluctuate more. 
Although the pattern of yields of different types of bonds is changing, an 
attempt to provide a brief description of main trends may be appropriate. 
During the years 1965-67, the yield on long-term bonds remained rather stable 
at an effective interest rate of 9-10 per cent. In the first half of 1968 it 
declined by 1-2 percentage points. However, during the spring of 1969 the 
discount rate was increased substantially, as mentioned above, and this in-
crease was reflected in bond yields. From the summer of 1969 onwards, yields 
on bonds in 'open' series remained above 10 per cent, fluctuating considerably 
more than the bond yields shown in table VIII.5. For instance, as part of a 
In January 1974, the discount rate was further increased to 10 per cent. 
2 
In fact, from early 1970 onwards, the interest rate on 3 months deposits is 
exactly 1 per cent below the discount rate according to table VIII.5 135 
tightening of monetary policy during the summer and autumn of 1970, yields of 
bonds in open series were allowed to increase to 12 per cent. Such fluctua-
tions reflected the revised priorities of the central bank in the conduct of 
open market operations. 
OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS BY THE CENTRAL BANK 
16. During the period from the mid-1960s up to 1973, the conduct of open 
market operations gave rise to substantial problems from the viewpoint of the 
central bank. These problems were related to the fact that the Danish bond 
market mainly consists of long-term mortgage bonds and, furthermore, that 
long-term financing of residential investment takes place at interest rates 
determined in the bond market. Hence, in carrying through open market opera-
tions the central bank would necessarily affect conditions (= effective in-
terest rates to be paid) in connection with residential investment and other 
investment in buildings. 
17. However, in assessing the need for open market operations the central 
bank would also have to include considerations related to the liquidity of 
the private sector, i.e. on the development of the monetary base. 
In monetary analysis, it is usually rather difficult to obtain consistency 
with respect to the figures to be used. This problem has also - although only 
to a limited extent - affected figures in the preceding tables. However, 
since consistency is always desirable, a comprehensive set of figures cover-
ing the field of monetary analysis has been established; they are shown in 
appendix tables VIII.1 - VIII.3. These figures fulfill the requirement of 
consistency. Concepts and techniques which have been used are explained in an 
appendix to the present chapter, to which reference should be made. In the 
following, technical comments will be avoided to the largest possible extent. 
Appendix table VIII.1 contains figures showing the size of the total monetary 
base and its components, end of years 1965-1973. In table VIII.6, changes of 
the monetary base are shown in the bottom row, with the body of the table 
showing the extent to which the various factors have contributed to the.3e 
changes. 
18. During the years 1966 to 1973, the current account of the balance of 
payments exerted a persistent contractionary influence on the monetary base. 
However, this effect was partly offset by net foreign capital imports, and 
during the last part of the period - and particularly in 1973, after the Dan-
ish entry into the EEC - private foreign borrowing exceeded the deficit on 
the current accounts of the balance of payments. This heavy foreign borrowing 
was partly a deliberate result of monetary policy, which kept domestic inter-
est rates high in order to stimulate borrowing abroad. 
As is explained in the final part of the appendix, figures in the appendix 
tables are based exclusively on publications by the central bank. Reference 
is made to these sources with respect to further details on the coverage of 
the basic figures. - 136 -
Table VIII.6 
Factors affecting the monetary base, 1966-73 
Balance of paym., curr. ace. 
Net foreign capital imp., excl. 
central government 
Central gov.t, domestic deficit 
Other factors 
TOTAL 
Increased bond holdings by 
central bank 
Increased central bank lending 
Total increase of monetary base 
(DKR 
1966 
1 
and 1967 
- 3.5 
+ 3.5 
- 0.8 
- 0.3 
- 1.1 
+ 2.1 
+ 0.4 
+ 1.4 
300 million, current 
1968 
and 1969 
- 4.7 
+ 3.5 
+ 0.1 
- 1.1 
- 2.2 
+ 3.8 
+ 0.3 
+ 1.9 
1970 
and 1971 
- 7.3 
+ 6.4 
- 1.3 
- 0.1 
- 2.3 
+ 1.5 
+ 0.1 
- 0.9 
prices) 
1972 
and 1973 
- 3.2 
+ 6.1 
- 3.9 
+ 0.7 
- 0.3 
+ 0.9 
+ 2.3 
+ 2.9 
Source : Danmarks Nationalbank; Monetary Review August 1976 and Beretning og 
Regnskab 1971, 1973 and 1975. See appendix table VIII.1. 
During most of the period 1966-73, the central government had an overall do-
mestic surplus, which also had a negative effect on the monetary base. This 
effect was especially strong during boom years, and in 1973 in particular. 
The combined effect of these factors was to reduce the monetary base (cf. the 
fifth row in table VIII.6). As is illustrated in appendix table VIII.1, this 
reduction was particularly pronounced in boom years, thus reflecting the 
'built-in stabilizer' - boom years leading to balance of payments deficits as 
well as to overall domestic surpluses of the central government, both tending 
to reduce the monetary base. 
19. However, this tendency was offset by the central bank. During the period 
up to 1969, the central bank mainly increased the monetary base by buying 
bonds (cf. table VIII.6), while central bank lending played a larger role 
during the final part of the period. From mid-1965 to the spring of 1969, net 
bond purchases by the central bank amounted to roughly DKR 5 000 - 6 000 mil-
lion. However, these open market operations should be seen in the light of a 
bond rationing scheme, introduced in 1965, the latter in turn reflecting a 
similar arrangement on compulsory deposits by private banks. These issues will 
be reconsidered later. - 137 
CENTRAL BANK LENDING TO PRIVATE BANKS 
20. Conditions of central bank lending to private banks are partly reflected 
in the discount rate as far as the 'price' to be paid by the private banks is 
concerned. Another aspect - and probably a potentially much more powerful 
one, in particular during periods when the central bank wants private banks 
to reduce the rate of growth of their lending in order to dampen demand - is 
the amount which private banks may borrow from the central bank. Up to 1975,
1 
the ceilings on private banks' borrowing from the central bank were deter-
mined in terms of specified percentages of the holdings of various assets of 
each private bank.
2 However, these percentages have not usually been used as 
monetary-policy instruments by the central bank to any significant extent. 
Therefore, the possibilities for the private banks to borrow from the central 
bank were substantial, even during the 1972-73 boom, and the private banks 
actually took advantage of this opportunity. As appears from table VIII.6, 
borrowing from the central bank by private banks increased by well over DKR 
2 000 million during 1972 and 1973, and at the end of 1973, the indebtedness 
of the private banks to the central bank amounted to roughly DKR 4 000 mil-
lion.
3 
21. The fundamental philosophy of monetary policy has been one of 'persua-
sion' , the central bank coming to terms with the private banks on the basis 
of confidential negotiations.
4 Requirements by the central bank with respect 
to reserve ratios of the private banks (i.e. liquid assets of the private 
banks as a percentage of their deposits) have not been used as an instrument 
in monetary policy with the purpose of affecting lending by the private 
banks. Instead, in 1965 a system of compulsory deposits with the central 
1 
2 
From 1 May 1975, the criteria for private bank borrowing from the central 
bank were changed. New ceilings were introduced, depending exclusively on 
the 'owned capital' of each private bank. 
For details, see e.g. Danmarks Nationalbank, De penge- og valutapolitiske 
instrumenter i Danmark, Copenhagen 1972, pp. 28 ff. 
The discrepancy between the figure according to table VIII.4 (DKR 4 300 
million) and appendix table VIII.3 (DKR 3 800 million) is due to differ-
ences with respect to coverage, see the sources mentioned in the final part 
of the appendix. 
Until early 1973, part of the institutional background for this arrangement 
was the agreement on interest rates on deposits, mentioned above. In Janua-
ry 1973, the agreement was cancelled, see Danmarks Nationalbank, Beretning 
og regnskab 1972, p. 55. 
From the autumn 1973 onwards, a new basis was provided by a law of 
17 October 1973 on 'Kreditformidling' (monetary management). However, the 
new powers given to monetary-policy institutions (government and the cen-
tral bank) were not actually used, but the law may have made it easier for 
the central bank to persuade the private banks to follow its requirements. 
Until 1973, there was no legal basis for the central bank to use reserve 
requirements as a unilateral monetary-policy instrument. However, § 2 in 
the 1973 law on monetary management, mentioned in the preceding footnote 
provided such a basis. But this possibility was not used. - 138 -
bank was introduced, the size of the deposits required depending on the 
growth of deposits in the private banks. The formal basis of this scheme was 
an agreement between the central bank and the private banks in early 1965. 
However, this deposit scheme can hardly be said to have been a powerful mone-
tary-policy instrument from the viewpoint of the central bank. One reason is 
that, during periods when monetary policy was tightened, the private banks 
could still borrow from the central bank - and this borrowing might even be 
used by the private banks in order to fulfill their deposit requirement.
1 An-
other reason is that an increasing number of types of assets of the private 
banks were made eligible as 'liquid assets'. For instance, the banks were al-
lowed to deposit bonds as part of their 'compulsory deposits'. The deposit 
scheme was abolished, for all practical purposes, in the autumn of 1971.
2 
22. Instead, a new instrument was introduced in 1970, namely a ceiling on 
total credits granted by each private bank. Originally, this instrument was 
planned to be a temporary one, but actually it is still in existence. The 
idea is that, from time to time, the central bank and the private banks agree 
on the extent to which each bank may increase its credits, expressed as a 
certain overall percentage increase of the ceiling. Usually, the same per-
centage holds for all banks, hence the possibilities for anyone bank to in-
crease its 'market share' of total bank lending is reduced substantially by 
the scheme.
3 
An interesting aspect of this arrangement is that the ceiling does not refer 
to actual bank lending, but to credit lines granted. Hence a substantial 
amount of information had to be gathered on this issue. Obviously, the ar-
rangement implies that actual bank lending may increase, even at a constant 
ceiling, namely to the extent that actual lending by the private banks as a 
per cent of the total credit lines granted by them, may increase.
4 
1 
3 
4 
See, e.g., statement by the Governor of the central bank at the Annual 
Meeting of the Association of Provincial Banks in May 1967. 
Total amounts deposited reached a maximum at the end of 1970 of DKR 3 300 
million. However, less than DKR 200 million were actually directly depos-
ited in the central bank, the larger part of the total deposit requirements 
being fulfilled by the private banks depositing bonds in the central bank. 
Furthermore, commercial banks might include some foreign assets (DKR 800 
million at the end of 1970) as part of 'compulsory deposits'. See appendix 
table 11 in Danmarks Nationalbank, Beretning og regnskab 1970. 
This consequence was one of the reasons why the ceilings were considered to 
be useful only as a temporary instrument, see Danmarks Nationalbank, Beret-
ning og regnskab 1970, pp. 35-36. 
During 1970-1972, the percentage 'capacity utilization' for commercial 
banks was 65 per cent (= actual loans as a per cent of credits granted). 
However, by mid-1974 the percentage had increased to 80 per cent of total 
credits granted (roughly DKR 55 000 million). At the same time, actual 
lending by savings banks has reached 90 per cent of total credits granted 
(slightly below DKR 25 000 million. - 139 
A special problem arising from this arrangement should be mentioned in pass-
ing. Suppose that deposits in private banks increase substantially, but that 
bank lending cannot be increased to the same extent because of the ceiling. 
What, then, can the banks do with the remaining amounts? Obviously, as long 
as the private banks were deeply indebted to the central bank at expensive 
interest rates, these debts could be repaid. But if no such debts exist, an 
additional possibility would be for the banks to buy long-term bonds. How-
ever, from many viewpoints the effects of such purchases are similar to those 
arising from increased bank lending, for example, with respect to the effect 
on the money stock, unless the bonds are bought from the central bank. 
BOND RATIONING 
23. The agreement in 1965 between the central bank and the private banks on 
compulsory deposits by the latter was supplemented by a scheme in order to 
bring lending in the form of new mortgage bonds under control as well. 
In 1965, a scheme of 'bond rationing' was introduced, the idea being to put a 
ceiling on the total amount of new bonds to be issued. In June 1965, a bill 
with this aim was presented by the government in parliament, but was not ac-
tually passed. Instead, in order to limit the supply of bonds, a system of 
agreements between the central bank and the institutions issuing bonds was 
established, i.e. the same type of arrangement as the one favoured by the 
central bank when dealing with private banks. 
Given this limited supply of bonds, the central bank felt free to enter into 
open-market operations, and in the period up to the spring of 1969, the cen-
tral bank bought substantial amounts of bonds. As a result, the yield of 
long-term bonds remained rather stable at 10 per cent from 1965 to 1967, and 
during 1968 it even declined. 
However, the arrangement was not considered to be a complete success. The 
combined effect of the bond-rationing scheme and the stabilizing of the long-
term interest rates by the central bank was not reflected in stability of 
residential investment. Furthermore, the effects from a monetary-policy view-
point were not satisfactory. The bond-rationing scheme had the effect of 
causing queues of debtors to be established from time to time, waiting for 
bonds to be issued to them. These debtors might fell cheated if bond prices 
declined while they were queueing up, so the central bank had a strong incen-
tive to keep bond prices stable. However, the amount of open-market purchases 
by the central bank required in order to obtain this result - and hence the 
increase of the monetary base -, was probably larger than was expected when 
the system was introduced. 
Admittedly, the bond rationing scheme reduced the supply of new bonds. But 
investors who wanted to borrow more than they could get under the rationing 
scheme might find alternative ways of doing so, e.g. on the basis of direct 
private mortgage loans. To the extent that these attempts were successful, 
1 
See Danmarks Nationalbank, Beretning og regnskab 1965, pp. 29 ff. 140 
the demand for traditional bonds would be reduced as well. Hence the effect 
of reducing the supply of traditional bonds on bond prices would become 
smaller than was originally envisaged. This argument, of course, simply re-
flects the general point that the effect of rationing with respect to certain 
types of lending is reduced to the extent that possibilities of substitution 
exist, in the form of alternative - and unrestricted - means of finance. 
24. The traditional system of long-term financing through the bond market im-
plies that the effective interest rate to be paid by the debtor is not deter-
mined until the long-term bonds are sold, i.e. after the investment has been 
completed. Hence the interest rate actually to be paid may turn out to be 
much higher than envisaged by the debtor at the time when the investment de-
cision was originally made. In order to reduce uncertainty on this point, ar-
rangements, which have been in force for some decades, exist by which the 
debtor might sell part of the bonds prior to the completion of the investment 
concerned. However, when the liquidity of the private banks was tight, they 
required the investor to sell his bonds as soon as possible as a condition of 
granting the 'building loan'. In this way, lending in the form of building 
loans would not reduce the liquid assets of each private bank to the same ex-
tent as if the bonds had been sold by the investor after the completion of 
the investment. Obviously, such requirements by the private banks were not in 
accordance with the original intentions behind the scheme for the early sale 
of bonds, and during 1968 and early 1969, the scheme was abolished completely. 
25. On the whole, open market purchases by the central bank up to the spring 
of 1969 were not as successful as was envisaged, and there was a substantial 
increase in the monetary base. This problem was amply demonstrated during the 
foreign-exchange crisis in April-May 1969 and - as was mentioned above - from 
the summer 1969 onwards, increased priority was given to the balance of pay-
ments problem and to the exchange-rate aspects. Hence the monetary base was, 
at least in principle, kept comparatively tight, and the levels of interest 
rates were to a large extent determined in the light of the levels of inter-
est rates in other countries, with the objective of making it comparatively 
less expensive to borrow abroad and hence stimulating capital imports. 
PRIVATE BANK LENDING 
26. Changes of main components in the balance sheets of private banks dur-
ing the years 1966-1973 are shown in table VIII.7. This table is based on ap-
pendix table VIII.3, the latter providing, in addition, corresponding stock 
figures at the end of calendar years. 
Lending by private banks showed a strongly increasing trend over the period, 
covered by the table. The increase of net lending was especially pronounced 
in boom years, i.e. in 1969 (DKR 5 600 million), in 1972 (DKR 5 900 million) 
and in 1973 (DKR 8 500 million), (cf. appendix table VIII.3). In addition, 
bond holdings by private banks increased, although by much smaller amounts. 
According to appendix table VIII.3, total bond holdings, at the end of 1973, 
amounted to DKR 13 200 million. 
1 Actually, figures on bond holdings, taken directly from the balance sheets 
of private banks, as at the end of 1973, are somewhat higher. This techni-
cal issue is further discussed in the appendix. - 141 -
Table VIII.7 
Changes of main items in the balance sheets of 
private banks during the years 1966-1973 
(DKR 1 000 million, current prices) 
Change in assets 
Monetary base held by banks 
Private banks, lending 
Private banks, bond holdings 
Increase of assets = liabilities 
Change in liabilities 
Deposits, incl. time deposits 
Borrowing in central bank 
Other accounts, net 
1966 
and 1967 
+ 0.4 
+ 7.0 
+ 0.4 
+ 7.8 
+ 7.4 
+ 0.4 
+ 0.0 
1968 
and 1969 
+ 0.8 
+ 8.6 
+ 1.0 
+ 10.4 
+10.4 
+ 0.3 
- 0.3 
1970 
and 1971 
- 0.4 
+ 4.9 
+ 3.0 
+ 7.5 
+ 7.1 
- 0.1 
+ 0.5 
1972 
and 1973 
+ 1.0 
+14.4 
+ 4.3 
+19.7 
+16.3 
+ 2.3 
+ 1.1 
Source: See appendix table VIII.3. 
On the liabilities side, it should be noted that the private banks were in-
debted to the central bank during the whole period, the debt amounting to 
DKR 3 800 million at the end of 1973 according to appendix table VIII.3. Net 
borrowing in the central bank by the private banks was especially large in 
the boom years when the private banks expanded their own lending, i.e. in 
1969, 1972 and 1973. With this in mind it seems obvious that the central bank 
would have been able to persuade the private banks to dampen the rate of in-
crease of their lending, especially during the 1972-73 boom, had it really 
wanted to conduct a tight monetary policy during these years. 
THE MONEY SUPPLY 
27. In table VIII.8, the factors affecting changes of the money supply are 
spelled out.
1 Corresponding stock figures, end of calendar years, are shown 
in appendix table VIII.2. 
The terms 'money stock' and 'money supply' are used synonymously, both rep-
resenting V¡2 (cf. the appendix).. - 142 -
Table VIII.8 
Factors affecting the money stock, 1966-73 
(DKR 1 000 million, current prices) 
Balance of payments, curr. ace. 
Net foreign capital imp., excl. 
central government 
Central gcv.t, domestic deficit 
Other factors 
TOTAL 
Increased bond holdings by 
central bank 
Increased bond holdings by 
private banks 
Increased private bank lending 
TOTAL INCREASE OF MONEY STOCK 
1966 
and 1967 
- 3.5 
+ 3.5 
- 0.8 
- 0.3 
- 1.1 
+ 2.1 
+ 0.4 
+ 7.0 
+ 8.4 
1968 
and 1969 
- 4.7 
+ 3.5 
+ 0.1 
- 0.8 
- 1.9 
+ 3.8 
+ 1.0 
+ 8.6 
+11.5 
1970 
and 1971 
- 7.3 
+ 6.4 
- 1.3 
- 0.6 
- 2.8 
+ 1.5 
+ 3.0 
+ 4.9 
+ 6.6 
1972 
and 1973 
- 3.2 
+ 6.1 
- 3.9 
- 0.4 
- 1.4 
+ 0.9 
+ 4.3 
+14.4 
+18.2 
Source: See appendix page 154 (same source as table VIII.6. 
Table VIII.9 
The monetary base and the money stock as per cent 
of net national income, end of years 1965-73 
(Per cent) 
Monetary base: held by banks 
held outside banks 
MONETARY BASE, TOTAL 
Money stock: 
Monetary base held outside banks 
Deposits, excl. time deposits 
Time deposits 
MONEY STOCK, TOTAL 
NNI, thousand million DKR, 
current prices 
1965 
2.8 
9.2 
12.0 
9.2 
22.9 
29.5 
61.6 
56.8 
1967 
2.9 
9.2 
12.1 
9.2 
24.5 
30.4 
64.1 
67.7 
1969 
3.3 
8.7 
12.0 
8.7 
27.0 
29.7 
65.4 
84.0 
1971 
2.4 
6.7 
9.1 
6.7 
24.7 
29.2 
60.6 
101.5 
1973 
2.6 
6.7 
9.3 
6.7 
24.8 
29.5 
61.0 
130.6 
Source : See appendix tables VIII.1 and VIII.2. NNI figures are taken from 
Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1975. - 143 -
Apart from some minor differences due to technical problems with respect to 
definitions, the totals according to the fifth row of table VIII.8 corre-
spond to those in the similar row of table VIII.6. They show that, during the 
whole period, the combined effect from the balance of payments and from the 
central government accounts has been one of reducing the money supply. How-
ever, bond holdings by the central bank and by private banks have increased, 
and the same has been true - to a very substantial extent - for the increase 
in net private bank lending, especially during boom years. During 1972 and 
1973, the money supply increased by DKR 18 000 million to nearly DKR 80 000 
million, at the end of 1973 (cf. appendix table VIII.2). 
28. The figures in the preceding tables have been indicated at current 
prices. However, prices have increased during the period under study, and so 
have the amounts of transactions to be financed. In order to include these 
aspects, table VIII.9 expresses the monetary base as well as the money supply 
- and their components - as shares of net national income at current prices, 
i.e. the same technique as has been used in previous chapters. 
29. As appears from the upper part of table VIII.9, the total monetary base 
has declined in relation to NNI. This is true, in particular, for the mone-
tary base held outside banks. This decline probably reflects a gradual change 
of payments habits, favouring cheques,etc. at the expense of notes. However, 
the substantial decline from end-1969 to end-1971 calls for a more specific 
explanation. Undoubtedly, it reflects the introduction, from the beginning of 
1970, of a new income-tax system on a pay-as-you-go basis (cf. chapter VI), 
under which income-tax payments by wage earners are withheld by their employ-
ers. Hence the new system reduced the demand for liquid assets by wage earn-
ers for transaction purposes. 
30. According to the bottom part of table VIII.9, the total money supply 
(including time deposits) amounted to slightly more than 60 per cent of NNI 
at the end of 1965. The share increased to 65 per cent in 1969, but subse-
quently declined to 61 per cent in 1973. This decline mainly reflects smaller 
holdings of the more liquid parts of the money stock. Time deposits remained 
stable at slightly below 30 per cent of NNI. 
PROBLEMS IN MONETARY POLICY 
31. In order to assess the conduct of monetary policy during the period from 
the mid-1960s up to 1973, an appropriate starting point is provided in table 
VIII.6. As will be recalled, the main conclusion to be derived from the table 
is that, during the whole period, the overall effect from the balance of pay-
ments and the accounts of the central government was to reduce the monetary 
base. This contractionary effect provided the best possible background for 
the central bank to keep monetary policy tight. 
These technical problems are reflected in the figures for 'Other factors', 
being estimated as residuals in both tables (cf. the appendix). 144 
However, during the period up to the spring of 1969, the central bank, in 
fact, gave higher priority to stabilizing interest rates in the long-term 
bond market which, as noted earlier, led to a corresponding increase of the 
monetary base. 
32. From the spring of 1969 onwards, the balance of payments deficits gave 
rise to increasing concern, and the declared aim of the central bank became 
one of keeping monetary policy tight. This was stated, year by year, in the 
annual reports of the central bank. 
However, it may be questioned whether the aim of keeping monetary policy 
tight was actually achieved. The main weakness in this context was that bor-
rowing by the private banks from the central bank was allowed to increase by 
substantial amounts, even during the boom years 1972 and 1973 when the pri-
vate banks were already indebted to the central bank (cf. table VIII.6 and 
appendix table VIII.3). This borrowing by the private banks in the central 
bank was accompanied by substantial increases in lending by the private banks 
to the non-bank private sector. 
33. One way of conducting monetary policy is for the central bank unilater-
ally to fix conditions governing the behaviour of the private banks, which 
can be used as monetary-policy instruments. However, as noted earlier, the 
fundamental philosophy of the central bank has been a different one, namely 
one of 'persuasion', in the form of confidential negotiations. However, when-
ever this framework was really put to test, i.e. when the private banks had 
strong incentives to act in a way inconsistent with the priorities of the 
central bank, the private banks would, in fact, usually act in the way that 
was most profitable from their own viewpoint. This was particularly true dur-
ing boom years, when the central bank was concerned about the rate of in-
crease of total domestic demand. 
This raises the question as to the appropriateness of the fundamental philos-
ophy of monetary policy, i.e. that monetary policy can be carried out more 
successfully by using carrots than sticks, viz. that mutual agreement between 
the central bank on the one side, and private banks and other financial in-
termediaries on the other, is a better arrangement than unilateral action by 
the central bank. 
34. It should, however, be admitted that the task of the central bank has 
not been an easy one, because monetary policy during boom years has usually 
had to be conducted in the context of a fiscal policy which has not been suf-
ficiently tight either (cf. chapter VII). Therefore, it would have been dif-
1969 report, p. 10: 'It will not be possible to undertake any significant 
easing of monetary policy'. 1970 report, p. 10-11: Early 1970, monetary 
policy was tightened substantially ... The reduction of the discount rate 
from 9 to 8 per cent .... should not be taken as an indication that the 
tight monetary policy will be relaxed'. 1971 report, p. 11: 'As a conse-
quence of the balance of payments deficit, the tight monetary policy, in-
troduced in 1969, had to be maintained'. 1972 report, p. 13: 'A further de-
terioration of the balance of payments must be expected in 1973. Therefore, 
it is not possible to relax monetary policy'. 1973 report, p. 16: 'The 
tight monetary policy must be maintained during 1974, partly in order to 
finance the balance of payments deficit.'. 145 
ficult for the central bank to act with vigour, even if more ambitious at-
tempts had been made in order to tighten monetary policy. 
More fundamentally, it should be emphasized that the role to be played by 
monetary policy is bound to be rather modest in a small, open economy like 
that of Denmark. For private investors, competing or having other contacts 
abroad, the alternative of borrowing abroad will usually exist. If the money 
supply is used as an indicator of the liquidity of the non-bank private sec-
tor, such additional possibilities of borrowing abroad should always be kept 
in mind. 
This openness of the economy may give rise to a special dilemma during peri-
ods of tight monetary policy designed to reduce (the increase of) total pri-
vate borrowing, whilst at the same time difficulties exist with respect to 
financing a substantial balance of payments deficit. Obviously, these two 
aims call for exactly opposite conclusions with respect to the desired 
amount of private foreign borrowing. However, private investors able to take 
advantage of the possibilities of foreign borrowing may often belong to the 
balance of payments industries and hence to the industries which, from a 
long-term balance of payments viewpoint, should be encouraged. Hence the di-
lemma may not necessarily be as serious as originally imagined. 
35. Still, the conclusion remains that the central bank ought to have been 
able to act with more vigour in order to achieve the declared aim of keeping 
monetary policy tight. But an additional observation should me made in this 
context, namely the difficulties in conducting open market operations in the 
form of bond purchases in a market almost exclusively consisting of long-
term bonds. As far as this is concerned, the situation has changed since 
1974, with the overall surpluses of the central government being turned into 
overall deficits, partly financed by issuing short-term government bonds. In 
this way, a short-term bond market was finally established (cf. chapter XI). 
36. An additional problem is of a more fundamental nature, namely the appro-
priateness of the present system of obtaining finance by long-term bonds dur-
ing periods of inflation and - even more so - during periods when prices and 
price expectations are changing substantially. 
As was explained in the first part of the present chapter, the basic idea be-
hind the traditional Danish bond system is that the bond yield (= the effec-
tive interest rate) is fixed in money terms for the whole period of the loan 
at the time the debtor sells the bonds. However, for those creditors (the 
bond holders) with high marginal tax rates, even high bond yields may result 
in negative real interest rates after tax. Furthermore, a system according to 
which interest payments are not adjusted to take account of changes in the 
general price trend is bound to create tensions from the viewpoint of person-
al income distribution (cf. chapter IX). 
Of course, the same mechanisms affect the debtor. As interest rate payments 
are fully deductible on his income-tax return, the real after tax interest 
rate to be paid by him may also become negative. Still, the burden of serv-
icing the debt may be quite heavy for the debtor during the first part of the 
period of redemption of the loan, i.e. during the years when inflation has 
not yet eroded the remaining debt in real terms (the so-called 'time-profile 
problem'). Even so, if inflation is expected to continue, investment in one's 
own home (house or apartment) will be a rather profitable undertaking. - 146 -
37. But the problem is not limited to the residential sector. As long as in-
flation continues at constant, or perhaps even at increasing rates, most real 
investment will turn out to have been profitable. However, if investment is 
based on loans at 15 per cent or more, reflecting expectations of continued 
inflation, and subsequently the rate of inflation is reduced substantially, 
the profitability of the investment could easily be endangered. It is against 
this background that the heated debate on index-linked bonds (and other types 
of index-linked loans and deposits) should be seen.
1 
See, e.g., the report from a 'working group' on indexation of claims and 
debts. Betaenkning nr. 732, Copenhagen 1975. Appendix table VIII.l 
The monetary base 
(D 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(IO) 
(11) 
(12) 
Notes, Post Giro etc. 
Deposits in central bk. 
Net foreign ass. of 
priv. banks 
Total monetary base 
which held: 
by private banks 
outside banks 
Changes explained by: 
Balance of paym., 
current account 
Net foreign cap. imp. 
Central government 
domestic deficit 
Central bank, in-
creased bond holdings 
Central bank, in-
creased lending 
Other factors 
End 
of 
1965 
6.0 
0.9 
-0.1 
6.8 
1.6 
5.2 
1966 
+0.7 
-0.2 
+0.2 
+0.7 
+0.1 
+0.6 
-1.5 
+ 1.8 
-0.9 
+0.8 
+0.7 
-0.2 
End 
of 
1966 
6.7 
0.7 
0.1 
7.5 
1.7 
5.8 
1967 
+0.4 
+0.2 
+0.1 
+0.7 
+0.3 
+0.4 
-2.0 
+1.7 
+0.1 
+1.3 
-0.3 
-0.1 
End 
of 
1967 
7.1 
0.9 
0.2 
8.2 
2.0 
6.2 
1968 
+0.7 
+0.1 
+0.7 
+ 1.5 
+1.0 
+0.5 
-1.6 
+1.3 
+0.9 
+2.2 
-0.4 
-0.9 
End 
of 
1968 
7.8 
1.0 
0.9 
9.7 
3.0 
6.7 
1969 
+0.8 
+0.1 
-0.5 
+0.4 
-0.2 
+0.6 
-3.1 
+2.2 
-0.8 
+1.6 
+0.7 
-0.2 
End 
of 
1969 
8.6 
1.1 
0.4 
10.1 
2.8 
7.3 
1970 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.1 
-0.8 
-0.5 
-0.3 
-4.1 
+3.8 
-1.7 
+0.4 
-0.0 
+0.8 
End 
of 
1970 
8.2 
0.8 
0.3 
9.3 
2.3 
7.0 
(DKR 1 
1971 
-0.2 
+0.3 
'■■ 
-0.2 
-0.1 
+0.1 
-0.2 
-3.2 
+2.6 
+0.4 
+1.1 
-0.1 
-0.9 
000 million 
End 
of 
1971 
8.0 
1.1 
0.1 
9.2 
2.4 
6.8 
1972 
+1.2 
+0.4 
+1.1 
+2.7 
+1.4 
+1.3 
-0.4 
+0.7 
-0.5 
+0.4 
+1.7 
+0.8 
, current pr 
End 
of 
1972 
9.2 
1.5 
1.2 
11.9 
3.8 
8.1 
1973 
+ 1.2 
-1.0 
+0.0 
+0.2 
-0.4 
+0.6 
-2.8 
+5.4 
-3.4 
+0.5 
+0.6 
-0.1 
ices) 
End 
of 
1973 
10.4 
0.5 
1.2 
12.1 
3.4 
8.7 
Excluding central government net foreign borrowing. 
Sources : See appendix to chapter VIII. Appendix table VIII.2 
The money stock 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
Monetary base held 
outside banks 
Deposits, includ. 
time deposits 
Total money stock 
Changes expained by: 
(16) 
(17) 
Í18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
Balance of paym., 
current account 
Met foreign cap. imp. 
Central government 
domestic deficit 
Central bank, in-
creased bond holdings 
Priv. banks, increased 
bond holdings 
Private banks, 
increased lending 
Other factors 
End 
of 
1965 
5.2 
29.8 
35.0 
1966 
+0.6 
+3.9 
+4.5 
-1.5 
+1.8 
-0.9 
+0.8 
+0.5 
+4.1 
-0.3 
End 
of 
1966 
5.8 
33.7 
39.5 
1967 
+0.4 
+3.5 
+3.9 
-2.0 
+1.7 
+0.1 
+1.3 
-0.1 
+2.9 
-0.0 
End 
of 
1967 
6.2 
37.2 
43.4 
1968 
+0.5 
+5.8 
+6.3 
-1.6 
+1.3 
+0.9 
+2.2 
+0.7 
+3.0 
-0.2 
End 
of 
1968 
6.7 
43.0 
49.7 
1969 
+0.6 
+4.6 
+5.2 
-3.1 
+2.2 
-0.8 
+1.6 
+0.3 
+5.6 
-0.6 
End 
of 
1969 
7.3 
47.6 
54.9 
1970 
-0.3 
+1.9 
+1.6 
-4.1 
+3.8 
-1.7 
+0.4 
+0.6 
+2.9 
-0.3 
(DKR 1 
End 
of 
1970 
7.0 
49.5 
56.5 
1971 
-0.2 
+5.2 
+ 5.0 
-3.2 
+2.6 
+0.4 
+1.1 
+2.4 
+2.0 
-0.3 
300 million, 
End 
of 
1971 
6.8 
54.7 
61.5 
1972 
+1.3 
+7.9 
+9.2 
-0.4 
+0.7 
-0.5 
+0.4 
+2.4 
+5.9 
+0.7 
current pri 
End 
of 
1972 
8.1 
62.6 
70.7 
1973 
+0.6 
+8.4 
+9.0 
-2.8 
+5.4 
-3.4 
+0.5 
+1.9 
+8.5 
-1.1 
ces) 
End 
of 
1973 
8.7 
71.0 
79.7 
co 
Excluding central government net foreign borrowing. 
Sources: See appendix to chapter VIII. Appendix table VIII.3 
Balance sheets of private banks 
(DKR 1 000 million, current prices) 
Assets 
(23) Monetary base held 
by banks 
(24) Private banks, in-
creased lending 
(25) Private banks, in-
creased bond holding 
(26) Assets = liabilities 
Liabilities 
(27) Deposits, incl. 
time deposits 
(28) Borrowing in central 
bank 
(29) Other accounts, net 
End 
of 
1965 
1.6 
27.5 
4.5 
33.6 
29.8 
0.9 
2.9 
1966 
+0.1 
+4.1 
+0.5 
+4.7 
+3.9 
+0.7 
+0.1 
End 
of 
1966 
1.7 
31.6 
5.0 
38.3 
33.7 
1.6 
3.0 
1967 
+0.3 
+2.9 
-0.1 
+3.1 
+3.5 
-0.3 
-0.1 
End 
of 
1967 
2.0 
34.5 
4.9 
41.4 
37.2 
1.3 
2.9 
1968 
+1.0 
+3.0 
+0.7 
+4.7 
+5.8 
-0.4 
-0.7 
End 
of 
1968 
3.0 
37.5 
5.6 
46.1 
43.0 
0.9 
2.2 
1969 
-0.2 
+5.6 
+0.3 
+5.7 
+4.6 
+0.7 
+0.4 
End 
of 
1969 
2.8 
43.1 
5.9 
51.8 
47.6 
1.6 
2.6 
1970 
-0.5 
+2.9 
+0.6 
+3.0 
+1.9 
-0.0 
+1.1 
End 
of 
1970 
2.3 
46.0 
6.5 
54.8 
49.5 
1.6 
3.7 
1971 
+0.1 
+2.0 
+2.4 
+4.5 
+5.2 
-0.1 
-0.6 
End 
of 
1971 
2.4 
48.0 
8.9 
59.3 
54.7 
1.5 
3.1 
1972 
+1.4 
+5.9 
+2.4 
+9.7 
+7.9 
+1.7 
+0.1 
End 
of 
1972 
3.8 
53.9 
11.3 
69.0 
62.6 
3.2 
3.2 
1973 
-0.4 
+8.5 
+1.9 
-ao.o 
+8.4 
+0.6 
+1.0 
End 
of 
1973 
3.4 
62.4 
13.2 
79.0 
71.0 
3.8 
4.2 
I 
I 
Sources: See appendix to chapter VIII. - 151 -
Appendix to chapter VIII 
PROVIDING CONSISTENT DATA FOR MONETARY ANALYSIS 
A note on concepts and techniques 
Introduction 
1. In this appendix, explanations will be given of the definitions of the 
concepts of 'the monetary base', 'the money stock' etc., used in appendix ta-
bles VIII.1 - VIII.3. These definitions have been determined so as to provide 
the largest possible degree of consistency between different tables. Consist-
ency is obtained in the following ways: 
a) Figures on stocks and flows of each item tally. 
b) Increases of the monetary base and of the money stock are explained in 
terms of the following two types of factors: 1) Surplus on the balance of 
payments, including net private foreign borrowing, as well as the 'domes-
tic' deficit of the central government. (These factors immediately affect 
the monetary base and the money stock to the same extent). 2) Increased 
lending from domestic financial institutions, including increased bond 
holdings by these institutions. 
c) Figures for balance sheets of private banks (cf. appendix table VIII.3), 
are obtained from appendix tables VIII.1 and VIII.2 exclusively. 'Private 
banks' include commercial banks as well as savings banks. 
2. As will be further discussed below, the figures are obtained from two 
sources only, i.e. from a standard table in the annual report of the central 
bank and from the quarterly Monetary Review by the central bank. In order to 
contribute to consistency, the rule has been followed as soon as data for a 
certain item have been obtained, based either on stock or flow figures, such 
data have been retained as the appropriate description through all the ta-
bles.
2 
Roundings of figures have been made, keeping this in mind. 
2 
This point may appear trivial. However, monetary statistics are frequently 
subject to adjustments and rearranging to a substantial extent. Hence these 
problems are not easy to deal with in practice. - 152 -
This technique has also been used for items where substantial changes of 
prices have taken place, bonds being the most obvious example. In the present 
context, the most relevant concept is amounts actually used by banks in order 
to by (or sell) bonds. Hence appropriate flow figures have provided the basis 
for time series in this field. Corresponding stock figures have been obtain-
ed, taking the starting point in actual stock figures at the end of 1965. 
Stock figures for the ends of years are not obtained from balance sheets of 
subsequent years, but are determined from the stock figure, end of 1965, ad-
justed by the subsequent flow figures, showing amounts used in order to buy 
(or sell) bonds.
1 
3. As was mentioned above, stock and flow figures describing a certain item 
always tally. Stock figures (assets and liabilities, end of calendar years) 
are indicated without brackets and the corresponding flow figures (covering 
changes during a certain calendar year) are always shown in brackets. 
The monetary base 
4. The total monetary base is shown in the upper part of appendix table 
VIII. 1. It covers liquid assets of the private sector, including banks, and 
is split between the amount held by banks and that held by the non-bank pri-
vate sector. 
Assets included are notes and coins. Furthermore, deposits on 'Post Giro' ac-
counts are included under this item. The Danish Post Giro system is part of 
the central government accounts. Deposits are short-term deposits exclusive-
ly; the Danish Post Giro system has not been developed in the direction of a 
'post savings bank' to the same extent as in some other countries. A large 
part of the assets of the Post Giro is held as bonds. 
Deposits in the central bank cover short-term deposits, mainly by private 
banks. 
Net foreign assets of private banks provide the final part of the monetary 
base.
2 It might be argued that gross foreign assets would be a more appropri-
ate concept. This problem can only be decided upon on the basis of more de-
tailed studies of behaviour. It should, however, be kept in mind that if a 
gross concept has been chosen, changes of frreign liabilities of the banks 
would have had to be included among the explanatory factors. 
2 
The resulting figure for holdings of bonds by private banks, end of 1973, 
i.e. DKR 13 200 million according to appendix table VIII.3, actually is some-
what lower than the corresponding figure, to be obtained directly from bal-
ance sheets, end of 1973. Probably, the main explanation of this discrepan-
cy is that prices (below par) of bonds held by a certain creditor will in-
crease and approach par, as the time of maturity approaches. 
In principle, enterprises and private persons are not allowed to hold for-
eign exchange, but must sell it to their banks. Hence foreign exchange 
holdings of the private sector are assumed to be held by the private banks 
exclusively. - 153 -
5. In the lower part of appendix table VIII.1, factors explaining changes of 
the monetary base are listed. The first items are the surplus on the balance 
of payments current accounts and net foreign capital import, the latter ex-
cluding foreign borrowing by the central government. The reason for excluding 
central government foreign borrowing is that such amounts do not affect do-
mestic money supply, because the central government keeps its accounts with 
the central bank. However, the implication of this viewpoint is that an im-
provement of the position of the accounts of the central government in the 
central bank should not be interpreted as reflecting a reduction of money 
supply to the extent that the improvement is caused by foreign borrowing by 
the central government. Therefore, the deficit of central government, i.e. 
the third explanatory factor, is indicated net of changes due to foreign bor-
rowing by the central government. 
The two last specific explanatory factors are under the direct control of the 
central bank, i.e. increased bond holdings and increased lending by the cen-
tral bank itself. 
The last item, i.e. 'other factors', is determined as a residual. 
The money stock 
6. The money stock, held by the non-bank private sector, consists partly of 
the share of the total monetary base which is held outside banks, and partly 
of deposits in private banks. In appendix table VIII.2, time deposits are in-
cluded, hence the coverage of 'deposits' is very broad, corresponding to the 
wider definition of the money supply (M2 in Denmark). If deposits had been 
defined in a more narrow way, an additional explanatory factor would have 
been required in the bottom part of the table.
1 
7. The first three explanatory factors, listed in the lower part of appendix 
table VIII.2, refer to the balance of payments and to central government ac-
counts. They are identical with the first three items in the lower part of 
appendix table VIII.1. The same is true for the fourth item, i.e. increased 
bond holdings by the central bank which is taken from the accounts of the 
central bank, and so show total net bond purchases. Therefore, the fifth 
item, i.e. increased bond holdings by private banks, also illustrate their 
total net purchases of bonds.
2 
1 From a conceptual viewpoint, arguments on this point are similar to those 
discussed above in connection with the net foreign assets of the private 
banks. 
Above, foreign borrowing by the central government and the corresponding 
increase of government deposits in the central bank were eliminated from 
the figures. Applying similar reasoning, it could be argued that net bond 
sales (and corresponding purchases) between the central bank and private 
banks should be eliminated as well, because these transactions take place 
entirely outside the sphere of the non-bank private sector. However, mainly 
for reasons of convenience the opposite solution has been chosen in the 
present context. Therefore, the figures in appendix table VIII.2 should in 
principle be interpreted as if net sales (purchases) of bonds by the central 
(cont'd on page 154) - 154 -
The sixth explanatory factor according to appendix table VIII.2 is increased 
bank lending, the last item, i.e. 'Other factors', being determined as a re-
sidual . 
Balance sheets of private banks 
8. Usually, figures illustrating the main items of the balance sheets of 
private banks are taken directly from such balance sheets of different years. 
It is, however, important to notice that, having already constructed appendix 
tables VIII.1 and VIII.2 in the way explained above, an alternative procedure 
is immediately available: figures relating to the balance sheets of private 
banks can be obtained simply by deducting figures in appendix table VIII.2 
from the figures in appendix table VIII.I.
1 Using this procedure, the figures 
according to appendix table VIII.3 will of course be completely consistent 
with the figures in appendix tables VIII.1 and VIII.2. 
The figures according to appendix table VIII.3 will be similar to those ob-
tained according to traditional procedures except for the figures relating 
to bond purchases and bond holdings by the private banks. The discrepancy on 
this point was discussed above in the section on consistency. In fact, the 
way in which appendix table VIII.3 is arrived at represents the optimal pro-
cedure from the viewpoint of consistency. No additional information is re-
quired in order to obtain figures describing changes of the various items of 
the balance sheets of private banks over the period in question (in brackets). 
Sources to appendix tables 
9. All the figures in the appendix tables are based on the following two 
sources : 
A. Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review August 1976. 
B. Danmarks Nationalbank, Beretning og regnskab 1971, pp. 40-41 (figures for 
1966-69), Beretning og regnskab 1973, pp. 54-55 (figures for 1970 and 
1971) and Beretning og regnskab 1975, pp.66-67 (figures for 1972 and 1973) 
10. Appendix table VIII.1: 
Rows (1) - (6): Source A, p. 26. 
Rows (7) - (10): Source B. 
(cont'd of note 2 on preceding page) 
bank and by the private banks had taken place in the non-bank private mar-
ket. 
However, in the period covered by appendix table VIII.2 this point is not 
important as a background for interpreting the figures, because the central 
bank and the private banks have been acting in the same way: they have both 
been buying bonds. 
1 Alternatively, this relationship can be expressed by noting that appendix 
table VIII.1 may be obtained by consolidating appendix tables VIII.2 and 
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Row (11): Source A, p. 27. 
Row (12): Residual. 
11. Appendix table VIII.2: 
Row (13) = (6). 
Rows (14) - (15): Source A, p. 28. 
Rows (16) - (19) = (7) - (10). 
Rows (20) - (21): Source B. 
Row (22): Residual. 
12. Appendix table VIII.3: 
Row (23) = (5). 
Row (24) = (21). End-1965 figure from source A, pp. 22-23. 
Row (25) = (20). End-1965 figure from source A, pp. 22-23. 
Row (26) = (23) + (24) + (25). 
Row (27) = (14). 
Row (28) = (11). End-figure from source A, p. 19. 
Row (29): Residual. - 157 -
Chapter IX 
INFLATION, INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INCOMES POLICY 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The present chapter will start out by briefly reviewing inflationary 
trends during the period up to 1973, giving special attention to the latest 
part of this period. The description will be based on indicators of prices as 
well as of money wages. Subsequently, a summary will be given of the institu-
tional framework with respect to the determination of wages and legislation 
on prices and monopolies will also be discussed. 
The effects of the interrelationship between increases in money wages and in 
prices partly influence income distribution, which will be discussed from a 
functional as well as from a personal viewpoint. Arguments on this issue play 
an important part in any debate on wages policy. In this connection, develop-
ments in the field of incomes policy will be briefly discussed. 
As the Danish economy is a very open one, the issue of inflation has usually 
been debated largely from the viewpoint of comparing rates of domestic infla-
tion with rates of inflation abroad, the implicit political assumption being 
that fixed exchange rates of the Danish krone were very much to be preferred. 
However, it should not be forgotten that, in addition to questions related to 
relative rates of inflation abroad and in Denmark, changes in the rate of in-
flation are bound to have important domestic consequences. Some of them af-
fect income distribution, because assets and liabilities are not held to the 
same extent by different groups of the population. In particular, the dis-
tinction between those who own their own homes and those who live in rented 
apartments becomes of decisive importance. These questions will be considered 
in more detail at a later stage. 
2. One of the most important aspects of the inflation problem is closely re-
lated to the ability of Danish producers to compete with foreign competitors, 
abroad and on the home market, and hence is related to the balance of pay-
ments problem. The question of relative increases of costs of Danish produc-
ers and those of their foreign competitors will be discussed in the final 
part of the present chapter. - 158 -
Table IX.1 
Indicators of price increases 
Indices 
1958, 1950 = 100 
1966, 1958 = 100 
1973, 1966 = 100 
Per· cent increase 
over preceding year 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
National-account deflators 
GDP 
128.8 
149.1 
158.0 
5.3 
4.3 
4.6 
8.5 
5.8 
7.5 
11.4 
Priv. 
con-
sumpt . 
126.6 
141.5 
150.2 
5.4 
7.5 
3.4 
5.6 
5.2 
6.3 
8.6 
Public 
con-
sumpt . 
150.7 
177.9 
184.1 
7.4 
8.8 
3.9 
13.2 
9.9 
8.5 
12.2 
Fixed 
inv. 
134.2 
142.3 
156.3 
4.8 
6.1 
4.5 
7.1 
5.5 
8.4' 
9.8 
con-
sumer 
prie.
1 
-
-
156.1 
7.0 
8.2 
3.0 
5.9 
5.6 
6.6 
9.9 
Wage-regulation 
price index
2 
excl. 
resi-
den-
tial 
costs 
-
-
144.1 
4.6 
3.9 
2.4 
5.9 
4.9 
6.9 
9.0 
incl. 
resi-
den-
tial 
costs 
-
-
148.1 
4.8 
5.2 
3.2 
6.1 
5.7 
6.9 
8.7 
Excluding residential costs, including indirect taxes. 
2 
Excluding indirect taxes. 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik, Nationalregnskabsstatistik 1947-1960, S.U. No 7 
and Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1971 and 1975. 
RATES OF INCREASE IN PRICES AND MONEY WAGES 
3. As was already pointed out in chapter I, the rate of inflation as meas-
ured by the implicit national accounts deflators has shown a long-term trend 
of accelerating price increases. This point is confirmed by the figures in 
table IX.1. The first four columns indicate rates of price increases accord-
ing to some selected national accounts deflators. 
As appears from the upper part of the table, the rate of inflation has, on 
the whole, been increasing. In this connection it should be kept in mind that 
while the first two sub-periods cover eight years each, the last sub-period 
covers seven years only. Year-by-year figures of the last sub-period are in-159 -
dicated in the bottom part of the table. According to these figures, the 
1969-70 boom was accompanied by accelerating prices. Subsequently, rates of 
inflation were temporarily reduced, but in 1972-73 price increases were sub-
stantial, the GDP deflator increasing by more than 10 per cent from 1972 to 
1973. 
4. In the last three columns, rates of inflation according to consumer price 
indices are indicated.
1 The index of consumer prices includes indirect taxes. 
This fact explains the substantial price increases in 1967 and 1968 according 
to the table. During these years, the value-added tax was introduced and sub-
sequently increased (cf. chapter VI). 
The last two columns indicate price increases according to the so-called 
wage-regulation price index, which excludes indirect taxes.
2 On the whole, 
price increases are somewhat smaller according to the latter index, but the 
main pattern is rather similar to that according to the other indices, taking 
the conceptual differences into account. 
5. Table IX.2 indicates rates of increase of money wages. Not surprisingly, 
the pattern of accelerating trends of wage increases according to table IX.2 
is rather similar to that of price increases according to table IX.1. Wage 
rates for female workers - usually substantially lower than rates for their 
male colleagues - have increased relatively more than rates for male workers. 
When increases of rates for skilled and unskilled male workers are compared, 
a similar tendency for wage differentials between higher and lower-paid work-
ers to disappear is not evident, at least not during the first two sub-peri-
ods. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO WAGE AGREEMENTS 
6. In principle, wage negotiations take place at a very aggregated level. 
'General Agreements' are concluded between the Association of Danish Trade 
Unions and the Danish Employers' Union. From 1961 onwards, such agreements 
have been concluded for two-year periods, the date of expiration always being 
March 1. The basic philosophy underlying these general negotiations are that 
they reflect the bargaining powers of the two organizations and are based on 
what is called the 'free right of the two parties to negotiate' without in-
terference from outside. However, in practice the system is much more compli-
cated. 
These indices are published including as well as excluding residential 
costs. Those excluding residential costs are probably the most reliable be-
cause of difficulties of providing appropriate expressions of price in-
creases related to residential expenditure. 
Residential expenditure is included when the index is used for the purpose 
of adjusting wage rates. Whether this is an appropriate procedure, taking 
the difficulties in this field into account, is another question. - 160 -
Table IX.2 
Money wage rates for different categories of worker 
Wage r-ates, kroner 
1950 
1973 
Indices of wage increases 
during sub-period 
1958, 1950 = 100 
1966, 1958 = 100 
1973, 1966 = 100 
Per cent increase over 
mg year 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
preced-
Total 
3.27 
24.85 
162.4 
208.3 
224.7 
9.4 
11.8 
11.5 
11.2 
15.1 
11.6 
15.4 
Male 
workers, 
skilled 
3.91 
27.99 
160.6 
208.4 
213.8 
8.6 
10.7 
11.5 
10.8 
13.5 
11.1 
14.2 
Male 
workers, 
unskilled 
3.28 
24.10 
158.8 
205.0 
225.7 
9.5 
12.1 
11.5 
11.4 
15.0 
11.7 
15.2 
Female 
workers 
2.32 
20.64 
164.7 
219.4 
246.3 
10.1 
12.5 
11.4 
11.6 
16.5 
14.0 
20.5 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1960, 1970 and 1975. 
7. It is important to notice that the results of the general negotiations 
are always expressed in terms of increases in actual wage rates. This implies 
that, to the extent that certain groups have succeeded in getting their wage 
rates increased during the two-year period, this advantage is maintained at 
the conclusion of a new two-year agreement. 
This aspect is of special importance because the possibilities 
'in-between' increases of wages differ between different groups 
ers. For many trade unionists - usually those not belonging to 
groups - a system of 'minimum wages' is used. According to this 
wage rates in each individual firm may be re-negotiated during 
period, hence the system provides a legal basis for wages drift 
most unskilled workers the system is one of 'normal wages', whi 
pie excludes the possibility of additional wages negotiations 
of obtaining 
of wage earn-
the lower-paid 
arrangement, 
the two-year 
However, for 
ch in princi-
This institu-- 161 -
tional framework provides part of the background for the so-called wages-
wages spirals, the pattern being the following: during general negotiations 
on new agreements, the trade unions will often concentrate on getting wage 
increases for the low-wage groups, the aim being one of so-called 'wage poli-
cy of solidarity'. The low-wage groups are usually paid according to the 
'normal wages' system. However, during the period covered by the agreement, 
the other groups, paid according to the 'minimum wages' system, often manage 
to get 'individual' wage increases to such an extent that wage relativities 
between the higher and lower paid (male) workers are re-established (cf. ta-
ble IX.2). 
8. Therefore, while the importance of the biennial negotiations between the 
trade unions and the employers' unions should not be underestimated - and 
this is especially true with respect to working hours and other working con-
ditions - it should be recalled that as far as negotiations on money wages 
are concerned, the result should in many cases be considered a floor for wage 
increases, on top of which wage drift may take place. This is particularly 
true not only during periods of labour shortage, but also in periods when es-
pecially large wage increases have been given to some (low-income) groups ac-
cording to the previous general agreement. 
9. A peculiar aspect of the general agreements on wages is the 'escalator 
clause', which provides for an automatic adjustment of money wages when price 
increases take place during the two-year period covered by the agreement. The 
size of such price increases is indicated by the so-called wage-regulation 
price index, in principle excluding indirect taxes
1 and subsidies. Price in-
creases according to this index were shown in the last column of table IX.1. 
Usually, around two-thirds of the price increase is compensated, taking the 
total wage bill as a basis. However, the pattern of compensation may vary and 
has been changed from time to time. 
10. In order to give an impression of the relative importance of increases 
of wage rates according to (1) the escalator clause, (2) wage increases ac-
cording to the general agreements and (3) wages drift, the share of the total 
increase of wage rates according to each of these three factors is indicated 
in table IX.3 for different types of workers for sub-periods during 1955-1974. 
The pattern according to the table corresponds fairly well to the hypotheses 
mentioned above. In particular, wage drift is by far the most important fac-
tor in wage increases for skilled male workers: ás appears from the table, 
more than half of the total increase of wages of this group is explained by 
wages drift. For the lowest paid group, i.e. female workers, the correspond-
ing share is less than 30 per cent. For female workers the major factor in 
their wage increases has been the escalator-clause adjustment. 
11. As was mentioned earlier, the biennial negotiations take place at a very 
centralized level. This, at least, is true for the final stages of the nego-
tiations. This phase is, however, preceeded by decentralized negotiations on 
'special issues' related to the problems of each individual trade union. 
The reason for excluding price increases caused by indirect taxes is that 
such increases may represent part of a general counter-cyclical fiscal pol-
icy. Such increases of indirect tax rates in order to reduce disposable 
real income should not, according to the argument, give rise to compensa-
tion for wage earners. 162 
Table IX.3 
Increase of money wage rates, by causal factor 
1955-1960 
1960-1965 
1965-1969 
1969-1974 
1955-1974, 
1955-1960 
1960-1965 
1965-1969 
1969-1974 
1955-1974, 
1955-1960 
1960-1965 
1965-1969 
1969-1974 
1955-1974, 
TOTAL 
TOTAL 
TOTAL 
Total increase 
øre/ 
hour 
187 
380 
491 
1 315 
2 373 
136 
317 
435 
1 161 
2 049 
108 
269 
368 
1 150 
1 895 
per 
cent 
of wh 
esca-
lator 
clause 
ich caused by 
general 
agreem. 
Male workers, skilled 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
30 
23 
29 
32 
30 
Male workers, uns 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Fem 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
41 
27 
32 
36 
34 
20 
18 
25 
13 
17 
killed 
24 
34 
33 
20 
26 
ale workers 
51 
40 
43 
37 
40 
22 
33 
34 
32 
32 
wages 
drift 
50 
59 
46 
55 
53 
35 
39 
35 
44 
40 
27 
27 
23 
31 
28 
Source: The table, based on information from the Danish Employ-
ers' Union, has been taken from Steen Leth Jeppesen, 
Løn og Priser, Copenhagen 1975, p. 20. - 163 
Hence the whole pattern of negotiations is a time-consuming one, covering sev-
eral months or perhaps even half a year prior to the date of March 1, when 
the old agreements expire. 
In order to contribute to the negotiations leading to some kind of an agree-
ment, an official arbitrator is appointed according to a special law, origi-
nating as far back as 1910. The purpose of the arbitrator is solely to find 
a solution, acceptable to both parties, irrespective of whether the solution 
is in accordance with targets of the government with respect to permissible 
rates of inflation, etc. 
12. In practice, the arbitrator may or may not be able to find a basis for 
presenting a proposal, acceptable to both parties, as to how the problem 
could be settled. If the arbitrator does present a proposal, and this is sub-
sequently rejected by votes of one of the parties, the final result may be 
that the proposal, perhaps with certain amendments, is transformed into law 
by parliament. 
LEGISLATION ON PRICES AND MONOPOLIES 
13. Legislation on prices and monopolies takes as its starting point the 
premise that 'unjust prices and conditions of sales are prohibited'. In or-
der to deal with problems in this field, an authority to control monopolies 
has been established. Business agreements which substantially limit competi-
tion, are not prohibited as a general principle. However, they must be reg-
istered with the monopolies authority. The authority is empowered to nego-
tiate with business firms if certain agreements are considered by the author-
ity to limit competition to a substantial extent. If these negotiations do 
not lead to a positive result, the authority may order that such business 
agreements be cancelled. 
14. In principle, producers are not allowed to fix the retail prices for 
their products, but such prices cannot be binding on the retailer, and should 
only be considered as a recommendation. If they are to be considered as 
binding, prior acceptance of the prices by the monopolies authority is re-
quired. Furthermore, several rules on the procedures to be followed in cal-
culating prices have been established. But, as with similar problems in other 
countries, it is easier to establish authorities and procedures in this 
field than it is to make sure that the intentions are met in practice by 
businesses. 
15. With these factors in mind, it may be more appropriate to mention some 
'basic viewpoints' in this field rather than to discuss the legislation in 
detail. 
Firstly, as has been frequently stressed, the Danish economy is a small and 
open one. Hence competition from abroad plays an important role in determin-
ing the degree of competition on the domestic market. In this connection, 
multinational firms are often criticized in the debate on these issues, be-
cause establishments in Denmark that are owned by a multinational firm may be 
subject to comparatively little competition from abroad (and, furthermore, 
bearing in mind the high rates of taxation in Denmark, they are unlikely to 
account for all of their profits in their Danish balance sheets). - 164 -
16. The limited involvement in business activities of the government sector 
probably contributes quite substantially to the degree of competition in Den-
mark. Of course, several activities in the field of infrastructure, etc. are 
under government ownership, railways being owned by the central government 
and electricity works by associations of local authorities. But apart from 
such fields, government ownership in business is rather rare in spite of the 
fact that labour party governments have been in power during most of the last 
4-5 decades. 
The explanation of this state of affairs may be found in some of the observa-
tions made in earlier chapters. The liberal tradition of the Danish economy, 
dominated by the agricultural sector until a few decades ago, was very 
strong. Furthermore, the industries expanding during the late 1950s and the 
1960s acquired a liberal way of reasoning in connection with the OEEC liber-
alization, the creation of EFTA, etc. Finally, manufacturing enterprises are 
usually rather new, rather small and not too capital intensive. In such 
fields, a policy of direct government involvement is not an obvious strategy. 
THE FUNCTIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
17. The starting point for estimates of the functional income distribution 
is the total wage bill actually paid. The corresponding concept of profits 
should be defined 'net', i.e. net domestic product (excluding depreciation, 
etc.) should provide the total to be distributed. A starting point for such 
estimates is shown in table IX.4. 
According to the table, the share of wages has shown a strongly increasing 
trend, and the share of 'other income' has declined correspondingly, from 41 
per cent in 1962 to 32 per cent in 1973. However, the table is based on total 
domestic product,
1 hence a substantial part of 'other income' must be inter-
preted as imputed wages and should be shifted from 'other income' to 'wages' 
in order to obtain the distribution between wages (including imputed wages 
for owners, and the self-employed) and profits.
2 
Such an adjustment obviously would change the picture according to table 
IX.4, because the number of owners, and the self-employed has shown a per-
sistent decline. Hence the importance of the imputed wages has been declin-
ing, and consequently the share of profits has not been declining to the same 
1 This is different from table III.4. Furthermore, the latter table was based 
on gross figures. 
Other problems with respect to such estimates will not be elaborated. One 
is how contributions to social funds, e.g. by employers, should be handled. 
In table IX.4, they are considered as part of total profits but, as men-
tioned in chapter VI, in Denmark such contributions are insignificant. 
Another problem is whether government services, use of dwellings and some 
other components of domestic product should be excluded, before the func-
tional incomes distribution is estimated. Such adjustments have not been 
made in table IX.4. - 165 -
Table IX.4 
The functional income distribution 
1962 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
Wages 
58.5 
60.4 
61.9 
62.3 
63.5 
63.0 
65.1 
67.4 
67.1 
67.6 
Share of 
Other incomes 
41.5 
39.6 
38.1 
37.7 
36.5 
37.0 
34.9 
32.6 
32.9 
32.4 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Net domestic 
product, DKR 
1 000 million 
current prices 
42.5 
56.9 
62.0 
67.8 
73.9 
84.3 
93.3 
102.0 
114.8 
131.6 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1975. 
extent as the share of 'other incomes' according to table IX.4. Still, this 
adjustment would only eliminate the substantial decline of the share of 
'other incomes' to a limited extent. 
18. The interpretation of changes in the functional income distribution is 
far from obvious. A persistent decline in the share of profits may not be 
compatible with increased private investment, the latter being urgently need-
ed in order to improve the performance of the balance of payments industries. 
Furthermore, it should 
low-income groups, nor 
discussed in chapters 
benefit from the high 
true for small-holders 
and the self-employed 
the viewpoint of equal 
distribution may provi 
be recalled that wages are not necessarily earned by 
are profits necessarily received by the rich. As was 
II and V, certain large groups have not been able to 
overall growth rates of the last decades. This has been 
in agriculture and a substantial part of the owners 
in retail trades and in handicrafts. Therefore, from 
ity of the income distribution, the personal income 
de a better analytical framework. 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME 
19. Information on the distribution of personal income can mainly be found 
from income-tax returns. However, these figures are not very suitable for the - 166 
purpose of illustrating trends in personal income distribution. There are 
several reasons for this viewpoint. Firstly, as discussed in chapter VI, the 
income tax system has changed completely during the last decade. These chang-
es have affected the comparability of information according to the income-
tax returns. Furthermore, the way in which taxable income has been affected 
for a person owning his own home has undergone substantial changes with re-
spect to the share of taxable income, because of changes in the 'imputed in-
come' from living in one's own home. At the same time, interest payments - at 
increasing interest rates - have been fully tax-deductible. Therefore, per-
sons -who have recently bought their own home will usually belong to the low-
income groups (on the basis of taxable income) according to statistics based 
on income-tax returns, although their standard of living does not exactly 
correspond to that of traditional low-income groups. Additional problems oc-
cur related to the use of depreciation allowances, etc. 
Therefore, while statistics based on income-tax returns usually suggest that 
personal income distribution has become more and more even over the last dec-
ades, this conclusion may just as well reflect the increased possibilities, 
and greater efforts by high income groups, for reducing their taxable income. 
Other difficulties with respect to the personal income distribution are re-
lated to the interpretation of the figures. For instance, changes of the age 
distribution of the population should be taken into account. Furthermore, to 
the extent that higher education (delaying the time of entering the 'active' 
labour force) becomes more widespread, this will lead to a larger part of 
the population (the students) belonging to the low income groups, although 
the problems of the latter are not similar to those of traditional low-income 
groups. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that attempts have been made to find al-
ternative ways of illustrating trends in the personal income distribution. 
One of the most promising is based on the concept of 'life income'. 
20. The idea behind statistics on life incomes is the following: for many 
occupations, information on wages by age in a certain year is available. Us-
ing this information, the starting point is assumptions as to the age at 
which the employee with a certain education enters the labour force, how he 
is promoted and at what age he retires. Given this 'time profile' and infor-
mation on wages at each age, the life income of the employee may be esti-
mated. Obviously, such estimates are not very meaningful for employers or 
self-employed, hence they are mainly useful in order to illustrate wage dif-
ferentials between different kinds of wage-earners, where detailed informa-
tion on wage rates is available, usually based on wage agreements. 
In table IX.5, life wages for different kinds of employees are indicated on 
the basis of wage statistics by ages for 1970. Wages are indicated 'before 
tax', and life wages are shown both using simple summation and capitalized 
1 
See Det økonomiske Råd, Den personlige indkomstfordeling og indkomstudjaev-
ningen over de offentlige finanser, Copenhagen 1967. For more recent fig-
ures, see Statistisk tiårsoversigt. 167 -
Table IX.5 
Life wages for selected types of wage earners, based on 1970 wage rates 
Female worker, textiles 
Clerk, gov.t admin. 
Metal worker 
Unskilled bricklayer 
Economist, civil serv. 
High school teacher 
Simple ε 
mill. 
DKR 
1.412 
1.953 
2.067 
2.567 
3.822 
3.922 
ummation 
Metal work-
er = 100 
68 
95 
100 
124 
185 
190 
5 per cent 
discount rate 
mill. 
DKR 
0.459 
0.573 
0.611 
0.812 
0.859 
0.867 
Metal work-
er = 100 
75 
94 
100 
133 
141 
142 
Source: Det økonomiske Råd, Dansk økonomi foråret 1972, pp. 61 and 66. 
at a 5 per cent discount factor. The latter rate of discount probably is very 
much on the high side. 
Differences with respect to life wages are quite substantial, even if the 
longer periods of education of the highly paid groups are taken into consid-
eration, as is the case in the table. Thus, using undiscounted figures, the 
life wage of a high school teacher was almost three times as high as that of 
a female textile worker. 
EFFECTS OF HOLDING ASSETS AND LIABILITIES DURING PERIODS OF CHANGING RATES OF 
INFLATION 
21. While estimates of life wages provide a useful supplement to traditional 
statistical information on personal income distribution, further data is 
still needed. Perhaps the major factor which has affected personal income 
distribution over recent years which have been marked by increasing rates of 
inflation, is differences with respect to the balance sheets of the persons 
concerned, the pertinent feature being whether they own land (perhaps with a 
On these issues, see Erik Gørtz and J. Vibe-Pedersen, 'Livsindkomstbereg-
ninger og deres betydning', Nationaløkonomisk Tidsskrift 1973, pp. 25-59. 
If the pension arrangements of the high school teacher are taken into ac-
count, the difference becomes even larger. - 168 -
holiday home) and for larger buildings (perhaps their own houses), which are 
financed by loans. As it has turned out, prices of land and real property 
have increased more than the general price level, thus giving rise to capital 
gains which have, in practice, usually not been subject to taxation. Further-
more, as noted in the previous chapter, increasing rates of inflation have 
reduced the real burden of the loans obtained in order to finance this in-
vestment. Finally, imputed income from living in one's own home is included 
in the income-tax returns at very low rates. 
22. Most of these effects, which have led to advantages for owners of own 
homes as compared with those living in rented apartments, are at least partly 
due to rules of taxation, etc., established by parliament. With increasing 
rates of income taxation and with increasing rates of inflation, these prob-
lems have been increasingly difficult to handle from a political viewpoint. 
The result has been that income distribution between the different groups, 
mentioned above, has been affected substantially, the relevant concept being 
income after tax, after current housing expenditures and after adjustment for 
the real net value of 'owned capital'. 
Obviously, a possible permanent reduction of the future rate of inflation 
will give rise to new - although different - problems, some of them being re-
lated to those who have invested (in new houses) at high interest rates on 
the assumption that inflation would continue. Nevertheless, it is true to say 
that, in the longer run, low and stable rates of general price increases 
represent the only way of avoiding most of the distribution problems discus-
sed above. It may be seen, therefore, that the need for policies to dampen 
and stabilize rates of inflation is not only due to problems with respect to 
the ability of the balance of payment industries to compete, but is also due 
to problems related to demand management. 
INCOMES POLICY, THE DANISH EXPERIENCE 
23. 'Incomes policy' became a key word, for the first time, in 1962-63. Dur-
ing this winter, general wage negotiations were taken place with unemployment 
increasing and a balance of payments deficit in 1962 of more than DKR 1 500 
million - the biggest deficit ever recorded at that time. Prospects for 
reaching agreement between the Association of Trade Unions and the Employers' 
Union were not very promising and the labour party held a majority - although 
a small one - in parliament. 
Actually, the negotiations were never brought to an end, and the official 
arbitrator was never really involved. Instead, parliament took over and new 
wage rates were established by law. The immediate result was very successful 
with respect to the balance of payments. The modest increases of money wages 
according to the solution passed by parliament probably contributed to this 
development, but an additional factor undoubtedly was the international up-
swing in 1963. The rate of unemployment was not reduced until 1964. However, 
on the whole the 1963 'package solution' was considered to be a success. 
24. Incomes policy again became a live issue in November 1967, when the Dan-
ish krone followed sterling half way, when the latter was devalued by 15 per 
cent. The Danish devaluation reflected the Danish dependence at that time on 169 
the British market for its agricultural exports. Subsequently, in order to 
avoid the krone devaluation simply leading to corresponding domestic price 
increases, the labour government suggested that the automatic escalator 
clause should be suspended. However, the majority in parliament on which the 
government was based at that time included a party to the left of the labour 
party, and some of the members of that party were opposed to the suspension 
of the escalator clause. Therefore, the majority in parliament was no longer 
controlled by the government. In this situation, the liberal and conservative 
parties, having been in opposition for 14 years, could not resist the tempta-
tion of voting against the government, even if at least some of them had been 
in favour of suspending the escalator clause. Therefore, the government had 
to call for an election, and after the election the liberal-conservative par-
ties obtained a majority in parliament. They actually formed a new govern-
ment, but this government was obviously not in a strong position to implement 
an incomes policy. 
INCOMES POLICY, SOME GENERAL REMARKS 
25. During the early 1960s, incomes policy in Denmark as well as in other 
industrialized countries, consisted principally of guidelines for the permis-
sible increase of money wages, assuming prices remained stable. With rela-
tively stable rates of capacity utilization and terms of trade, such guide-
lines would usually be for an increase of about 3 per cent. However, while 
pretending to indicate the total increase in money wages, this figure was 
frequently interpreted as indicating the permissible wage increase according 
to the general agreements, which of course is a very different - and much 
more narrow - concept (cf. table IX.3 above). 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, the guidelines subsequently became more 
and more detailed, and hence more and more controversial. From 1968 onwards, 
the idea of publishing guidelines was abolished. The main reason was the lack 
of success in implementing the guidelines, when compared with what actually 
happened. A special factor of some importance in this connection was that, 
with guidelines established prior to the general negotiations, the trade un-
ions were likely to consider such guidelines as a 'floor' with respect to fu-
ture wage increases, i.e. as minimum increases from which the negotiations 
would start. 
26. During the 1960s, another aspect of the debate on incomes policy was 
whether the issue was solely - or at least mainly - one of wages policy, in 
other words to what extent it made sense, in a market economy, to put up 
guidelines for other types of incomes as well. 
The latter question might, however, more appropriately be reversed, asking 
whether it is possible to affect even the rate of increase of money wages, 
taking the Danish system of wage fixing into account and recalling, in par-
ticular, the substantial amount of wages drift. A consensus of opinion was 
gradually reached in the debate, according to which incomes policy could at 
most be considered to be a modest supplement to fiscal and monetary policy, 
at least as long as capacity utilization was high with labour shortage in 
several areas. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that questions related to 
incomes policy played a rather insignificant role, until unemployment once 
again became a major problem after the oil crisis of 1973-74. 170 
27, So far, the term 'wages' has frequently been used without qualifica-
tions, perhaps implying that an increase in money wages would lead to an in-
crease in real wages. While the latter result may be true, provided that the 
wage increase is obtained only by a small group of workers, experience from 
the late 1960s and early 1970s has amply demonstrated that, for large groups, 
relative wages are likely to be re-established to a large extent. Hence the 
main effect of substantially increased money wages will be one of increased 
prices. 
The dilemma of the trade unions under present arrangements is obvious: during 
the centralized negotiations, the instrument being negotiated by the trade 
unions is money wages, but the object of the trade unions is to affect real 
wages - or perhaps even real net wages. Unfortunately, changes in money wages 
are not a very good instrument for reaching the latter objectives. 
So far, the concept of real disposable income has only been mentioned in 
passing. This concept represents the after tax purchasing power of a person's 
income. Hence it disregards the amount of services obtained from the govern-
ment sector. Even with this shortcoming, real disposable income seems to play 
a significant role in the minds of an increasing number of wage earners. 
28. To the extent that this is true, one obvious way of trying to solve the 
dilemma of the trade unions is somehow to include the future level of taxa-
tion and other factors affecting real disposable income among the issues to 
be discussed during the general wage negotiations. Such a framework would im-
ply that the majority in parliament should somehow be currently involved dur-
ing the whole period of negotiations, so that the trade unions as well as the 
employers' union know the kind of reactions to be expected from parliament, 
assuming various outcomes of the wage negotiations. 
CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF WAGES AS A REFLECTION OF STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC 
PROBLEMS 
29. The distinction between balance of payments industries and domestic in-
dustries was already introduced in chapter I (see table 1.9). It is based on 
research, originating in Norway and Sweden.
1 The conclusion to be drawn from 
this analysis with respect to wages policy, assuming relatively full employ-
ment, may be summarized as follows: 
a) If structural problems are to be avoided, any increase in money wage rates 
should - at fixed exchange rates - reflect price increases abroad and the 
rate of increase of productivity in the balance of payments industries, 
both factors being largely exogenous from the viewpoint of domestic econ-
omic policy. 
Originally, the ideas were presented by the Norwegian Aukrust Committee, 
see Innstilling fra Utredningsutvalget for inntektsoppgjørene 1966 I - and 
in particular - II, January and October 1966. The analysis was extended and 
refined in Edgren, Faxen and Odhner, Wage Formation and the Economy, Allen 
& Unwin, 1973. 171 
Table IX.6 
Life wages for selected types of wage earners, 
based on wage rates in 1960 and 1970 
Female worker, textiles 
Clerk, government adm. 
Metal worker 
Unskilled bricklayer 
Economist, civil serv. 
High school teacher 
1960 
mill. DKR 
0.510 
0.721 
0.864 
0.961 
1.307 
1.284 
1970 
mill. DKR 
1.412 
1.953 
2.067 
2.567 
3.822 
3.922 
1970, 
1960 = 100 
277 
271 
239 
267 
293 
306 
Note: Figures are obtained by simple summation, see ta-
ble IX.5. 
Source: Det økonomiske Råd, Dansk økonomi foråret 1972, 
p. 70. 
b) It is therefore important that conditions in the balance of payments in-
dustries should determine the rate of increase of money wages. Wage rates 
in these industries should 'set the pace' for wage increases in other in-
dustries as well. In order to obtain this result, demand pressure on the 
capacity of domestic industries should be avoided. 
c) Serious consequences will, however, emerge if domestic industries are in a 
better position than the balance of payments industries to increase output 
and income. If the increase of total demand is mainly directed towards do-
mestic industries - by definition implying that shortages of domestic sup-
ply cannot be met by increased imports - wages and profits in domestic in-
dustries will increase. Of course, attempts will be made by the workers in 
the balance of payments industries to obtain similar wage increases, but 
they are only likely to succeed to a limited extent, because prices of the 
output of the balance of payments industries are imposed from outside. 
Hence wages in the balance of payments industries will lag behind, and at 
the same time profits of the balance of payments industries will be 
squeezed. Obviously, such a development will not provide the best back-
ground for the balance of payments industries to expand. 
30. The pattern according to c) in the preceding paragraph may provide an 
appropriate description of economic developments during the 1960s and the 
early 1970s. Changes in the pattern of wages according to this description 
can actually be shown to have taken place (cf. table IX.6). The table illus-
trates life incomes - as in table IX.5 - for some well defined, smaller 
groups of wage earners in 1970 as compared with 1960. 172 
Several trends are indicated by the table. Firstly, the relative increase in 
wages of female workers, indicated in table IX.2, is illustrated by develop-
ments in the life wages of a female textile worker. The explanation of this 
new pattern
1 can partly be found in fields outside the narrow economic ones, 
including a gradually more widespread recognition that male and female work-
ers should have the same working conditions, including wage rates. Neverthe-
less, the hypothesis cannot be neglected that the comparatively large wage 
increases for female workers in balance of payments industries, which to a 
large extent have a female labour force (e.g. textiles), may have contrib-
uted to the economic difficulties of these industries. 
Another interesting result is the comparatively low wage increase for male 
workers in the balance of payments industries, exemplified by the metal work-
ers. This is in accordance with the analysis in the preceding paragraph. 
The male workers in domestic industries, which were booming during the 1960s, 
have been able to obtain much higher wage increases, as is shown by the fig-
ures for the unskilled bricklayer. 
However, the big winners apparently were government employees, in particular 
those employed in posts requiring higher education. As was discussed in chap-
ter VI, a large expansion in the number of employees in this field took place 
during the 1960s, with the demand for employees with university degrees far 
exceeding supply. However, this was not only a problem in those areas of the 
government sector where higher education was required. Clerks in government 
service also had high wage increases - probably much higher than their col-
leagues in the private sector. Bearing in mind that the share of the total 
labour force employed in the government sector grew rapidly during the 1960s, 
this result should not be surprising. 
HAVE MONEY WAGES INCREASED TOO FAST? 
31. In the above argument, it has been implied that the structural problems 
of the economy would have been less serious if the general level of money 
wages had shown smaller increases during the 1960s and the early 1970s. Table 
IX.7 provides a comparison of year-by-year increases in wage costs in Denmark 
with similar figures for groups of countries. The figures include indirect 
wage costs in connection with contributions to social funds, etc. Further-
more, they are adjusted for exchange-rate changes of the individual coun-
tries. As it turns out, Danish wage costs have, on the whole, increased more 
than the average increases in Western Europe and in OECD-countries as a 
whole. 
Admittedly, the ability of Danish producers to compete with foreign competi-
tors does not depend on wages costs exclusively. The development of relative 
prices of goods - and in particular output prices of Danish manufactured 
As appears from table IX.2, female wages increased more than male wages 
during 1950-1966, but the difference was not very impressive. It was not 
until 1966-1973 that female wages really started to catch up with male 
wages. - 173 -
Table IX.7 
Increases of wage costs in manufacturing industries 
of different countries, 1965-1973 
Denmark 
Western Europe 
OECD countries 
Difference between 
Denmark and Western 
Europe 
Difference between 
Denmark and OECD 
countries 
pere 
1965 
12.5 
8.2 
6.2 
+4.3 
+6.3 
entage 
1966 
12.9 
7.5 
5.6 
+ 5.4 
+7.3 
Total wage 
increase as 
1967 
8.2 
6.2 
7.0 
+2.0 
+1.2 
1968 
12.5 
11.6 
13.5 
+0.9 
-1.0 
costs per hour, 
compared with previous 
1969 
9.7 
10.6 
9.9 
-0.9 
-0.2 
1970 
11.9 
16.6 
11.7 
-4.7 
+0.2 
1971 
15.0 
15.3 
11.1 
-0.3 
+3.9 
1972 
12.5 
12.4 
8.2 
+0.1 
+4.3 
year 
1973 
18.8 
10.7 
3.2 
+8.1 
+ 15.6 
Note: For coverage and concepts, see text. 
Source: Det økonomiske Råd, Dansk økonomi April 1976, p. 18. 
goods as compared with those of other countries - also play an important 
role. Here it should be recalled that the table refers to wage costs of all 
manufacturing industries in the various countries. Furthermore, differences 
with respect to productivity increases will affect levels of profits. How-
ever, comparable figures covering these aspects are difficult to obtain. In 
particular, figures on increases in productivity in different countries give 
rise to conceptual problems which have not yet been solved in a satisfactory 
way. 
32. Although the figures in table IX.7 cannot be claimed to provide decisive 
evidence on the issue of the ability of Danish industries to compete, they 
still cover the important aspects which can be quantified without going into 
controversial - or unsettled - issues. The immediate conclusion to be drawn 
from the table is that, during the period up to 1973, wage costs of Danish 
manufacturing industries increased to an extent which made it increasingly 
difficult for the Danish balance of payments industries to compete. The find-
ings of the present chapter may be considered as confirming the viewpoint 
that, up to 1973, too much attention was given to the aim of reducing short-
term unemployment and too little attention was given to problems which had to 
be solved if full employment in the long run was to be maintained. These 
problems included the dampening of demand for output from domestic industries 
in order to restructure the economy, giving higher priority to the expansion 
of the balance of payments industries and thus contributing to the elimina-
tion of the balance of payments deficit. 175 
Chapter Χ 
FOREIGN TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
1. In many of the preceding chapters, economic trends have been illustrated 
by data for selected years. However, when discussing balance of payments def­
icits, this form of presentation has a number of disadvantages. In order to 
provide a comprehensive survey, this chapter begins by indicating the size 
of, and discussing the trends in, the main items on the current account of 
the balance of payments on a year-by-year basis since 1950. The reason for 
going back that far should be obvious: the balance of payments issue has been 
one of the most troublesome in Danish economic policy ever since the Second 
World War. The persistent balance of payments deficits since 1960 have led to 
permanent problems of financing the steadily increasing foreign debt. How 
these problems have been handled is discussed in subsequent sections. Final­
ly, problems related to the exchange rate will be discussed. 
CURRENT ACCOUNT OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1950-1973 
2. As appears from table X.l, the balance of payments was rather badly hit 
by the Korean crisis and the consequent substantial deterioration of the 
terms of trade. In 1950, the deficit on goods and services amounted to DKR 
800 million, the largest deficit to be experienced for more than a decade. 
The deficit occurred in spite of the fact that the Danish krone had followed 
sterling, when the latter was devalued in 1949, thus maintaining the sterling 
rate of DKR 19.34 established when the Danish krone was revalued during the 
Second World War. 
Fortunately, in 1950 and 1951 Denmark still received Marshall aid, of slight­
ly below DKR 500 million per year. Nevertheless, the foreign exchange hold­
ings at that time were so small - and the possibilities of foreign borrowing 
so limited - that deficits on the current accounts of the balance of pay­
ments could not be afforded. This constraint explains why the current account 
was virtually in balance during most of the 1950s - accompanied by substan­
tial unemployment (cf. chapter I). - 176 -
Table X.l 
Main items on the current account of the balance of payments, 1950-1973 
(DKR 1 000 million, current prices) 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
Goo 
Exports 
6.0 
7.8 
8.0 
8.2 
8.8 
9.8 
10.5 
11.4 
11.9 
12.9 
13.8 
14.3 
15.3 
17.3 
19.4 
21.4 
22.9 
24.2 
27.2 
30.7 
34.6 
39.2 
44.1 
52.9 
ds and services 
Imports 
6.8 
8.0 
7.8 
8.0 
9.2 
9.5 
10.5 
11.1 
10.9 
12.7 
14.2 
14.9 
16.8 
17.0 
20.5 
22.3 
23.9 
25.7 
28.3 
32.9 
37.8 
41.0 
42.7 
55.9 
Export 
surplus 
- 0.8 
- 0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
- 0.4 
0.3 
0.0 
0.3 
1.0 
0.2 
- 0.4 
- 0.6 
- 1.5 
0.3 
- 1.1 
- 0.9 
- 1.0 
- 1.5 
- 1.1 
- 2.2 
- 3.2 
- 1.8 
1.4 
- 3.0 
Interest 
payments, 
transfers 
etc. 
0.4 
0.4 
-
0.1 
- 0.1 
- 0.1 
- 0.1 
-
- 0.1 
- 0.1 
-
- 0.2 
- 0.2 
- 0.1 
- 0.3 
- 0.3 
- 0.5 
- 0.5 
- 0.5 
- 0.9 
- 0.9 
- 1.4 
- 1.8 
0.1 
Balance of 
payments, 
current 
account 
- 0.4 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
- 0.5 
0.2 
- 0.1 
0.3 
0.9 
0.1 
- 0.4 
- 0.8 
- 1.7 
0.2 
- 1.4 
- 1.2 
- 1.5 
- 2.0 
- 1.6 
- 3.1 
- 4.1 
- 3.2 
- 0.4 
- 2.9 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1963, 1970 and 1975. - 177 -
However, after the deterioration in connection with the Suez crisis in late 
1956, the terms of trade again improved, and so did the possibilities - and 
willingness - to borrow abroad. In 1958, the largest balance of payments sur-
plus of the post-war period occurred, of slightly below DKR 1 000 million. 
Admittedly, this surplus partly reflected a running down of stocks, but in 
the following years exports - in particular of manufactures - increased at an 
unexpectedly rapid rate, providing for a satisfactory balance of payments po-
sition at declining rates of unemployment. At the end of 1960, the total net 
foreign debt amounted to less than DKR 500 million. 
3. However, in the spring of 1961, following a new 'General Agreement' for 
the labour market, government expenditure increased substantially. The im-
plied expansionist fiscal policy led to a record balance of payments deficit 
in 1962, accompanied by domestic price increases. As a result, the 'package 
solution', described in chapter IX, was passed in parliament in the spring of 
1963, fixing money wage conditions for the following two-year period. In 
1963, there was a surplus on the current account of the balance of payments -
a situation that has not been repeated since. The surplus mainly reflected a 
reduction of stocks, leading to low import figures. 
4. From 1964 onwards, the goods and services account of the balance of pay-
ments has shown a persistent deficit. Consequently, foreign debt has increas-
ed - as have the interest payments related to the foreign debt. This has 
caused the deficit on the current account to increase even more. 
During most of the 1960s, the main philosophy was that the deficit should -
apart from short-term changes of general business conditions - be seen as re-
flecting the difficulties of agriculture, and of agricultural exports in par-
ticular. However, even after most of the reduction of the labour force in ag-
riculture had taken place, the balance of payments deficit continued. Never-
theless, optimism was renewed by the expected advantages to be obtained from 
future Danish membership of the EEC. In 1971,
2 temporary import duties were 
imposed in order to protect the balance of payments and the foreign exchange 
reserves during the year when the question of Danish EEC-membership was to be 
decided. Actually, imports slowed down in 1972, and a surplus occurred on the 
goods and services account. However, as net interest paid abroad had increas-
ed, the result for 1972 was a deficit, although a small one, on current ac-
count . 
In 1973, after Denmark's accession to the EEC, the economy was booming. The 
advantages from the EEC membership actually showed up, partly in the form of 
payments to Denmark from EAGGF of around DKR 2 000 million (cf. the 'trans-
fer' column in table X.l). However, increasing demand led to a substantial 
increase of imports, in particular because stocks had been reduced in 1972. 
Hence the balance of payments deficit returned to the DKR 3 000 million level. 
The terms of trade during the 1950s are shown in appendix table 1.1. 
Legislation was passed in October 1971. According to the scheme, temporary 
general import duties were introduced at the rate of 10 per cent, to be re-
duced to 7 per cent in July 1972, to 4 per cent in January 1973 and to be 
abolished completely in April 1973. - 178 -
Table Χ.2 
Exports by commodities, 1950, 1958 and 1964 
current prices 
Beef and cattle 
Bacon and pigs 
Butter and cheese 
Canned food 
Other agrie, exports 
AGRIC. EXPORTS, TOTAL 
Food, beverages, etc. 
Machines, instruments, etc. 
Metal products, etc. 
Chemical products 
Textiles and clothing 
Wood, wooden prod., furniture 
Other industral prod. 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, TOTAL 
Other products 
TOTAL EXPORTS 
1950 
mill. 
DKR 
297 
747 
1 056 
249 
932 
3 281 
135 
341 
215 
174 
86 
26 
142 
1 119 
192 
4 592 
per 
cent 
6 
16 
23 
5 
21 
71 
3 
7 
5 
4 
2 
0 
3 
24 
5 
100 
1958 
mill. 
DKR 
752 
1 249 
805 
655 
1 533 
4 994 
173 
1 237 
614 
488 
210 
171 
385 
3 278 
336 
8 608 
per 
cent 
9 
14 
9 
8 
18 
58 
2 
14 
7 
6 
2 
2 
5 
38 
4 
100 
1964 
mill. 
DKR 
931 
2 048 
1 126 
941 
1 715 
6 761 
299 
2 398 
1 072 
906 
580 
464 
1 045 
6 764 
857 
14 382 
per 
cent 
6 
14 
8 
7 
12 
47 
2 
17 
8 
6 
4 
3 
7 
47 
6 
100 
Note: The 1958 and 1964 figures are not completely comparable. However, this 
only affects the percentage distribution to a very limited extend. 
Sources : 1950 and 1958 figures are from Ole Bus Henriksen and Anders Ølgaard, 
Danmarks Udenrigshandel 1874-1958, Copenhagen 1960. 1964 figures are 
from Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk Ãrsoversigt March 1965. 
EXPORTS BY PRODUCTS 
5. The share of agricultural products in total exports continued to decline 
after the Second World War. In chapter II, only a few figures were shown in Table Χ.3 
Exports by commodities, 1964-1973 
Current prices 
Beef and cattle 
Bacon and pigs 
Butter and cheese 
Canned food 
Other animal products 
Vegetab. products 
AGRIC. EXPORTS, TOTAL 
Food, beverages, etc. 
Instruments, radios, etc. 
Other machines 
Other metal prod., etc. 
Pharmaceuticals 
Other chem. prod. 
Textiles and clothing 
Furniture 
Oil, etc. 
Other industrial prod. 
INDUSTRIAL PROD., TOTAL 
New ships 
Second-hand ships, etc. 
Fish and fish prod. 
Furs 
TOTAL EXPORTS 
1964 
mill. 
DKR 
931 
2 048 
1 126 
941 
755 
449 
6 250 
532 
746 
1 614 
598 
215 
718 
582 
256 
121 
1 126 
6 508 
452 
221 
706 
248 
14 385 
per cent 
6 
14 
8 
7 
5 
3 
43 
4 
5 
11 
4 
1 
5 
4 
2 
1 
8 
45 
3 
2 
5 
2 
100 
1967 
mill. 
DKR 
798 
2 163 
1 141 
1 287 
711 
503 
6 603 
562 
1 056 
2 203 
831 
263 
1 091 
822 
329 
188 
1 404 
8 749 
544 
228 
837 
303 
17 264 
per cent 
5 
12 
7 
7 
4 
3 
38 
3 
6 
13 
5 
2 
6 
5 
2 
1 
8 
51 
3 
1 
5 
2 
100 
1969 
mill. 
DKR 
905 
2 129 
986 
1 490 
746 
647 
6 903 
723 
1 787 
2 985 
1 122 
378 
1 648 
1 277 
452 
266 
2 084 
12 722 
712 
348 
1 050 
462 
22 197 
per cent 
4 
10 
4 
7 
3 
3 
31 
3 
8 
13 
5 
2 
8 
6 
2 
1 
9 
57 
3 
2 
5 
2 
100 
1971 
mill. 
DKR 
803 
2 284 
1 174 
1 899 
760 
719 
7 639 
995 
2 196 
3 841 
1 514 
516 
1 646 
1 715 
554 
453 
2 644 
16 074 
772 
370 
1 462 
422 
26 739 
per cent 
3 
9 
4 
7 
3 
3 
29 
4 
8 
14 
6 
2 
6 
6 
2 
2 
10 
60 
3 
1 
5 
2 
100 
1973 
mill. 
DKR 
1 255 
3 229 
1 402 
2 289 
1 036 
1 147 
10 358 
1 276 
2 987 
5 061 
2 009 
665 
2 175 
2 061 
897 
699 
3 508 
21 338 
849 
1 241 
2 291 
740 
36 817 
per cent 
3 
9 
4 
6 
3 
3 
28 
3 
8 
14 
5 
2 
6 
6 
2 
2 
10 
58 
2 
4 
6 
2 
100 
to 
I 
Source: Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk Oversigt. March 1972 and March 1976. Table Χ.4 
Agricultural exports by markets, 1965-73 
Current prices 
U.K. 
Fed. Rep. Germany 
Italy 
Other EEC-countries 
Fini., Norway, Sweden 
Other EFTA-countries 
U.S.A. 
Other countries 
TOTAL 
1965 
mill. 
DKR 
2 432 
921 
401 
195 
176 
188 
57 
547 
4 917 
per 
cent 
49 
19 
8 
4 
4 
4 
1 
11 
100 
1967 
mill. 
DKR 
2 607 
551 
397 
224 
215 
181 
92 
546 
4 813 
per 
cent 
54 
12 
8 
5 
4 
4 
2 
11 
100 
1969 
mill. 
DKR 
2 417 
705 
454 
156 
287 
109 
100 
538 
4 766 
per 
cent 
51 
15 
10 
3 
6 
2 
2 
11 
100 
1971 
mill. 
DKR 
2 493 
541 
556 
124 
323 
198 
136 
650 
5 021 
per 
cent 
50 
11 
11 
2 
6 
4 
3 
13 
100 
1973 
mill. 
DKR 
2 998 
901 
1 245 
362 
354 
162 
223 
677 
6 922 
per 
cent 
44 
13 
18 
5 
5 
2 
3 
10 
100 
Note: Figures correspond to those in table X.3, except that canned food and vegetable products are excluded. 
Source: Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk Oversigt, March 1973 and March 1976. 
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order to illustrate this trend. Tables X.2 and X.3 provide a more detailed 
picture.i 
From 1950 to 1958, the declining share of agricultural products was to a 
large extent due to a marked decline in butter exports (from 156 000 tons in 
1950 to 115 000 tons in 1958). Between 1958 and 1964, exports of eggs almost 
disappeared. 
According to table X.3, the share of agricultural products in total exports 
continue to decline until the late 1960s, when it had been reduced to 30 per 
cent. During the following years, this share was roughly maintained, although 
with a slightly declining trend. This new pattern was mainly caused by better 
prospects for agricultural exports in connection with the possibility of Den-
mark entering the EEC. 
6. Corresponding to the decline in the share of agricultural exports, that 
of industrial products increased during the 1950s and 1960s, reaching a level 
of roughly 60 per cent of total exports around 1970. The increase in exports 
of manufactures took place over a very wide range of products. 'Machines, 
etc.' remained the largest single item, but this category covers a wide range 
of different products. 
EXPORTS BY MARKETS 
7. Markets for agricultural and industrial exports differ considerably. The 
different patterns are illustrated in tables X.4 and X.5. 
Agricultural exports are sold mainly to Western Europe, the most important 
markets up to 1973 being the U.K., followed by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and Italy, whereas exports to Sweden, Norway and Finland are quite in-
significant. This fact may contribute to explaining why attempts to create 
close economic cooperation between the Scandinavian countries have never been 
successful. 
The three main customers for agricultural exports accounted for no less than 
75 per cent, with the U.K. buying roughly half of the total. Therefore, the 
obvious problem during the 1960s was that while Denmark's main customer - as 
Value figures for agricultural exports were already indicated in table II.5. 
The coverage of 'agricultural exports' in table X.2 is somewhat broader 
than in table II.5, hence the share of agricultural exports according to 
table X.2 is somewhat higher. 
In 1959, the Brussels Trade Nomenclature was introduced. This gave rise to 
new difficulties in presenting comparable export figures. These difficul-
ties explain why tables X.2 and X.3 differ with respect to grouping of 
products. A more detailed pattern is provided in table X.3 than in table 
X.2. At the same time, definitions were changed once more, reducing the 
coverage of total agricultural exports. However, figures inside table X.2 
are roughly comparable, and table X.3 is not affected by problems of com-
parability. Table Χ.5 
Exports of manufactured goods by markets, 1965-73 
Current prices 
Sweden 
Norway 
U.K. 
Fed. Rep. Germany 
Other EEC-countries 
Other European countries 
U.S.A. and Canada 
Other countries 
TOTAL 
1965 
mill. 
DKR 
1 262 
680 
546 
959 
698 
877 
466 
1 132 
6 620 
per 
cent 
19 
10 
8 
15 
11 
13 
7 
17 
100 
1967 
mill. 
DKR 
1 581 
879 
719 
901 
865 
961 
571 
1 427 
7 904 
per 
cent 
20 
11 
9 
12 
11 
12 
7 
18 
100 
1969 
mill. 
DKR 
2 399 
1 208 
1 089 
1 289 
1 193 
1 415 
1 078 
1 858 
11 529 
per 
cent 
21 
11 
10 
11 
10 
12 
9 
16 
100 
1971 
mill. 
DKR 
2 867 
1 559 
1 599 
1 723 
1 377 
1 872 
999 
2 389 
14 385 
per 
cent 
20 
11 
11 
12 
9 
13 
7 
17 
100 
1973 
mill. 
DKR 
3 389 
1 806 
2 471 
2 389 
2 119 
2 441 
1 275 
3 021 
18 911 
per 
cent 
18 
9 
13 
13 
11 
13 
7 
16 
100 
l·-· 
r\3 
Excluding Eastern Europe. 
Note: Some minor changes of definitions have taken place, but they only affect the absolute figures marginally 
and do not affect the percentage distributions. 
Source : Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk Oversigt 1970, March 1972 and March 1976. - 183 
well as Denmark itself - were not members of the EEC, half of the remaining 
agricultural exports were sold to EEC-countries, implying all the difficul-
ties and uncertainties which suppliers of agricultural products outside the 
EEC have to face. When the U.K. in 1972 decided to join the EEC, it was obvi-
ous that these difficulties and uncertainties would increase substantially, 
unless Denmark itself became a member of the EEC. 
Actually, Danish membership led to a reallocation of our agricultural exports, 
as is already apparent from the 1973 figures. The share of the U.K. declined, 
while that of Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and other EEC-countries 
increased. 
8. The market pattern for exports of manufactured goods remained remarkably 
stable during the period 1965-73 (cf. table X.5), the main exception being 
increased exports to the U.K. Roughly 75 per cent of manufacturing exports 
were sold in Western Europe, the most important market being Sweden. During 
the years of Danish membership of EFTA, the share sold in the EFTA countries 
increased at the expense of exports to the original six members of the EEC. 
However, Danish membership of the EEC reversed this trend. From 1971 to 1973, 
the share of manufacturing exports sold to the other eight EEC members in-
creased from 32 per cent to 37 per cent. 
IMPORTS BY PRODUCTS 
9. The composition of imports (cf. table X.6), reflects developments in the 
industrial pattern, described in earlier chapters. For instance, imports of 
grain for feeding purposes have become of declining importance. In 1950, im-
ports were affected by import policies at that time, for example with respect 
to quantitative restrictions; the same holds for the 1958 figures to some ex-
tent. Subsequently, and in particular during the early 1960s, imports of manu-
factured goods for consumption purposes increased substantially; a similar 
trend - starting somewhat earlier - is shown for the category of vehicles, 
ships and aircraft. The declining share of imports of fuel from 1958 to 1966 
is mainly due to declining fuel prices. 
10. On the whole, the figures illustrate the import pattern of an economy 
which is becoming gradually more industrialized with imports being increas-
ingly liberalized. In this context, it might have been expected that, due to 
increased international specialization, the share of imports as a per cent of 
NDP would have shown an upward trend. This is, however, not the case (cf. 
the bottom row of table X.6), and several factors may be cited to explain 
this development. 
First of all, short-term fluctuations in imports as a per cent of NDP reflect 
to a large extent changes in Stockbuilding. This phenomenon explains the low 
1972 figure (also affected by the temporary import duties) as well as the 
high 1973 figure. Furthermore, when considering the fact that total imports 
equalled 31-33 per cent of NDP in 1950, 1958 and 1966, the declining share of 
raw materials for agriculture should be borne in mind. Thirdly, it should be 
recalled that, whilst it may be true that the balance of payments industries, 
including the sector of manufacturing, have been affected by increased inter-
national division of labour, the relative size of this sector has been de-Table X.6 
Imports by commodity groups, 1950-1973 
Current prices 
Raw materials-agriculture 
Raw materials-industry 
Fuel and energy 
Semi-manufactured prod. 
Machines, instruments 
Vehicles, ships and 
aircraft 
Manuf. goods for consumpt. 
Food, beverages, etc. 
TOTAL IMPORTS 
TOTAL IMPORTS 
AS PER CENT OF NDP 
1950 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
0.66 
1.79 
1.00 
1.30 
0.36 
0.30 
0.15 
0.33 
5.89 
per 
cent 
11 
30 
17 
22 
6 
5 
3 
6 
100 
31.2 
1Ö58 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
0.95 
2.29 
1.50 
1.71 
0.90 
0.94 
0.47 
0.64 
9.40 
per 
cent 
10 
24 
16 
18 
10 
10 
5 
7 
100 
33.0 
1966 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
1.52 
4.26 
2.18 
4.18 
2.96 
2.39 
1.84 
1.32 
20.65 
per 
cent 
7 
21 
11 
20 
14 
12 
9 
6 
100 
33.3 
1970 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
1.29 
7.05 
3.38 
7.10 
5.05 
3.51 
3.59 
1.94 
32.91 
per 
cent 
4 
21 
10 
22 
15 
11 
11 
6 
100 
35.3 
1972 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
1.46 
7.14 
3.77 
7.91 
5.23 
3.68 
3.91 
2.06 
35.16 
per 
cent 
4 
20 
11 
22 
15 
11 
11 
6 
100 
30.6 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
2.26 
9.12 
4.92 
10.04 
6.91 
5.46 
5.35 
2.68 
46.74 
per 
cent 
5 
20 
10 
21 
15 
12 
11 
6 
100 
35.5 
00 
Sources: Ole Bus Henriksen and Anders Ølgaard, Danmarks Udenrigshandel 1874-1958, Copenhagen 1960, and Det 
økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk Oversigt, various volumes. - 185 -
Table Χ.7 
Prices in foreign trade, including terms of trade, 1960-1973 
Index 1960 = 100 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
GDP 
deflator 
100 
106 
112 
118 
124 
132 
141 
149 
155 
162 
176 
186 
200 
223 
Implicit deflators, 
goods and services 
Exports  Imports  Terms 
of trade 
100 100 100 
98 100 98 
101 100 101 
103 102 101 
107 103 103 
109 105 104 
112 107 105 
111 108 103 
115 114 101 
119 116 102 
126 123 103 
134 131 102 
139 132 105 
154 145 106 
Foreign trade, 
Exports  Imports 
100 100 
98 100 
99 99 
102 101 
105 102 
106 103 
110 104 
108 104 
110 110 
116 112 
122 119 
126 126 
132 126 
148 139 
goods 
Terms 
of trade 
100 
98 
100 
101 
103 
103 
106 
104 
100 
103 
103 
100 
105 
106 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1970 and 1975. 
clining. At the same time, the relative size of domestic industries has in-
creased, and their propensity to import is far lower than in the balance of 
payments industries. 
PRICES IN FOREIGN TRADE AND THE TERMS OF TRADE 
11. In table X.7, the pattern of prices in foreign trade is illustrated for 
the period 1960-1973. In the first column, the GDP deflator is shown. Price 
increases according to the GDP deflator substantially exceed price increases 
in foreign trade. This pattern may partly reflect international difficulties 
in marketing raw materials (Danish importers benefiting from such difficul-
ties) . An additional, and no less important, explanation is that the prices 
of goods exported and imported are more likely to be affected by increases 
of productivity than domestic services. 
In chapter I, and in appendix table 1.1 in particular, terms of trade figures 
were arrived at for goods and services, based on national accounts statistics. 186 
Such figures are shown in columns 2-4 in table X.7. In the last three columns, 
corresponding figures are shown according to the usual way of presentation, 
covering goods only. Terms of trade figures are very similar according to the 
two procedures of estimation. Furthermore, they remained remarkably stable 
during the period 1960-73. 
A larger improvement might perhaps have been expected between 1972 and 1973, 
reflecting improved agricultural prices due to the Danish EEC-membership. 
However, the latter largely showed up as EAGGF payments of about DKR 2 000 
million per year. These payments were included in transfers in table X.l, and 
therefore are not included in table X.7. 
If, instead, they had been interpreted as higher export prices, the total 
value of exports, which in 1973 amounted to about DKR 40 000 million, would 
have been increased by an additional 5 per cent - and the terms of trade 
would have shown an additional improvement of the same order of magnitude. 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, SERVICES AND TRANSFERS 
12. In table X.8, all the main items of the balance of payments are indicat-
ed for selected years during the period 1960-1973. Services receipts accord-
ing to the table are net receipts.^ 
The balance of trade has shown a persistent - and increasing - deficit. To 
some extent, this has been offset by net earning from foreign services. In 
particular, shipping has contributed with increasing net receipts, growing 
from DKR 1 000 million in 1960 to DKR 4 000 million in 1973, equivalent to 
slightly below half of the import surplus. 
Tourism has also given rise to net receipts, although of a much smaller order 
of magnitude. Substantial difficulties are involved in defining this item in 
a consistent way, and in collecting relevant statistical information. It 
should be added that the level of gross receipts in 1960 was about DKR 700 
million. In 1966, this amount had roughly been doubled. In 1973, gross re-
ceipts amounted to DKR 3 500 million, reflecting the rapid expansion of the 
sector of tourism. 
Other services, including a variety of items, have shown steadily increasing 
net receipts. 
In order to ensure comparability with the foreign trade figures in the pre-
vious tables, but contrary to the procedures recommended by IMF and others, 
imports are indicated cif (and not fob ). Consequently, in order to obtain 
consistency, freight expenditure related to foreign ships carrying imports 
to Denmark are not included among the service items. Furthermore, to the 
extent that imports are brought to Denmark on Danish ships, the correspond-
ing freight values are included among the service credits earned by Danish 
shipping. 187 
13. The main item on the transfers account is net foreign interest payments. 
These payments have shown an increasing deficit, reflecting the increasing 
net foreign debt. In late 1973 it was estimated that future interest payments 
on the foreign debt of the government sector at that time would amount to 
DKR 700-800 million per year in the following years.
1 
Unilateral transfers have also shown an increasing net outflow, mainly re-
flecting assistance to developing countries. However, in 1973, net receipts 
of DKR 1 400 million were recorded, a figure which includes net payments from 
the EEC, in particular EAGGF payments. 
FINANCING OF THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICITS 
14. In order to contribute to reducing the risk of private foreign debt 
leading to speculation against the Danish krone, the government sector under-
took a substantial amount of foreign long-term borrowing, thus attempting to 
'fund' part of the increasing foreign debt. Such borrowing was undertaken in 
1971 and 1972 in particular. During these two years, the net foreign indebt-
edness of the government sector increased by DKR 3 500 million. Such loans 
at the same time implied an increase in the foreign exchange holdings of the 
central bank. According to the bottom part of table X.8, the net change in 
the foreign debt of the banking sector was, on the whole, negative, implying 
increased foreign-exchange holdings. 
The major part of the burden of financing the increasing foreign debt fell on 
the private non-bank sector. This is true, in particular, for the later years 
of the period except for 1972, when several factors - including the slow rate 
of growth of imports - caused the foreign debt of the non-bank private sector 
to remain constant. However, this tendency was strongly reversed in 1973, 
when private net foreign borrowing amounted to DKR 4 500 million or substan-
tially more than the deficit on the current account of the balance of pay-
ments for that year, the result being an increase of DKR 2 000 million in 
Denmark's foreign exchange holdings. This increase in private net foreign 
debt partly reflected the boom of imports, but may also be explained by the 
Danish entry into the EEC as well as by the substantial increase of private 
investment in 1973. 
15. In 1960, total net foreign debt was insignificant - and amounted to 
about DKR 500 million. However, during the early 1960s balance of payments 
deficits started to become a permanent feature of the economy (cf. table 
X.l), and by the end of 1966 the net foreign debt had reached DKR 5 700 mil-
lion. This figure roughly corresponded to private foreign debt, as net gov-
ernment debt was equal to the foreign exchange holdings of the banking sys-
tem (cf. the first column of table X.9). 
By the end of 1973, total net foreign debt had increased to DKR 19 000 mil-
lion (cf. the last columns of table X.9). Net foreign exchange holdings of 
the banking system - DKR 8 000 million - nearly corresponded to the net debt 
See Budgetministeriet, Danske Statslån 1972-73, Copenhagen 1973, p. 87. Table Χ.8 
The balance of payments, 1960-73 
Current prices 
Imports, cif 
Exports, fob 
BALANCE OF TRADE 
Services, net receipts 
Foreign shipping
3
 
Tourism 
Other services 
GOODS AND SERVICES, NET
b
 
Transfers and factor incomes, (net) 
Interest payments, ¿tc. 
Transfers 
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE 
Net increase in foreign debt 
Private non-bank sector
e
 
Government sector 
Banking sector 
TOTAL 
1960 
12.43 
10.16 
- 2.27 
+ 1.34 
+ 0.23 
+ 0.26 
- 0.44 
+ 0.03 
c 
- 0.41 
0.91 
1.10 
- 1.60 
0.41 
1966 
20.65 
16.59 
- 4.06 
+ 1.92 
+ 0.10 
+ 0.80 
- 1.24 
- 0.12 
- 0.09 
- 1.45 
1.68 
0.01 
- 0.24 
1.45 
1968 
24.19 
19.38 
- 4.81 
+ 2.48 
+ 0.03 
+ 0.85 
- 1.45 
- 0.21 
+ 0.04 
- 1.62 
0.96 
0.60 
0.06 
1.62 
1970 
32.91 
24.67 
- 8.24 
+ 3.48 
+ 0.31 
+ 1.00 
- 3.45 
- 0.34 
- 0.29 
- 4.08 
3.47 
0.64 
- 0.03 
4.08 
1971 
34.01 
26.74 
- 7.27 
+ 2.94 
+ 0.57 
+ 1.52 
- 2.24 
- 0.54 
- 0.39 
- 3.17 
1.86 
2.14 
- 0.83 
3.17 
(DKR 1 000 million) 
1972 
35.16 
30.14 
- 5.02 
+ 3.40 
+ 0.81 
+ 1.84 
+ 1.03 
- 0.83 
- 0.60 
- 0.40 
0.09 
1.48 
- 1.17 
0.40 
1973 
46.74 
36.82 
- 9.92 
+ 4.03 
+ 0.48 
+ 2.02 
- 3.39 
- 0.96 
+ 1.40d 
- 2.95 
4.57 
0.42 
- 2.04 
2.95 
As imports of goods are on a cif basis, the figures for services include Danish shipping receipts in connection with imports 
to Denmark, but exclude payments to foreign ship-owners in connection with imports to Denmark. 
Due to differences with respect to definitions as compared with table X.l, the balance according to table X.8 is lower by an 
amount increasing to DKR 400 million by 1973. The difference is related to the fact that table X.8 includes Greenland and the 
Faeroe Islands, but these areas are not included in table X.l. There is an offsetting difference on transfers account, and 
the current account deficits according to the two tables tally. 
In 1960, these transfers are included among 'Other services'. 
Including net receipts of DKR 2 000 million from the EEC, -mainly EAGGF payments. 
00 
OS 
Including errors and omissions amounting to between DKR 300 - 700 million. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1970 and 1975. 189 
Table X.9 
Danish foreign assets and liabilities, end of 1966 - end of 1973 
Priv. non-banks sector 
Government sector 
Banking sector 
TOTAL 
Net, 
end 
of 
1966 
- 5.95 
- 3.51 
+ 3.72 
- 5.74 
Accumulated changes 
of net position ac-
cording to bal. of 
paym., cap. ace., 
1967-73
1) 
-14.31 
- 6.18 
+ 3.18 
-17.31 
(DKR 1 000 million) 
End of 1973 
Net 
of which 
assets  liab. 
-16.84 17.31 34.15 
-10.06 1.73 11.79 
+ 8.23 13.22 4.99 
-18.67 32.26 50.93 
Figures are taken from the bottom part of table X.8, including figures from 
1967 and 1969, not indicated in the latter table. 
Source : Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1975. 
of the government sector - DKR 10 000 million. Thus, by far the major part of 
the debt was held by the non-bank private sector. It should be emphasized 
that this pattern was not a matter of coincidence. On the contrary: as was 
discussed in chapter VIII, one of the aims of monetary policy was to keep in-
terest rates sufficiently high so as to make it profitable for Danish firms 
to borrow abroad. 
16. By taking as a starting point the net (foreign) liabilities of a certain 
year (1966) and adding the accumulated increases of net debts according to 
the capital accounts of the balance of payments over a certain period 
(1967-73), the result should be equal to the net debt at the end of the peri-
od (1973). Of course, this assumes that the values (in Danish kroner) of for-
eign assets and liabilities do not change, e.g. as a consequence of adjust-
ments of - Danish or foreign - exchange rates. This exercise is undertaken in 
the middle columns of table X.9. 
According to the table, net foreign debt at the end of 1973 was lower than 
this method of calculation would suggest. Net foreign debt at the end of 1966 
amounted to somewhat below DKR 6 000 million, and the accumulated deficits on 
current accounts of the balance of payments during the years 1967 through 
1973 totalled well above DKR 17 000 million. However, at the end of 1973, net 
foreign debt did not amount to DKR 23 000 million, but only to DKR 19 000 
million. 
On a sector basis, the figures roughly match for the government sector. How-
ever, -che net position of the banking sector at the end of 1973 was around 
DKR 1 000 million better than the simple calculations would indicate, mainly 
due to the creation of SDR's. - 190 -
Perhaps the most interesting result is that, according to table X.9, the non-
bank private sector made a 'capital gain' on foreign assets and liabilities 
during 1967-73 of about DKR 3 500 million. Probably, one of the explanations 
is that a substantial part of private liabilities (trade credits, etc.) had 
been fixed in pounds sterling, the external value of which declined substan-
tially during the period 1967-73. 
17. Finally, in the last columns of table X.9 the net foreign debt of the 
three sectors at the end of 1973 are divided into assets and liabilities. As 
appears from the figures, the government sector only holds foreign assets to 
a limited extent. Gross liabilities amounted to nearly DKR 12 000 million, of 
which roughly DKR 6 000 million were held by the central government (cf. ta-
ble VI.13). 
Net foreign holdings by the banking sector amounted to DKR 8 200 million at 
the end of 1973. The figure equals the net official reserves (including re-
serve position in IMF as well as SDR's) plus net foreign exchange holdings by 
the private banks. 
The most interesting results according to the last columns of table X.9 are 
those referring to the non-bank private sector. This sector had a net debt of 
DKR 17 000 million, but its gross liabilities amounted to no less than DKR 
34 000 million, of which no less than DKR 13 000 million were short-term 
loans. These figures provide another illustration of the vulnerable position 
of the Danish economy, when economic problems started to become really seri-
ous at the end of 1973. 
THE EXCHANGE RATE 
18. In a general international context, the Danish krone is of rather lim-
ited importance. Therefore, from a Danish viewpoint relative exchange rates 
between foreign currencies are to be considered exogenous. As soon as the 
Danish exchange rate has been decided upon in connection with one foreign 
currency, the whole pattern of exchange rates follows immediately. 
From the beginning of the present century and up to the early 1960s, the 
sterling rate was considered to be the key exchange rate. On the export side, 
where agricultural products predominated, the main customer was Britain. Fur-
thermore, imports - including raw materials - were to a large extent pur-
chased in Britain
1 or at least according to contracts expressed in sterling. 
Therefore, any discussion of the exchange-rate invariably referred to the 
sterling rate. 
Before the change in the presentation of Danish foreign trade statistics in 
1959, the geographical analysis was based on 'country of sale' (rather than 
final destination) and 'country of purchase' (rather than country of ori-
gin). Ever since the First World War, Britain has been both the most impor-
tant market for Danish exports and the most important supplier of goods to 
Denmark; see figures (up to 1958) in Ole Bus Henriksen og Anders Ølgaard, 
Danmarks Udenrigshandel 1874-1958. Copenhagen 1960. - 191 -
Table Χ. 10 
Foreign exchange rates, kroner per foreign unit of exchange 
U.S. dollar 
Pound steri. 
Swedish kr. 
Norwegian kr. 
Deutsche 
mark 
1967, 
par values 
Prior 
to de-
valua-
tion 
6.91 
19.34 
1.34 
0.97 
1.73 
After 
deval-
uation 
7.50 
18.00 
1.45 
1.05 
1.88 
1968 
7.50 
17.89 
1.45 
1.05 
1.88 
Selling rates, 
1969 
7.49 
17.99 
1.45 
1.05 
2.03 
1970 
7.49 
17.93 
1.45 
1.05 
2.05 
December 31st 
1971 
7.06 
18.04 
1.46 
1.05 
2.16 
1972 
6.85 
16.05 
1.44 
1.03 
2.14 
1973 
6.29 
14.60 
1.37 
1.10 
2.33 
Quoted by Danmarks Natioanlbank. 
Source: Danmarks Nationalbank, Beretning og regnskab, various volumes. In 
particular, see the 1967 report. 
19. The krone/sterling rate according to the gold standard prior to the 
First World War was DKR 18.16. During the mid-1920s, this rate was re-estab-
lished, but in early 1933 the krone was devalued as part of a package of po-
litical measures. The new rate of DKR 18.16 per pound sterling was maintained 
until the Second World War. During the war, the krone was revalued in order 
to dampen inflation, the new sterling rate being 19.34. This rate was main-
tained until 1967. In 1949, the Danish krone followed sterling, when the lat-
ter was devalued in terms of dollars. Other exchange rates just prior to the 
sterling devaluation in 1967 are shown in the first column of table X.10. 
20. Because the close relationship between the krone and sterling had been 
maintained for decades, the devaluation of sterling in 1967 by 15 per cent 
put the political authorities in a difficult position. The problem was com-
plicated by the fact that Norway and Sweden did not want to adjust their par-
ity because of the sterling devaluation. However, the Danish balance of pay-
ments deficit had increased during 1966 and 1967. Finally, it was decided to 
follow sterling, but only half way. The krone was revalued by 6.9 per cent 
against sterling and was devalued against most other currencies, by 8.6 per 
cent. The resulting pattern of Danish exchange rates prevailed during the 
following three years (cf. table X.10). 
21. The exchange rate decision in 1967 represented a compromise, partly re-
flecting the fact that although the UK was still an important trade partner, 
its importance was diminishing, mainly because of the declining role of agri-
cultural products in total exports. Furthermore, the compromise implied that 
the exchange rate vis-à-vis the other Scandinavian currencies was increased - 192 -
by roughly 8 per cent. These countries were important markets for Danish ex-
ports of manufactures (cf. table X.5). At the same time, there was a strong 
political interest in maintaining fixed exchange rates between Norway, Sweden 
and Denmark. This object was actually achieved from 1968 up to 1972, when the 
value of sterling started to decline once more. 
22. At that time, the Scandinavian countries abandonned the policy of keep-
ing their currencies tied to sterling. In April 1972, i.e. prior to the Dan-
ish entry into the EEC, Denmark and Norway started negotiations with the cen-
tral banks of the EEC-countries on joining the 'snake', and in March 1973 
Sweden joined this arrangement. 
For a variety of reasons, it is especially difficult for the currency of a 
'small' economy to float independently; in practice it will usually be tied 
to a more important currency - or perhaps to a block. During the late 1950s, 
informal talks had taken place as to whether the Danish krone should join the 
sterling area. However, such arrangements were never formalized. By 1973, the 
Scandinavian currencies were certainly not linked to sterling anymore. In-
stead, the major currency to which they were tied was the Deutsche mark, the 
latter playing a dominating role in the 'snake' system. 
23. Finally, some comments might be appropriate on the question of exchange-
rate adjustments as an instrument of economic policy up to 1973, i.e. during 
a period of low unemployment, but with substantial balance of payments defi-
cits. Actually, no independent Danish steps were taken in this field. How-
ever, when a decision was forced upon the government in November 1967, the 
Danish labour-party government suggested steps be taken with respect to the 
suspension of the escalator clause in order to avoid corresponding increases 
of money wages. However, the government was voted down in parliament, and at 
the ensuing election, a liberal-conservative government took office (cf. 
chapter IX). 
24. The reluctance of Danish governments to use a devaluation of the Danish 
krone as a remedy in order to improve the balance of payments may partly re-
flect the political experiences of late 1967. But more fundamental economic 
aspects were also involved. First of all, it was recognized that a devalua-
tion should be accompanied by steps in the field of incomes policy in order 
to avoid subsequent increases of domestic prices and money wages, if the de-
valuation were to be successful from a balance of payments viewpoint. Such 
steps in the field of incomes policy, however, are especially difficult to 
implement during periods of nearly full employment. Furthermore, introducing 
devaluation as a policy instrument was bound to create uncertainty as to 
whether additional future devaluations might take place, and hence could cre-
ate additional uncertainty as to the future rate of domestic inflation. 
At the same time, the problem of dampening the rate of inflation had become 
increasingly urgent during the late 1960s and the early 1970s (cf. chapter 
IX). However, one certain effect of a devaluation would be to increase the 
rate of domestic inflation. Therefore, the viewpoint that prevailed in the 
debate on these issues during the years up to 1973 was that the only appro-
priate policy to correct the balance of payments deficits was to reduce the 
pressure of domestic demand, in particular demand directed towards domestic 
industries. - 193 
25. In fact, the issue of a possible unilateral devaluation was only once 
brought up in recent years, namely during the campaign prior to the referen-
dum on future EEC-membership. Here the government made it clear that if the 
proposal on Danish EEC-membership was turned down by the electorate, the Dan-
ish krone would have to be devalued substantially, perhaps by 20 per cent. 
However, with a positive outcome of the referendum, this possibility did not 
materialize. - 195 
Chapter XI 
FROM GROWTH TO RECESSION, 1973-1977 
POPULATION AND LABOUR FORCE 
1. In 1973, the size of the Danish population passed the 5 million mark. 
Since then, the population has continued to increase, although at only a mod-
est rate of about 0.3 per cent per year. This was caused by the age distribu-
tion of the population being favourable from the viewpoint of fertility. 
Net immigration had been unusually large in 1973, as a result of the substan-
tial labour shortage due to the general economic boom. During 1974 and 1975, 
this development was reversed and net emigration took place, roughly corre-
sponding to the net immigration of 1973. 
2. The total number of births per year showed a substantial decline, (cf. ta-
ble XI.1). The net reproduction rate, which had been above 1 200 during the 
main part of the 1960s, remained below 1 000. In 1977 it was even below 800. 
Table XI.1 
Population, deaths, immigration, births 
(1 000 persons) 
Total population, mid-year 
Deaths 
Net immigration 
Births 
(Legal abortions) 
NET REPRODUCTION RATE (PER 
1 000) 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, 
1973 
5 022 
50.5 
12.2 
71.9 
(16.5) 
915 
Befolknin 
1974 
5 
gei 
045 
51.6 
- 6.6 
71.3 
(24.9) 
908 
is bevae 
1975  1976 
5 060 5 
50.9 
- 8.7 
72.1 
(27.9) 
921 
geiser 1977. 
073 
54.0 
3.3 
65.3 
(26.8) 
829 
1977 
5 088 
50.5 
5.8 
61.9 
(25.7) 
794 - 196 -
Table XI.2 
Age distribution of the population 
Age (both sexes): 
0-6 
7-16 
17 - 24 
25 - 66 
67 - 79 
80 and over 
TOTAL, PER 
TOTAL POPULA! 
CENT 
ΓΙ0Ν, 
1 000 PERSONS 
1973 
10.3 
15.5 
12.0 
51.2 
9.1 
1.9 
100.0 
5 036 
1977 
9.8 
15.4 
11.7 
51.4 
9.2 
2.5 
100.0 
5 080 
1980 
9.4 
15.2 
11.6 
51.4 
9.6 
2.8 
100.0 
5 126 
1990 
9.4 
13.2 
11.7 
52.4 
9.8 
3.5 
100.0 
5 251 
Sources : 1973 figures (1 January 1974): Danmarks Statistik, 
Befolkningens bevaegelser 1973. 
1977-1990 figures: Danmarks Statistik, Befolk­
ningsprognoser 1977-2000, S.U. No 36, Copenhagen 
1978. 
A similar development can be observed in other Western European countries. 
However, in Denmark the period under study was affected by an important 
change in the law concerning abortions in 1973.
1 During the following years, 
the total number of legal abortions remained around 25 0002 as compared with 
60 - 70 000 births per year. Short-run fluctuations in the number of abor­
tions have been similar to fluctuations in the number of births. From 1974 to 
1975 they both increased, during the following two years they both declined. 
3. On the basis of this evidence, new estimates of the size and composition 
of the population have recently been made, (cf. table XI.2). Total population 
is expected to continue to grow slowly, and the share of the population with 
the highest rates of participation in the labour force (25-66 years) will re­
main constant or perhaps even increase slightly. But the share of children 
and youngsters (requiring kindergardens and schools, etc.) is expected to de­
cline. It should, however, be kept in mind that these estimates are bound to 
be rather uncertain. 
According to a law, passed in June 1973, a woman became entitled to have an 
abortion during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy. 
Prior to 1973, the number of legal abortions had been as follows: 1966-68 
roughly 6 000 per year, 1969: 7.300, 1970: 9 400, 1971: 11 200 and 1972: 
13 000. - 197 -
Table XI.3 
Labour force by occupation 
Agriculture etc. 
Manufact., handicraft 
Build, and construct. 
Distribution, banking, 
Transport 
Private services 
Government services 
Others 
TOTAL LABOUR 
Converted to full-time 
employed
1 
of which: men 
women 
etc. 
FORCE 
1973, 
1 000 
pers. 
233 
652 
202 
384 
167 
204 
564 
40 
2 446 
2 199 
1 417 
782 
total 
per 
cent 
9.5 
26.7 
8.3 
15.7 
6.8 
8.3 
23.1 
1.6 
100.0 
89.9 
1977 
total 
1 
Ρ 
2 
2 
1 
000 
3ΓΞ. 
220 
635 
209 
399 
171 
216 
678 
51 
579 
188 
396 
792 
per 
cent 
8.5 
24.6 
8.1 
15.5 
6.6 
8.4 
26.3 
2.0 
100.0 
84.8 
1 
Ρ 
2 
Full 
empi 
000 
srs. 
203 
551 
190 
342 
156 
174 
544 
28 
188 
-time  J  oyed 
per 
cent 
9.3 
25.2 
8.7 
15.6 
7.1 
7.9 
24.9 
1.3 
100.0 
The figures are adjusted for part-time work, applying the same techniques 
as were used in connection with table VI.3. In addition - and contrary to 
table VI.3 - the figures exclude the unemployed. 
Note: For concepts, see tables 1.3 and VI.3. 
Sources : Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and Statistiske 
Efterretninger 1978, No A 11. 
The most striking aspect - and probably the most reliable too - is the in-
creasing share of old people. In particular, the share of those at 80 and 
above is expected almost to double between 1973 and 1990. Obviously, this is 
bound to have important consequences for government expenditure in the form 
of pensions, the provision of institutions, etc. 
4. From 1973 to 1977, the total labour force increased by roughly 5 per cent 
(cf. table XI.3). In 1973, 67.3 per cent of the population aged 15-74 years 
belonged to the labour force; in 1977 the participation rate had increased to 
69.7 per cent. While the participation rate of men remained rather stable, 
that of women increased substantially. - 198 -
Table XI.4 
Labour force in government services 
Admin., police, defence 
Education etc. 
Health and soc. services 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES, TOTAL 
Professions 
Other occupations 
TOTAL LABOUR FORCE 
Total lab 
1973 
125 
167 
272 
564 
68 
1 814 
2 446 
our force 
1977 
136 
197 
345 
678 
78 
1 823 
2 579 
(1 000 persons) 
of which actually 
employed 
(full-time equivalent) 
1973 
117 
137 
219 
473 
60 
1 666 
2 199 
1977 
124 
161 
259 
544 
68 
1 576 
2 188 
Note: For concepts, see tables VI.2, VI.3 and XI.3. 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978, Statistiske Ef-
terretninger 1978 No A 11 and supplementary information from D.S. 
5. Since 1973, the share of the labour force employed in the balance of pay-
ments industries has continued to decline, and in manufacturing industries 
and in agriculture, the labour force has even declined in absolute terms. 
On the other hand, the share of the labour force employed in the government 
sector continued to grow. Out of an increase in the total labour force of 
130 000 persons, more than 100 000 were accounted for by government services 
(cf. table XI.3). The major part of this increase, i.e. more than 70 000 per-
sons, took place in the sector of health and social services (cf. table 
XI.4). Not only does this table provide a break-down of the labour force in 
government services, it also provides figures on actual employment, converteu 
to equivalent full-time employment. On the latter basis, the relative in-
crease of employment in the sector of health and social services from 1973 to 
1977 becomes somewhat smaller; nevertheless it remains the fastest expanding 
sector of the whole labour market. 
6. Concluding this summary of recent trends in the labour force, a few com-
ments on the composition of the labour force by sex and marital status should 
be made. As will be recalled from table VI.4, substantial changes took place 
in this area from 1967 to 1973; the pattern of these changes continued from 
1973 to 1977 (cf, table XI.5 which is fully comparable with table VI.4). For 
the ten-year period 1967-1977 as a whole, the total number of persons employ-
ed in government services increased from 368 000 to 678 000. Within this to-
tal, the number of married women rose from 122 000 in 1967 to no less than 
304 000 in 1977; in 1967, 65 000 of these married women were employed in the 
sector of health and social services but this total had grown to no less than 
188 000 by 1977. 199 
Table XI.5 
Composition by sex and marital status of labour force 
in government services (unjusted data) 
(1 000 persons) 
Admin., police, 
defence 
Education etc. 
Health, soc. serv. 
GOVERNMENT 
SERVICES, TOTAL 
Professions 
Other occupations 
TOTAL LABOUR FORCE 
Men 
1973 
77 
70 
37 
184 
38 
1 232 
1 454 
1977 
85 
83 
47 
215 
45 
1 230 
1 490 
Unmarried 
women 
1973  1977 
19 18 
26 31 
94 110 
139 159 
12 12 
188 202 
339 373 
Married 
women 
1973  1977 
29 33 
71 83 
141 188 
241 304 
18 21 
394 391 
653 716 
Total 
1973 
125 
167 
272 
564 
68 
1 814 
2 446 
1977 
136 
197 
345 
678 
78 
1 823 
2 579 
Note: For earlier years, see table VI.4. 
Sources: See sources to table XI.4. 
Table XI.6 
Total GDP, real product and real income 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
GDP, 
current 
DKR 1000 
million 
158.9 
182.4 
203.8 
233.1 
256.8 
GDP de-
flator 
1955=100 
254.6 
287.0 
326.6 
355.7 
382.2 
Terms of 
trade, 
1955=100 
110 
98 
101 
102 
99 
Real product, 
1955-
DKR 1000 
million 
62.4 
63.6 
62.4 
65.5 
67.4 
prices 
per cent 
incr. 
2.4 
1.9 
- 1.8 
5.0 
2.8 
Real income, 
1955-prices 
DKR 1000 
million 
per cent 
incr. 
65.7 2.3 
62.8 - 4.4 
62.8 0.0 
66.4 5.7 
67.1 1.1 
Note: For concepts etc., see appendix table 1.1. The figures for 1973 have 
been slightly revised. 
Source : Danmarks Statistik, Statistiks tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. 200 
FLUCTUATION OF MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
7. The oil crises of late 1973 and the subsequent increase in fuel prices 
caused a substantial deterioration in the terms of trade (see table XI.6) of 
about 10 per cent.
1 The deterioration was abrupt and the effects dramatic. It 
should, however, be kept in mind that the terms of trade in the period 1974-
77 were roughly equal to those prevailing in the late 1960s, if the EAGGF 
payments to Danish agriculture are interpreted as improved export prices. 
Although the Danish national accounts data have been subject to radical revi-
sion during the last years (the purpose being to introduce the SNA defini-
tions suggested by the United Nations and, in particular, the EEC of this 
system,
2 the figures in the present chapter are based on the old definitions, 
partly in order to allow for comparison with figures in earlier chapters, 
partly because a comprehensive set of national accounts data according to the 
new definitions are not yet available for 1974 and following years. The na-
tional accounts figures of the present chapter should be considered prelimi-
nary, and some of the rather surprising results according to the tables may 
reflect shortcomings on the part of the data rather than economic realities. 
This is especially true with respect to disaggregated figures. 
8. While total real product increased by two per cent from 1973 to 1974, the 
terms of trade deterioration implied that total real income declined by 4-5 
per cent during the same period. From 1974 to 1975 total real product de-
clined by two per cent while, due to some improvement in the terms of trade, 
total real income remained constant.3 In 1976, real product as well as real 
income increased by 5-6 per cent, but in 1977 the upswing faded out. Real 
product increased by less than 3 per cent, and real income by only 1 per 
cent. 
9. Table XI.7 shows the main factors behind the rather unstable development 
of overall growth from 1973 onwards. In spite of a substantial - but probably 
partly involuntary - increase of stocks, domestic demand declined from 1973 
to 1974, partly reflecting the decline of real income, but mainly because of 
a substantial reduction in fixed investment. At the same time, the volume of 
exports increased whilst that of imports declined, hence real product was 
As was explained in a note to appendix table 1.1, the terms of trade fig-
ures are calculated on the basis of national accounts data. They do not in-
clude payments, cf. the section on prices in foreign trade in chapter X. If 
the latter payments had been included, the terms of trade would have im-
proved by an additional 5 per cent from 1972 to 1973. 
Among other things, according to the new system, repair and maintenance 
will be considered as input and hence not be included in gross figures of 
domestic product, national income, etc. See Danmarks Statistik, Statistiske 
Efterretninger 1978 No A 20. 
Actually, the discrepancy between the figures on growth rates of real pro-
duct and real income in table XI.6 probably underestimates the effect of 
terms of trade changes. The figures are based on weights from as far back 
as 1955, hence the relative weight of foreign trade as comparad with total 
national product is probably less than it ought to be. - 201 -
Table XI.7 
Annual growth rates of main national accounts components 
Real product figures 
(Per cent) 
Domestic demand 
Exp., goods and services 
TOTAL DEMAND 
Imp., goods and services 
GROSS NAT. PROD., MARKET PRICES 
1973 
7.2 
8.9 
7.7 
18.0 
2.6 
1974 
- 3.7 
5.2 
- 0.9 
- 4.5 
1.3 
1975 
- 2.2 
- 2.3 
- 2.3 
- 4.2 
- 1.2 
1976 
11.8 
3.4 
9.0 
16.5 
5.1 
1977 
- 0.2 
4.1 
1.2 
- 1.6 
2.8 
Note: For earlier years, see table VII.l. No adjustment of the demand figures 
has been made with respect to indirect taxes and with respect to repair 
and maintenance. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. 
able to increase, although only moderately. However, due to the deterioration 
of the terms of trade, the balance of payments deficit at current prices in-
creased. 
From 1974 to 1975, all the main items in the national accounts showed a de-
cline at constant prices (real product figures). Imports declined more than 
exports, hence the balance of payments position improved. This improvement 
should, however, be seen in the light of changes of stocks. While the latter 
increased by roughly DKR 1 000 million (at 1955 prices) in 1974, they de-
clined by more than DKR 1 600 million in 1975. 
10. In the autumn of 1975, a substantial - although shortlived - expansion of 
domestic demand occurred. It continued to the autumn of 1976, i.e. during 
roughly one year. From 1975 to 1976, domestic demand increased by no less 
than 12 per cent (cf. table XI.7). Private consumption increased, and so did 
private fixed investment. Furthermore, the run-down of stocks which occurred 
in 1975 was replaced by some positive stockbuilding during 1976. 
Unfortunately, the only demand component which only showed a moderate in-
crease was exports of goods and services. At the same time, imports increased 
by more than 15 per cent, and the balance of payments deficit reached record 
levels. As a result, economic policy was tightened, and during 1977 the up-
swing faded out. 
11. When economic developments during the period 1973-77 are appraised from 
the viewpoint of whether the main objectives of economic policy have been 
achieved, the conclusion can hardly be claimed to be very positive (cf. ta-
ble XI.8). In this connection it should, of course, be recalled that Denmark 
has shared this fate with most other industrialized countries. - 202 -
Table XI.8 
Main economic indicators 
Balance of payments, 
current ace, DKR 1 000 million 
Average rate of unemployed: 
Persons under insurance 
Total labour force 
Average price increase 
according to GDP deflator 
1973 
- 2.8 
2.4 
1.1 
11.3 
1974 
- 5.6 
5.2 
2.5 
12.7 
1975 
- 3.0 
11.1 
6.0 
13.8 
1976 
-11.6 
10.0 
6.1 
8.9 
1977 
- 9.9 
11.4 
7.7 
7.2 
Note: For concepts and earlier years, see table VII.2. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. 
The balance of payments deficit has already been mentioned. It remained at 
roughly DKR 3 000 - 5 000 million per year during 1973-75, but subsequently 
increased to DKR 10 000 million per year in 1976 and 1977. Although stock 
fluctuations should be kept in mind, such persistent deficits - which, in 1976 
and 1977, corresponded to roughly 4 per cent of GDP at current prices - were 
clearly quite unacceptable. Hence the balance of payments problem, which had 
been the major constraint on economic policy prior to 1973, has since become 
even more intractable. 
12. In addition, the rate of unemployment increased substantially. As was 
discussed in the final part of chapter I, the traditional statistics on un-
employment overestimate actual rates. Therefore, supplementary figures cover-
ing the whole labour force are shown in table XI.8. According to the latter, 
the rate of unemployment increased from 1 per cent in 1973 to 6-8 per cent in 
1975-77. 
On the basis of past experience, even higher rates of unemployment might have 
been expected, given the development of domestic product during the period 
from 1973 to 1977 as well as the increase of the total labour force. In par-
ticular, the 1976 upswing is hardly reflected in the unemployment figures. A 
variety of explanations for this pattern may be suggested, but the main con-
clusion to be drawn is that labour productivity must have been increasing far 
less than during earlier periods. One implication of this conclusion is prob-
ably that, if or when a substantial increase of total demand should occur 
sometime in the future, the immediate result may be increased productivity 
rather than a substantial decline in the rates of unemployment. 
13. As far as the objective of reducing the rate of domestic inflation is 
concerned, at least some improvement has been made. In table XI.8, the rate 
of inflation is illustrated by the implicit price deflator of gross domestic - 203 -
product. According to this yardstick, the rate of inflation in 1973 was 11 
per cent. The subsequent deterioration in the terms of trade was of the worst 
possible type from the viewpoint of restoring price stability, namely a very 
substantial increase in import prices in a limited, but essential field, i.e. 
fuel. This increase in fuel prices administered a shock to the pattern of 
relative prices and wages, which has still not been fully absorbed. 
Although output almost stagnated and unemployment increased from 1973 to 1975, 
the rate of inflation accelerated, reaching a peak of nearly 14 per cent in 
1975. But subsequently - and in spite of the 1976 upswing - the rate of in-
creases in prices finally began to decelerate, and the rate of inflation in 
1977 was 'only' slightly above 7 per cent. 
THE INDUSTRIAL PATTERN 
14. For reasons explained in chapter I, changes in the industrial pattern at 
constant prices are best illustrated by real income figures. Such figures are 
shown in table XI.9, which corresponds to table I.7.
1 
From 1973 to 1975, the ral income of agriculture and of manufacturing indus-
tries actually declined.
2 During the following two years, the real income of 
these balance of payments industries increased. Still their share of total 
real income was lower in 1977 than in 1973. 
In real income terms, the building and construction industry declined sub-
stantially from 1973 to 1975, but it should be recalled that the 1973 level 
was unusually high. From 1975 to 1976, it recovered somewhat. However, from 
1974 onwards it can hardly be claimed that the expansion of this domestic 
industry represents a major problem from the viewpoint of providing suffi-
cient resources for the balance of payments industries. 
A similar conclusion can not be drawn with respect to the other - and in 
fact the major - domestic industry, i.e. government services.3 According to 
table XI.9 - and to the findings in the above section on the labour force -
the role of government services has been increasing steadily. This is true for 
its 'real income' in absolute terms and is reflected by the share of govern-
ment services in total real income. The latter increased from 19.2 per cent 
in 1973 to 21.4 per cent in 1977. 
Some minor differences for 1973 according to the two tables are due to re-
visions in the basic national accounts data. 
It should, however, be kept in mind that the real income figures for agri-
culture according to table XI.9 do not take into account payments from 
EAGGF, the latter being treated in the national accounts as transfers. 
Obviously, with substantial overall unemployment this statement does not 
refer to immediate availability of labour resources. But additional aspects 
should be taken into account, e.g. the question of financing increasing 
government expenditure. Some of these aspects are discussed later in the 
present chapter. - 204 -
Table XI.9 
Real income by industries, 1955-prices 
Agriculture, etc. 
Manufact. handicraft etc. 
Building and construction 
Distribution, banking, 
hotels, etc. 
Transport 
Private services 
Government services 
TOTAL REAL INCOME 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
5.3 
18.8 
6.2 
11.7 
6.2 
4.9 
12.6 
65.7 
1974 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
5.1 
17.4 
5.6 
11.0 
6.1 
4.7 
12.9 
62.8 
1975 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
4.7 
17.2 
5.3 
11.2 
6.1 
4.8 
13.5 
62.8 
1976 
DKR 
1 000 
mil 
lion 
4.8 
18.4 
5.9 
11.7 
6.4 
5.1 
14.1 
66.4 
1977 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
5.0 
18.4 
5.8 
11.6 
6.7 
5.2 
14.4 
67.1 
distribution 
1973 
8.1 
28.6 
9.4 
17.9 
9.4 
7.4 
19.2 
100.0 
1977 
7.5 
27.3 
8.7 
17.3 
10.0 
7.8 
21.4 
100.0 
The figures also express the percentage distribution of GDP at factor cost, 
current prices. 
Note: For earlier years, see table 1.7. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. 
Table XI.10 
GDP by industries in 1977 
Index, 1973 = 100 
Agriculture etc. 
Trade and industry 
Building and construction 
Distribution, banking, hotels 
Transport 
Private services 
Government services 
TOTAL 
curr 
GDP, 
ent pr 
152 
154 
148 
156 
171 
170 
181 
162 
ices  Real prod 
113 
107 
92 
104 
115 
114 
115 
108 
uct  Real income 
95 
97 
95 
99 
109 
108 
114 
102 
Note: For earlier years, see table 1.8. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
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15. The findings according to table XI.10 are rather difficult to summarize, 
unless the arguments in the appendix to chapter I - and especially the find-
ings according to appendix table 1.3 - are kept in mind. The discrepancy be-
tween the index of total real product and that of total real incòme reflects 
the deterioration in the terms of foreign trade between 1973 and 1977. 
However, the loss originating from the deterioration in the terms of trade 
has apparently not been distributed evenly between industries. Assuming the 
basic national accounts data to be sufficiently reliable, the sectors of 
'services' have suffered a substantial loss, due to a deterioration in their 
relative prices. Thus, while from 1950 to 1973 the real income figures of 
government services increased far more than the corresponding real product 
figures (cf. appendix table 1.3), the corresponding increase from 1973 to 
1977 was of the same size for both, i.e. 14-15 per cent according to table 
XI.10. 
Table XI.11 
GDP and domestic demand, current prices 
(DKR 1 000 million) 
GDP, factor costs 
+ indirect taxes, net 
GDP, MARKET PRICES 
+ imp. goods and services 
TOTAL 
- exp. goods and services 
DOMESTIC DEMAND 
of which: 
consumption 
fixed investment 
stockbuilding 
repair and maintenance 
1973 
158.9 
21.7 
180.6 
55.9 
236.5 
53.0 
183.5 
129.5 
37.9 
2.3 
13.8 
1974 
182.4 
21.2 
203.6 
71.0 
274.6 
66.1 
208.5 
148.0 
40.8 
2.0 
17.7 
1975 
203.8 
24.1 
227.9 
71.1 
299.0 
69.9 
229.1 
170.6 
40.7 
- 3.3 
21.1 
1976 
233.1 
29.4 
262.5 
88.3 
350.8 
77.8 
273.0 
196.0 
51.4 
1.4 
24.2 
1977 
256.8 
35.0 
291.8 
95.2 
387.0 
86.4 
300.6 
217.7 
55.0 
0.5 
27.4 
Note: For earlier years, see table I.10. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. 
This assumption may be somewhat doubtful, recalling that the national ac-
counts figures in the present chapter are preliminary. - 206 
Table XI. 12 
Domestic demand, 1955-prices (constant relative prices over time) 
Consumption: 
private 
public 
Fixed investment: 
housing 
other priv. 
public 
Stockbuilding 
TOTAL DOMESTIC 
TOTAL 
TOTAL 
DEMAND 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
36.3 
8.9 
45.2 
3.5 
10.7 
3.3 
17.5 
1.3 
64.0 
1974 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
35.3 
9.2 
44.5 
2.5 
10.2 
3.2 
15.9 
1.0 
61.4 
1975 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
36.9 
9.8 
46.7 
2.0 
9.2 
3.2 
14.4 
- 1.7 
59.4 
1976 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
39.2 
10.3 
49.5 
2.6 
11.1 
3.3 
17.0 
0.6 
67.1 
1977 
DKR 
1 000 
mil-
lion 
39.1 
10.5 
49.6 
2.4 
11.1 
3.2 
16.7 
0.3 
66.6 
Percentage 
distri 
1973 
56.7 
13.9 
70.6 
5.5 
16.7 
5.2 
27.4 
2.0 
100.0 
bution 
1977 
58.7 
15.8 
74.5 
3.6 
16.7 
4.8 
25.1 
0.4 
100.0 
Note: For concepts and earlier years, see table I.11. Note that the procedure 
of deflation differs from that used in table XI.9. 
Source : Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. 
COMPONENTS OF DOMESTIC DEMAND 
16. Table XI.11 shows the main concepts of domestic product as well as compo-
nents of domestic demand, all the figures being indicated at current prices. 
The figures on exports and imports of goods and services are in accordance 
with the figures on the balance of payments deficit, presented above. In ad-
dition, table XI.11 brings out the substantial fluctuation in stockbuilding. 
The figures of consumption and fixed investment are of course highly affected 
by inflation. Corresponding figures at constant prices are shown in table 
However, contrary to the balance of payments figures in table XI.8, the 
figures in table XI.11 do not include net foreign interest payments. These 
payments have recently shown a substantial increase, reflecting the growing 
net foreign debt. - 207 -
Table XI.13 
Labour force and unemployment 
Labour force 
Men 
Women 
TOTAL 
of which: 
Employers and self-
employed 
Assisting housewives 
Employees 
Number of unemployed, 
total 
Rate of unemployment among 
employees, total
1 
Employees under insurance 
Men 
Women 
TOTAL 
Rates of unemployment : 
Men
1 
Women
1 
TOTAL
1 
February 
June 
November 
1973 
1 
2 
2 
454 
992 
446 
328 
113 
005 
21 
1. 
652 
181 
833 
2 
2 
2 
3 
1 
2 
1 
4 
4 
4 
6 
2 
2 
1974 
1 
1 
2 
2 
464 
015 
479 
322 
107 
050 
50 
2.5 
664 
183 
847 
5.1 
5.9 
5.2 
3.9 
3.1 
9.2 
1975 
1 
1 
2 
2 
463 
023 
486 
323 
110 
053 
124 
6. 
715 
217 
932 
10 
12 
11 
12 
9 
11 
0 
7 
5 
1 
0 
1 
1 
(1 000 persons) 
1976 
1 480 
1 051 
2 531 
321 
106 
2 104 
126 
6.1 
777 
295 
1 072 
9.3 
11.8 
10.0 
12.4 
7.6 
9.9 
1977 
1 490 
1 089 
2 579 
320 
103 
2 156 
164 
7.7 
815 
340 
1 155 
10.2 
14.4 
11.4 
12.9 
10.0 
11.8 
Yearly averages. 
Note: For some of the concepts, see table 1.13. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978. - 208 
XI.12. The deflating technique used in the latter table is similar to that 
used in connection with table I.11. Hence the figures in these two tables are 
comparable. 
17. According to table XI.12, private consumption stagnated - or even de-
clined - until late 1975. Subsequently, a substantial increase took place, re-
flecting partly the increase of real income, partly changes in fiscal policy. 
However, from late 1976 onwards the picture again became one of stagnation. 
Public consumption increased steadily over the whole period, continuing the 
trend prior to 1973. This result is in accordance with other evidence pre-
sented above, e.g. on the distribution of the labour force. 
The various components of fixed investment showed different trends. Public 
fixed investment remained stable, whilst residential investment declined sub-
stantially from the extremely high levels on 1972 and 1973 (cf. tables IV.1 
and IV.2). 
Perhaps the most interesting finding is that other private fixed investment, 
including business investment, remained rather stable at the very high level 
of 1973. The share of this demand component out of total domestic demand was 
exactly the same in 1977 as in 1973. 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR SUPPLY 
18. The substantial increase in the rate of unemployment, especially from 
1973 to 1975, has already been mentioned above (cf. table XI.8). However, 
the issue deserves closer examination. Additional information is provided in 
table XI.13. 
A somewhat confusing aspect of the unemployment situation is that, while un-
employment increased, the same was true for the size of the labour force. The 
increase was no less than 10 per cent for the female labour force. While, 
from 1973 to 1977, the total labour force increased by roughly 130 000 per-
sons, the total number of employees increased even more, i.e. by 150 000 per-
sons, a figure corresponding almost exactly to the increase in the total num-
ber of persons unemployed. The rate of unemployment among all employees in-
creased from 1.1 per cent in 1973 to 7.7 per cent in 1977. 
19. As mentioned in the last part of chapter I, Danish unemployment statis-
tics have traditionally been based on information covering only those persons 
with unemployment insurance. Table 1.13 was mainly based on such data; com-
parable figures for the years 1973 onwards are indicated in the lower part of 
table XI.13. 
Perhaps the most striking finding is that, from 1975 to 1976, the number of 
women under insurance increased by no less than 50 per cent, i.e. from 
Again, some revisions to the basic data have caused some minor differences 
with respect to the 1973 figures. - 209 -
Table XI.14 
Changes per year of labour supply and employment 
Increase of number at 
the age of 15-74 
Change in participa-
tion rate 
Change of extent of 
part-time empi. 
Total increase in sup-
ply, full-time equiva-
lent 
Total increase in em-
ployment 
TOTAL INCREASE 
IN UNEMPLOYMENT 
Men 
1967-73 
11.9 
-15.7 
2.0 
- 1.8 
- 0.4 
- 1.4 
1973-77 
6.5 
2.2 
- 0.6 
8.1 
- 5.2 
13.3 
Women 
1967-73 
5.1 
12.5 
- 8.5 
9.1 
8.8 
+ 0.3 
1973-77 
3.5 
15.4 
- 5.7 
13.2 
2.5 
10.7 
(1 000 persons) 
Total 
1967-73  1973-77 
17.0 10.0 
- 3.2 17.6 
- 6.5 - 6.3 
7.3 21.3 
8.4 - 2.7 
- 1.1 24.0 
Note: All figures are c 
Source: Det økonomiske 
onverted to full-time equivalents. 
Råd, Dansk økonomi november 1978, p.51. 
200 000 to 300 000. At the same time, from 1973 to 1977, the rate of unem-
ployment for female workers accelerated faster than that of their male col-
leagues. 
Unemployment statistics relating to persons with insurance provide a much 
more detailed picture than the statistics based on the total labour force. 
This picture seems to suggest that the unemployment problem of the 1970s is of 
a much more general nature than that of the 1950s. As appears from the bottom 
part of table XI.13, seasonal unemployment only explains a limited part of 
average yearly rates of unemployment. It might be added that rates of un-
employment between industries differ comparatively less than for earlier pe-
riods,
1 and the same is true for the geographical distribution. 
20. In its report from November 1978, the chairmanship of the Danish Econ-
omic Council summarized the structural shift in the labour market during 
1967-73 as compared with the period 1973-77 (cf. table XI.14). The figures 
However, rates of unemployment have clearly been lowest in 'services'. 
Unemployment did, however, remain highest in Northern Jutland (16.4 per 
cent in 1977). 210 
are based on employment surveys of the labour force and are indicated in 
terms of 1 000 persons per year, converted to full-employment figures. 
Whereas unemployment in absolute terms declined slightly from 1967 to 1973 
(although with an insignificant increase for women), it increased by more 
than 10 000 persons per year for men as well as for women during 1973-77, 
leading to a total annual average increase of 24 000 persons per year. For 
male workers, this shift was partly the result of an absolute decline of em-
ployment during 1973-77, but apparently another important factor was that the 
rather substantial decline in participation rates during 1967-73 was turned 
into a slight increase during 1973-77. For female workers, employment in ab-
solute terms increased during both sub-periods, but much less during the sec-
ond than during the first. In addition, their participation rates continued 
to increase at an accelerating rate. 
21. In the following sections, comments will be made on mainly private in-
dustries, i.e. agriculture, manufacturing industries and activities in the 
field of building and construction. As has been pointed out above, all these 
industries were strongly affected by the recession, in particular during 1974 
and 1975 (cf. table XI.9 and table XI.3). 
AGRICULTURE 
22. Between 1971 and 1973, the total real income of agriculture increased by 
17 per cent according to figures based on traditional national accounts data. 
However, on the basis of data more in line with that used in other countries 
- including among other things EAGGF payments in output prices - the increase 
becomes even larger, i.e. 27 per cent according to table XI.15. 
In 1974, the harvest reached a record level. But at the same time, economic 
conditions of agriculture were adversely affected by the price increase of 
products purchased by the agricultural sector, including those of final de-
mand. Hence the real income of agriculture declined somewhat. In 1975 - and 
even more so in 1976 - the harvest was rather small and the real income of 
agriculture declined in contrast to the improvement noted in other industries 
in 1976. However, the 1977 harvest was back at the 1973 level, and real in-
come showed a substantial increase. 
Of course, real income of agriculture is also affected by trends in animal 
output, and here the picture has not been very clear. Output of butter de-
clined, but that of cheese increased. Output of beef increased, but that of 
bacon declined. For the period from 1973 to 1976 as a whole, the total quan-
tities of animal output increased by hardly more than 2 per cent. However, an 
additional 3 per cent increase took place in 1977. - 211 -
Table XI.15 
Agriculture, main indicators 
Index of real income, 
1971 = 
Traditi 
Révisée 
Total h 
100 
onal estimates 
i estimates 
íarvest, 
millions tons 
Output 
1971 = 
„ . 4  Grain 
Animal 
Animal 
Butter 
Cheese 
price indices, 
100 
products 
output, 1 000 t: 
Beef, veal, etc. 
Bacon, 
Number 
Number 
pork, etc. 
of farms 
of 'whole-year 
workers', 1 000 man 
years^ 
1973 
117 
127 
13.5 
145 
147 
146 
127 
205 
832 
141 
145 
1974 
112 
115 
14.4 
162 
146 
137 
150 
261 
791 
138 
136 
1975 
104 
99 
12.8 
172 
159 
139 
152 
259 
776 
134 
129 
1976 
106 
99 
11.5 
202 
179 
139 
157 
264 
759 
131 
124 
1977 
112 
105 
14.3 
212 
188 
131 
177 
263 
786 
128 
120 
Corresponding to real-income figures in table XI.9. 
2 
Excluding repair and maintenance, including EAGGF payments. 
3 
All crops converted to barley-equivalent on the basis of relative fodder 
values. 
4 
Including EAGGF payments. 
5 
Comparable figures according to author's estimates. 
Note: All figures refer to calendar years. Due to several conceptual revi-
sions in the basic statistics, most figures are not directly comparable 
with similar figures shown in chapter II. 
Source : Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978. - 212 -
The total number of farms continued to decline. Employment in terms of 'whole 
-year workers'
1 declined even more, suggesting a continued increase in labour 
productivity in agriculture. 
23. Thus, the picture painted by the figures in table XI.15 is not very en-
couraging. It should, however, be added that a continued decline in employ-
ment and in the number of farms was not unexpected when Denmark joined the 
EEC in 1973. The basic problem of agriculture from 1973 onwards has probably 
been similar to that in the sector of owner-occupied houses, i.e. related to 
inflation. The value of existing real assets (including land) has increased 
at a faster rate than the general price level, and at the same time the real 
burden of the debt of agriculture has been eroded. These factors do not show 
up in figures such as those in table XI.15. But they are beneficial from the 
viewpoint of those who have been farmers for a number of years . 
However, an additional aspect of this pattern of inflation is that the imme-
diate burden of new loans is substantial, interest rates being very high. In 
turn, such heavy immediate burdens may explain why productive capacity has 
not shown a higher increase than has actually been the case. They may also 
contribute to explaining why existing farms are being taking over only rather 
slowly by young farmers. 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
24. In recent years, the main balance of payments industry, i.e. manufactur-
ing industry has been adversely affected by the deteriorating terms of trade 
and, in particular, by the low level of demand, both from home and overseas. 
Between 1973 and 1976 the number of firms declined somewhat (cf. table 
XI.16), but in 1977 it increased again. The total number of employees de-
clined by well over 10 per cent, the decline being particularly marked in 
1975. Due a shortening of the working week, the total number of hours worked 
declined even more, namely by 17 per cent between 1973 and 1977. Again by far 
the major part of the decline occurred in 1975. 
The index of output in manufacturing industries showed a substantial decline 
between 1973 and 1975, but the 1976 upswing took output back to its 1973 lev-
el. 
For an explanation of this concept, see table II.6. However, several 
changes of definitions and procedures of estimation have taken place during 
the period 1973-77. This is true for the coverage, but is also true for the 
procedures used to estimate the number of man years of labour provided 
by the owner and his spouse. This figures in table XI.15 have been esti-
mated so as to adjust for these changes. They are, however, not too reli-
able. 
Apparently, the share of total sales being purchased by foreign customers 
increased slightly, i.e. from 30.0 per cent in 1973 to 32.0 per cent in 
1977. - 213 -
Table XI.16 
Manufacturing industries, main indicators 
Number of firms, 1 000's 
Index, 1965 = 100: 
Employment, number of: 
workers 
salary-earners 
EMPLOYEES, TOTAL 
Total number of hours 
worked 
Output 
Share in gross value 
added of 
wages 
'profits' 
Rate of return on net 
assets 
Capacity to expand through 
earnings 
1973 
6.7 
99 
110 
101 
83 
152 
54.8 
45.2 
18.3 
5.4 
1974 
6.7 
95 
111 
98 
81 
147 
57.3 
42.7 
18.7 
5.3 
1975 
6.6 
85 
106 
89 
70 
137 
57.8 
42.2 
2.8 
0.8 
1976 
6.4 
86 
104 
90 
71 
154 
55,0 
45.0 
12.3 
3.6 
1977 
6.6 
83 
104 
88 
69 
155 
55.9 
44.1 
9.4 
2.8 
Note: Concepts in the upper part of the table correspond to those, presented 
in table III.3. 
Concepts in the lower part of the table correspond to some of the con-
cepts used in table III.4. 1973 figures on factor shares differ from 
those in table III.4 because of revisions to coverage, etc. 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. However, figures in the two 
bottom rows are taken from Det økonomiske Råd, Dansk økonomi novem-
ber 1976, p. 87. The latter institution has provided additional fig-
ures for the years 1976 and 1977. 
25. Earlier in the present chapter the observation was made, based on figures 
of total real product and of total employment on a full-time basis, that the 
overall rate of increase in labour productivity had probably slowed down in 
the period 1973-77 as compared with 1967-73. As has frequently been pointed 
This finding is discussed at great length in Det økonomiske Råd, Dansk 
økonomi novpmber 1978, chapter III. - 214 
out, such productivity figures should be interpreted with great care. For in-
stance, the lower overall rate of growth in labour productivity may be due to 
a change in the composition of total national product. 
Still, keeping all the shortcomings of the figures in mind, it might be 
worth noting that output in manufacturing industries divided by the number of 
hours worked has continued to increase at a roughly constant rate from 1969 
to 1977 - the only obvious exception being a decline in 1974.^ This finding 
may suggest that, in manufacturing industries, the trend rate of increase in 
labour productivity has continued after the immediate set-back in 1974. In 
this connection the figures of fixed investment in table XI.12 should be kept 
in mind. The decline of fixed investment from 1973 to 1977 was entirely due 
to lower residential investment. 
However, even if labour productivity in manufacturing industries has contin-
ued to increase, so have important cost elements - and money wage rates in 
particular. Hence the question of how manufacturing industries can maintain 
- or even improve - their ability to compete with producers in other coun-
tries has not yet been satisfactorally answered. 
26. From 1973 to 1975, i.e. during the period of declining output, the share 
of wages, in gross value-added, increased. However, this trend was reversed in 
1976. 
Somewhat superior indicators of the. orofitabilitv of manufacturing industries 
are shown in the last two rows of table XI.16. These concepts, based on sam-
ple surveys, are explained in connection with table III.4. According to the 
figures, earnings of manufacturing industries remained surprisingly stable 
from 1973 to 1974,
2 but the setback in 1975 was substantial. The 1976 up-
swing is clearly reflected in the figures, and so is the subsequent stagna-
tion in 1977. 
BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION 
27. The years 1972 and 1973, saw a boom in the building and construction in-
dustry. The total floor area of new buildings started reached a peak in 1972; 
but declined slightly in 1973 in spite of a substantial increase in indus-
trial investment in buildings (cf. table IV.2). 
The main factor behind this pattern was residential investment. In 1972, the 
number of new residential units started reached an all-time record of 64 000 
This observation is based on the figures in tables III.3 and XI.16, indi-
cating indices of output in manufacturing industries as well as the total 
number of hours worked. 
This may partly be explained by the fact that the sample on which the fig-
ures are based consisted of exporting firms to a large extent. Exports de-
clined later than domestic demand (cf. table XI.7), - 215 -
Table XI.17 
Building and construction, main indicators 
GDP in building and con-
struction
1 
As per cent oj 
Investment in 
total2 
of which: 
government 
industries 
residential 
Starts of new 
by floorarea^ 
of which: 
government 
industries 
residential 
r total GDP
1 
buildings, 
buildings 
1973 
4.97 
8.0 
6.24 
1.22 
1.54 
3.48 
12.97 
1.19 
3.79 
7.99 
1974 
4.48 
7.0 
5.25 
1.10 
1.65 
2.50 
8.27 
1.07 
3.25 
3.95 
1975 
4.07 
6.5 
4.40 
1.09 
1.26 
2.05 
8.82 
1.16 
2.36 
5.30 
1976 
4.59 
7.0 
5.24 
1.09 
1.50 
2.65 
10.88 
1.11 
3.79 
5.98 
1977 
4.55 
6.8 
5.10 
1.03 
1.68 
2.39 
10.45 
1.05 
3.76 
5.64 
Real-product figures, DKR 1 000 million. 
2 
Real-product figures, excluding repair and maintenance, DKR 1 000 million. 
3 2 
Million m started. 
Note: For concepts, see tables IV.1 and VI.2. 
Sources : Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. 
units. Part of this shift should, of course, be seen as reflecting changes in 
the general economic climate, but a more specific factor is also of import-
ance. Until 1972, residential investment was not subject ¿o value-added tax-
ation. However, in order to dampen residential investment, especially in own-
er-occcupied houses, legislation was introduced so that, from late 1973 on-
wards, residential investment became subject to value-added taxation. During 
the 'transitional period', starts of new residential units were, of course, 
precipitated by those who had planned to become owners of their own homes. By 
1974, the number of new residential units started had'fallen back to 26 000 
units. 
As for other investment in buildings public investment declined rather stead-
ily, while industrial investment fell substantially between 1973 and 1975. 
However, the 1976 upswing brought business investment back to its 1973 level. 
28. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the share of the building and 
construction industry in total GDP declined from 8.0 per cent in 1973 to 6.5 
per cent in 1975( cf. table XI.17). The level of activity recovered somewhat 
in 1976, but 1977 was another year of stagnation. 216 
Table XI. 18 
Number of residential units started and completed 
Total number started 
Total number completed 
of which (by type of unit): 
one-family houses 
apartments
1 
others 
of which (by type of ownership): 
private 
housing societies 
others 
1973 
50.4 
55.6 
37.9 
16.9 
0.8 
42.3 
12.9 
0.4 
1974 
25.7 
48.6 
34.2 
13.6 
0.8 
36.3 
11.4 
0.9 
1975 
33.6 
35.5 
25.4 
9.2 
0.9 
26.3 
8.7 
0.5 
(1 000 
1976 
35.9 
39.2 
29.8 
8.8 
0.6 
29.8 
9.0 
0.4 
units) 
1977 
34.7 
36.3 
30.4 
5.2 
0.7 
29.5 
6.4 
0.4 
Including dormitories, of which the number has declined from 2 600 in 1973 
to 800 in 1974, 400 in 1975, 300 in 1976 and 100 in 1977. 
Note: For concepts, see tables IV.2 and VI.3. 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978. 
RESIDENTIAL INVESTMENT 
29. Table XI.18 provides details of residential investment. All the figures 
are indicated in terms of 'number of residential units', hence differences 
with respect to the size and quality of individual units are not indicated. 
In the period 1975-77, the number of residential units completed oer vear 
stabilized at a level of 35- 40 000. However, the number of new apartments 
continued to decline and reached an all-time low of 5 200 units in 1977. In 
this connection it should be recalled that, even during the 1950s when total 
residential investment was much lower, the number of apartments completed re-
mained around 10 000 per year, and during the late 1960s the number was sub-
stantially higher. The number of new one-family houses remained more stable, 
in fact it returned to its level prior to the 1972-73 boom, i.e. roughly 
30 000 new houses per year. 
30. In the bottom part of table XI.18, the number of new residential units 
completed is distributed according to type of ownership. The figures for 
housing societies are rather similar to the figures relating to new apart-
ments, mentioned above - but not completely. Apartments are also built by 
private investors, although only to a limited extend, and housing societies 
have recently started to invest in groups of one-family houses, although so 
far only on a modest scale. 
The figures for new residential units owned by private persons, mainly con-
sist of owner-occupied one-family houses. They include verv few units built 
for letting. This activity is not profitable any more, taking into account 217 -
the high costs of finance. But increasing number of apartment buildings are 
erected in which the individual apartments are subsequently sold private own-
ers. 
31. The legal framework for establishing such individually-owned apartments 
was not introduced until 1966, and in the following years legal conditions 
for such arrangements were tightened. This was especially true with respect 
to the possibilities of splitting existing buildings with rented apartments 
into individually-owned apartments, an exercise which would usually be prof-
itable for the owner because of the combination of rent control for existing 
rented apartments and free market pricing of apartments and other individual-
ly-owned residential units for sale. 
From 1976 onwards, conditions for establishing individually-owned apartments 
within the existing stock of rented apartment buildings were liberalized once 
more. In 1977, legal provisions had been made for converting roughly 100 000 
apartments from tenant apartments to individually-owned apartments.1 
THE STOCK OF RESIDENTIAL UNITS 
32. The pattern of ownership of the stock of residential units is, of course, 
affected by the type of ownership of recently-built residential units (cf. 
the bottom part of table XI.18). However, these figures at best indicate 
marginal adjustments in the composition of the total stock. Comparable stock 
figures are shown in table XI.19, from which may be seen the remarkable shift 
in the pattern of ownership that has taken place during the period 1970-77 
- and particularly in the later part of this period. The share of owner-oc-
cupied homes increased sharply, partly because residential investment con-
sisted almost exclusively of owner-occupied one-family houses (cf. table 
XI.18), and partly because old, privately owned apartments to let were con-
verted to individually-owned apartments. 
At the same time, the number of private apartments to let started to decline, 
even in absolute terms. The decline was due, partly to conversion into indi-
vidually-owned apartments, partly to insignificant investment in this field 
and partly to the fact that these buildings are comparatively old. According 
to appendix table VI.1, in 1970 almost half of the (slightly above 500 000) 
privately-owned rented apartments mere erected prior to 1919.
2 Hence quite a 
few of them are becoming obsolete, in particular because the standard of main-
tenance has usually been lower for rented apartments than for owner-occupied 
homes. 
33. At first glance, according to table XI.19 the position of the housing so-
cieties is not too bad. Their share of total residential units continued to 
However, an apartment to let cannot be sold as long as the old tenant wants 
to stay. 
2 
Of these 242 000 apartments, 122 000 were situated in the metropolitan area 
(cf. appendix table IV.2). 218 
Table XI.19 
Total stock of residential units' 
Owner-occupied 
farms 
one-family houses 
others 
TOTAL 
Rented apartments, 
owned by: 
4.
 e  private 
housing societies 
others 
TOTAL 
Other dwellings 
TOTAL 
of which individual-
ly-owned apart-
ments included in 
other owner-occu-
pied units 
private rented 
apartments 
TOTAL 
1960 
1 000 
units 
177 
393 
98 
668 
510 
144 
50 
704 
91 
1 463 
_ 
-
per 
cent 
12 
27 
7 
46 
35 
10 
3 
48 
6 
100 
-
1965 
1 000 
units 
179 
473 
86 
738 
517 
174 
50 
741 
99 
1 578 
_ 
-
per 
cent 
11 
30 
6 
47 
33 
11 
3 
47 
6 
100 
-
1970
b 
1 000 
units 
161 
605 
80 
846 
519 
253 
44 
816 
81 
1 743 
7 
27 
per 
cent 
9 
35 
5 
49 
30 
15 
2 
47 
4 
100 
34 
1977
C 
1 000 
units 
150 
830 
100 
1 080 
480 
330 
40 
850 
60 
1 990 
40 
63 
per 
cent 
7 
42 
5 
54 
24 
17 
2 
43 
3 
100 
103 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
Excluding certain one-room units. 
The figures are equal to those, presented in appendix table IV.1. 
Figures are estimated. 
Including individually-owned apartments, actually sold (cf. the bottom 
part of the table). 
Including apartments destined to be sold but currently occupied by a sit-
ting tenant (cf. the bottom part of the table). 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik, Boligen, Statistisk Tabelvaerk 1975, C 2 and 
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increase between 1960 and 1977. Very few of their apartments were erected 
prior to 1940 (cf. appendix table IV.1), hence the problems connected with 
obsolescence are not yet of major importance. Furthermore, individually-
owned apartments cannot be established in buildings owned bv housing soci-
eties. However, recently investment in new residential units by housing soci-
eties has declined sharply (cf. table XI.18). In fact, out of the 75 000 new 
units erected between 1970 and 1977 by the housing societies, 50 000 were 
completed in the years 1971-74 and only 25 000 between 1975 and 1979. 
The main problem of the housing societies is that they are not able to invest 
in new homes given existing financial conditions unless they are subsidized 
by the government. Such subsidies are only provided for a limited number of 
new residential units, and frequently they have only been given for a limited 
period of years. Hence the tenant will face increasing rents as the subsidies 
are reduced, and therefore they may prefer to buy a home of their own, if 
this is at all possible for them. 
34. For these reasons - and others, mentioned in chapter IV - Denmark is in-
creasingly becoming a nation of owner-occupiers. Much can be said for such 
a development, but if this trend continues, quite substantial social problems 
may arise for those who - for one reason or the other - cannot afford to buy 
a home of their own. The number of apartments to let may become too small to 
meet the demand from would-be tenants belonging to low-income groups. How 
these problems are going to be solved is still an open question. 
FISCAL POLICY 
35. From the mid-1960s up to 1973, the government accounts were roughly in 
balance (cf. table VI.12). However, with the start of the 1973/74 recession, 
social transfers increased, and so did other social expenditure - partly be-
cause the level of benefits was improved by legislation. In order to finance 
this expenditure - and to try to reduce the balance of payments deficits -
indirect taxation was increased, in 1976 and especially in 1977. Neverthe-
less, from 1975 onwards there was a persistent overall government deficit. 
Hence the central government debt increased, and in order to cope with the 
corresponding growth of the money supply, treasury bills and short-term bonds 
were introduced and issued on a large scale. Hence the effects of the govern-
ment deficit from the viewpoint of monetary policy became substantial. These 
problems are treated in the concluding part of the following sections on fis-
cal policy during a period of recession. 
36. However, the starting point will be taken in the field of total public 
expenditure and revenue, covering central government as well as local authori-
ties. Because of changes in the institutional structure of the government 
sector during the 1970s (see chapter VI), consistent figures for the total 
government sector are available only to a limited extent. The problems of 
recalculation have been solved for revenue figures, but disaggregated expend-
iture figures are not so easily produced. 
A final complication must be mentioned. From January 1979 onwards, the fiscal 
year of the central government became the calendar year. A similar shift for 220 
municipalities took place from January 1977 onwards.
1 Statistics of govern-
ment finance are published to an increasing extent on a calendar-year basis, 
even for earlier years, and most of the figures in the following tables will 
be on this basis. 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
37. Between 1973 and 1974, government expenditure as a proportion of net na-
tional income increased from 51 to 55 per cent, and in 1975 the share reached 
a level of no less than 60 per cent (cf. table XI.20). The increase was 
partly due to the fact that national income in real terms stagnated from 1974 
onwards, but it also reflected increased government spending. In fact, most 
of the increase in total expenditure between 1973 and 1974 was in the field 
of government purchases of goods and services, and the same was true in 1975. 
However, from 1975 onwards, total government purchases of goods and services 
stabilised at a level of 37-38 per cent of net national income, reflecting 
attempts to cut some of these activities in volume terms - as well as a lower 
rate of increase in wage rates for government employees as compared with 
those of other wage earners. 
The increase in government transfer payments as a share of net national in-
come is almost exclusively explained by a substantial increase in unemploy-
ment benefits. 
38. In table XI.20, government purchases of goods and services are not ana-
lysed by type of expenditure, the reason being the statistical difficulties 
mentioned above. Hence the table cannot be compared with table VI.8. Table 
XI.21 provides, however, the same kind of disaggregation as table IV.8 - in 
fact the 1973/74 figures are identical. But corresponding figures are only 
available for 1974/75; they confirm the picture of overall expansion, de-
scribed above. 
In addition, table XI.21 shows comparable figures for the calendar year of 
1977. These figures are estimated on the basis of various indicators. They 
suggest that the policy of budget cuts -or reduced rate of increase in govern-
ment expenditure - has been successful to the extent that, form 1974/75 to 1977, 
most types of expenditure have stagnated, as percentages of national income. 
The only obvious exception is social expenditure, which increased from 25 per 
cent of national income in 1973/74 to 28 per cent in 1974/75 - and to no less 
than 31 per cent in 1977, corresponding to half of total public expenditure. 
To a large extent, this picture reflects a political aim of keeping social 
expenditure unaffected by budget cuts. But at the same time the 1977 figures 
amply demonstrate that a policy of budget cuts becomes increasingly difficult 
to pursue when half the budget is exempt. 
Previously, the fiscal years were from 1 April to 31 March. Table XI.20 
Total public expenditure 
Calendar years, current prices 
Transfers 
Pensions 
Unemployment benefits 
Health related transfers 
Other domestic subsidies and transfers 
Foreign transfers 
TRANSFERS, TOTAL 
Purchases of goods and services 
Current exp. 
Investment, incl. road exp. 
GOODS AND SERV., TOTAL 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
NET NAT. INCOME 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
11.4 
0.7 
3.8 
6.6 
1.4 
23.9 
34.7 
8.0 
42.7 
66.6 
130.2 
per 
cent 
NNI 
9 
0 
3 
5 
1 
18 
27 
6 
33 
51 
100 
1974 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
13.2 
1.8 
4.3 
8.4 
1.6 
29.3 
41.6 
9.6 
51.2 
80.5 
145.8 
per 
cent 
NNI 
9 
1 
3 
6 
1 
20 
29 
6 
35 
55 
100 
1975 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
15.3 
4.8 
5.0 
8.0 
2.1 
35.2 
49.8 
11.6 
61.4 
96.6 
160.6 
per 
cent 
NNI 
10 
3 
3 
5 
1 
22 
31 
7 
38 
60 
100 
1976 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
17.3 
5.7 
5.6 
9.6 
2.5 
40.7 
55.5 
12.8 
68.3 
109.0 
184.2 
per 
cent 
NNI 
10 
3 
3 
5 
1 
22 
30 
7 
37 
59 
100 
1977 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
19.4 
7.8 
6.4 
9.8 
3.1 
46.5 
62.3 
14.0 
76.3 
122.8 
200.4 
per 
cent 
NNI 
10 
4 
3 
5 
1 
23 
31 
7 
38 
61 
100 
INJ 
Including all defence expenditure. 
Source : Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk Oversigt February 1979. - 222 -
Table XI.21 
Total public expenditure by function 
Fiscal and calendar years, current prices 
Current account 
Social expenditures: 
Pensions etc. 
Health, social 
insurance etc. 
Others (incl. unem-
ployment benefits) 
SOCIAL EXP., TOTAL 
Education 
Various transfers 
Other current exp. 
CURRENT EXP., TOTAL 
Public investm., excl. 
defence 
Defence 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 
Net national income 
1973/74 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
per 
cent 
NNI 
13.3 10 
11.4 9 
7.4 6 
32.1 25 
10.8 8 
5.1 4 
9.1 7 
57.1 44 
7.1 5 
3.6 3 
67.8 52 
130.2 100 
1974/75 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
per 
cent 
NNI 
15.9 11 
14.1 10 
10.9 7 
40.9 28 
13.0 9 
7.2 5 
11.0 7 
72.1 49 
8.0 6 
4.4 3 
84.5 58 
145.8 100 
1977
a 
DKR 
1 000 
million 
22 
22 
18 
62 
18 
10 
14 
104 
13 
6 
123 
200 
per 
cent 
NNI 
11 
11 
9 
31 
9 
5 
7 
52 
6 
3 
61 
100 
a) 
Author's preliminary estimates. 
Note: For comparison, see table VI.8. 
Sources: 1973/74 and 1974/75 figures have been provided by Det økonomiske 
Sekretariat. Table XI.22 
Total public revenue, current prices 
Specific sales taxes, incl.import duties 
General sales taxes, including VAT 
INDIRECT TAXES, TOTAL 
Income taxes, persons 
Income taxes, companies 
INCOME TAXES, TOTAL 
Property taxes, inheritance duties, etc. 
Contrib. to social insurance schemes 
TOTAL REVENUES 
NET NATIONAL INCOME 
Revenues collected by: 
Centr, government 
Local authorities 
Social insurance schemes 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
12.9 
13.2 
26.1 
39.7 
2.3 
42.0 
4.5 
1.4 
74.0 
130.2 
52.0 
20.7 
1.3 
per 
cent 
NNI 
10 
10 
20 
30 
2 
32 
4 
1 
57 
100 
% of 
total 
reve-
nue 
70 
28 
2 
1974 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
12.4 
14.8 
27.2 
49.9 
2.8 
52.7 
5.3 
1.1 
86.3 
145.8 
62.2 
23.1 
1.0 
per 
cent 
NNI 
9 
10 
19 
34 
2 
36 
3 
1 
59 
100 
% of 
total 
reve-
nue 
72 
27 
1 
1975 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
14.5 
15.1 
29.6 
48.4 
2.8 
51.2 
5.9 
1.2 
87.9 
160.6 
60.3 
26.5 
1.1 
per 
cent 
NNI 
9 
9 
18 
30 
2 
32 
4 
1 
55 
100 
% of 
total 
reve-
nue 
69 
30 
1 
1976 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
18.2 
18.5 
36.7 
56.1 
3.6 
59.7 
6.7 
1.3 
104.4 
184.2 
72.1 
31.1 
1.2 
per 
cent 
NNI 
10 
10 
20 
30 
2 
32 
4 
1 
57 
100 
% of 
total 
reve-
nue 
69 
30 
1 
1977 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
21.2 
22.3 
43.5 
60.9 
3.6 
64.5 
7.6 
1.5 
117.1 
2.00.4 
81.5 
34.3 
1.3 
per 
cent 
NNI 
10 
11 
21 
30 
2 
32 
4 
1 
58 
100 
% of 
total 
reve-
nue 
70 
29 
1 
IVI 
ω 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary information from Danmarks Statistik. - 224 
PUBLIC REVENUE 
39. In 1974, total government revenue increased as a percentage of national 
income, and was mainly caused by a substantially higher revenue from income 
taxes (cf. table XI.22). However, at the general election in December 1973, 
the electorate indicated that income taxation at prevailing rates was not 
very popular. Rates were, therefore reduced in 1974, affecting revenue from 
1975 onwards. During the period 1975-77, revenue from income taxes on persons 
remained at 30 per cent of net national income, and rates of indirect taxa-
tion became the main instrument of fiscal policy. 
During the summer of 1975, it was still hoped that the international reces-
sion would be a temporary one, and it was decided to fight unemployment by a 
temporary reduction in the rate of value-added tax. The rate of 15 per cent 
which had prevailed since 1970 was reduced to 9.25 per cent
1 from late Septem-
ber 1975 to the end of February 1976, when - as was decided in advance - it 
returned to 15 per cent. The effect of the reduced tax rate on private con-
sumption was substantial, but unfortunately this was reflected in an in-
creased demand for foreign rather than for domestic goods. The balance of 
payments deficit increased substantially, and from the summer of 1976 onwards 
there was no further room for expansionist fiscal policies. On the contrary: 
in the late summer of 1976, rates of specific sales taxes were increased to 
produce additional revenue of DKR 3 000 - 4 000 million per year. 
40. However, the balance of payments deficit remained at a level of DKR 10 000 
million per year, and in the late summer of 1977, commodity tax rates were 
increased substantially. The rate of value-added tax was increased to 18 per 
cent, and serveral specific taxes were increased as well,not least those re-
lated to car usage. The additional revenue expected was an estimated 
DKR 6 000 - 7 000 million per year. 
At the same time, various measures were taken in order to increase employment 
- at least to the extent of compensating for the reduced demand caused by the 
increased indirect tax rates. 
41. In chapter VI, revenue from various types of taxation in Denmark, shown 
as percentages of gross national income, were compared with similar figures 
for some neighbouring countries (cf. VI.11). In table XI.23, a similar com-
parison is made for 1973-77. 
Over the period 1973 to 1977, there has been a general international tendency 
for total taxation as a percentage of national income to increase. In fact, 
this increase has been smaller in Denmark than in the other countries shown 
in table XI.23. The basic problem of Danish fiscal policy on the revenue side 
has prevailed: there is little prospect of increasing revenue as long as con-
tributions to social insurance schemes are insignificant. Revenue from income 
tax has remained at a record level, and indirect taxation is probably approach-
ing a ceiling. 
At first sight, this rate may appear odd, but it represents a 5 per cent 
reduction in the normal VAT-inclusive price of an article (i.e. 100 + 15% 
VAT = 115 and 115 minus 5% = 109.25). - 225 -
Table XI.23 
Public revenue as a percentage of gross domestic 
product, at market prices: an international comparison 
(Per cent) 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
Fed. Re-
public of 
Germany 
UK 
France 
Nether-
lands 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1973 
1976 
1977
a 
1973 
1976 
1977
a 
1973 
1976 
1977
a 
1973 
1976 
1977
a 
1973 
1976 
1977
a 
1973 
1976 
1977
a 
Indirect 
taxes 
14.9 
13.9 
14.3 
15.0 
15.8 
17.1 
17.2 
17.9 
12.2 
11.7 
11.9 
9.6 
8.9 
9.0 
8.4 
8.7 
8.7 
12.5 
12.5 
11.7 
10.5 
10.6 
11.2 
Income 
taxes 
25.9 
28.8 
25.2 
25.7 
24.9 
17.4 
18.9 
19.4 
21.0 
23.7 
23.7 
13.0 
12.8 
14.0 
13.2 
15.7 
15.0 
6.2 
7.3 
7.5 
15.0 
15.7 
15.5 
Property 
taxes 
etc. 
2.7 
2.7 
2.6 
2.5 
2.6 
1.0 
1.0 
0.9 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
1.1 
1.2 
1.2 
4.4 
4.5 
4.4 
1.4 
1.5 
1.4 
1.4 
1.5 
1.8 
Contrib. 
soc. 
insur. 
schemes 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
8.9 
8.3 
8.3 
6.7 
11.8 
13.5 
11.5 
12.7 
12.9 
5.8 
7.1 
7.0 
13.4 
15.8 
16.5 
16.1 
17.5 
17.3 
Other 
taxes 
0.8 
0.9 
0.9 
1.0 
1.4 
0.9 
0.8 
0.9 
2.6 
3.2 
3.7 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
0.8 
0.7 
1.5 
2.0 
2.4 
2.3 
0.8 
0.9 
0.9 
Total 
44.8 
46.8 
43.5 
44.7 
45.2 
45.3 
46.2 
47.4 
43.0 
50.9 
53.3 
36.3 
36.7 
38.2 
32.6 
36.7 
36.6 
35.5 
39.5 
39.4 
43.8 
46.2 
46.7 
Preliminary figures. 
Note: The table corresponds to table VI.11, but definitions used in the two 
tables differ in certain details. 
Source: 0ECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-1976, and supplementary information 
from Danmarks Statistik. 
On the expenditure side, government expenditure outside the social sector has 
already been kept at a rather low - or at least at a stable - level, while 
expenditure on social services have expanded rapidly. It is difficult to im-
agine how any further increase in expenditure can be financed on the basis of 
existing tax instruments. Admittedly, the value-added tax rate may be in-- 226 -
creased somewhat, but even here the effective ceiling may not be too far 
away. Finally, the substantial balance of payments deficit may require in-
creased taxation in order to reduce domestic demand. But when the effect of 
existing tax instruments is exhausted, it will become increasingly difficult 
to tighten fiscal policy from the revenue side. 
SURPLUSES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
42. In chapter VII it was shown that the balance of payments deficit prior 
to the recession reflected an increasing deficit of the private sector (pri-
vate investment exceeding private savings), whereas the government sector 
maintained a surplus (cf. table VII.4). From 1973 onwards, the government's 
financial surplus gradually disappeared (cf. table XI.24). Government in-
vestment remained rather stable, but the surplus of the government sector was 
reduced. 
As was discussed earlier (cf. table XI.12), the components of total private 
investment have fluctuated sharply, with reduced residential investment prob-
ably being the most permanent feature. These fluctuations are reflected in 
the upper part of table XI.24. For the period 1973-77 as a whole - and dis-
regarding the extremely bad result in 1975 (cf. table XI.7) - the trend of 
total private investment as a proportion of national income has been one of a 
slight decline, from 25 per cent in 1973 to 22 per cent in 1977. At the same 
time, the share of private savings has, on the whole, been increasing. Hence 
the private sector's deficit has been diminishing. 
43. These findings suggest that the substantial balance of payments deficits 
in 1976 and 1977 mainly reflected a declining government surplus. In this 
sense, it might be said that fiscal policy was not kept sufficiently tight, 
but of course the substantial unemployment of these years should be kept in 
mind before drawing any final conclusions. 
44. The most discomforting feature of recent years is that a reallocation of 
resources in favour of the balance of payments industries at the expense of 
domestic industries has not been obtained. Indeed, the trend between 1973 
and 1977 has been in the opposite direction (cf. tables XI.3 and XI.9 above). 
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the issue of incomes policy has 
played an increasing role in discussions about the economy, the aim being to 
reduce rates of increase of money incomes in order to improve the ability of 
the balance of payments industries to compete. In this way, reduced unemploy-
ment as well as an improved balance of payments position might be obtained, 
if such policy was successful. Unfortunately, success has not been achieved 
so far. 
45. These problems will be reconsidered below, but a final comment should 
be added in the present context. This is related to the conduct of fiscal 
policy with these problems in mind, and particularly to the intervention in 
the late summer of 1977, mentioned above. In order to improve the balance of 
payments position, indirect taxation was increased substantially. To the ex-
tent that the balance of payments industries also sold goods on the home 
market, these increased taxes, of course, reduced their total sales. An ad-
ditional part of the 'package' was several expansionary measures affecting Table XI.24 
Investment, savings and financial balance: Private, public and foreign sectors 
Private sector 
A. Investment 
Residential 
Business fixed 
Increase stocks 
INVESTMENT, TOTAL 
Β. Savings 
Joint stock comp. 
Other institutions 
Personal 
SAVINGS, TOTAL 
Financial balance 
Government sector 
Investment 
Savings 
Surplus deficit 
Balance of payments, 
current accounts 
NNI, DKR 1 000 mill. 
current prices 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
10.7 
19.7 
2.3 
32.7 
6.4 
5.0 
8.1 
19.5 
-13.2 
7.7 
18.1 
10.4 
- 2.8 
130.2 
per 
cent 
NNI 
8 
15 
2 
25 
5 
4 
6 
15 
-10 
6 
14 
8 
- 2 
100 
1974 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
10.0 
22.8 
2.0 
34.8 
6.1 
6.4 
7.7 
20.2 
-14.6 
8.4 
17.5 
9.1 
- 5.5 
145.8 
per 
cent 
NNI 
7 
16 
1 
24 
4 
4 
6 
14 
-10 
6 
12 
6 
- 4 
100 
1975 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
9.4 
21.5 
- 3.3 
27.6 
6.9 
6.1 
16.2 
29.2 
1.6 
10.1 
5.4 
- 4.7 
- 3.1 
160.6 
per 
cent 
NNI 
6 
13 
- 2 
17 
4 
4 
10 
18 
1 
6 
3 
- 3 
- 2 
100 
1976 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
12.9 
27.5 
1.4 
41.8 
-
-
-
30.2 
-11.6 
10.8 
10.8 
0.0 
-11.6 
184.2 
per 
cent 
NNI 
7 
14 
1 
22 
16 
- 6 
6 
6 
0 
- 6 
100 
(Current prices) 
1977 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
12.7 
30.7 
0.4 
43.8 
-
-
-
34.0 
- 9.8 
11.5 
11.2 
- 0.3 
-10.1 
200.4 
per 
cent 
NNI 
7 
15 
0 
22 
17 
- 5 
6 
6 
- 0 
- 5 
100 
M 
SI 
Source: Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk Oversigt February 1979. - 228 -
government expenditure. Which, however, mainly benefited domestic industries. 
Hence, while the overall effect of the package might have been one of a re-
duced balance of payments deficit and constant - or perhaps even slightly de-
clining - overall unemployment, the effect on employment in the balance of 
payments industries was probably negative. Given these results, it is very 
doubtful whether the Danish economy can afford similar 'packages' in the fu-
ture. 
Table XI.25 
Total government accounts. Calendar years, current prices 
(DKR 1 000 million) 
Total public revenue 
2 
Total public expenditure 
Surplus 
of which: 
Central government curre 
Central govern, net capi 
Central gov.t net lending 
>nt 
tal 
or 
balance 
expenditure 
ρ ·
 
3
 
borrowing 
1973 
76.1 
66.6 
9.5 
6.2 
3.2 
3.0 
1974 
88.7 
80.5 
8.2 
3.8 
4.7 
- 0.9 
1975 
91.6 
96.6 
- 5.0 
- 7.6 
3.5 
-11.1 
1976 
108.4 
109.0 
- 0.6 
- 3.6 
6.7 
10.3 
1977 
121.4 
122.8 
- 1.4 
- 4.0 
7.8 
-11.8 
The figures include some interest receipts and public-works surpluses. 
Hence they slightly exceed the revenue figures according to table XI.22. 
2 
Current, investment and defence expenditures (cf. table XI.20). 
3 
Except for some minor adjustments, the numerical size of these figures cor-
responds to the figures of 'Central government domestic deficit' in appen-
dix tables VIII.1, VIII.2, XI.1 and XI.2. 
Note: The table is some extent similar to table VI.12. 
Source : Most of the figures are from Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk 
Oversigt February 1979. 
OVERALL BUDGETARY POSITION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
46. The decline of the government financial surplus between 1973 and 1977 
(see table XI.24) is also reflected in the figures in the upper part of table 
XI.25. Here, total public revenue minus total public expenditure is shown, 
and the resulting surplus is - except some technical discrepancies - equal to 
the financial surplus of the government sector according to table XI.24. 
In addition, table XI.25 shows the current balance of central government. 
When certain net capital expenditure by the central government is deducted, the 
net lending capacity of the central government is obtained. As appears from 
the table, the actual result is one of a central government borrowing re-
quirement in the region of 10 thousand million DKR per year during the period 
1975-77. 229 -
Table XI.26 
Net position of central government, loans and debt - at end - March 
(DKR 1 000 million) 
Total loans 
Debt: 
Domestic: 
Long-term bonds 
Short-term bonds etc. 
Treasury bills 
Central bank 
TOTAL DOMESTIC 
Foreign : 
U.S. dollars 
Deutsche mark 
Others 
TOTAL FOREIGN 
TOTAL 
DEBT 
DEBT 
DEBT 
1974 
12.4 
2.1 
0.5 
-
-15.3 
-12.7 
2.5 
2.0 
2.0 
6.5 
- 6.2 
1975 
13.8 
2.0 
0.5 
-
-13.0 
-10.5 
3.4 
1.9 
1.9 
7.2 
- 3.3 
1976 
14.9 
1.8 
6.5 
-
- 8.9 
- 0.6 
4.3 
3.3 
2.8 
10.4 
9.8 
1977 
16.1 
1.7 
11.3 
5.0 
-15.9 
2.1 
9.5 
5.6 
3.9 
19.0 
21.1 
1978 
17.3 
1.6 
19.9 
7.9 
-19.5 
9.9 
11.6 
9.7 
5.7 
27.0 
36.9 
Maturity: ten years or more. 
Sources: Loan figures are from Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review, Febru-
ary 1979. Debt figures are form Danske statslån 1977-78, Finans-
ministeriet. 
The figures on the central government net lending or b 
preted from at least two viewpoints. First, apart from 
ments they represent the 'Central government domestic 
of the explanatory factors with respect to changes of 
as of the money stock (cf. appendix tables VIII.1 and 
the period 1966-73 : similar figures for 1974-77 are s 
XI.1 and XI.2, see rows (9a) and (18a)). The appendix 
similar to the figures for the central government net 
in table XI.25, and will be reconsidered below in the 
policy. 
orrowing may be inter-
some technical adjust-
deficit', which is one 
the monetary base as well 
VIII.2 for figures for 
hown in appendix table 
table figures are very 
borrowing requirement 
context of monetary 
47. Finally, the persistent overall deficits affect ,of course,the net position 
of the central government. Figures are shown in table XI.26 for 1974-1978. The 
figures refer to ends of fiscal years and thus are not completely comparable 
with the calendar year deficits according to table XI.25. Nevertheless, the 
central government net borrowing requirement at roughly DKR 30 000 million 
for the period 1975-77 as a whole is not too far from the figures for the to-
tal debt of the central government shown in the bottom row of table XI.26. 
From end of March 1975 to end of March 1978, total government debt increased 
by roughly DKR 40 000 million - and by roughly DKR 35 000 million when the 
increase in government loans is deducted. - 230 
As appears from tables XI.26, the pattern and the composition of total gov-
ernment debt have undergone major changes. Government borrowing abroad in-
creased substantially, especially during 1976 and 1977. The purpose of this 
foreign borrowing was to finance the balance of payments deficits of these 
years. While, up to 1977, loans in U.S. dollars are dominated, the borrowing 
during the last part of the period took place to an increasing extent in 
Deutsche marks. 
48. In addition, short-term bonds and treasury bills were introduced and 
sold on the domestic market in order to dampen the effects of the overall 
central government deficits on the money supply. According to table XI.26, 
the total net sales of short-term bonds as well as of treasury bills from 
early 1975 to early 1978 amounted to some DKR 25 000 million. (This figure is 
not too far from the corresponding figures for calendar years in rows 9b and 
18b in appendix tables XI.1 and XI.2). 
As a result of this heavy foreign and domestic borrowing, deposits by the 
central government in the central bank showed an increasing trend, especially 
during 1976 and 1977, in spite of the government borrowing requirement. 
MONETARY POLICY 
49. From 1973 to 1977, heavy fluctuations on the balance of payments as well 
as on the government accounts had substantial implications for the money sup-
ply. At the same time, the increasing balance of payments deficits became the 
main concern of monetary policy. The aim of keeping interest rates atable -
perhaps even at a low level - which had played a major role during most of 
the 1960s (cf. chapter VIII), had to be sacrificed. As a result, interest 
rates on bonds were allowed to increase - and to fluctuate. 
The issuing of short-term government bonds (cf. table XI.26), was started 
during 1975, but was not institutionalized in a systematic way until the 
spring of 1976, when a law on short-term government borrowing was passed by 
parliament. As a consequence of this new instrument, a short-term bond market, 
accessible to the non-bank private sector, was created for the first time, 
and was used by the monetary authorities in order to control the monetary base. 
An attempt was even made in order to 'twist' the structure of Danish interest 
rates in the bond market. 
50. The main factors affecting the monetary base during the period 1973-77 
are shown in table XI.27. The table - and some of the following - are based 
on more detailed figures in appendix tables XI.1 - XI.3. These tables, con-
structed in the same way as appendix tables VIII.1 - VIII.3, aim at bringing 
the latter up to date. 
As appears from the upper part of table XI.27, the balance of payments defi-
cits were partly financed by private foreign borrowing
1 in 1974 and 1977 (and 
In table XI.27 - and also in table XI.30 below - private capital imports 
are presented in the upper part among the factors, which are exogenous from 
(cont'd on page 231) - 231 -
Table XI.27 
Factors affecting the monetary base 
(DKR 1 000 million, current prices) 
Bal. of paym., curr. ace. 
Net foreign cap. imp., excl. centrai 
government 
Central 
Other f< 
Central 
Central 
Central 
Private 
central 
gov . t, domestic deficit 
ictors 
TOTAL 
gov.!., net bond sales 
bank, increased bond holdings 
bank, increased lending 
banks, incr. of tied deposits in 
bank 
TOTAL INCREASE OF MONETARY BASE 
1973 
- 2.8 
+ 5.4 
- 3.4 
- 0.1 
- 0.9 
-
+ 0.5 
+ 0.6 
-
+ 0.2 
1974 
-
+ 
+ 
-
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
5.8 
4.9 
0.6 
0.3 
0.6 
-
2.6 
0.2 
-
2.2 
1975 
- 2.9 
+ 1.3 
+10.8 
+ 1.3 
+10.5 
- 5.8 
+ 1.5 
- 2.7 
- 3.2 
+ 0.3 
1976 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
11.6 
1.9 
10.0 
1.0 
1.3 
5.9 
5.6 
0.9 
0.2 
2.1 
1977 
- 9.9 
+ 6.7 
+ 11.1 
+ 1.3 
+ 9.2 
- 9.8 
- 1.7 
+ 2.5 
+ 3.0 
+ 3.2 
Note: For earlier years, see table VIII.6. Note, however, that figures in ta-
ble VIII.6 cover two-year periods. 
Source: See appendix tables VIII.1 and XI.1. 
even more so in 1973). Hence the main effect from the balance of payments oc-
curred in 1976, when net foreign payments caused a drain on the monetary base 
of some DKR 10 000 million. However, in 1976 this was offset by a domestic 
deficit of the central government of roughly the same size. Hence the main 
overall effects on the monetary base occurred in 1975 and 1977, reflecting do-
mestic deficits by the central government of the same order of magnitude as 
in 1976, i.e. roughly DKR 10 000 million. 
A substantial part of this expansionary effect on the monetary base was, how-
ever, counterbalanced by sales of short-term government bonds and treasury 
bills. These sales were undertaken by the central bank in close cooperation 
with the government. They amounted to nearly DKR 6 000 million in 1975, in-
creasing to DKR 10 000 million in 1977. In 1976, the sales continued in spite 
of the fact that the net effect from the exogenous factors was close to zero. 
However, the central bank at the same time increased its bond holdings by 
roughly DKR 6 000 million (cf. table XI.27). As these bonds were largely 
(cont'd of note 1 on page 230) 
a monetary-policy viewpoint. It can be argued with some justification that 
this item should, instead, be shown in the lower part of the table, because 
private capital imports are influenced by monetary policy. - 232 -
Table XI.28 
Interest rates. End of half-year periods 
1973,2. 
1974,1. 
1974,2. 
1975,1. 
1975,2. 
1976,1. 
1976,2. 
1977,1. 
1977,2. 
Discount rate, 
central bank 
9.0 
10.0 
10.0 
8.0 
7.5 
8.5 
10.0 
9.0 
9.0 
Note: For concepts, 
Source: Danmarks Nat 
and November 
see 
Private banks, 
Time deposits 
12 monts 
table 
ionalbank 
1978. 
11.0 
12.0 
12.0 
10.0 
9.5 
10.5 
12.1 
11.1 
11.1 
VIII.5. 
Monetary Rev 
Yield of 
(Per cent) 
gov.t bonds 
5 per cent 
S 2007 
12.7 
14.8 
14.4 
11.9 
12.6 
14.0 
14.6 
15.3 
16.6 
10 per cent 
S 1976/83 
-
-
-
-
-
-
16.6 
16.6 
17.1 
iew February 1976, November 1977 
long-term bonds, this joint operation might be interpreted as an attempt to 
twist the interest rate structure.
1 
51. Actually, from the late 1976 onwards the yield on short-term government 
bonds was kept above the long-term interest rate (cf. the two last columns 
of tables XI.28). They also illustrate the high level of effective yields on 
bonds during the later part of the period under study. By the end of 1977, 
bond yields had increased to roughly 17 per cent. Interest rates on 12 months 
deposits were substantilly lower, reflecting the discount rate of the central 
bank. In fact the former remained roughly two per cent above the latter. 
The discount rate of the central bank was increased from 8 to 10 per cent 
during late 1973 and early 1974. During 1975, it was gradually reduced to 7.5 
per cent, reflecting the overall attempt to stimulate domestic demand, de-
in its 1976 report (see pp. 70-71), the central bank explains why sales of 
short-term government bonds have been introduced. In this connection it is 
stated that the purpose was to keep the long-term interest rate from in-
creasing too much, while the interest rate on short-term government bonds 
would be kept sufficiently high so as to stimulate private foreign capital 
imports. - 233 -
Table XI.29 
Changes of main items in the balance sheets of private banks 
(DKR 1 000 million, current prices) 
Change in assets 
Monetary base held by banks 
Priv. banks, lending 
Priv. banks, bond holdings 
Tied deposits in centr, bank 
INCREASE OF ASSETS = LIABILITIES 
Change in liabilities 
Short-term deposits 
Time deposits 
Borrowing in centr, bank 
Other accounts, net 
1973 
- 0.4 
+ 8.5 
+ 1.9 
-
+10.0 
+ 3.2 
+ 5.2 
+ 0.6 
+ 1.0 
1974 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
2.0 
4.4 
1.7 
-
8.1 
2.2 
4.7 
0.2 
1.0 
1975 
- 1.6 
+ 1.8 
+15.3 
+ 3.2 
+18.7 
+ 9.3 
+10.5 
- 2.7 
+ 1.6 
1976 
+ 1.4 
+11.5 
+ 1.5 
- 0.2 
+14.2 
+ 2.7 
+ 9.0 
+ 0.9 
+ 1.6 
1977 
+ 1.6 
+ 9.4 
+ 5.2 
- 3.0 
+13.2 
+ 3.7 
+ 6.6 
+ 2.5 
+ 0.4 
Note: For earlier years, see table VI 
Source:See appendix tables VIII.3 and 
II.7. 
XI. 3. 
scribed in the sections on fiscal policy above. But when, during 1976, it be-
came clear that the recession was of a more permanent nature, the discount 
rate was increased to 11 per cent in the early autumn of 1976, corresponding 
to the tightening of fiscal policy at that time. However, in December 1976 it 
was reduced to 10 per cent and in March 1977 to 9 per cent. 
52. On of the results of this policy is immediately clear from table XI.28: 
bank interest rates gradually became much lower than yields in the short-term 
bond market. Still, time deposits continued to increase (cf. table XI.29). 
There are, however, at least two types of explanations for this phenomenon. 
The first is that a substantial part of time deposits is subject to arrange-
ments which are favoured by the tax authorities, i.e. special types of long-
term savings which reduce taxable income. Therefore, the effective yield (in-
cluding the tax benefit) is higher than the deposit rate shown in table 
XI.28. 
The same is true for a different type of time deposit, the so-called 'depos-
its subject to special agreement'. As was mentioned in chapter VIII, the 
agreement betweeen the private banks on interest rates on deposits was can-
celled in 1973. Therefore, competition started between individual banks for 
large deposits, firstly from local authorities and subsequently from firms 
which had excess liquidity, partly in connection with the substantial decline 
of stocks in 1975. Deposits rates according to table XI.28 were only indica-- 234 
tiv« from 1973 onwards, and much higher rates were offered by the banks in 
connection with the 'special-agreement' deposits. 
In this connection, an additional purpose of introducing the short-term gov-
ernment bonds in early 1976 was to offer an alternative to 'special-agreement' 
deposits in the private banks. But the short-term bonds were only partly suc-
cessfull.
1 
53. The increased deposits in the private banks in 1975 were not met by a 
corresponding demand for bank loans because of the sluggish overall perform-
ance of the economy at that time. Hence the bond holdings of private banks 
increased (cf. table XI.29). However, the 1976 upswing led to a substantial 
Table XI.30 
Factors affecting the money stock 
Bal. of paym., curr. ace. 
Net foreign capital imp., excl. 
central government 
Central gov.t, domestic deficit 
Other factors 
TOTAL 
Central gov.t, net bond sales 
Central bank, increased bond 
holdings 
Private banks, increased bond 
holdings 
Private banks, increased lending 
TOTAL INCREASE OF MONEY STOCK 
1973 
- 2.8 
+ 5.4 
- 3.4 
- 1.1 
- 1.9 
-
+ 0.5 
+ 1.9 
+ 8.5 
+ 9.0 
1974 
- 5.8 
+ 4.9 
+ 0.6 
- 1.3 
- 1.6 
-
+ 2.6 
+ 1.7 
+ 4.4 
+ 7.1 
(DKR 1 000 
1975 
- 2.9 
+ 1.3 
+ 10.8 
- 0.3 
+ 8.9 
- 5.8 
+ 1.5 
+15.3 
+ 1.8 
+21.7 
1976 
-11.6 
+ 1.9 
+10.0 
- 0.6 
- 0.3 
- 5.9 
+ 5.6 
+ 1.5 
+11.5 
+12.4 
million) 
1977 
- 9.9 
+ 6.7 
+ 11.1 
- 0.9 
+ 8.8 
- 9.8 
- 1.7 
+ 5.2 
+ 9.4 
+11.9 
Note: For earlier years, see table VIII.8. 
Source: See appendix tables VIII.2 and XI.2. 
The Danish authorities apparently favour the introduction of as many mone-
tary policy instruments as possible. As increased interest rates in connec-
tion with 'special agreement' deposits might lead to increased lending 
rates, a law was passed in 1975 putting a ceiling on the difference between 
average lending and deposit rates as part of an incomes policy package. In 
early 1978, a ceiling on interest rates on 'special agreement' deposits was 
introduced. 235 
increase of bank lending in spite of the fact that the system of credit ceil-
ings, described in chapter VIII, had been retained. 
54. Perhaps the most basic monetary policy change with respect to private 
banks was the introduction, in 1975, of specified rules on the possibilites 
for the private banks to borrow in the central bank. This scheme, which was 
already mentioned in passing in chapter VIII, sets individual ceilings for 
private bank borrowing at the central bank, the ceiling dependine on the 
'owned capital' of the bank concerned. The closer each bank comes to the 
ceiling, the higher the interest rate it has to pay. In connection with bor-
rowing to a limited extent, the interest rate is related to the discount rate 
of the central bank, but when the borrowing approaches the ceiling, the in-
terest to be paid depends on the effective yield in the bond market. The 
central bank is able to keep the montary base under control more effectively 
than before, because remaining unused facilities for private bank borrowing 
from the central bank are now precisely defined. 
55.  Table XI.30 illustrates changes in the money stock (M ) as well as fac-
tors having caused these changes. However, the money-stock figures have be-
come increasingly difficult to analyse in a meaningful way partly because of 
the introduction of near substitutes such as short-term bonds. Hence, it 
should only be noted that while the money stock corresponded to roughly 60 
per cent of net national income in 1973 and 1974, the share increased to 65-
67 per cent in 1975-77. 
Table XI.31 
Indicators of price increases 
(Per cent) 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Nat 
GDP 
11.3 
12.7 
13.8 
8.9 
7.2 
ional-account deflators 
Priv. 
consumpt. 
8.1 
15.3 
8.4 
9.3 
11.0 
Public 
consumpt. 
14.4 
18.1 
12.1 
6.7 
8.2 
Fixed 
inv. 
9.8 
20.7 
13.9 
6.0 
9.8 
Consum-
ers ' 
prices 
9.9 
15.7 
9.7 
8.4 
11.0 
Wage-regulation 
price index 
excl. 
residen-
tial 
costs 
incl. 
residen-
tial 
costs 
9.0 8.7 
16.3 15.2 
10.5 10.4 
7.2 8.6 
8.3 9.1 
Note: For concepts and earlier years, see table IX.1. 
Source : Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1976 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. 236 
PRICE AND WAGE INFLATION 
56. As was briefly mentioned in connection with table XI.8, the overall rate 
of inflation did not start to decline until 1975-76. Table XI.31 provides a 
more detailed picture in terms of year-by-year percentage increases of vari-
ous price indices. These figures are fully comparable with similar figures in 
table XI.I.
1 
As will be recalled from the latter table, rates of inflation in 1973 were at 
record levels as compared with previous years, but prices increased even 
faster in 1974. According to the wage-regulation price indices (which exclude 
changes of indirect taxation, etc.), the rate of overall price increase was 
gradually reduced from above 15 per cent in 1974 down to roughly 8 per cent 
in 1977. 
The index of consumers' prices shows a somewhat different pattern. The dis-
crepancies are mainly due to changes in the rate of value-added taxation·^ as 
well as in other rates of indirect taxes. These changes in indirect tax rates 
also affect the implicit deflator of private consumption, which shows a pat-
tern roughly similar to that of the index of consumers' prices. 
The two other series of implicit deflators in table XI.31 behave in a rather 
surprising way.3 The implicit deflator of fixed investment, shows an increase 
of no less than 20 per cent in 1974, declining sharply during the following 
two years. The implicit deflator of public consumption, which usually has 
shown larger rates of increase than other price indicators, showed very small 
rates of increase between 1975 and 1977. This result is in accordance with 
the findings on the sector of government services in table XI.10 and may, 
among other things, reflect the fact that wage rates for government employees 
have increased comparatively little since 1975. 
57. Money wage rates for workers have shown a pattern roughly corresponding 
to that of price increases (cf. table XI.32). Again, although the rate of 
increase in 1973 was a record (cf. table IX.2), the increase in 1974 was even 
larger, reaching a rate of roughly 20 per cent. It was not until 1976 that 
the rate of increase in money wages was reduced substantially, and by 1977 i i-
was down to roughly 10 per cent per year. 
Apparently, the deceleration of the increase in money wages took place some-
what later than the slowing down of price increases. This may partly be due 
to the system of automatic adjustment of money wage rates to preceding price 
It should, however, be recalled that national accounts data of the early 
1970s have been slightly revised. 
'"he rate of value-added taxation was temporarily reduced from 15 to 9.25 per 
cent from October 1975 to the end of February 1976, when it returned to 15 
per cent. From early October 1977 onwards, the rate was increased to 18 per 
cent. 
It should be recalled that national accounts data for this period are pre-
liminary, hence the results according to the final figures may differ from 
those in table XI.31. 237 
Table XI.32 
Money wage rates for different groups of workers 
Wage rates, kroner 
1973 
1977 
Per cent increase over 
preceding year 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Total 
24.85 
43.39 
15.4 
19.7 
19.2 
11.5 
9.8 
Skilled 
workers 
27.99 
47.52 
14.2 
18.5 
17.8 
11.2 
9.3 
Male 
workers, 
unskilled 
24.10 
42.04 
15.2 
19.3 
18.8 
11.6 
10.3 
Female 
workers, 
unskilled 
20.64 
38.25 
20.5 
22.7 
20.6 
12.8 
11.0 
Note: For earlier years, see table XI.2. Changes in the description of cate-
gories originate from the sources, mentioned below. They have mainly 
been made for the purpose of presentation. (Note that 1973 figures are 
identical in the two tables). 
Source : Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and Statistiske Ef-
terretninger 1978 No A 32. 
increases, i.e. the escalator clause described in chapter IX. One of the im-
plications of this mechanism is that, during a period of sharply declining 
prices, real wages may show a temporary sharp increase. It was partly in or-
der to prevent this transitional increase from leading to increased private 
consumption, and hence to a further deterioration of the balance of payments, 
that indirect taxation was increased in 1976 and 1977. 
58. As was pointed out in connection with table IX.2, relative wages for 
different groups of workers remained very stable from 1950 to around 1970. 
This pattern of stability has, however, not prevailed during the 1970s. The 
principle of 'equal pay for men and women' was pressed with increasing vig-
our during wage negotiations - and finally it was formalized.! Because of 
differences with respect to types of jobs, average wage rates of unskilled 
As a consequence of this formalization, the headings of official wage-rate 
tables have been changed. This is reflected in the headings of table IX.2 
as compared with table XI.32. So far there are, however, only very few 
skilled female workers, thus the problem is mainly one of presentation. 238 
women in 1977 were still roughly 4 DKR per hour - or 10 per cent - lower than 
those of their male colleagues. But in 1973 the difference in absolute terms 
had also been roughly 4 DKR - corresponding to 15 per cent. 
In brief, wage rates for unskilled female workers have increased more than 
average wage rates, while those of skilled (male) workers have increased less. 
Rates of unskilled male workers show rates of increase roughly corresponding 
to those of overall average wages. 
59. This pattern of increase of money wages partly reflects the outcome of 
the biennial wage negotiations in the Spring of 1975 and 1977. Without going 
into details it might be worth mentioning that neither of these negotiations 
were carried through in accordance with the principle of free collective bar-
gaining. 
In 1975, the trade unions and the employers' union could not agree at all. 
According to Danish legislation, the official arbitrator (mentioned in chapter 
IX) is only allowed to act if the delegations of the negotiating parties are 
willing to recommend his proposal. Nevertheless, in early 1975 the arbitrator 
presented a draft proposal, on which both parts disagreed 'to the same ex-
tent'. Such a draft proposal was hardly in complete accordance with the law 
on the official arbitrator,
1 but it provided an urgently needed basis on 
which parliament could act, and the draft was actually turned into law. It is, 
however, unlikely that this procedure will be used again in the immediate fu-
ture. 
In the autumn of 1976, it was again realized that parliament might be in need 
of a basis on which to act, if such action became necessary in the spring of 
1977. In order to cope with this possibility, a majority in parliament agreed 
on guidelines aimed at keeping the increase in money incomes down to 6 per 
cent per year from the spring of 1977 onwards. However, in early 1977 the of-
ficial arbitrator actually succeeded in finding support from both parties for 
a proposal, although the resulting increase in total money wage rates would 
probably exceed 6 per cent per year. Subsequently, the proposal was accepted 
by the members of the trade unions - but rejected by the members of the em-
ployers' union. However, the proposal was put into effect by parliament -
and the employers' union elected a new chairman. 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
60. As will be recalled from table IX.4, the share of wages, in total net 
domestic product followed a rising trend from the early 1960s onwards. This 
trend has continued from 1973 onwards (cf. table XI.33), and has been in ex-
cess of 70 per cent since 1974. Short-term fluctuations mainly reflect gener-
al business conditions. Thus the increase in the share of 'other income' in 
1976 probably reflects the 1976 upswing. 
Cf. Svend Auken and Jacob Α. Buksti, 'Den indkomstpolitiske problematik i 
Danmark', Økonomi og Politik 1975, pp. 241-73 and pp. 268 in particular. - 239 -
Table XI.33 
The functional income distribution 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Share of 
Wages 
67.2 
71.1 
73.1 
72.4 
Other incomes 
32.8 
28.9 
26.9 
27.6 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Net domestic 
product, 
DKR 1 000 
million, 
current prices 
131.2 
147.3 
162.5 
186.3 
Note: For earlier years, see table IX.4. Figures for 1977 are not yet availa-
ble. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. 
61. Data on life wages on a comparable basis to that used in table ϊλ.6 are 
only available for 1975. The appropriate figures are presented in table XI.34 
which, furthermore, includes additional groups of wage earners. These figures 
suggest that, even in 1975, the pattern of relative wages had already res­
ponded to the change in the general economic climate. The main conclusions 
may be summarized as follows: the tendency for wages of female workers to in­
crease comparatively fast continued from 1970 to 1975 (cf. the figure for 
the female textile worker). However, while the female clerk in government en­
joyed higher wage increases than her colleague in the private sector between 
1960 and 197Ü, this situation was reversed between 1970 and 1975. 
The suggested change of pattern between government and private workers is 
confirmed by the figures for government employees with a university education, 
i.e. the high school teacher and the civil servant with a degree in law or in 
economics. While the percentage wage increases of these groups were among the 
highest between 1960 and 1970, they were below average in 'the perioa 19/0 to 
1975. It was only from 1975 onwards that wage rates in the government sector 
were really kept down. 
Finally, wages for metal workers (balance of payments industries) and brick-
layers (domestic industries) might be compared. In both fields, wages of un-
skilled workers have increased comparatively faster than those of their 
skilled colleagues, as already noted from table XI.32. But the most inter-
esting finding is perhaps that while wages of bricklayers increased faster than 
those of metal workers during the 1960s, when the balance of payments indus-
trias were on the defensive and residential investment was booming, the oppo-
site pattern emerges between 1970 and 1975 when the building and construction 
industries experienced a slump. - 240 
Table XI.34 
.ile wages for selected types of wage earners 
Female worker, textiles 
Female clerk, private 
Female clerk, government 
Metal worker, unskilled 
Metal worker, skilled 
Bricklayer, unskilled 
Bricklayer, skilled 
High school teacher 
Economist, civil serv. 
1960, 
DKR million 
0.510 
0.618 
0.721 
0.741 
0.864 
0.961 
1.078 
1.284 
1.307 
1970, 
1960 = 100 
277 
259 
271 
243 
239 
267 
253 
306 
293 
1975, 
1970 = 100 
205 
188 
181 
199 
195 
162 
153 
162 
170 
Note: For concepts, see table IX.6. 
Sources: Det økonomiske Råd, Dansk økonomi foråret 1972, p. 70, and Dansk 
økonomi maj 1977. 
Table XI.35 
Main items on current account of the balance of payments, current prices 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Goods and services 
Exports 
53.0 
66.3 
69.9 
77.8 
86.4 
Imports 
55.9 
71.0 
71.1 
88.2 
95.2 
Export 
surplus 
- 2.9 
- 4.9 
- 1.2 
-10.4 
- 8.8 
(DKR 
Interest 
payments, 
transfers 
etc. 
0.1 
- 0.7 
- 1.8 
- 1.2 
- 1.1 
1 000 million) 
Balance of 
payments, 
current 
account 
- 2.8 
- 5.6 
- 3.0 
-11.6 
- 9.9 
Note: For concepts, see table X.l. Note that the figures in the first three 
columns, taken from national accounts statistics, are consistent with 
figures in appendix table 1.2. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. - 241 
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, SUMMARY 
62. As seen in table XI.8, the balance of payments deficit has persisted 
since 1973, and reached a record in 1976 (cf. table XI.35). This was mainly 
due to a substantial increase in imports which turn partly reflected a turn-
round from negative to positive stockbuilding between 1975 and 1976 (cf. ta-
ble XI. 11). However, in 1977 imports continued to increase, in spite of the 
fact that the rate of stockbuilding slowed down. 
Net foreign transfer payments added to the balance of payments deficit during 
the years 1974-1977. Higher interest payments on the Danish foreign debt (and 
growing transfers to developing countries) exceeded the increasing amounts 
received from EEC, mainly in form of EAGGF payments. 
EXPORTS 
63. The composition of exports by commodity groups at current prices is 
shown in table XI.36. The share of agricultural exports continued to decline 
from 1973 onwards. In particular, the share of exports of bacon etc. in to-
tal experts was reduced from 9 per cent in 1973 to 6 per cent in 1977. The 
pattern of exports of industrial products by commodity groups remained rath-
er stable. 
64. Trends in the markets for exports are illustrated in tables XI.37 and 
XI.38 for agricultural and industrial products respectively. The figures in 
table XI.37 are fully comparable with those in table X.4. 
The share of agricultural exports sold to other EEC countries remained at 
around 80 per cent. However, the German market became of increasing importance, 
while the opposite was true for the British - the latter reflecting the de-
clining share of exports of bacon. EFTA-countries continued to purchase 6-8 
per cent of total agricultural exports. The increasing share of 'other coun-
tries' is partly due to the establishment of new markets in some of the more 
well-off developing countries. 
Markets for manufactured goods are shown in table XI.38. The table is roughly 
comparable with table X.5, but the 1977 figures are preliminary. Sweden has 
remained the most important export market but the share of Norway has increased 
slightly. The share of EEC countries remained around 35 per cent, but the Brit-
ish market has declined in importance. 
IMPORTS 
65. According to table IX.39, the composition of total imports remained 
rather stable from 1973 to 1977. Still, the decline of fixed business invest-
ment from 1973 to 1975 is reflected in some of the figures, e.g. imports of 
metals and machines. But the obvious exception to the pattern of stability 
is, of course, to be found in imports of fuel. The share of fuel in total im-Table XI.36 
Exports by commodities 
Beef and cattle 
Bacon and pigs 
Butter and cheese 
Canned food 
Other anim. prod. 
Vegetab. prod. 
AGRIC. EXP., TOTAL 
Food, beverages, etc. 
Machines, instruments etc. 
Other metal prod. 
Chemical prod. 
Textiles and clothing 
Furniture 
Fuel and lubricants, excl. crude oil 
Other industrial prod. 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, TOTAL 
New ships 
Second-hand ships, etc. 
Fish 
Other prod. incl. furs 
TOTAL EXPORTS 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
1.25 
3.23 
1.40 
2.29 
1.04 
1.12 
10.33 
0.72 
7.92 
1.93 
2.31 
2.05 
0.90 
0.71 
5.56 
22.10 
0.74 
1.16 
1.49 
1.00 
36.82 
per 
cent 
3 
9 
4 
6 
3 
3 
28 
2 
22 
5 
6 
6 
2 
2 
15 
60 
2 
3 
4 
3 
100 
1974 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
1.34 
3.22 
1.89 
2.31 
1.13 
1.70 
11.59 
1.04 
10.67 
2.70 
3.39 
2.39 
1.03 
1.64 
7.74 
30.60 
1.34 
0.68 
1.62 
1.09 
46.92 
per 
cent 
3 
7 
4 
5 
2 
4 
25 
2 
23 
6 
7 
5 
2 
4 
16 
65 
3 
2 
3 
2 
100 
1975 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
1.88 
4.08 
2.23 
2.08 
1.06 
1.89 
13.22 
1.03 
11.32 
2.87 
3.36 
2.40 
0.99 
1.54 
7.47 
30.98 
1.64 
1.36 
1.70 
1.13 
50.03 
per 
cent 
4 
8 
4 
4 
2 
4 
26 
2 
23 
6 
7 
5 
2 
3 
14 
62 
3 
3 
3 
3 
100 
(Current prices) 
1976 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
1.54 
4.00 
2.45 
2.51 
1.17 
1.94 
13.61 
1.06 
12.76 
3.36 
3.85 
2.76 
1.21 
1.83 
8.90 
35.73 
1.55 
0.87 
1.91 
1.36 
55.03 
per 
cent 
3 
7 
4 
5 
2 
4 
25 
2 
23 
6 
7 
5 
2 
4 
16 
65 
3 
2 
3 
2 
100 
1977 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
2.00 
3.85 
2.59 
2.71 
1.33 
2.11 
14.59 
1.21 
13.81 
4.04 
4.42 
2.91 
1.38 
1.61 
10.26 
39.64 
1.38 
0.82 
2.31 
1.70 
60.44 
per 
cent 
3 
6 
4 
5 
2 
4 
24 
2 
23 
7 
7 
5 
2 
3 
17 
66 
2 
1 
4 
3 
100 
KJ 
Note: Definitions differ in certain respects from those in table X.3. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978. Table XI.37 
Agricultural exports by markets 
U.K. 
Fed. Rep. Germany 
Italy 
Other EEC-countries 
Fini., Norway, Sweden 
Other EFTA-countries 
U.S. 
Other countries 
TOTAL 
1973 
1 000 
mill. 
DKR 
3.00 
0.90 
1.25 
0.36 
0.35 
0.16 
0.22 
0.68 
6.92 
per 
cent 
44 
13 
18 
5 
5 
2 
3 
10 
100 
1974 
1 000 
mill. 
DKR 
3.52 
1.07 
1.09 
0.29 
0.42 
0.12 
0.24 
0.79 
7.54 
per 
cent 
47 
14 
14 
4 
6 
2 
3 
10 
100 
1975 
1 000 
mill. 
DKR 
4.14 
1.31 
1.62 
0.35 
0.47 
0.07 
0.17 
1.08 
9.21 
per 
cent 
45 
14 
18 
4 
5 
1 
2 
11 
100 
1976 
1 000 
mill. 
DKR 
3.85 
1.47 
1.40 
0.46 
0.52 
0.06 
0.19 
1.16 
9.11 
per 
cent 
42 
16 
15 
5 
6 
1 
2 
13 
100 
Current prices) 
1977 
1 000 
mill. 
DKR 
per 
cent 
3.50 36 
1.75 18 
1.77 18 
0.57 6 
0.47 5 
0.06 1 
0.19 2 
1.40 14 
9.71 100 
Note: For concepts and earlier years, see table X.4. 
Source: Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk Oversigt, December 1977, and supplementary information from Det 
økonomiske Sekretariat. 
ω Table XI.38 
Exports of manufactured goods by markets 
Sweden 
Norway 
U.K. 
Fed. Rep. Germany 
Other EEC-countries 
Other European countries 
U.S. and Canada 
Other countries 
TOTAL 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
per 
cent 
3.39 18 
1.81 9 
2.47 13 
2.39 13 
2.27 12 
2.29 12 
1.27 7 
3.04 16 
18.93 100 
1974 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
per 
cent 
4.54 18 
2.22 9 
2.72 11 
2.90 12 
3.16 13 
3.04 12 
1.57 6 
4.73 19 
24.88 100 
1975 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
per 
cent 
4.87 19 
2.43 10 
2.37 9 
3.14 12 
2.97 12 
2.71 11 
1.61 6 
5.41 21 
25.51 100 
1976 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
per 
cent 
5.57 19 
2.83 10 
2.46 8 
3.95 14 
3.82 13 
2.88 10 
1.90 7 
5.63 19 
29.04 100 
Current prices) 
1977 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
per 
cent 
5.61 18 
3.37 11 
2.73 8 
4.69 15 
4.31 13 
3.37 10 
1.98 6 
6.08 19 
32.14 100 
Note: For concepts and earlier years, see table X.5. 
Source: Det økonomiske Sekretariat, Økonomisk Oversigt December 1977, and supplementary information from Det 
økonomiske Sekretariat. 
ru Table XI.39 
Imports by commodity groups 
Raw materials-agriculture 
Fuel and energy 
Iron and metals 
Chemical prod., excl. fertilizers 
Other raw materials and semi-manufacture 
producs 
Machines, instruments, etc. 
Vehicles, ships and aircrafts 
Manufacture goods for consumption 
Food, beverages, etc. 
Other goods 
TOTAL IMPORTS 
Total imports as per cent of NDP 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
2.17 
4.76 
3.83 
3.72 
4.59 
8.69 
4.85 
4.89 
2.21 
7.02 
46.73 
per 
cent 
5 
10 
8 
8 
10 
19 
10 
10 
5 
15 
100 
35.5 
1974 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
2.72 
11.12 
5.11 
5.43 
5.67 
10.13 
4.42 
5.51 
2.14 
8.23 
60.48 
per 
cent 
5 
18 
8 
9 
9 
17 
7 
9 
4 
14 
100 
41.1 
1975 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
2.54 
10.62 
3.92 
5.02 
4.99 
10.19 
6.20 
5.53 
2.30 
8.40 
59.71 
per 
cent 
4 
18 
7 
9 
8 
17 
10 
9 
4 
14 
100 
36.7 
(current 
1976 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
3.22 
11.75 
5.00 
5.85 
6.25 
12.75 
8.50 
7.44 
3.16 
11.09 
75.01 
per 
cent 
4 
16 
7 
8 
8 
17 
11 
10 
4 
15 
100 
40.3 
prices 
1977 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
3.84 
12.70 
4.76 
6.23 
6.66 
13.49 
7.84 
7.80 
4.02 
12.30 
79.64 
per 
cent 
5 
16 
6 
8 
8 
17 
10 
10 
5 
15 
100 
39.1 
Note: Concepts and definitions have been 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk ti 
INJ 
t* 
αϊ 
changed substantially as compared with table X.6. 
årsoversigt 1978. 246 -
ports increased from 10 per cent in 1973 to no less than 18 per cent in 1974. 
In 1973, 95 per cent of fuel imports consisted of oil etc. Gradually, imports 
of coal etc. has provided an increasing share of total fuel imports. However, 
in 1977 coal imports only amounted to slightly below 10 per cent of total 
fuel imports. 
PRICES IN FOREIGN TRADE 
66. Because of the Jominating role of oil in Danish fuel imports - added to 
the fact that no domestic sources of fuel have been available until recently 
- fuel prices trebled between 1973 and 1974, causing the terms of trade to 
deteriorate by more than 10 per cent (cf. table XI.40), before they subsequent-
ly stabilized. When the figures in table XI.40 are compared with similar fig-
ures in table X.7, covering the period up to 1973, it should be recalled that 
improved agricultural prices due to membership of EEC are not reflected in 
the index of export prices. If adjustments are made to include EAGGF payments 
as representing increased prices of agricultural exports, the resulting pic-
ture is one where the terms of trade during the mid-1970s were roughly at the 
same level as during the late 1960s. 
Table XI.40 
Prices in foreign trade, including terms of trade 
Index 1960 = 100 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
GDP 
deflator 
224 
252 
287 
313 
335 
Implicit deflators, 
goods and services 
Exports 
154 
183 
198 
213 
227 
Imports  Terms 
of trade 
145 106 
193 95 
202 98 
216 99 
236 96 
Forei 
Exports 
148 
174 
191 
204 
217 
gn trade, 
Imports 
139 
188 
197 
210 
229 
goods 
Terms 
of trade 
106 
93 
97 
97 
95 
Note: For earlier years, see table X.7. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and supplementary 
information from Danmarks Statistik. 
SERVICES AND TRANSFERS 
67. On the services account of the balance of payments, quite substantial 
net receipts have usually contributed to reducing the deficit on the balance - 247 -
Table XI.41 
The balance of payments 
Imports, cif 
Exports, fob 
BALANCE OF TRADE 
Services, net receipts 
Foreign shipping 
Tourism 
Other services 
GOODS AND SERVICES, NET 
Transfers, etc., net receipts 
Interest payments etc. 
EEC 
Unilateral transfers etc. 
CURRENT ACCOUNTS, NET 
Net increase of foreign debt 
Private non-bank sector 
Government sector 
Monetary sector 
TOTAL 
(DKR 1 000 
1973 
46.73 
36.82 
- 9.91 
+ 4.15 
+ 0.48 
+ 2.02 
- 3.26 
- 0.96 
+ 2.02 
- 0.62 
- 2.82 
4.44 
0.42 
- 2.04 
2.82 
1974 
60.48 
46.92 
-13.56 
+ 5.09 
+ 0.72 
+ 2.71 
- 5.04 
- 1.46 
+ 1.77 
- 0.83 
- 5.56 
4.16 
0.61 
0.79 
5.56 
million, 
1975 
59.71 
50.03 
- 9.68 
+ 4.55 
+ 0.57 
+ 2.96 
- 1.60 
- 1.87 
+ 1.43 
- 1.01 
- 3.05 
0.14 
0.87 
2.04 
3.05 
current 
1976 
75.01 
55.03 
-19.98 
+ 5.19 
+ 0.33 
+ 3.76 
-10.70 
- 2.18 
+ 2.50 
- 1.19 
-11.57 
1.77 
10.13 
- 0.33 
11.57 
prices) 
1977 
79.64 
60.44 
-19.20 
+ 6.20 
- 0.01 
+ 4.07 
- 8.94 
- 3.24 
+ 3.45 
- 1.15 
- 9.88 
7.31 
8.38 
- 5.81 
9.88 
Note: For concepts, see table X.8. 
Source: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978. 
of trade, and this pattern has continued in the period since 1973. However, 
net receipts from foreign shipping were adversely affected by a sluggish 
freight market. Net receipts from tourism have declined; in 1977 they were 
negative for the first time since the early 1950s. However, net receipts from 
other services have increased. 
In this connection it should be recalled that imports are indicated cif in 
table X.8 as well as in table XI.41. This presentation affects the size of 
net receipts from services (cf. comments in chapter X). Table XI.42 
Net foreign debt, end of years 
Balance of payments, 
curr. ace. net 
Net foreign position 
of which: 
Government sector 
Private non-bank sector 
Monetary sector 
Composition of net assets 
of the monetary sector: 
Holdings by the central bank 
Net IMF position 
Holdings by private banks 
1973 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
- 2.82 
-18.72 
-10.11 
-16.84 
8.23 
6.24 
1.80 
0.19 
per 
cent 
NNI 
2 
14 
8 
13 
7 
1974 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
- 5.56 
-23.72 
-10.55 
-20.62 
7.45 
3.96 
1.14 
2.35 
per 
cent 
NNI 
4 
16 
7 
14 
5 
1975 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
-3.05 
-26.82 
-12.01 
-20.90 
6.09 
4.21 
1.04 
0.84 
per 
cent 
NNI 
2 
17 
8 
13 
4 
1976 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
-11.57 
-38.50 
-21.90 
-23.17 
6.57 
3.55 
1.00 
2.02 
"per 
cent 
NNI 
6 
21 
12 
13 
4 
1977 
DKR 
1 000 
mill. 
-9.88 
-48
a 
-30
a 
-30
a 
12.57 
8.18 
1.19 
3.20 
per 
cent 
NNI 
5 
24 
15 
15 
6 
Preliminary figures. 
Including gold valued at about DKR 500 million. 
c 
Reserve position and SDR's. 
Sources: Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk tiårsoversigt 1978 and Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review, February 
1979. 
iv. 
.C 
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68. Among the transfer items, unilateral transfers to developing countries 
showed a slow, but rather steady increase. Gross receipts from the EEC, mainly 
representing EAGGF payments, gradually increased from DKR 2 400 million in 
1973 to DKR 5 300 million in 1977.. However, the Danish contribution to the 
EEC increased as well, from less than DKR 500 million in 1973, to DKR 1 800 
million in 1977. Interest payments on the increasing foreign debt, which 
amounted to under DKR 1 000 million in 1973, rose to over DKR 3 000 million 
in 1977. 
THE NET FOREIGN DEBT 
69. According to the bottom part of table XI.41, most of the balance of pay-
ments deficit in 1974 was financed by borrowing by the private non-bank sector, 
while the comparatively small 1975 deficit was met by reduced foreign exchange 
holdings. However, when it was realized that substantial deficits would occur 
in 1976 and 1977, the government started to borrow abroad on a large scale. 
During these two years, net government borrowing was almost equal to the bal-
ance of payments deficits. 
70. The balance of payments deficit varied from the equivalent of 2 per cent 
of net national income
1 in 1973 to 6 per cent of NNI in 1976 (cf. table XI.42). 
In 1973, total net foreign debt amounted to DKR 18 700 million or 14 per cent 
of NNI, but had increased to nearly DKR 50 000 million or to 24 per cent of 
NNI by the end of 1977. 
Due to heavy foreign borrowing in 1976 and 1977, the net debt of the govern-
ment sector increased from DKR 10 000 million in 1973 to DKR 30 000 million 
in 1977. These figures are somewhat larger than the figures of the net foreign 
debt of central government shown above in connection with the question of fi-
nancing net expenditure of thé central government. The difference is explained 
by foreign borrowing by local authorities and other government agencies. 
The private non-bank sector increased its net foreign debt during 1974 by 
DKR 4 000 million. In 1975, the net debt remained stable at DKR 20 000 mil-
lion, but in 1976 and in 1977 the foreign debt of the private sector increased 
again. This development partly reflected aims of monetary policy. Ceilings on 
borrowing at home and high domestic interest rates induced the private sector 
to borrow abroad. However, as a per cent of NNI, the foreign debt of the pri-
vate sector only increased moderately between 1973 and 1977. 
71. As a result of these pattern of behaviour, net foreign exchange holdings 
of the banking sector, remained at around DKR 6 000-8 000 million during the 
years 1973-75, but had increased to more than DKR 12 000 million by the end 
of 1977, corresponding to 6 per cent of NNI. Such comparatively large foreign 
exchange holdings imply a significant interest payment burden but this price 
is probably worth paying, because they contribute to calmer conditions on 
foreign exchange markets. 
It should be recalled that NNI is measured at current prices at factor cost. 250 
THE EXCHANGE RATE 
72. As was described in the final part of chapter X, Denmark joined the mon-
etary system know as the 'snake' in 1972-73, and has remained a member of the 
'snake family' ever since. Therefore, the Danish krone has been rather closely 
linked to the Deutsche mark. If these links had been very tight, i.e. if the 
Danish krone/Deutsche mark rate had remained stable, obvious problems would 
have arisen because the Danish rates of price and wage inflation have certain-
ly exceeded rates in the Federal Republic. 
This problem has been handled by occasional, but minor, adjustments of the 
exchange rate of the Deutsche mark in terms of Danish kroner. In November 
1976, the rate was increased by 6 per cent, in April 1977 by 3 per cent and 
in August 1977 by an additional 5 per cent. These adjustments are shown in 
table XI.43. 
Table XI.43 
Danish foreign exchange rates 
Kroner per unit: 
U.S. dollar 
Pound sterling 
Sweden krone 
Norwegian krone 
Deutsche mark 
Index of 'effective exchange rate' 
of krone, end of 1972 = 100: 
Reciprocal of 'effective exchange 
rate': 
Value (kroner per unit) of: 
SDR 
EUA 
End of year 
1973 
6.29 
14.60 
1.37 
1.10 
2.33 
102.4 
97.6 
-
-
1974 
5.65 
13.29 
1.39 
1.09 
2.35 
104.8 
95.4 
6.92 
-
1975 
6.18 
12.51 
1.40 
1.11 
2.36 
104.3 
95.9 
7.23 
7.20 
1976 
5.79 
9.86 
1.40 
1.12 
2.45 
111.6 
89.6 
6.72 
6.54 
1977 
5.78 
11.02 
1.24 
1.13 
2.75 
107.5 
93.1 
7.02 
7.08 
Note: For earlier years, see table X.10. Concepts in the lower part of the 
table are explained in the text. 
Source : Danmarks Nationalbank, Beretning og regnskab, various years. 251 
Whenever these adjustments occurred the exchange rate to be used in connection 
with the Common Agricultural Policy was adjusted accordingly. The implication 
of the policies of EEC member countries in this field has been that, in terms 
of industrial goods, Danish famers receive lower prices than their German 
colleagues, whilst food prices are cheaper in Denmark than in the Federal Re-
public. The opposite holds for comparisons between the United Kingdom and 
Denmark. 
73. While the Danish krone has been devalued in terms of Deutsche mark, it 
has appreciated vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and sterling (cf. table XI.43). The 
table clearly illustrates the effects of a system of floating exchange rates. 
Within such a system, the question of whether, on balance, the krone has 
been devalued or revalued, cannont be answered in an unambiguous way. The an-
swer must somehow be based on the average price of a 'basket of foreign cur-
rencies'. If this basket is weighted in accordance with the composition of 
Danish foreign trade, the 'effective exchange rate' is obtained. According to 
table XI.43, this yardstick indicates that the value of the krone has increased 
by 7 per cent from the end of 1972 to the end of 1977 - and by 3 per cent from 
the end of 1975 to the end of 1977. During the latter period, the price of an 
SDR unit declined by 3 per cent, whereas the price of a European Unit of Ac-
count declined by slightly less than 2 per cent. 
74. At first sight, these results may be surprising, recalling the substan-
tial balance of payments deficits of 1976 and 1977. However, several factors 
should be kept in mind, of which the most important might - at the risk of 
some repetition as compared with the final part of chapter X - be summarized 
as follows: 
Firstly, many people fear that the advantages to be obtained by the balance 
of payments industries from a substantial devaluation of the krone will be 
offset by subsequent increases in wages and prices, at least as long as the 
escalators clause is retained in connection with the fixing of wage rates. 
This in turn will create additional problems, because it will be difficult to 
lower interest rates. Furthermore, the redistribution effects, between those 
who hold financial assets and those who hold real assets financed by loans, 
may give rise to new social and political tensions. 
Finally, in an international context, competing devaluations by different 
countries represent as much a 'beggar-your-neighbour' policy as did the pol-
icies of quantitative restrictions of the 1930s. Appendix table XI.1 
The monetary base 
(DKR 1 000 million, current prices) 
End of 
1973  1974  End of 
1974  1975  End of 
1975  1976  End of 
1976  1977  End of 
1977 
(1) Notes, Post Giro etc. 
(2) Deposits in central bank 
(3) Net foreign ass. of private 
banks 
(4) Total monetary base 
of which held: 
(5) by private banks 
(6) outside banks 
Changes explained by: 
(7) Balance of payments, current 
account 
(8) Net foreign capital inflows 
(9a) Central government domestic 
deficit 
(9b) Central govern., net bond sales 
(10) Central bank, incr. bond hold-
ings 
(11) Central bank, incr. lending 
(12a) Private banks, tied depos. in 
central bank 
(12b) Other factors 
10.4 + 0.3 
0.5 - 0.3 
1.2 + 2.2 
10.7 
0.2 
3.4 
+ 1.7 
- 0.1 
- 1.3 
12.4 + 0.7 
0.1 + 0.0 
2.1 + 1.4 
13.1 
0.1 
+ 1.6 
+ 0.0 
3.5 + 1.6 
12.1 + 2.2 14.3 + 0.3 14.6 + 2.1 16.7 + 3.2 
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
w 
5.8 
4.9 
0.6 
CO 
2.6 
0.2 
0.0 
0.3 
- 2.9 
+ 1.3 
+10.8 
- 5.8 
+ 1.5 
- 2.7 
- 3.2 
+ 1.3 
-11.6 
+ 1.9 
+10.0 
- 5.9 
+ 5.6 
+ 0.9 
+ 0.2 
+ 1.0 
-
+ 
+ 
-
_ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
9 
6 
LI 
9 
1 
2 
3 
1 
9 
7 
1 
8 
7 
5 
0 
3 
14.7 
0.1 
5.1 
19.9 
3.4 
8.7 
+ 2.0 
+ 0.2 
5.4 
8.9 
- 1.6 
+ 1.9 
3.8 
10.8 
+ 1.4 
+ 0.7 
5.2 
11.5 
+ 1.6 
+ 1.6 
6.8 
13.1 
rv 
(Jl 
IV 
Source notes follow the tables. Appendix table XI.2 
The money stock 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
Chang 
(16) 
(17) 
(18a) 
(18b) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
Monetary base held outside banks 
Deposits, incl. time deposits 
Total money stock 
es explained by: 
Balance of payments, current 
account 
Net foreign capital import 
Central government domestic 
deficit 
Central government, net bond 
sales 
Central bank,incr. bond holdings 
Private banks, incr. bond hold­
ings 
Private banks, incr. lending 
Other factors 
End of 
1973 
8 
71 
79 
7 
0 
7 
1974 
+ 0.2 
+ 6.9 
+ 7.1 
- 5.8 
+ 4.9 
+ 0.6 
0.0 
+ 2.6 
+ 1.7 
+ 4.4 
- 1.3 
End of 
1974 
8 
77 
86 
9 
9 
8 
1975 
+ 1.9 
+19.8 
+21.7 
- 2.9 
+ 1.3 
+10.8 
- 5.8 
+ 1..5 
+15.3 
+ 1.8 
- 0.3 
(DKR 1 000 
End of 
1975 
10 
97 
108 
8 
7 
5 
1976 
+ 0.7 
+11.7 
+12.4 
-11.6 
+ 1.9 
+10.0 
- 5.9 
+ 5.6 
+ 1.5 
+11.5 
- 0.6 
million, 
End of 
1976 
11 
109 
120 
5 
4 
9 
current 
1977 
+ 1.6 
+10.3 
+11.9 
- 9.9 
+ 6.7 
+11.1 
- 9.8 
- 1.7 
+ 5.2 
+ 9.4 
+ 0.9 
prices) 
End of 
1977 
13.1 
119.7 
132.8 
ro 
en 
ω 
Source notes follow the tables. Appendix table XI.3 
Balance sheets of private banks 
Asset 
(23) 
(24) 
(25a) 
(25b) 
(26) 
Liabi 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
s : 
Monetary base held by banks 
Private banks, incr. lending 
Private banks, incr. bond 
holdings 
Private banks, increase of 
tied deposits in central bank 
Assets = liabilities 
lities: 
Deposits, incl. time deposits 
Borrowing from central bank 
Other accounts, net 
End of 
1973 
3.4 
62.4 
13.2 
0.0 
79.0 
71.0 
3.8 
4.2 
1974 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
2.0 
4.4 
1.7 
0.0 
8.1 
6.9 
0.2 
1.0 
End of 
1974 
b.4 
66.8 
14.9 
0.0 
87.1 
77.9 
4.0 
5.2 
1975 
- 1.6 
+ 1.8 
+15.3 
+ 3.2 
+18.7 
+19.8 
- 2.7 
+ 1.6 
(DKR 1 000 
End of 
1975 
3.8 
68.6 
30.2 
3.2 
105.8 
97.7 
1.3 
6.8 
1976 
+ 1.4 
+11.5 
+ 1.5 
- 0.2 
+14.2 
+ 11.7 
+ 0.9 
+ 1.6 
million, 
End of 
1976 
5.2 
80.1 
31.7 
3.0 
120.0 
109.4 
2.2 
8.4 
current 
1977 
+ 1.6 
+ 9.4 
+ 5.2 
- 3.0 
+13.2 
+10.3 
+ 2.5 
+ 0.4 
prices) 
End of 
1977 
6.8 
89.5 
36.9 
0.0 
133.2 
119.7 
4.7 
8.8 
Source notes follow the tables. - 255 
Sources to appendix tables XI.1 - XI.3 
A. Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review November 1978. 
B. Danmarks Nationalbank, Beretning og regnskab 1975, pp. 66-67 (figures for 
1974) and Beretning og regnskab 1977, pp. 60-61 and 65 (figures for 1975-
77). 
Appendix table XI.1 
Rows (l)-(6): Source A, p.26. 
Rows (7)-(9): Source B. 
Rows (10)-(12a): Source A, p. 27. 
Row (12b): Residual. 
Appendix table XI.2 
Row (13) = (6) 
Rows (14)-(15): Source A, p. 
Rows (16)-(19) = (7)-(10). 
Row (20): Source A, p. 32. 
Row (21): Source B. 
Row (22): Residual. 
28. 
Appendix table XI.3 
Row (23) = (5). 
Row (24) = (21). End-1973 figure from appendix table VIII.3. 
Row (25a) = (20). End-1973 figure from appendix table VIII.3. 
Row (25b) = (12a). 
Row (26) = (23) + (24)' + (25). 
Row (27) = (14). 
Row (28) = (11). End-1973 figure from appendix table VIII.3. 
Row (29): Residual. Studies 
published to date in the series 'Economic and Financial' 
8075*-No 1 
Electricity prices in the countries of the EEC 
1962, 106 pp. (DE,FR,IT,NL). UKL 1.30; USD 3.60; BFR 180. 
8125* - No 2 
Government revenue and expenditure in the EEC countries 1965 
1965, 306 pp. (DE,FR,IT,NL). UKL 1.62
1/2; USD 4.50; BFR 225. 
8133* - No 3 
Natural gas in the European Economic Community: problems and outlook 
1965, 72 pp. (DE,FR,IT,NL). 62'/2p; USD 1.70; BFR 85. 
8157* - 'No 4 
Economic influence of the energy prices 
1966, 145 pp. (DE,FR,IT,NL). 87y2p; USD 2.40; BFR 120. 
8179* - No 5 
Study for the promotion of an industrial development pole in southern Italy 
(Vols. I and II) 
1966, Vol. I: 220 pp.; Vol. II: 690 pp. (DE,EN,FR,IT,NL). UKL 5.75; USD 16.00; 
BFR 800. 
8219* - No 6 
The productivity of capital in 21 industries in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
1950-1975 
1968, 132 pp. (DE.FR). UKL 2.07
1/2; USD 5.00; BFR 250. 
8249* - No 7 
Report on the contribution of pension funds to the capital markets of the EEC 
1968, 70 pp. (DE,EN,FR,IT,NL). UKL 1.00; USD 2.40; BFR 120. 
8291* - No 8 
Development of public finance in the Member States of the European Commu-
nities 
1970, 262 pp. (DE,FR,IT,NL). UKL 1.85; USD 50; BFR 225. 
8461 - No 9 
The United Kingdom economy 
1974, 156 pp. (EN). UKL 2.00; BFR 180. 
1 The abbreviations after each title indicate the languages in which the documents have been published: DA = Danish, DE = German, 
EN = English. FR = French, IT = Italian, NL = Dutch. 8462-No 10 
The Irish economy 
1975, 168 pp. (EN). UKL 2.20; BFR 200. 
8713 - No 11 
The Trend of Public Finance in the Member States of the Community from 1966 
to 1970 
1976, 238 pp. (DE.EN.FR). UKL 2.75; USD 6.50; BFR 225. 
8854 - No 12 
The impact of Rising Prices on Taxation and Social Security Contributions in the 
European Community 
1976, 76 pp. (DE.EN.FR). UKL 1.20; USD 2; BFR 75. 
CB-NI-77-A13-EN-C - No A13 
Report of the study group on the role of public finance in European integration 
Volume I: General Report 
1977, 76 pp. (DA,DE,EN,FR,IT,NL). UKL 2.40; USD 4.20; BFR 150. 
CB-NI-77-B13-EN-C - No B13 
Report of the study group on the role of public finance in European integration 
Volume II: Individual contributions and working papers 
1977, 518 pp. (DE,EN,FR). UKL 7; USD 12.50; BFR 450. European Communities — Commission 
The Danish economy 
by Anders Ølgaard 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
1980 - 255 pp., num. tab. - 17.6 χ 25 cm 
Collection studies: Economic and Financial Series — 1980 — 14 
EN 
ISBN 92-825-0494-8 
Catalogue number: CB-NI-79-014-EN-C 
BFR 420 DKR 81 DM 26 FF 60,60 IRL 7 
LIT 12000 HFL 28,60 UKL 6.50 USD 15 
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